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The Hill
4 days ago
- Politics
- The Hill
Potential unrest at home and abroad puts the US in an uneasy position
Israel's strikes against Iran, launched in the early hours on Friday, followed up by attacks against Iran's natural gas facilities, raise an important question: What could go wrong? The consequences of these attacks, which could also cripple Iranian air and other defenses, and which Israel says will continue until Iran cannot build a nuclear weapon over the short and possibly medium term, will be profound and unpredictable. Whether this escalates further and leads to the overthrow of the ayatollahs or a negotiation is among the possible outcomes. As with Ukraine's Operation Spider Web, these attacks demonstrate operational brilliance of the first order. One wonders if the U.S. and NATO could show this level of innovative thinking and planning. Still, the conflict in Gaza is burning. And the war in Ukraine shows no sign of abating — quite the opposite, given the likelihood of an ongoing Russian summer offensive. Events at home are equally volatile and unpredictable. The National Guard and a battalion of U.S. Marines have been deployed to deal with the protests and violence taking place in Los Angeles over immigration policies and the role of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency in arresting migrants accused of illegally entering the U.S. and who, in some cases, have committed serious crimes. While this violence could spread across the nation, the parade in Washington marking the Army's 250th birthday, as well as President Trump's 79th birthday, was relatively protest-free, despite the 'No Kings' protests taking place in several cities the same day. However, what transpired in 2020 with the unrest following protests of the murder of George Floyd, or even the protests that sprang up during the Vietnam War, could happen again, putting the country in disarray. That chaos could be intensified as both parties see it in their interest to take opposing stands on immigration, making a bad situation much worse. Where is this headed? History bears some lessons. In a little-publicized story so far, the Pentagon is reviewing the AUKUS submarine deal signed between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. to provide five to eight nuclear submarines to the latter. Should the Pentagon recommend that the administration modify or revoke the agreement, it will surely be another arrow into the heart of American credibility and reliance as an ally. Some six-plus decades ago, the U.S. backed out of the Skybolt program with the U.K. The aim was to build an air-launched intercontinental ballistic missile. The U.K. had structured its nuclear posture around Skybolt. Canceling the program was another reason why being a friend of the U.S. in many ways is worse than being an enemy, who cannot be disappointed in this way. The AUKUS review coming weeks before the NATO Hague Summit with heads of government was far from ideal, given Trump's uneven behavior towards the alliance and America's commitment to it. The administration is pushing for NATO members to increase defense spending to 3.5 percent of GDP, with an additional 1.5 percent committed to enhancing related infrastructure, including a defense industrial base. That figure is probably unobtainable for most members, including the U.S., which spends about 3.2 percent of its GDP on defense. And it is far from clear how more defense spending by individual NATO members will strengthen the military power of the alliance as a whole, absent a cogent strategy and plan for making the most effective use of these increases. Since World War II, the U.S. has confronted simultaneous crises at home and abroad. Protests over Vietnam and civil rights enforcement during the 1950s and 60s turned violent. The U.S. has fought at least four major wars and one major campaign since World War II — Korea, Vietnam, Iraq twice and Afghanistan. The record has not been a good one. Many Americans see similarities between today and the late 1850s prior to the Civil War, and 1914 before World War I, in terms of extreme political tensions. History may never repeat or rhyme. However, rarely have so many potential dangers been present at the same time. The U.S. is facing a crisis point on whether the current government and political process is capable of coping with or anticipating one or more potential hot spots exploding at home and abroad, especially if protests over ICE and immigration spread across the nation and one of the overseas conflicts escalates uncontrollably. At this stage, a great deal could go very wrong. Harlan Ullman, Ph.D., is UPI's Arnaud deBorchgrave Distinguished Columnist, a senior advisor at Washington, D.C.'s Atlantic Council, the chairman of two private companies and the principal author of the doctrine of shock and awe. He and David Richards are authors of a forthcoming book on preventing strategic catastrophe.
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First Post
6 days ago
- Politics
- First Post
A ‘new' old war: Why Jammu & Kashmir is more vulnerable than ever
The line between war and peace is increasingly blurred in Jammu and Kashmir, and Punjab as well, as proxies and hybrid non-state actors of Pakistan could adopt drone warfare tactics to create a disproportionate impact read more Let me recall moments from mid-1999, when I served as Colonel of the Rashtriya Rifles, an experience that profoundly shaped my understanding of Kashmir's counter-insurgency dynamics. While Operation Vijay was being fought on the heights of Kargil, the valley floor was also under siege — albeit of a different kind. The ISI, innovating once again, had infiltrated special suicide squads of highly trained and motivated terrorists, many led by Pakistani regulars. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Beginning July 1999, they launched sneak attacks on army and police camps that were then poorly secured by non-existent or minimal perimeters. It forced us into reactive postures. A large number of troops had to be diverted to static guard duties — defending installations, logistics hubs, and communication centres — all of which were vital not just for counter-insurgency (CI) operations but also for any future war. This diluted the effectiveness of our offensive posture; fewer troops were available for area domination, raids, and ambushes. Cut to 2025. While India analyses the success of Operation Sindoor through the lens of conventional escalation — targeting key assets in Pakistani Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir — one cannot ignore that the ISI and its ecosystem will also be conducting their own war games. Their objective would be to re-establish relevance in the Kashmir theatre and reclaim psychological initiative. Remember the Pahalgam attack of April 22, 2025, a brutal assault on tourists; it was not an isolated act. It was, in many ways, a copycat replication of Hamas' strike of October 7, 2023, on Israel — a sudden and high-visibility operation meant to create shockwaves and provoke. If we view Pahalgam in that light, it becomes clear that a new asymmetric campaign would be under contemplation — one that could integrate novel tactics and technologies for infiltration, recruitment of youth and management of hideouts. Also remember that the communication systems being used by terrorists are of the advanced Chinese versions, which are difficult to intercept. Enter drones, the bane of today's warfare. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Operation Spider Web: The New Template One of the most significant evolutions in modern warfare has been unfolding before our eyes in Ukraine. On June 1, 2025, Ukraine launched what is being referred to as Operation Spider Web — a sophisticated, long-range drone and sabotage operation deep inside Russian territory. The operation had reportedly been in planning for nearly 18 months. Small, innocuous-looking trucks — some pre-positioned and others inserted covertly — carried armed drones hundreds of kilometres into Russian territory. These were launched against airfields, command and control nodes, early warning systems, and other critical infrastructure. The results were spectacular; not just in terms of physical damage but also psychological disorientation. For a country like Ukraine with limited air power, this operation represented a stunning workaround, achieving strategic effects without traditional air superiority. The second Israel–Iran conflict of 2025 has added yet another layer of validation to this emerging pattern. For the second time in a single month, drones have not just crossed borders but have been launched from within adversary territory — in one case, reportedly from civilian rooftops in central Iranian towns. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Israel's imaginative use of small, autonomous drone swarms, leveraging both prepositioned assets and internal collaborators, illustrates the new grammar of warfare. It is a compelling real-world demonstration of how state-level actors are operationalising asymmetric drone strategies to create strategic surprise and psychological shock. If this is what state-on-state drone warfare looks like today, one can easily see how proxies or hybrid non-state actors in South Asia could mimic such tactics at a smaller scale with equally disproportionate impact. Just transpose this template to a sub-conventional, asymmetric theatre like J&K combined with Punjab. The implications are chilling — and very real. Drone Wars in the Kashmir–Punjab Belt Even though the number of terrorists operating inside the Kashmir Valley has dwindled, the threat is far from over. The conflict has been seeping southwards — into Rajouri, Reasi, Kathua, and even parts of Punjab. This southward spread coincides with the steady increase in drone sightings and recoveries along the Punjab border — originally attributed to narcotics smuggling, arms drops, and infiltration aids. If these drone operations are recalibrated for pure terror purposes, can one imagine the impact? It could also ensure the activation of all three target zones with lessened risk and yet a high scope for denial for the terror perpetrators. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Unlike 1999, today's terrorists can do far more damage with fewer men. The cost-benefit ratio of drone warfare is heavily tilted in favour of the attacker. Even low-cost recreational drones, assembled from commercial kits, can strike convoys, helipads, or civilian targets and create an impact in the information domain. GPS-guided kamikaze drones of the loitering variety can be launched from rooftops, fields, or moving vehicles. Encrypted communication apps, AI-assisted navigation, and satellite imagery make planning both detailed and deniable. The same open-source tools used by civilian OSINT communities — such as Google Earth and others — can be used for target acquisition, route mapping, and surveillance. A series of micro-drone attacks in a short span of time — on convoys on the Jammu–Srinagar highway, fuel dumps in rear logistics areas, or crowded civilian spaces — could paralyse response grids, spark panic, and create disproportionate psychological effects. That is exactly what terrorists sought in 1999 and managed to achieve for some time. This time the numbers could be higher as also the impact before the security forces find answers to neutralise them. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD A 'New' Old War What makes this emerging threat even more serious is that it blurs the line between war and peace. A drone strike from within Indian territory — launched from a hut, an orchard, or a cattle shed — does not carry the signature of cross-border infiltration. Attribution becomes tricky. This strategy suits the adversary perfectly; it revives terrorism without increasing physical infiltration. It creates 'ghost threats' — attacks without visible footprints. And it pulls in security forces into high-alert static duties, just like 1999 — thereby reducing proactive engagement options. In a sense, this becomes a hybrid warfare layer built on top of a disaggregated insurgency — a low-cost, high-impact model aimed at strategic paralysis and political destabilisation. Since the line between targeting civilians and security personnel has blurred with the Pahalgam attack, tourist spots would be constantly under threat, robbing both sides of the Pir Panjal of the tourist footprint. Even the Amarnath Yatra could come under threat. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Lessons from 1999, Warnings from 2025 If the post-Kargil 1999 asymmetric surge forced India to rethink perimeter security, troop deployment patterns, and intelligence integration, the post-Pahalgam, post-Spider Web world of 2025 demands even more. This is a battlefield of algorithms and altitudes, where satellites meet sabotage and where drones replace the fidayeen. The war in Ukraine has shown what's possible — and the threat landscape in Kashmir and Punjab is evolving to reflect that. It is time we anticipate what comes next — because the adversary could already be contemplating the next moves. It's not as if there aren't counters to this threat, but that will need a full essay to cover, perhaps in the near future. The writer is a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
Forbes
12-06-2025
- Politics
- Forbes
Ukraine's Effects-Based Precision Guided Munition Strikes: Implications
Ukrainian munition hitting Russian bomber On June 1, 2025, Ukraine launched a bold and innovative series of attacks against four Russian airbases, including some deep within Russian territory. As the world now knows, they used precision-guided munitions in the form of inexpensive quadcopters armed with small explosive charges. This operation, termed Operation Spider Web, was notable not only for the destruction of valuable Russian combat aircraft, but also for its profound strategic implications. These attacks exemplified an effects-based approach to operations by employing innovative means to achieve desired strategic outcomes in unconventional ways. Through these actions, Ukraine demonstrated that it is fighting smarter than the Russians, which highlights a potential strategy to defeat Russia's attrition-based combat approach. Central to any large-scale military campaign is the beneficial objective of gaining and maintaining control of the airspace—air superiority—to ensure freedom from attack, while also enabling optimal offensive operations. Counter-air operations, especially offensive counter-air missions targeting enemy aircraft on the ground, are critical to achieving this goal. Such missions traditionally involve coordinated efforts by strike packages of fighters, bombers, suppression of enemy air defense aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers to penetrate defended airspace and disable enemy command and control, communications, aircraft, airbases, and associated logistics support. Ukraine, lacking long-range bombers, possessing only a small number of modern strike fighters, no aerial tankers, minimal suppression of enemy air defense capability, and a limited stock of long-range missiles, applied non-traditional methods to achieve offensive counter-air effects. The result was the destruction or damage of multiple Russian bomber aircraft on the ground, thereby reducing Russia's capacity to launch offensive attacks against Ukraine. Most analyses describe Operation Spider Web as a special operations raid. Implementing an effects-based strategy goes beyond that approach. This type of strategy could be applied across all operational domains and employed by all military service components. The methodology aims to incorporate alternative actions that are effective against an enemy, moving beyond traditional force-on-force doctrines reliant on attrition to achieve exhaustion of an opponent. Instead of fighting an enemy in a linear fashion—blow for blow—the objective is to land a series of leveraged punches that deliver outsized impacts. This approach offers Ukraine the best chance to achieve its objectives against Russia. Russia's strategy hinges on leveraging its numerical superiority in troops, artillery, and other warfighting materiel to prevail in a prolonged war of attrition. Ukraine must execute its military operations to greater effect—as illustrated by its June 1st attacks. Ukraine should expand this approach to the entirety of key Russian centers of gravity—not only the counter-air target set. An effects-based strategy involves identification of and planning for alternative courses of action aimed at changing adversary behavior to achieve desired outcomes that ultimately support Ukraine's overall military and political objectives. These attacks represent more than tactical successes; they provide a broader strategic framework demonstrating how asymmetric innovation can serve as an alternative to brute force. By focusing on specific outcomes rather than engaging in direct large-scale confrontations, Ukraine showcases a viable path to victory. The principle is clear: in warfare, strategic insight and operational innovation can be more decisive than numerical superiority alone. It remains uncertain whether Ukraine will adopt this approach as the basis of its strategy against Russia, but doing so would likely increase their chances of success. As would the U.S. and Ukraine's western allies equipping Ukrainian forces to facilitate their success. That outcome is directly tied to securing U.S. critical national security objectives. Commentators assessing Operation Spider Web largely focus on aircraft vulnerabilities. However, the implications of recent attacks on infantry, tanks, ships, logistics, power generation, and other targets using inexpensive, small, and numerous precision guided munitions (lethal drones) are significant. These small uninhabited aerial vehicles have undeniably changed the character of warfare. Accurate assessment and realistic understanding of their implications are essential to capitalize on this reality. The actual effects of small lethal drones are many. Perhaps the most significant in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war is that they provide individual soldiers access and control of precision guided munitions. Before this war, these were generally only applied in quantity by combat aircraft. Facing an existential threat, Ukraine came up with a means to effectively defend themselves while compensating for their weapons deficiencies in both capability and capacity relative to Russia. Their solution was to develop cheap, numerous, easy to produce and tactically effective precision guided munitions, largely quadcopters delivering explosive charges, along with relatively inexpensive cruise missiles to give Ukraine the ability to strike critical targets in Russia. While the media is focusing on Ukraine's drone attacks on Russian airpower, their most effective use to date is in countering conventional infantry and armor engagements. Indeed, today nominally 80 percent of the targets engaged by Ukrainian Army units on the front lines are by portable precision guided munitions/ drones—we may be witnessing artillery being replaced by drones as the new 'king of the battlefield.' The vulnerability of aircraft—along with infantry, tanks, ships, etc.—in the open should not be a surprise to anyone. During the Cold War, U.S. Air Forces in Europe and in Korea were virtually all positioned in hardened aircraft shelters. The U.S. military leadership of the day understood the consequences of unprotected forward-deployed combat aircraft and were not willing to take that risk. With respect to forces based in the continental United States, the oceans were then still considered to be an effective defense. That is no longer the case. Portable precision guided munitions/ drones can be concealed and transported near the area of intended use by other means to overcome vast ocean distances. Not requiring complex or expensive construction, indigenous drones are easily constructed, Note the drone incidents that occurred at Virginia's Langley Air Force Base in December of 2023. The drone operators could have very easily executed a Ukrainian-style attack had they desired. A playbook titled 'Unrestricted Warfare' detailing non-traditional methods to accomplish desired effects was written by two Chinese Air Force colonels in 1999. It describes how China plans to nullify U.S. defenses using asymmetric means. We are on notice and the warning indicators have been blinking red for years. No one should be surprised that adversaries intend to hold U.S. forces overseas and in the continental U.S. at risk. Lethal drones provide a cheap, high volume, and effective means to actualize these sorts of concepts—not only against military targets—but even more leveraged targets in the form of vulnerable civil infrastructure such as electricity power generation, communication and transportation networks, oil, gas, water distribution, etc. The 1941 strike against Pearl Harbor was against a limited set of distant military installations. A modern equivalent could impact a broad range of targets across the U.S. in a very narrow window of time. If executed across a comprehensive set of key targets, America's ability to competently fight could be derailed at the opening of a conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, force protection has not been a priority for the U.S. armed forces or the civil authorities responsible for safeguarding critical infrastructure. This reality stems from a confluence of erroneous strategic assumptions, associated fiscal constraints, bureaucratic inertia, and risk taken based on a low probability of credible threat to justify the cost of protection. These presumptions are no longer tenable. Both the threats to U.S. forces and the capabilities of adversaries have advanced dramatically—and ignoring these changes puts American security at significant risk. As far back as 2004, while serving as the Director of Operations for Pacific Air Forces, I proposed building hardened aircraft shelters on Guam to protect B-2s and F-22s. That proposal was rejected due to insufficient funding. At the time, senior U.S. security leadership accepted the risk of attacks on Guam, and on the continental United States. Two decades later, that mindset is only now beginning to change, despite a radically different threat environment. China, by contrast, has taken the opposite view. It has made significant investments in protecting its airpower by constructing thousands of hardened shelters, underscoring a clear strategic emphasis on survivability. Perhaps the recent proliferation of portable precision-guided munitions/ drones will finally serve as a wake-up call for Department of Defense leadership, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congress to provide the required funding to secure our military assets. The vulnerability of unprotected U.S. air, space, sea, land, and cyber resources is clear. The widespread and innovative use of portable precision-guided munitions by Ukrainian forces has revealed the effectiveness of such weapons, even against major military powers. The U.S. military must respond with resolve. Base and area defense must become a top priority. That includes decentralizing operations, investing in layered defenses, and ensuring that its military forces are adequately protected. Airpower, along with every other element of military power, without assured survivability is a hollow deterrent. It may be rendered ineffective before it can be brought to bear in combat. Ensuring the ability to fight starts with protecting the ability to survive.
Yahoo
11-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Trump's Joint Chiefs chair says Putin won't stop at Ukraine
Joint Chiefs of Staff Chair Gen. Dan 'Razin' Caine told senators Wednesday that he did not believe Russian President Vladimir Putin would stop at Ukraine if he succeeds in overtaking the country, a marked contrast to President Trump's typical ambiguity on the question. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) asked Caine and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth whether Putin would 'stop at Ukraine' in a series of rapid-fire questions on foreign conflicts. 'I don't believe he is,' Caine told the Senate Appropriations subcommittee on armed services. Graham turned to Hegseth with the same question. 'Remains to be seen,' Hegseth said. The senator then said the answer was obvious. 'It doesn't remain to be seen. [Putin] tells everybody around what he wants to do,' the South Carolina Republican said, noting Russia's buildup of ordnance is well beyond what it might need to take Ukraine. 'I like what you're doing,' Graham added to Hegseth. 'I just think we gotta get this stuff right.' Graham had earlier asked Hegseth if he agreed the world miscalculated in its approach to Adolf Hitler in the years leading up to WWII. 'The danger that is like 50 million people get killed,' he said. 'So, let's don't do that.' Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), the subcommittee chair, came out of the gates asking Hegseth about Ukraine, asking which side he wanted to win the war. The Defense chief said the Trump administration wanted the killing to end but would not choose a side. Hegseth criticized former President Biden's handling of Russia and Ukraine before McConnell cut in to say he agreed the previous administration was 'completely inadequate' and had encouraged Putin with its withdrawal from Afghanistan. 'But we are where we are, and beating up the past is not a plan for going forward to the future,' the former Republican leader said. He noted that other NATO members and Europe seemed to be spending more on defense generally and committed to increasing support for Ukraine. 'Everybody seems to be moving in the right direction, and they look at us and wonder whether we're in the midst of brokering what appears to be allowing the Russians to define victory,' McConnell said. Biden often spoke about Putin's threat beyond Ukraine's borders, both in terms of taking more territory in former Soviet states and emboldening autocrats around the world. Trump promised to end the war within 24 hours of taking office but has made little apparent headway about five months into his second term. Russia has so far refused U.S. proposals for a 30-day ceasefire. Trump has expressed increasing frustration with Putin, but often says he is unsatisfied with Ukraine as well. After Ukraine carried out a stunning drone attack on Russian military bases June 1, Trump complained it would set back his push for peace, comparing Russia and Ukraine to children fighting in a schoolyard. Russia has ramped up drone strikes on Ukraine since 'Operation Spider Web,' on Wednesday launching what Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the biggest strikes on Kyiv since the war began more than three years ago. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Time of India
11-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Ukraine fires, Russia retaliates, but diplomacy remains on the table: Where is Europe's largest conflict of the century heading?
Russia launched nearly 500 drones and missiles at Ukraine overnight this week in "a string of record‑breaking aerial assaults". 'Russia has been stepping up its barrages in recent months,' pushing to exhaust Ukraine's air defenses amid stalling peace talks, New York Times reported shortly after Ukrainian forces reported the attack. This escalation followed Ukraine's 'Operation Spider Web' on June 1, when Ukrainian drones targeted four Russian air bases simultaneously. Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like She Was The Dream Girl In The 80s, This Is Her Recently Undo Kyiv claims up to 41 Russian aircraft were destroyed, including around 34% of its cruise missile carriers, according to Ukraine's SBU intelligence. NATO confirmed that 'over 40 aircraft were damaged, 10 to 13 ... completely destroyed' . Moscow disputes those numbers. Despite these military blows, diplomatic channels have mildly advanced. Following Istanbul talks on June 2, Ukraine and Russia agreed on a phased exchange of POWs – at least 1,200 on each side – and the return of war dead . Live Events Kyiv says the broader ceasefire discussions have 'sputtered,' with little progress beyond this humanitarian deal . Covert operations deep within Russia While ceasefire talks stagger on, Ukraine has launched a shadow war inside Russia, targeting critical infrastructure and key officials, according to a report by DW. In the latest, a series of explosions on Russian rail lines in Belgorod and Voronezh prompted terrorism investigations. Authorities say no one was injured, but the sabotage strikes mirror earlier actions including train derailments and attacks on bridges in Bryansk and Kursk on June 1 — incidents blamed on Ukrainian intelligence . Elsewhere, Ukraine has hit the Crimean Bridge, a strategic and symbolic Russian supply route. DW notes that Kyiv's SBU in June 2025 'placed underwater mines on pillars of the Crimean bridge and detonated them from a distance.' Though Russia denies serious damage, the strike briefly halted bridge traffic. Ukraine's drones have also extended their reach into military and civilian targets. Meanwhile, DW highlighted the assassination of high‑ranking Russian officers: Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov was killed in December 2024, and deputy missile designer Mikhail Shatsky, who was shot earlier this year . On the other hand, Russian aerial attacks increasingly reach beyond military objectives, hitting hospitals and other civilian infrastructure. According to The New York Times, 'Russia has been setting deadly records with the swarms of drones and missiles … often hitting civilian targets in towns and cities across the country' . Europe mobilizes: Could NATO face another war? What began as Vladimir Putin's bid to block Ukraine from joining NATO in 2022 has grown into a conflict reverberating across Europe—and now threatens the continent itself. Analysts and leaders are asking: Is Europe ready if war returns to NATO's frontiers? Europe has responded with sweeping defense measures. ABC News Australia reports that Poland plans military training for every adult male, aiming to expand its armed forces to 500,000. Norway has reinstated bomb shelter mandates for new buildings. Germany has unlocked billions to boost defense capacity. Additionally, along the eastern NATO border, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have withdrawn from the Ottawa landmine ban in order 'to give their troops flexibility and freedom of choice to defend NATO's eastern flank' . These actions follow warnings from Danish and German intelligence that a Russian attack could materialize 'in as little as five years.' Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen told ABC, 'It cannot be ruled out that within a three‑ to five‑year period, Russia will test Article 5 and NATO's solidarity' . Jakub Janda, Centre for Security Policy, Prague, summed it up starkly: 'If there is a ceasefire in Ukraine, time will start running out as Russia will be preparing for its campaign against NATO on a full scale' . Yet severe challenges lie ahead. Stephan Fruehling, from Australia's ANU, warns Europe still lacks sufficient manpower: 'Europe just doesn't have the forces that you need to hold front lines,' while Russian forces still number over 1.5 million active troops . The prospect of nuclear deterrence is also in flux. While NATO continues to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, some European nations are exploring greater strategic autonomy—looking toward France and Britain. However, their combined nuclear arsenals 'hardly compares to Russia and the U.S.,' making prospects for a European nuclear deterrent uncertain . Russia-Ukraine war: What world leaders say With battlefield momentum swinging between escalation and sabotage operations, world leaders are voicing increasing concern. Ukrainian President Zelenskiy says the POW exchange marks a rare diplomatic success: 'We count on the full implementation of the humanitarian agreements ... We are doing everything possible to bring back every single person' . The Trump administration maintains pressure for a ceasefire, though The New York Times observes Moscow is ignoring it: 'Efforts by the Trump administration to cajole both sides toward a ceasefire … sputtered' . European defense officials are unanimous: Italy, Baltic states, and Germany are investing heavily in military readiness. NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte confirmed summit talks on raising defense spending 'north of 3% of GDP' . Analysts suggest the next 12 months may prove decisive. Europe is arming and training; Ukraine is striking back; Russia is targeting civilian infrastructure with impunity. Stephan Fruehling puts it plainly: 'The good times were over in Western Europe' after Ukraine's full-scale invasion . Now, with European nations awakening to a grim new reality, the question remains: Will deterrence hold—or is Europe already in its next war?
