Latest news with #al-Shabaab
Barnama
a day ago
- Politics
- Barnama
Somali Army, With AU Peacekeepers' Support, Recaptures Strategic Villages From Al-Shabaab
MOGADISHU (Somalia) June 22 (Bernama-Anadolu) -- The Somali army, supported by African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) forces, reclaimed the strategic villages of Anole and Sabid from al-Shabaab militants after nearly two months of intense fighting, a senior official said on Saturday, Anadolu Ajansi (AA) reported. Anole and Sabid, located in the southwest province of Lower Shabelle, are strategic military assets and serve as a vital bridge. Maj. Gen. Sahal Abdullahi Omar, commander of the Somali National Army's land forces, told the media on Saturday evening that the operation "Silent Storm" dismantled al-Shabaab militants and reclaimed the two villages.
Daily Maverick
10-06-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Deepening ties between Houthis and Somali terror groups raise alarm over lethal drone threat
The sharing of lethal drone technology with al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Somalia could recast the conflict in the Horn and beyond. Yemen's Ansar Allah – commonly known as the Houthis – and Somalia's two proscribed terrorist organisations, al-Shabaab and Islamic State in Somalia (IS Somalia), are reportedly deepening ties. How could this impact the tools of war, especially lethal drone technology, which is increasingly a hallmark of Ansar Allah's operations backed by its powerful ally, Iran? Will the relationship with the United Nations (UN)-sanctioned group influence how Somalia's violent extremist groups fight or are perceived regionally? Technology transfer between armed groups is better understood since the proliferation of improvised explosive devices following conflicts in Iraq (2002) and Afghanistan (2001-2021). Migration of foreign fighters and access to 3D printing have ramped up these groups' ability to exploit arms trafficking channels, share knowledge, access components or inspire others. The proliferation of military-grade drones in Africa makes this an even more crowded space. Al-Shabaab has to date used drones largely for propaganda, intelligence and surveillance rather than attacks. UN monitors describe its relationship with Ansar Allah as 'transactional or opportunistic' – the pair having shared interests in smuggling routes and access to revenue streams. However, there is evidence that al-Shabaab may seek a more lethal use of drones. The UN monitors note that in meetings between the two groups in 2024, al-Shabaab's leadership requested 'advanced weapons and training' from Ansar Allah. Ansar Allah has demonstrated a penchant for using drones, seen during attacks on commercial ships during the Red Sea crisis that began in 2023. Some of the group's equipment and components were traced directly to Iran, 'and were likely mostly domestically assembled Sammad-series [unmanned aerial vehicles]', Conflict Armament Research's head of Gulf operations, Taimur Khan, told ISS Today. 'The Houthis procure the internal dual-use components themselves and make the airframes domestically.' They also used commercial, off-the-shelf drones. Al-Shabaab, IS Somalia and Ansar Allah mutually benefit from working together. A Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, which includes interviews with coastguards, claims that 'Somalia's porous coastlines have become critical to ensuring that the group has access to Iranian supplies of Chinese equipment necessary for the growth of its Iranian-supported drone and missile programme'. And Somalia's armed groups allegedly benefit from training and more sophisticated drones. IS Somalia is also experimenting with drones. In Puntland, where it has a foothold, the group's first recorded drone strikes – on the Puntland Security Force – were in January. In the six months before, security officials seized five suicide drones 'dispatched by Ansar Allah… and arrested seven individuals' linked to Somalia's two main extremist groups. Furthermore, the UN monitors said that in May 2024 '[IS Somalia] employed unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance and limited explosive deployment… It is assessed that the programme was aimed at building suicide unmanned aerial vehicles.' This either suggests cooperation between Yemen and Somalia's armed groups or that they draw inspiration from each other. Owning drones is important for armed groups' power projection. Media focus on suicide or first-person-view drones used for short-range missions. These enable operators to receive real-time information, and are 'one of the deadliest threats to civilians in frontline areas', say UN human rights monitors in Ukraine. They are regarded as a game-changer in asymmetric warfare and seem highly coveted by armed groups, including Ansar Allah. But how likely are these weapons to be routinely used in Somalia? 'There have been… seizures of FPV [drone] components being smuggled into Yemen, but Conflict Armament Research has not seen FPV drones being used by [al-Shabaab], although it does not mean it has never happened,' Khan says. Assault rifles are still the main weapon smuggled into the region, but experts say greater drone proliferation seems almost inevitable. 'Once this technology is adopted [by] a particular terrorist group, the ideas will proliferate in the region and be picked up by other armed groups, even if there are no direct links between those groups,' Khan says. Existing supply routes for other forms of contraband can easily be repurposed. The relationship between Ansar Allah and al-Shabaab provides greater access for al-Shabaab to more sophisticated arms, and smuggling routes and financial opportunities for Ansar Allah. Closer ties with extremist groups in Somalia also mean that Ansar Allah – and more so Iran, which provides it with military, financial and logistical support – gains 'strategic depth', the Carnegie Endowment says. Via its Yemeni proxy, Iran can help 'shape the maritime security architecture of the Gulf of Aden and Bab-al-Mandab Strait', the site of many commercial shipping attacks. It also potentially increases threat perceptions in the region, especially in Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti and Kenya. This will force militaries to allocate more resources to air defences, says Institute for Security Studies (ISS) maritime senior researcher Timothy Walker. There is also a psychological and diplomatic effect of more lethal technology transfer, says ISS senior researcher Moses Okello. He suggests that the mere threat of owning lethal drones or having access to components and supply routes, may impact diplomacy such that 'insurgents may be less willing to take part in political discussions'. For the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia, the prospect of lethal drones in the hands of al-Shabaab is alarming, Okello adds. 'Offensive drones have not yet taken root, but al-Shabaab is said to be adapting commercial drones, adding payloads to them.' Insurgents need only one successful drone strike to impact the conflict's direction. Peacekeepers know that for now, assault rifles are still the weapon of choice in Somalia. But sharing technology and expertise with a key player in Yemen's complex proxy war could recast the conflict in the Horn of Africa and beyond. DM
Business Insider
06-06-2025
- Business
- Business Insider
Turkey to supply African country with combat helicopters
Turkey will supply Somalia's navy with T129 Atak helicopters as part of a defence agreement signed earlier this year, according to sources familiar with the deal. Turkey will supply Somalia with T129 Atak helicopters under a defense agreement to enhance naval capacity. The delivery is part of Turkey's 10-year pact to support Somali military readiness against threats such as al-Shabaab. The collaboration underscores Turkey's broader strategic expansion in the Horn of Africa through defense and economic initiatives.
Daily Maverick
04-06-2025
- General
- Daily Maverick
Somalia's stance on peace missions — interference or local ownership?
Threats to the independence of peace support missions call for clarity on their relationship with host countries. The Federal Government of Somalia has repeatedly used the 'persona non grata' principle to expel senior representatives of African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) missions, citing 'misconduct' and 'interference in internal affairs'. Somalia is also playing a more pronounced but contested role in planning, deploying and repatriating AU peace support operations (PSOs) in the country. These moves undermine missions' independence and hamper their ability to carry out mandated tasks. They also question host nations' increasing role in shaping mission strategy and operations. As the UN and AU explore the future of PSOs, the implications for existing and future peace missions must be considered. The UN and AU have long supported Somalia through peace missions to help deal with the country's protracted civil war. For almost 20 years the AU has deployed three consecutive PSOs – the latest being the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (Aussom) – with a mandate to help defeat violent extremist groups, including al-Shabaab, protect civilians and rebuild the country's governance capacity. The UN has provided special political missions to support state-building, rule of law, justice and human rights. It also authorised the AU PSOs and provided them with logistical assistance. Despite their many challenges and the persistent al-Shabaab threat, these missions have helped stabilise the country. Somalia has consolidated its government structures at federal and state levels, and an increasing number of regions have been liberated from al-Shabaab. Thousands of peacekeepers have died for the cause of peace. The 3,500 AU mission personnel killed in Somalia between 2007 and 2023 nears the total deaths of all UN peacekeeping missions in 75 years worldwide. Mission leaders walk a fine political line as they operate in Somalia. According to recent media reports, diplomatic concerns among Somali federal authorities resulted in Aussom acting head Sivuyile Bam being declared 'persona non grata'. Bam is also a deputy special representative to AU Commission chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf. Neither side has issued an official statement, but Somalia reportedly accused Bam of sympathising with al-Shabaab, and the government hinted at 'misconduct' when announcing Bam's replacement. This announcement appears false since the AU Commission has yet to appoint a head and deputy head of Aussom. Anonymous AU sources told ISS Today that the AU Commission withdrew Bam from the mission before Somalia expelled him. They said the reason was his briefing to the UN Security Council in April, which highlighted Aussom's funding and capabilities challenges, and the rise in al-Shabaab attacks. Somalia has used these tactics before, when senior leaders of AU and UN missions were forced to leave the country for similar reasons. In 2022, former AU Commission chairperson special representative and head of the first two AU PSOs, ambassador Francisco Madeira, was ejected. Somalia accused Madeira of 'engaging in acts that are incompatible with his status as representative of the AU Commission'. Former AU Commission chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat rejected the accusation, expressing his 'trust and confidence' in Madeira. In 2019, Somalia expelled the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy and Mission Head Nicholas Haysom, accusing him of 'interfering with the country's internal affairs.' However, other sources said he was expelled because he was defending human rights in the country. In recent years Somalia's government has increasingly contested the planning, deployment and repatriation of AU PSOs. For example, Burundi – one of the largest contributors to AU PSOs since 2008 – has said it will withdraw its forces from Somalia following disagreement with the government on the number of troops to be deployed. These decisions were not Somalia's to make. Burundi's troop contribution was planned under the AU framework, and any decisions on expert and troop numbers deployed should have been made by the AU Commission. Local and national ownership is generally recognised as key to a mission's effectiveness. In 2001, the UN endorsed the concept as a way to empower local actors and communities in the peacebuilding process. In principle though, this was not intended to compromise the strategic and operational independence of missions. Tensions between host nations and peace missions are not new and are not restricted to Somalia. When Sudan, Mali, and Kosovo expelled UN mission leaders, the UN condemned their actions because the 'doctrine of 'persona non grata' is not applicable to UN personnel'. While the legality of 'persona non grata' in the context of UN and AU peace missions is still debatable, the implications for peace missions of using this tactic are evident. At the very least, the threat of expulsion undermines the morale of mission personnel and their ability to act independently according to their mandates. Operational independence is vital to a mission's legitimacy in the eyes of host nation communities and the world. For Aussom, having an 'acting' head of mission since mid-April will limit its effectiveness. The Somali government's direct dealings with Burundi on troop contributions to Aussom not only compromise mission independence but undermine troop-contributing countries' confidence in the AU Commission's decision-making. This highlights the dilemma of state sovereignty and how to manage the principle of local ownership in peace operations. But once a country signs an agreement consenting to international support, it cedes some sovereignty in line with the mandate of UN and AU peace missions. Local ownership is important, but so too is ensuring missions' strategic and operational independence. The latest developments in Somalia call for a rethink of how these relationships are structured and managed. The UN and AU should jointly define the role of host nations to ensure the independence of existing and future peace missions as part of a larger conversation about the relationship between host countries and peace missions. DM
Daily Maverick
23-05-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
From conflict to cooperation: Rethinking security strategies in the Kenya-Ethiopia borderlands
Kenya's police have achieved some positive results, but lasting solutions require ongoing cooperation between the two countries. In February, Kenyan police launched Operation Ondoa Jangili ('remove the criminals') as part of security measures to drive the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) out of hideouts in Isiolo and Marsabit counties. The OLA is an informal militia fighting for self-determination for Ethiopia's Oromo ethnic group in the south of the country. Owing to its political orientation and culture of violence, it has frequently escaped Ethiopian authorities by crossing into Kenya. Marsabit and Isiolo are home to the Borana and Gabbra communities, both of which speak Oromo, thus providing cover for the OLA through ethnic affinity. Ethiopia's National Intelligence and Security Service says the armed group broke away from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) after the OLF renounced the armed struggle in 2018. Ethiopian intelligence says the OLA has established ties with the terrorist group al-Shabaab in Somalia and is involved in illicit activities such as arms trafficking and illegal mining. The Kenya Police Service has also accused the group of engaging in arms, drug and human trafficking, illegal mining, kidnapping for ransom and instigating tribal conflicts. In August 2024, two South Koreans were abducted from their Odda Mission Church residence in Moyale and allegedly handed to al-Shabaab in what Ethiopian intelligence says was an OLA-al-Shabaab collaboration. The OLA denies the claim. Kenya-Ethiopia cross-border insecurity The OLA says it has no presence in Kenya. This contradicts the country's National Intelligence Service Director-General Noordin Haji, who told a parliamentary oversight committee that the OLA was occupying Kenyan territory. The group has reiterated its commitment to ensuring the safety of Kenyan communities living along the border, pledging to respect Kenya's territorial integrity and expressing willingness to cooperate with authorities. The OLA accused Ethiopia's army and intelligence of facilitating transnational criminal networks and cautioned Kenya not to be misled and to maintain its balanced approach to regional stability. Kenyans living along the border are caught in the crossfire, often being detained by security forces for allegedly harbouring OLA fighters. Community members also face harassment by the OLA, which accuses them of spying for Kenya and Ethiopia's governments. The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights says the ongoing police operation has sparked an outcry from those affected, who report human rights violations by the security forces. A lack of coordinated Kenyan-Ethiopian security force patrols along their porous border, marginalisation of border communities by both governments, and weak state institutions lacking the capacity to respond to distress calls have all worked in the OLA's favour. A resident told ISS Today that previous efforts by both Kenyan and Ethiopian security agencies to contain the OLA's activities were disjointed. That allowed the group to easily melt into the Kenyan population across the border when escaping Ethiopian authorities. As a result of OLA's incursions and a mismatch in Kenya and Ethiopia's firearm policies, the border region has suffered an influx of small arms. Kenya controls the licensing of arms, while in Ethiopia, civilians can legally own guns after registering them with the federal government. This fuels a cycle of insecurity as border communities acquire illicit arms for self-defence, creating a ready market for arms traffickers and the OLA. Memorandum of understanding In August 2024, in the build-up to the current police operation, Kenya and Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding on security cooperation through intelligence sharing and coordinated operations. The countries also had a security defence pact ratified in 1964, which, among other things, allowed them to support each other if a third party attacked them. However, the pact lost significance as the Somalian threat at that time waned. Kenya's operation has uncovered 14 makeshift camps believed to be used by OLA members, 10 firearms, ammunition, fake US dollars and Ethiopian birr, and propaganda literature in Oromo. Several people with alleged links to the group were arrested, and the police claim to have disrupted human and arms trafficking networks while curtailing cross-border incursions and kidnappings. These are positive achievements. But as with all security force operations, the successes can generally only be sustained while the operation is active. Once it ends, illicit activities could resume. Longer-term measures and prevention strategies are also vital. For example, coordinated and ongoing joint cross-border security patrols, combined with state investment in infrastructure such as roads and education facilities in border areas, are needed. That would protect border communities and facilitate trade and investment, bringing stability after decades of upheaval. Kenya and Ethiopia should also establish a permanent joint border security management framework, including a 24-hour one-stop border post at Moyale and formal border posts in Forolle, Elhadi and Dukana. This would encourage trade and check the movement of criminal actors and contraband across the border. Also, while factionalism within insurgent groups makes engaging in meaningful peace talks hard, Ethiopia's government should consider dialogue with the OLA, as happened in 2023. Ironing out contentious issues and building trust could help settle the disputes among parties to the conflict. Lastly, security forces must adhere to the law when carrying out operations, particularly concerning human rights. This would build trust between them and local communities, with knock-on positive effects for intelligence sharing, and tracking and arresting suspects. DM
