How India's disavowal of SCO statement signals a new realism in global politics

— Amit Kumar and John Harrison
As the Israel-Iran conflict rages on, India has distanced itself from the statement issued by the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) last week, condemning Israel's military strikes on Iran. As one of the most influential members of the SCO, currently chaired by China, India dissociated itself from the statement and said it didn't even participate in the discussion.
This diplomatic friction within the 10-member bloc is more than a technical disagreement. It poses a critical question: What does the SCO's statement criticising Israel reveal about China, and what does India's quick withdrawal from it indicate about global politics? The answer opens a window into the dynamics of rising powers, shifting alliances, and the strategic contest to control not just geography, but global narratives.
At first glance, the SCO's intervention in the Israel-Iran conflict might seem like a bold assertion of a regional security body stepping up to global relevance. But the deeper context matters. The Israel-Iran relationship has long been defined by hostility, espionage, and proxy warfare. Israel's strikes on June 13, deep into Iranian territory, marked a dangerous escalation in a conflict that often teeters on the edge of a regional war.
But why would the SCO – a forum traditionally focused on Central Asian stability and counterterrorism – involve itself in the conflict so visibly? The answer lies in the bloc's new composition, particularly the recent inclusion of Iran as a full member, and more fundamentally, in the growing centrality of China within it.
What looks like a gesture of support for a fellow member is, more subtly, a reflection of the SCO's transformation into a geopolitical lever for Chinese diplomacy. By positioning the SCO as a moral counterbalance to Western-aligned military action, it looks like China is seeking to extend the SCO's relevance far beyond its founding mandate.
This pivot also suggests that China is attempting to redefine the normative language of international conduct, one that seemingly aligns less with UN charters or US-led alliances and more with a China-centric worldview that selectively invokes sovereignty, non-intervention, and regional stability based on who benefits from the narrative.
Behind the SCO's statement lies a bold, if underappreciated, strategy. China is no longer content to merely participate in global forums. It is repurposing them. By mobilising the SCO to speak collectively against Israel, China was not just defending Iran; rather it was testing a model of bloc-based legitimacy that could challenge Western diplomatic hegemony. The symbolism was potent – a group representing over 40 per cent of the world's population speaking in unison against a close US ally.
This messaging also marks a subtle recalibration of China's non-interference doctrine. Beijing is no longer sitting on the fence when its strategic partners are involved. Whether by abstaining from condemning the October 7 Hamas attacks or by amplifying Iranian grievances through multilateral forums, China is beginning to act with strategic asymmetry. It remains non-confrontational with the West on its own borders, yet assertive when it comes to Western partners in volatile regions like West Asia.
Such moves reveal China's attempt to build a moral alternative to US exceptionalism, not by mimicking Western institutions, but by gradually bending others, like the SCO, into ideological alignment. Through carefully orchestrated diplomatic theater, China is reshaping the perception of who holds the moral high ground, casting itself as a defender of sovereignty and stability against Western chaos.
India's prompt disavowal of the SCO statement was neither accidental nor reactionary. It was a calibrated act of diplomatic insulation – a move designed to protect its carefully balanced relationships with both Iran and Israel, while also signalling its discomfort with China's dominance over the SCO's voice. In doing so, India reaffirmed a principle that is becoming the hallmark of its foreign policy in the multipolar age: alignment without entanglement.
What makes India's move even more significant is its context within the global narrative competition. China may have tried to portray the SCO condemnation as reflective of a broader anti-Israel, implicitly anti-Western consensus, and India, had it stayed silent, would have been passively co-opted into that message. But India's refusal disrupted the choreography. It showed that multilateralism, in a world of self-confident middle powers, can no longer be orchestrated so easily.
Moreover, India's action speaks to a subtle transformation in its global identity. It no longer sees itself as a bridge between East and West, nor as a swing state, but as a sovereign power center shaping its own trajectory in the global order. In distancing itself from the SCO statement, India is rather projecting a future in which it refuses to let other powers define its strategic posture, even within forums it has co-founded or supports.
The incident reveals more than a disagreement between two members of a regional bloc. It exposes the tectonic shifts in global governance. China's attempt to manufacture a diplomatic consensus through the SCO is emblematic of a broader ambition. It seeks to build a non-Western geopolitical ecosystem where legitimacy flows from shared grievance, not shared values. In this system, countries like Iran find a voice not because of shared vision, but because of shared opposition to the US-led order.
At the same time, India's dissent points to a new realism in global politics. Multipolarity is not about blocs competing with one another. It is about a growing number of states refusing to be defined by any bloc at all. India's stance implies that true global influence now depends on agility, narrative independence, and the ability to defy both Western and Eastern orthodoxy.
If China's rise is defined by the repurposing of institutions like the SCO into ideological tools, India's ascent is marked by its refusal to be absorbed into any ideological project, not of its own making. This divergence in strategy, one building a club of allies, the other cultivating freedom of motion, may well define the contours of the coming global order.
In trying to turn the SCO into a stage for its foreign policy theatre, China revealed both its growing capabilities and its limitations. While it may script the lines, not all actors will follow. India's silent refusal to play the part it was assigned shows that even in the age of emerging powers, autonomy, not alignment, remains the highest currency of diplomacy.
India's disavowal of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation statement on Israel's attack against Iran reaffirmed a principle that is becoming the hallmark of its foreign policy in the multipolar age: alignment without entanglement. Comment.
Critically examine the aims and objectives of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. What importance does it hold for India?
By positioning the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a moral counterbalance to Western-aligned military action, is China seeking to extend the bloc's relevance far beyond its founding mandate?
Multipolarity is not about blocs competing with one another. It is about a growing number of states refusing to be defined by any bloc at all. Explain with examples.
Virus of Conflict is affecting the functioning of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; In the light of the above statement point out the role of India in mitigating the problems.
(Amit Kumar is a PhD candidate at the Birla Institute of Technology & Science, Pilani, Rajasthan, India. Dr. John Harrison is an Associate Professor at Rabdan Academy, specialising in homeland security.)
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