The end of Israeli exceptionalism
Israel has now been at war with its neighbours for nearly two years. The latest round began with the Hamas-led terrorist attack on 7 October 2023. In response, West Jerusalem launched an aggressive military campaign that has since expanded to touch nearly every country in the region. The escalation has placed the Jewish state at the centre of Middle Eastern geopolitics once again – this time, dragging in Iran, a state that had long avoided direct confrontation through strategic caution. Now, even Tehran finds itself under fire, with US backing making the stakes far higher. Iran is left facing a grim choice between the bad and the very bad.
But this isn't about Iran. It's about Israel, a country that has for decades functioned as the West's forward operating base in the Middle East. Since the mid-20th century, Israel has enjoyed a privileged position – a bridgehead of Western power in a volatile region, while also deeply enmeshed in its politics and rivalries. Its success has rested on two pillars: the unshakable support of the United States, and its own internal capacity for innovation, military strength, and a unique social model.
That second pillar, however, has weakened. The clearest sign is in demographics: Israel is facing rising negative migration. In 2024, some 82,700 people are expected to leave the country – a 50% increase from the year before. It is not the unskilled or disengaged who are leaving, but the young and educated. The people who are needed to sustain a modern state are choosing to go.
Of course, Israel's troubles are not unique. Like many developed nations, it is struggling under the weight of a decaying neoliberal economic system. The pandemic made things worse, exposing the fragility of the model and encouraging a shift toward a 'mobilisation' mode of governance – rule through emergency and constant readiness for conflict. In the West more broadly, war and geopolitical confrontation have become a way to delay or disguise necessary systemic reform.
In this regard, Israel has become a laboratory for the West's emerging logic: permanent war as a method of governance. In the autumn of 2023, the Israeli establishment embraced this fully. Conflict became not just a tactic, but a way of life. Its leaders no longer see peace as the goal, but war as the mechanism for national unity and political survival. In this, Israel mirrors the broader Western embrace of conflict with Russia and China – proxy wars chosen when actual reform is off the table.
At the global level, nuclear deterrence limits how far such wars can go. But in the Middle East, where Israel wages war directly, those constraints don't apply. This allows war to serve as a pressure valve – politically useful, even as it becomes self-destructive.
But even war has limits. It cannot indefinitely mask economic decay or social unrest. And while conflict tends to cement elite power – even among incompetent leadership – it also drains national strength. Israel is now consuming more and more of its own resources to sustain this permanent state of war. Its social cohesion is fraying. Its once-vaunted model of technological and civic progress is no longer functioning as it did.
Some in West Jerusalem may dream of 'reformatting' the Middle East – reshaping the region through force and fear. If successful, it could buy Israel a few decades of security and breathing room. But such outcomes are far from guaranteed. Crushing a neighbour doesn't eliminate the threat; it merely brings distant enemies closer. Most importantly, Israel's deepest problems aren't external – they are internal, rooted in its political and social structures.
War can define a state, yes. But such states – Sparta, North Korea – tend to be 'peculiar,' to put it mildly. And even for them, war cannot substitute for real diplomacy, policy, or growth.
So has Israel, always at war, truly developed? Or has it simply been sustained – politically, militarily, and financially – as a subdivision of American foreign policy? If it continues down this path of permanent conflict and right-wing nationalism, it risks losing even that status. It may cease to be the West's bridge in the Middle East – and become something else entirely: a militarised garrison state, isolated, brittle, and increasingly alone.This article was first published by the magazine Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team.
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Russia Today
6 hours ago
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The end of Israeli exceptionalism
Israel has now been at war with its neighbours for nearly two years. The latest round began with the Hamas-led terrorist attack on 7 October 2023. In response, West Jerusalem launched an aggressive military campaign that has since expanded to touch nearly every country in the region. The escalation has placed the Jewish state at the centre of Middle Eastern geopolitics once again – this time, dragging in Iran, a state that had long avoided direct confrontation through strategic caution. Now, even Tehran finds itself under fire, with US backing making the stakes far higher. Iran is left facing a grim choice between the bad and the very bad. But this isn't about Iran. It's about Israel, a country that has for decades functioned as the West's forward operating base in the Middle East. Since the mid-20th century, Israel has enjoyed a privileged position – a bridgehead of Western power in a volatile region, while also deeply enmeshed in its politics and rivalries. Its success has rested on two pillars: the unshakable support of the United States, and its own internal capacity for innovation, military strength, and a unique social model. That second pillar, however, has weakened. The clearest sign is in demographics: Israel is facing rising negative migration. In 2024, some 82,700 people are expected to leave the country – a 50% increase from the year before. It is not the unskilled or disengaged who are leaving, but the young and educated. The people who are needed to sustain a modern state are choosing to go. Of course, Israel's troubles are not unique. Like many developed nations, it is struggling under the weight of a decaying neoliberal economic system. The pandemic made things worse, exposing the fragility of the model and encouraging a shift toward a 'mobilisation' mode of governance – rule through emergency and constant readiness for conflict. In the West more broadly, war and geopolitical confrontation have become a way to delay or disguise necessary systemic reform. In this regard, Israel has become a laboratory for the West's emerging logic: permanent war as a method of governance. In the autumn of 2023, the Israeli establishment embraced this fully. Conflict became not just a tactic, but a way of life. Its leaders no longer see peace as the goal, but war as the mechanism for national unity and political survival. In this, Israel mirrors the broader Western embrace of conflict with Russia and China – proxy wars chosen when actual reform is off the table. At the global level, nuclear deterrence limits how far such wars can go. But in the Middle East, where Israel wages war directly, those constraints don't apply. This allows war to serve as a pressure valve – politically useful, even as it becomes self-destructive. But even war has limits. It cannot indefinitely mask economic decay or social unrest. And while conflict tends to cement elite power – even among incompetent leadership – it also drains national strength. Israel is now consuming more and more of its own resources to sustain this permanent state of war. Its social cohesion is fraying. Its once-vaunted model of technological and civic progress is no longer functioning as it did. Some in West Jerusalem may dream of 'reformatting' the Middle East – reshaping the region through force and fear. If successful, it could buy Israel a few decades of security and breathing room. But such outcomes are far from guaranteed. Crushing a neighbour doesn't eliminate the threat; it merely brings distant enemies closer. Most importantly, Israel's deepest problems aren't external – they are internal, rooted in its political and social structures. War can define a state, yes. But such states – Sparta, North Korea – tend to be 'peculiar,' to put it mildly. And even for them, war cannot substitute for real diplomacy, policy, or growth. So has Israel, always at war, truly developed? Or has it simply been sustained – politically, militarily, and financially – as a subdivision of American foreign policy? If it continues down this path of permanent conflict and right-wing nationalism, it risks losing even that status. It may cease to be the West's bridge in the Middle East – and become something else entirely: a militarised garrison state, isolated, brittle, and increasingly article was first published by the magazine Profile and was translated and edited by the RT team.
Russia Today
7 hours ago
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Pentagon & US national intelligence chiefs sidelined from Iran‑Israel discussions
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Kremlin comments on possible US strike on Iran
Washington would make a serious mistake by deciding to attack Iran, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told RT. Direct involvement by the US in the ongoing conflict between the Islamic Republic and Israel will only worsen the situation in the region, he warned. Tensions escalated last week after Israel launched a large-scale bombing campaign against Iran, claiming that Tehran was close to producing a nuclear bomb. Iran dismissed the accusations and retaliated with waves of drone and missile strikes. The two nations have continued exchanging strikes ever since. US President Donald Trump has made direct threats against Tehran in recent days, demanding its complete surrender and abandonment of its nuclear program. The Wall Street Journal reported on Wednesday that an attack plan on Iran had already been secretly approved, but the president said the publication 'has no idea.' The White House added that Trump would make a final decision 'within the next two weeks.' 'Moscow believes it is a wrong move,' Peskov said when asked about Russia's response to the hypothetical action. 'This is a step that is bound to lead to further escalation, a major escalation, and would only complicate the situation in the region.' 'Such conflicts are capable of setting the entire region on fire,' Peskov warned. He added that Russia remains ready and willing to assist in resolving the conflict. When asked about the possibility of regime change in Iran at the hands of the US or Israel, Peskov echoed President Vladimir Putin's view that such discussions are unacceptable. 'We believe that it is unacceptable to have such conversations, and even more so to take such actions,' he said. The Russian president reportedly has a 'complete picture' of the situation and the potential to act as a mediator, according to Peskov. He noted that Putin has been in contact with both Israel and Iran, and was one of the few world leaders to speak with both countries' leaders after hostilities began. However, Peskov admitted there is currently 'little ground' for talks as both Israel and Iran remain determined to continue the fighting. Putin himself told journalists at a late-night Q&A on Wednesday that Moscow has proposed several compromise frameworks to all parties – including the US, Israel, and Iran. He also suggested that a potential settlement could include mutual security guarantees protecting both Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology and Israel's right to security.
