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DW
2 days ago
- Politics
- DW
Mali's junta tightens grip after five years of military rule – DW – 06/17/2025
When General Assimi Goita seized power in 2020, many hoped it would bring positive change to Mali, a country grappling with jihadist attacks and an economic crisis. What has actually happened in the past five years? In 2020 and 2021, General Assimi Goita siezed power of Mali, bringing the country under military rule. Elections scheduled for February 2024 were postponed due to "technical reasons," including issues related to the adoption of a new constitution and a review of electoral lists. A new date has not been announced. In June 2025, the National Transitional Council approved a bill granting Goita an additional five-year term, extending his presidency until at least 2030. Stalled fight against Islamist rebels One of the main justifications for the coup was to improve the nation's security amid a growing number of jihadist attacks. However, this plan has not worked, said Ahmed Ould Abdallah, president of the Sahel Sahara Center for Security Strategies. "Not only has terrorism not disappeared, it is actually increasing and becoming more intense. It no longer affects only the north and center of the country, but also the south toward Sikasso, and the Kayes region in the west," he told DW. In early June 2025, several Malian army positions were attacked by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, known as JNIM. At least 30 people were killed in the attack on a camp. In September 2024, JNIM succeeded in attacking Bamako and occupied the airport for several hours. In July 2024, heavy fighting took place in the town of Tinzaouatene near the Algerian border. Tuareg separatists inflicted heavy losses on the Malian army and the Russian-backed Wagner Group. What's driving Russia's ambitious push into Africa? To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Fousseyni Ouattara, vice president of the Defense and Security Commission of Mali's transitional parliament, the National Transitional Council, told DW he blames "invisible hands" for the recent attacks, without offering a specific explanation. He claims that Mali is in control of its territory. "There is no doubt that the situation has improved compared to four years ago," he said. "Today, we are acting with full sovereignty. The capture of Kidal shows that there has been a major change." In November 2023, the Malian Armed Forces, with the help of Wagner Group mercenaries, recaptured the northern city of Kidal from the CSP rebel alliance. The Ministry of Defense's 2025 budget is 485 billion CFA francs (about $858 million), accounting for nearly 20% of the national budget. Some voices feel it's disproportionate. "At some point, you have to negotiate," Yoyana Baniara, a former judge and politician in Chad, told DW. "If you put a larger portion of resources into war, you put the country in a difficult economic situation." Dissolution of political parties, suppression of free speech in Mali In May 2025, the Malian authorities decided to dissolve all political parties. Many, including Sidylamine Bagayoko, professor of anthropology at the University of Bamako, feel it was the wrong move. "It is political debate that enriches the diversity of discussions and opinions so that the country can move forward," says Bagayoko. Since Mali had close to 300 political parties, many agreed that the system was in need of reform. But such an extreme decision, according to Ulf Laessing, director of the Sahel regional office for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bamako, amounts to an "abolition of the opposition." May 3, 2025: Pro-junta demonstrators in Bamako chant slogans as opposing political parties protest against their dissolution Image: AFP Indeed, opposition voices seem to come increasingly under threat. The opportunities to freely express one's opinion in Mali have deteriorated over the past five years, said Claus-Dieter König, head of the West Africa office of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS) in Dakar. "Goita is becoming a dictatorial ruler. Opposition members live in fear of being arrested. Radio stations have been banned and it is more difficult to obtain licenses," König says. Journalists in the country feel pressure not to write about army losses in the fight against jihadists or about Russian mercenaries, say experts, Oppression in every corner Several pro-democracy activists have recently been detained in Mali. According to Human Rights Watch, two opposition leaders who took part in protests in early May have disappeared. Research by the journalist consortium Forbidden Stories found that Malian civilians have been arbitrarily arrested, kidnapped, and tortured in secret prisons. They say Mali's army and the Wagner Group are behind this. Government member Fousseyni Ouattara rejects such accusations: "In Mali, our prisons are open to everyone. Anyone can visit them. No one is arbitrarily arrested," he told DW. Mali's academic sector is also under threat, says professor Sidylamine Bagayoko: "From 2020 to the present, we have seen several academics imprisoned. As a result, other intellectuals who want to write about restrictions on freedoms, or express their opinions about it. remain cautious." Assimi Goita took control of Mali through two coups Image: AP Photo/picture alliance However, despite concerns related to freedom of expression, the current regime still has many supporters, said Laessing. 'I do believe that the predominantly young population still supports the government because they did not want a return to the old elites, who, although elected, were considered corrupt and very close to France.' Fighting corruption while Mali's economy struggles When it comes to corruption, some observers are cautiously optimistic. "In the population survey we conduct annually, respondents say they see an improvement," says Svenja Bode, resident representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's Mali office in Bamako. In 2021, about 90% of respondents said they believed corruption in Mali was very high. This figure has fallen to 58% according to this year's survey which was released in May. Yet regardless of whether or not such perceptions are accurate, it is clear that the government has taken some steps towards reducing corruption — and made sure they were covered by the media, said Bode. Yet fighting corruption is one thing; improving everyday life is another. 'I don't yet see the major economic progress that will ultimately translate into better living conditions,' said Claus‑Dieter König of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Mali recently introduced an unpopular new tax on mobile communications and mobile‑money transfers. Explainer: What the German troop withdrawal from Mali means To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Education initiatives suffer Meanwhile, power shortages remain a serious problem, and the cost of living has risen sharply due to inflation linked in part to Russia's war in Ukraine, which has driven up the cost of materials worldwide. "Mali imports everything from gasoline to grain, is heavily dependent on the world market and has no access to the coast,' said Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. At the same time, experts such as Laessing say Western countries, including France, are suspending their work in Mali as Russia becomes more involved. The shift is negatively affecting education initiatives. Laessing said he spoke with Malian participants at an education conference in Tunisia who told him that although there are many initiatives and plans, few are implemented. Reliou Koubakin and Etienne Gatanazi contributed to this article. It was edited by Sarah Hucal.
DW
3 days ago
- Politics
- DW
A look at Mali after five years of military rule – DW – 06/17/2025
When General Assimi Goita seized power in 2020, many hoped it would bring positive change to Mali, a country grappling with jihadist attacks and an economic crisis. What has actually happened in the past five years? In 2020 and 2021, General Assimi Goita siezed power of Mali, bringing the country under military rule. Elections scheduled for February 2024 were postponed due to "technical reasons," including issues related to the adoption of a new constitution and a review of electoral lists. A new date has not been announced. In June 2025, the National Transitional Council approved a bill granting Goita an additional five-year term, extending his presidency until at least 2030. Stalled fight against Islamist rebels One of the main justifications for the coup was to improve the nation's security amid rising jihadist attacks. However, this plan has not worked, said Ahmed Ould Abdallah, president of the Sahel Sahara Center for Security Strategies. "Not only has terrorism not disappeared, it is actually increasing and becoming more intense. It no longer affects only the north and center of the country, but also the south toward Sikasso, and the Kayes region in the west," he told DW. In early June 2025, several Malian army positions were attacked by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, known as JNIM. At least 30 people were killed in the attack on a camp. In September 2024, JNIM succeeded in attacking Bamako and occupied the airport for several hours. In July 2024, heavy fighting took place in the town of Tinzaouatène near the Algerian border. Tuareg separatists inflicted heavy losses on the Malian army and the Russian-backed Wagner Group. What's driving Russia's ambitious push into Africa? To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Fousseyni Ouattara, vice president of the Defense and Security Commission of Mali's transitional parliament, the National Transitional Council told DW he blames "invisible hands" for the recent attacks, without offering a specific explanation. He claims that Mali is in control of its territory. "There is no doubt that the situation has improved compared to four years ago," he said. "Today, we are acting with full sovereignty. The capture of Kidal shows that there has been a major change." In November 2023, the Malian Armed Forces, with the help of Wagner Group mercenaries, recaptured the northern city of Kidal from the CSP rebel alliance. The Ministry of Defense's 2025 budget is 485 billion CFA francs (about $858 million), accounting for nearly 20% of the national budget. Some voices feel it's disproportionate. "At some point, you have to negotiate," Yoyana Baniara, a former judge and politician in Chad, told DW. "If you put a larger portion of resources into war, you put the country in a difficult economic situation." Dissolution of political parties, suppression of free speech In May 2025, the Malian authorities decided to dissolve all political parties. Many, including Sidylamine Bagayoko, professor of anthropology at the University of Bamako, feel it was the wrong move. "It is political debate that enriches the diversity of discussions and opinions so that the country can move forward," says Bagayoko. Since Mali had close to 300 political parties, many agreed that the system was in need of reform. But such an extreme decision, according to Ulf Laessing, director of the Sahel regional office for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bamako, amounts to an "abolition of the opposition." May 3, 2025: Pro-junta demonstrators in Bamako chant slogans as opposing political parties protest against their dissolution Image: AFP Indeed, opposition voices seem to come increasingly under threat. The opportunities to freely express one's opinion in Mali have deteriorated over the past five years, said Claus-Dieter König, head of the West Africa office of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS) in Dakar. "Goita is becoming a dictatorial ruler. Opposition members live in fear of being arrested. Radio stations have been banned and it is more difficult to obtain licenses," he says. Journalists in the country feel pressure not to write about army losses in the fight against jihadists or about Russian mercenaries, say experts, Oppression in every corner Several pro-democracy activists have recently been detained in Mali. According to Human Rights Watch, two opposition leaders who took part in protests in early May have disappeared. Research by the journalist consortium Forbidden Stories found that Malian civilians have been arbitrarily arrested, kidnapped, and tortured in secret prisons. They say Mali's army and the Wagner Group are behind this. Government member Fousseyni Ouattara rejects such accusations: "In Mali, our prisons are open to everyone. Anyone can visit them. No one is arbitrarily arrested," he told DW. Mali's academic sector is also under threat, says professor Sidylamine Bagayoko: "From 2020 to the present, we have seen several academics imprisoned. As a result, other intellectuals who want to write about restrictions on freedoms, or express their opinions about it remain cautious." Assimi Goita took control of Mali through two coups Image: AP Photo/picture alliance However, despite concerns related to freedom of expression, the current regime still has many supporters, said Ulf Laessing. 'I do believe that the predominantly young population still supports the government because they did not want a return to the old elites, who, although elected, were considered corrupt and very close to France.' Fighting corruption while the economy struggles When it comes to corruption, some observers are cautiously optimistic. "In the population survey we conduct annually, respondents say they see an improvement," says Svenja Bode, Svenja Bode, resident representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's Mali office in Bamako. In 2021, about 90% of respondents said they believed corruption in Mali was very high. This figure has fallen to 58% according to this year's survey which was released in May. Yet regardless of whether or not such perceptions are accurate, it is clear that the government has taken some steps towards reducing corruption — and made sure they were covered by the media, said Bode. Yet fighting corruption is one thing; improving everyday life is another. 'I don't yet see the major economic progress that will ultimately translate into better living conditions,' said Claus‑Dieter König of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Mali recently introduced an unpopular new tax on mobile communications and mobile‑money transfers. Explainer: What the German troop withdrawal from Mali means To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Education initiatives suffer Meanwhile, power shortages remain a serious problem, and the cost of living has risen sharply due to inflation linked in part to Russia's war in Ukraine, which has driven up the cost of materials worldwide. 'Mali imports everything from gasoline to grain, is heavily dependent on the world market and has no access to the coast,' said Ulf Laessing, director of the Sahel regional office for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bamako. At the same time, experts such as Laessing say Western countries, including France, are suspending their work in Mali as Russia becomes more involved. The shift is negatively affecting education initiatives. Laessing said he spoke with Malian participants at an education conference in Tunisia who told him that although there are many initiatives and plans, few are implemented. Reliou Koubakin and Etienne Gatanazi contributed to this article. It was edited by Sarah Hucal.
Libya Observer
4 days ago
- Politics
- Libya Observer
Dabaiba praises Tuareg tribes for supporting national unity and stability
Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba, has praised the "national and responsible" role played by the Tuareg tribes in supporting stability and promoting national unity. His remarks came during a meeting on Sunday at the Prime Minister's Office in Tripoli with a delegation of sheikhs and elders from the Tuareg tribes. The discussions focused on local development, enhancing stability in the south, and advancing national reconciliation efforts. Dabaiba reaffirmed the government's commitment to continuing the provision of essential services and promoting development in Tuareg regions, reflecting the principles of justice and equality among all segments of the Libyan population. He emphasized the government's openness to all national parties working to strengthen Libya's unity and overcome divisions, stressing that the current phase requires collective efforts from all Libyans to achieve stability and build the state. For their part, the Tuareg elders expressed full support for the Government of National Unity and commended its efforts to ensure security, stability, and improved living conditions across the country, particularly in the southern regions. Tags: Tuareg Tribes National Unity
New Statesman
11-06-2025
- Politics
- New Statesman
How Russia became a franchise of the Wagner Group
For several years, during a season of boredom in the West, the Wagner Group, Russia's private military company, became a pet obsession for the media. This was a story of Vladimir Putin's shadowy 'army of cut-throats', plundering Africa of its gold and diamonds while upending Europe's influence in its former colonies. Western audiences were hooked. In 2022, Wagner became a key tool in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its previously hidden founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former St Petersburg restaurateur, finally emerged from the shadows. The narrative became even riper: Prigozhin led a short-lived mutiny against the Russian regime in June 2023. But it ended abruptly when his private jet exploded not far from Putin's dacha on Lake Valdai two months later. The story is far from over. The group continues to wage vicious campaigns in the Sahel region, now rebranded as the 'Africa Corps'. In Mali, it helps the regime fight Tuareg and Islamist insurgencies, and was accused of executing civilians. Two recent books shed light on Wagner's role in ushering in a new era of modern warfare: Death Is Our Business by the American journalist John Lechner and Our Business Is Death by the Russian reporters Ilya Barabanov and Denis Korotkov. If Wagner's business was death, then it meant a good deal of its own mercenaries dying, too. This was true even back in the 2010s when Wagner was still viewed as an elite and secretive force, the most prominent case in point being the infamous Battle of Khasham in February 2018. In an episode that became the closest, if indirect, US-Russia clash of the 21st century, Wagnerites tried to capture an oil field in north-eastern Syria controlled by American-backed Kurdish fighters. The Kurds fought back, supported by the US from the air, and the mercenaries were mowed down. Some 80 Russians were killed in just a few hours. All the previous Wagner losses, however, were overshadowed by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the transformation of the mercenary group into a vehicle to recruit convicts. Lifted out of prisons and put through short and superficial training, some 50,000 of them, by Prigozhin's own estimate, were sent to storm the Ukrainian stronghold of Bakhmut. Barabanov and Korotkov's book presents accounts of convicts forced to fight under the fear of execution. Those refusing to take part in the 'meat storms' were reportedly shot as deserters. Some 20,000 Wagner fighters died in Bakhmut alone, according to Prigozhin's count. Shocking as it was, this practice was not new. Penal battalions were introduced in the Soviet army during the Second World War, guarded by anti-retreat detachments with orders to shoot deserters. Allowing for huge losses to advance on a battlefield was another tradition from Soviet times that was resurrected in Putin's Ukrainian 'special military operation'. 'The special military operation was, in many respects, one giant World War II re-enactment, and everyone got to don a costume and play a character,' Lechner observes. All of this, however, came later. Before 2022, Wagner was less of a cosplay enterprise and more of a private military company with operations in Syria, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Africa's Sahel region. Nobody was forced or encouraged to fight for it – but thousands volunteered to. Subscribe to The New Statesman today from only £8.99 per month Subscribe What made so many Russian men risk their lives in faraway countries? Barabanov and Korotkov grapple with this question, drawing from personnel files included in a vast archive of Prigozhin's corporate empire that was leaked to them, as well as their interviews with mercenaries. The fact that Wagner offered the kind of salaries these men would never get anywhere else loomed large. In 2017, the Wagner salary of Rbs250,000 a month was worth around $4,300 – six times the national average wage in Russia at the time. Even by Moscow standards, such salaries were very high indeed; outside of Moscow, unheard of. The dramatic culmination of Prigozhin's story, too, is a testament to a broader trend. His rebellion against the system was triggered by bureaucratic pressure. The Russian state wanted to control all those fighting against Ukraine, forcing private military companies and volunteer units to sign contracts with Russia's Ministry of Defence (MoD). Moscow did not need the plausible deniability of Wagner, Cossacks and ragtag nationalist militias any more. It was now openly and brazenly invading Ukraine under the pretext of 'denazification' and wanted to have full military control. When Prigozhin pushed back against the MoD takeover, the palace intrigue ran out of control. He questioned the Kremlin's justification for the invasion, criticised the rampant corruption of Russian elites and even suggested that a certain 'grandpa' in charge of Russia could be 'a dickhead'. Grandpa was the opposition's nickname for Putin, popularised by Alexei Navalny. A showdown was imminent, and Prigozhin blinked first, launching his mutiny before abruptly aborting it. Shortly afterwards, he was dead. [See also: Death of a warlord] But having dispensed with Prigozhin, the Putin regime appears transformed by its former enforcer. Practices he pioneered have been adopted and taken to another level. Recruitment of convicts is now run at such a scale that entire prisons have been hollowed out. And bribes to entice Russian men to fight keep growing. Recently, regional governments started offering new recruits 'staggering sums' with sign-up bonuses of up to $40,000, a BBC investigation revealed. Moreover, the mercenary group changed the very way Russia executes its war. Wagner's tactics at Bakhmut 'led to the systematic adoption of assault groupings, and expendable convict-staffed formations across the Russian military', wrote Michael Kofman, a leading expert on the Russian military. He called the process the 'Wagnerisation of the Russian army'. With up to a million Russians having signed contracts to fight in Ukraine, it may be time to consider the Wagnerisation of Russia. Being paid to kill Ukrainians is today among the highest paying jobs in the country. But for its owner, Wagner was never a golden goose the way, for example, his food catering services in Russia were. Instead, Lechner places the private military company in the broader context of Prigozhin's attempts to ingratiate himself with Putin, the case of the troll factory meddling in the US elections being another prominent example. It was about status, the restaurateur-turned-warlord being 'hell-bent on joining the elite', the author suggests. In the process, he helped bring about the new age of private warfare. Private military companies 'helped usher us into the 17th century with 21st-century technology – onto a battlefield in which the distinction between soldier and mercenary is close to immaterial', Lechner writes, drawing parallels between the likes of Blackwater founder Erik Prince and Prigozhin and the condottieri of Italian city states. In the new era of conflicts between global and regional powers, the mercenaries have returned. There was initial hesitation: Western leaders' thinking was shaped by the post-Cold War 'peace dividend', with Russia humbled by its defeat in Afghanistan and the Cold War in general, while America was still haunted by the spectre of Vietnam. In the era of liberal interventionism and the war on terror that followed, policymakers offered elaborate justifications and set tight rules for use of force. Their justifications later proved bogus, and all rules were trespassed. But disillusionment with war has not sparked a pacifist revival. All around the world, not just in Moscow, there is less hesitation about using military force – and less need to hide behind private contractors. The US support for Israel's war in Gaza is an open-ended commitment, as is Nato's intelligence-sharing, weapons supplies and training of Ukraine's armed forces. Israel and Iran, for the first time in their history, have exchanged direct blows. Reasons for going to war are framed in terms of 'existential threats' and therefore require no further explanation. Mercenaries are still in high demand, but their role is changing. What started as a bespoke service provided by highly skilled, well-paid ex-soldiers has turned into mass recruitment of cannon fodder from poor and conflict-torn regions and countries. These include thousands of Colombians fighting in Ukraine, Yemen and Sudan; hundreds of Nepalese serving as the first line of attack for Russian troops; and Syrians being recruited to kill and die in Azerbaijan, Libya and Niger. For this new age of private warfare, the transformation of Wagner is a useful case study. Founded as an elite group providing security, military training and guarding installations – a business model based on the American example of Blackwater – it grew into dispensable shock troops managed directly by the Russian state. If the US's overseas campaigns made the modern mercenary industry a lucrative career path for army veterans and well-connected hustlers, Putin's wars helped transform it into a global form of human trafficking for men from poor regions of Russia. That in 2025 Russian men are as keen as Colombians and Syrians to fight for money in distant lands is perhaps the best indicator of the desperation, hopelessness and nihilism in Russian provinces after a quarter century of Putin's rule, despite all the talk of Moscow's economic resilience. Death Is Our Business: Russian Mercenaries and the New Era of Private Warfare John Lechner Bloomsbury USA, 288pp, £23 Our Business is Death: The Complete History of the Wagner Group Ilya Barabanov and Denis Korotkov StraightForwardFoundation, 291pp, $9.99 [See also: Trump's nuclear test] Related
Yahoo
06-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
The Latest Escalation Between Russia and Ukraine Isn't Changing the Course of the War
The empire strikes back. Last week, Ukrainian spies destroyed a large chunk of Russia's fearsome nuclear bomber fleet using small, smuggled drones. On Friday, Russia retaliated with some of the largest air raids against Ukraine to date. The Russian air raids killed eight Ukrainians and wounded 46. They also sent the message that, as Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday, the current round of peace talks is over. On the whole, however, neither the Ukrainian guerrilla operation nor the old-fashioned Russian retaliation changed the course of the war. Russia has a slight, but not decisive, advantage. Russian forces have been gaining ground in Ukraine at a slow rate and high cost. Although they have continued to suffer from manpower shortages, Ukrainian forces have managed to inflict greater losses on the Russian side. The human butchery on the front lines can continue for the time being. Of course, the attack on the Russian nuclear bomber fleet matters a lot for the global balance of power. And Ukraine has grown quite bold at attacking Russian interests outside of Ukraine. Ukrainian operatives have reportedly blown up the Nord Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea, captured Russian mercenaries in Sudan, enabled Tuareg rebels to kill dozens more Russian mercenaries in Mali, and trained Syrian rebels to use drones against the former government of Bashar Assad, a Russian ally. Rather than changing the balance of forces on the battlefield, these moves serve two psychological purposes. On one hand, they blunt Putin's confidence that he can simply wait Ukraine out. U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly told European leaders last month that Putin doesn't want to end the war because he believes Russia is winning. On the other hand, Ukrainian operations help demonstrate Ukraine's usefulness to its foreign backers. Even more than having to justify the financial cost of U.S. aid, over $128 billion in total, Ukraine has to compete for scarce physical resources with other theaters of war. (Late last month, the U.S. military decided to move anti-drone proximity fuzes from Ukraine to American forces in the Middle East.) And Trump has made no secret of his belief that Ukraine is a freeloader that doesn't "have the cards." After the drone attack, Ukrainian spokespeople bragged that they do, in fact, hold "the cards." The Trump administration was reportedly very impressed by the "badass" Ukrainian attack. As one White House adviser told Axios, "you've got a chihuahua inflicting some real damage on a much bigger dog." Feats of reckless defiance might prove more effective than the half-baked scheme to market Ukraine's non-existent mineral wealth to Trump. Many political figures have misread Trump as someone who enjoys flattery. But he does not necessarily respect those who grovel before him, whether it's domestic politicians or allied heads of state, and he does enjoy winning over adversaries. Congress is also getting ready to impose new economic sanctions on Russia, something that Trump has threatened to do over the past few months. The Wall Street Journal reports that the White House is fighting to "water down" the legislation, but the dispute seems to be more about keeping the president's options open to lifting sanctions than the strength of the pressure. Unlike in the Middle East, where U.S. enemies are relatively weak and American partners are extremely reliant on U.S. support, the United States does not have an easy "off" switch for the Russian-Ukraine war. Europe provides Ukraine with slightly more aid than the United States. Although U.S. aid to Ukraine has been massive—and irreplaceable in the areas of air defense and intelligence—Ukraine can fight on for quite a while with European support and its own domestic capabilities. "Both sides are suffering before you pull them apart, before they're able to be pulled apart," Trump told reporters at the White House on Tuesday. "You see in hockey, you see it in sports. The referees let them go for a couple of seconds, let them go for a little while before you pull them apart." That's a lot of suffering in the meantime. A recent estimate put overall casualties of the war—which includes both wounded and killed—at 1.2 million troops since 2022. And the United Nations has recorded 45,000 civilian casualties in Ukraine throughout the war. Each of those numbers represents a family torn apart forever. However depressing the situation sounds, the fact that neither side has a clear path to victory means that they will both have to come back to the negotiating table. It's in America's interest for this war to end as quickly as possible, and as other conflicts show, the U.S. can do a lot of good as a distant but powerful mediator. The post The Latest Escalation Between Russia and Ukraine Isn't Changing the Course of the War appeared first on
