How South African mainstream media fuels xenophobia

Displaced African migrant workers seek refuge at a warehouse, turned into a shelter by a group of volunteers to house migrant workers who fled Israeli bombardment in southern Lebanon. June 20 marked World Refugee Day.
Anthony Kambi Masha
Foreigners, especially refugees in South Africa, face numerous challenges, including language barriers, discrimination, xenophobia, and financial difficulties. The perception of refugees is often negative, even when the host country benefits from them. Access to public resources is increasingly tied to citizenship and ethnicity, contributing to marginalisation.
Refugees lack the power and voice to overcome these boundaries of exclusion and belonging, which hinder their full contribution to economic growth and development.
Refugees face language barriers, discrimination, xenophobia, and financial issues. All South African cities have discourse exclusionary practices like name-calling, discrimination, prejudice, and outright violence and intimidation, but Greater Johannesburg has the most anti-refugee xenophobia.
Today, there is a dizzying array of labels to describe those who cross an international border. Humiliating and derogatory name-calling such as makwerekwere, amagrigamba, and amaGhana constitutes a form of bullying and classifies xenophobia towards refugees. Other names are alien and mkeres mooo, meaning an intruder.
In isiZulu, refugees are referred to as abokufika, which means people who came from elsewhere. While such a designation may not necessarily be underpinned by malicious intentions, it classifies refugees as outsiders who do not belong to their adopted communities.
A study of YouTube videos featuring reports of xenophobic incidents in South Africa shows that discourse on xenophobia is based on the us/them dichotomy, emphasising the positive traits of the ingroup and the negative traits of the outgroup (refugees).
The media's role in xenophobic behaviour, including discrimination and violence against refugees, is a complex issue. Traditional media still dominates as a source of news and knowledge about refugees in South Africa, with the internet and social media trailing in terms of public trust in information about refugees. The distribution of the public across different forms of media may reflect the wide reach of radio and television across rural and urban areas.
The media's reportage of immigration has possibly exacerbated tensions between native South Africans and African migrants in the country. The media's agenda-setting function influences consumer thoughts about refugees, but it does not necessarily control how they think about these things.
It plays a huge role in spreading hostility towards refugees, with the deployment of predominantly negative language in South African tabloid and mainstream print media presenting refugees as a threat, aliens, and outsiders.
Social media platforms can influence culture, fostering cross-cultural understanding and potentially reinforcing social divisions. However, they can also amplify xenophobia, particularly in communities like South Africa with pre-existing xenophobic sentiment.
A study by Dube and Setlalentoa (2024) found that xenophobia is a significant social pathology in South Africa, affecting migrant learners and causing increased incidents, bullying, school violence, and social exclusion in schools. This highlights the risk of intolerance and prejudice in society.
The media spreads hate and division, and people believe it. When news stories about refugees are written, only the bad things are shown. Hardly are refugees seen as victims.
South Africa's refugee policy allows refugees to seek employment and access basic services, but they often face discrimination and exclusion from the formal labour market. Refugees, especially those from Africa, are sometimes viewed as a burden on the country's resources and are scapegoated for economic problems.
Discrepancies across personalised social media feeds often incorporate harmful stereotypes and make implicit assumptions about people that are problematic from the standpoint of representation. This xenophobic sentiment further exacerbates the challenges refugees face in finding employment.
Following apartheid, South Africa has experienced a shift in national identity and nationalism, with politicians refraining from endorsing violence. This is fueled by state action and exclusive conceptions of citizenship, including the notion of South African exceptionalism compared to the rest of the continent.
Government institutions target illicit refugees, such as the police force, which arrest and harass refugees. The high level of xenophobia is directed at both youth and older persons who happen to find themselves in the country, black African migrants, and refugees. Common stereotypes include allegations that African refugees import diseases and crime, are labelled as people who steal jobs and women, drain the health care system, and other state resources.
Physical and systematic xenophobia contribute to refugees' appalling experiences in South Africa.
Murray (2013) reveals that the unsettled circumstances of urban living in the "new South Africa" have proven to be a fertile breeding ground for alarmist fantasies about unwanted refugees that occasionally spill over into genuine moral panics.
These moral panics arise at times of political instability and uncertainty, and the fear, apprehension, and anxiety linked to urban disorder can be more easily accommodated if traced to an identifiable cause and attached to a particular socially stigmatised menace.
Dr A. K. Masha is a social realist and a leadership catalyst. He writes in his personal capacity.

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