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The National
29-05-2025
- Business
- The National
The Gulf and South-East Asia show civilisations can work together, despite their differences
The second summit between the Association of South-East Asian Nations and the Gulf Co-operation Council wound up in Kuala Lumpur around lunchtime on Tuesday. In the afternoon, the regional groupings were joined by China, for the first ever Asean-GCC-China trilateral. Did the gatherings constitute one of the 'most substantive' milestones in 10-nation Asean's history, as this year's chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, put it? Was the trilateral 'historic', as the Malaysian academic Phar Kim Beng argued last week, because 'it institutionalises symmetry among three civilisational spheres – maritime South-East Asia, the Islamic Gulf, and Confucian China'? Or was the Asean-GCC meeting a small and incremental step forward for two very different regional blocs, with the addition of an extra meeting with China that may turn out to have been a one-off? There may be elements of truth in all three statements. Mr Anwar made a confident case, saying he thought 'the Asean-GCC partnership has never been more vital than it is today'. He pointed to both region's centuries of history as trading hubs, mentioning that Oman and the Malaysian city of Malacca had both served as 'strategic crossroads that linked East and West, demonstrating the power of openness, exchange and strategic connectivity'. Kuwait's Crown Prince, Sheikh Sabah Al Khaled Al Sabah, also called the partnership 'vital'. He said: 'Together our 16 nations represent immense economic and human potential, with a combined GDP nearing $6 trillion and a population of about 740 million.' The total trade volume between the two blocs stood at $131 billion in 2023, he added – a figure he expected to rise to $180 billion by 2026. 'The growth in GCC-Asean trade, along with rising Gulf investments in Asian markets, reflects mutual confidence and deepening economic integration.' Chinese Premier Li Qiang said that Beijing was 'willing to join hands with Asean and the GCC to fully harness the synergy of one plus one plus one being greater than three, and inject powerful momentum into the common development and prosperity of our three sides' and that 'differences are not obstacles to co-operation – rather, they present opportunities for complementarity'. Prof Phar Kim Beng's at-times rather poetic essay also pointed out that 'when senior officials discuss port interoperability, halal certification frameworks, or AI governance standards, they are doing more than negotiating terms – they are creating a shared civilisational grammar … China's Digital Silk Road, the GCC's green hydrogen corridors, and Asean's biodiversity-based value chains are not competing blueprints. They are complementary avenues for creating value – and values – across regions that refuse to be passive recipients of a waning Bretton Woods system'. There should be a kind of magic, even a touch of romantic idealism, about trying to bring these two regions (and China) closer There's no doubting that the sentiment between the leaders, ministers and officials in the meeting halls was warm and genuine. Timor-Leste Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao – present because his country is expecting to join Asean later this year – spread the joy when he unexpectedly handed out chocolates to reporters waiting outside the ballroom at the Kuala Lumpur Convention Centre after the first of Tuesday's summits. 'Take it, you've waited so long,' he told them with a smile. The summits also concluded with a joint statement that underlined the commitments of Asean, the GCC and China to peace, stability, dialogue, development, mutual respect and co-operation, non-interference into the internal affairs of others, and to strengthening collaboration between the regions. But that doesn't mean that getting there was easy or that concrete results will automatically follow without much further work. Negotiations in the run-up to the summits were 'hard', I'm told by a senior official involved. There were substantial differences in style and process between the GCC and Asean – which is not surprising, considering how different their make-ups are. The GCC countries are all Arab Muslim and the amount they have in common may aid faster decision-making. Asean, on the other hand, is made up of states with so many different faiths and ethnicities that the region was once known as 'the Balkans of Asia'. The association is used to a very measured – critics would say laboured – way of reaching conclusions. I'm told that some on the GCC side were pushing for a mutual free trade agreement fast, whereas some Asean members were suggesting that the GCC should consider joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – a free trade agreement that includes all Asean countries, plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. 'And in any case,' one other official said to me, 'the Asean way is that we can't take a formal decision without doing a study first.' Differences in approach may have led to some misunderstandings. Some on the Asean side felt their GCC counterparts didn't always appreciate the advances some of their countries had made. On the other hand, perhaps because of its long and deep institutional relations with Beijing, there is a danger that Asean overestimates the extent to which it is needed as a 'bridge' between the Gulf and China – two parties that now know each other extremely well. This doesn't appear to be a problem at the top level. It is among the ranks of diplomats and sherpas on both sides that these issues must be worked through – for it is they who will need to put in the hard yards to turn warm words into economic mechanisms that benefit the peoples of both the Gulf and South-East Asia. It's not just a matter of material progress, and shared and equitable prosperity, important though both are. There should be a kind of magic, even a touch of romantic idealism, about trying to bring these two regions (and China) closer. And so, I will leave the last words to Prof Phar. The senior officials who were working to make the Kuala Lumpur summits a success were doing more than laying the groundwork for trade, he wrote. 'They are rewriting the rules of recognition. They are showing that in a fragmented world, civilisation can still speak to civilisation – not through weapons or treaties, but through standards, ports, and trust.'
Barnama
15-05-2025
- Politics
- Barnama
- Malaysia and ASEAN Are Right to Engage Russia Deeply – Despite the War in Ukraine
15/05/2025 04:21 PM Opinions on topical issues from thought leaders, columnists and editors. By Phar Kim Beng As the geopolitical tremors of the Ukraine war continue to reshape global alignments, it may appear counterintuitive that Malaysia and ASEAN are seeking to deepen engagement with Russia. After all, ASEAN as a regional organisation has collectively expressed concern over the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty, following the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022. The Chairman's Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 2022 emphasised 'respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful resolution of disputes'. But ASEAN's embrace of diplomacy – even toward contentious actors – is not naiveté. Rather, it is a principled realism shaped by decades of navigating major power rivalries. The path forward is not disengagement, but deeper engagement – one that encourages Russia to act not merely as a great power, but as a responsible power capable of contributing constructively to the peace and prosperity of East Asia. ASEAN was never meant to be a military alliance or a tribunal for disciplining major powers. It is, instead, a convening platform designed to keep open channels of communication among actors with vastly different worldviews. Its architecture -anchored in ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – functions precisely because it welcomes all parties, including rivals and antagonists. Engaging Russia within this framework is not a sign of approval of its actions in Ukraine, but a recognition that global peace requires the inclusion, not isolation, of great powers. The East Asia Summit scheduled for October 2025 in Kuala Lumpur is an opportunity for Russia to return to the table, to listen, to reflect, and to re-engage with Asian partners beyond the shadow of war. Moreover, Malaysia and ASEAN share a long-term vision of a multipolar world order, one not defined solely by U.S.-China competition. The Indo-Pacific is not destined to be a bipolar arena. ASEAN's own Indo-Pacific Outlook promotes inclusivity, balance, and cooperation. Strategic diversity in this region – through the presence of India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and Russia – helps to prevent the domination of any single power, preserving ASEAN's autonomy and policy space. This is why Russia's continued involvement is valuable. Not because ASEAN condones aggression, but because it recognises the dangers of exclusion, polarisation, and bloc politics. Malaysia, as a neutral, trade-dependent country with a tradition of non-alignment, sees engagement as the wiser path. The East Asia Summit is a test of whether Russia is willing to conduct itself in line with the norms and principles of regional stability. Economic, Energy, and Defence Ties with Russia Are Still Relevant Despite Western sanctions, Russia remains a major energy producer, a source of advanced defence technology, and a critical member of global food and fertilizer supply chains. For countries like Vietnam, Laos, and even Indonesia, Russian arms and military cooperation remain significant. Malaysia itself operates Russian-origin Su-30MKM fighter jets, which require sustained technical collaboration. Cutting off ties would not only be impractical but potentially dangerous – forcing ASEAN states into greater dependency on a single supplier or bloc. Pragmatic cooperation, without legitimising aggression, is the wiser path. Russia's Role in Eurasian Integration and the Arctic May Impact ASEAN While distant in geography, Russia's activities in Central Asia, the Northern Sea Route (NSR), and Arctic energy development hold long-term implications for ASEAN's connectivity and climate resilience goals. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) increasingly intersects with Russia's Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), shaping transcontinental trade routes that could complement ASEAN's interests. ASEAN wants Russia to play a thoughtful role in this Eurasian architecture – one that enhances regional integration rather than reproduces Cold War-style blocs. Engagement allows ASEAN to influence, however subtly, the evolution of this role. Russia at the East Asia Summit 2025: A Test of Maturity The East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur this October will serve as a litmus test for Russia. Will it continue to define itself primarily through antagonism and historical grievances? Or will it embrace the spirit of the EAS – openness, cooperation, and strategic restraint? ASEAN is extending the invitation not as a reward, but as a challenge. It hopes Russia will rise to the occasion, to prove it can be more than a revisionist power – perhaps even a civilisational interlocutor. Malaysia, as host, is uniquely positioned to deliver this message with moral clarity. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim's long-standing emphasis on justice, dialogue among civilisations, and inclusive governance offers a template for what a better Russia can look like – if it chooses to be one. Conclusion: From Power to Purpose ASEAN's engagement with Russia does not condone war; it calls for wisdom. It does not validate violence; it invites transformation. At a time when Russia is increasingly portrayed in zero-sum terms, ASEAN offers a third way: principled pragmatism anchored in peace. Malaysia and ASEAN are not naïve. They understand power. But they also understand purpose. The East Asia Summit in October 2025 is a chance for Russia to demonstrate that it, too, can understand both. And perhaps, act accordingly. -- BERNAMA Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia. (The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of BERNAMA)
Malay Mail
08-05-2025
- Politics
- Malay Mail
Why the accusation of Malaysia ‘not being a neutral mediator' in the ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan? — Hafiz Hassan
MAY 8 — I refer to Phar Kim Beng's 'Why third-party mediation in South Asia is not bias — but urgent diplomacy'. Perhaps Indian journalist Palki Sharma should look at India's official position on Gaza where Minister of External Affairs (MEA) in a parliamentary answer said: 'India has strongly condemned the terror attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023 and also the loss of civilian lives in the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. India has called for ceasefire and sustained humanitarian assistance to the people of Gaza. During the ongoing conflict, India has provided 70 tonnes of humanitarian aid including 16.5 tonnes of medicines and medical supplies. We have also called for the release of remaining hostages. 'We remain concerned at the deteriorating security situation and have called for restraint and de-escalation and emphasised a peaceful resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy. Palestinians carry a victim after an Israeli airstrike, in Gaza City, May 7, 2025. According to the author, while India has condemned Hamas's attack on October 7, 2023, and is concerned at the situation in Gaza, it has not condemned Israel's genocidal attack on Gaza. — Reuters pic 'India's policy towards Palestine has been long standing and we have always supported a negotiated two State solution, towards establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine within secure and recognised borders, living side by side in peace with Israel.' While India has condemned Hamas's attack on October 7, 2023, and is concerned at the situation in Gaza, it has not condemned Israel's genocidal attack on Gaza. According to progressive groups in India, the country has maintained a very ambiguous stance on the Israeli war in Gaza in the UN too. India's failure to take a principled position on Israel's criminal behavior has been 'shameful' and 'unprecedented'. One may recall Prime Minister Narendra Modi's initial response to Hamas' attacks where Modi immediately tweeted: 'Deeply shocked by the news of terrorist attacks in Israel. Our thoughts and prayers are with the innocent victims and their families. We stand in solidarity with Israel at this difficult hour.' Four days later, he tweeted: 'People of India stand firmly with Israel in this difficult hour. India strongly and unequivocally condemns terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.' The Indian prime minister's tweet has been largely seen as a categorical tilt toward Israel. India's official position on the Gaza conflict is said as reflecting its broader aspirations on the global stage. In October last year, Ranjith Rebello wrote in the Diplomatist: 'As a rising power and a member of the G20, India seeks to play a more prominent role in international diplomacy. Its approach to the Gaza conflict is consistent with its broader foreign policy objectives, which include promoting dialogue, conflict resolution, and respect for international law. India's emphasis on a two-state solution aligns with its advocacy for a rules-based international order and its support for multilateralism.' If such is India's approach to the situation in Gaza — diplomacy, dialogue, respect for international law — why the accusation of Malaysia 'not being a neutral mediator' in the ongoing tensions between India and Pakistan? * This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
