Latest news with #Mojtaba
Hindustan Times
10 hours ago
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei picks possible successors amid Israel's assassination threats, son not among them: Report
Jun 21, 2025 05:44 PM IST Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has reportedly named three clerics as possible successors while taking shelter in a bunker amid assassination threats from Israel during the ongoing conflict. A demonstrator holds a picture of Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as people gather for a rally in solidarity with Iran after Friday prayers, amid the Iran-Israel conflict, in Beirut's southern suburbs, Lebanon.(REUTERS) The New York Times, citing three Iranian officials familiar with the development, reported that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has begun appointing replacements for top military commanders who were killed in Israeli strikes. Interestingly, contrary to earlier reports, the officials said Ali Khamenei's son, Mojtaba, is not among the clerics shortlisted to succeed him – despite previous claims that he was being groomed for the role. This is a developing story. More details are awaited.
Euronews
2 days ago
- Politics
- Euronews
If Israel kills Iran's Khamenei, could his son Mojtaba suceed him?
Israel's military campaign against Iran has raised questions about the future leadership of the Islamic Republic and who will succeed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei if he is killed. After assassinating several top Iranian military officials and nuclear scientists, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has warned that Khamenei could be next. Khamenei has rejected US calls for surrender in the face of Israeli strikes and warned that any military involvement by Washington would cause "irreparable damage". US President Donald Trump said earlier this week that the US knew where Khamenei was "hiding" but that "we are not going to take him out ... at least not for now". As tensions continue to rise almost a week after Israel launched its surprise attack on its major rival Iran, reports have emerged of the growing influence of Khamenei's son Mojtaba — and the possibility of him succeeding his father if Israel wipe him out. Mojtaba is a mid-ranking cleric seen as an influential figure within Iran's decision-making circles, despite his lack of public appearances, insiders have previously told Reuters. Those sources said he has established solid ties with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other important religious and political players in Tehran. Although Khamenei has never endorsed a successor, Iran analysts say Mojtaba has long been considered as one of the main candidates to be the country's next supreme leader. The other was the late President Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash last May. Despite talk of his extensive influence, Iran's Assembly of Experts — the panel that will be tasked with appointing the country's next supreme leader — excluded Mojtaba from a list of potential candidates about six months ago, according to reporting by Reuters. However, although his popularity is said to have faded, sources said there had been behind-the-scenes lobbying by influential clerics to put his name back into the mix. US and Israeli officials have previously raised concerns that the lack of consensus over who should be the country's next supreme leader could complicate the succession phase, and lead to chaos within the regime, the Wall Street Journal reported last year. Iran watchers have also said that Khamenei opposes hereditary rule in a nation where the US-backed monarchy was overthrown in 1979. Nevertheless, the overlapping of religious and military institutions in Iran, as well as the lack of transparency behind the process to appoint the next supreme leader, means that Mojtaba cannot be ruled out. In an attempt to motivate people to come back home, Ukraine is allowing multiple citizenship for the first time ever in the country's history, the parliament in Kyiv, Verhovna Rada, decided in a bill passed on Wednesday. The president must now sign the law before it enters into force, which is expected to be a formality, given that Volodymyr Zelenskyy himself submitted the bill last summer. Oleksiy Chernyshov, Ukraine's vice prime minister and minister for national unity, says it is a crucial step to motivate the Ukrainians to come back home — not only those who left after Russia's all-out war in 2022, but also those who had to leave Ukraine when Russia first invaded in 2014. The number of Ukrainians currently abroad is very close to the number of those living in Ukraine: approximately 32 million Ukrainians reside in their home country, while up to 25 million Ukrainians are abroad. With this move, Kyiv wants to "unite Ukrainians throughout the globe," Chernyshov told Euronews. 'There are Ukrainians who stepped into the citizenship of other countries and we want to keep their Ukrainian identity, to give this opportunity to them. Within the current setup, there was only one choice of Ukrainian passport so now our citizens have the solution,' he explained. The Ukrainian government now needs to draft a list of countries whose citizens will be eligible for dual Ukrainian citizenship. Deputy Foreign Minister Serhii Kyslytsia said the law does not apply to Russian citizens or citizens of countries that do not recognise Ukraine's territorial integrity. Chernyshov told Euronews that Kyiv expects a third of those who left Ukraine since Russia's full-scale invasion in early 2022 to come back once the "the peace solution is reached," while the rest are likely to "monitor the situation and see whether it makes sense to come back." 'The answer lies in the framework of economic development and further reforms of our country that would definitely pave the way for future development and creation of new jobs, new opportunities, new business developments. And we are very, very dedicated to it," Chernyshov explained. 'I think they bring a lot of value to countries of the European Union right now. I heard it from many ministers of European Union countries, they value a lot the Ukrainian presence. That is why we will also have to compete among the labour markets and to provide better conditions:" What makes Ukraine optimistic about the return of its people is the past experience when the Ukrainians rushed to go back after Russian troops were pushed out of the Kyiv region and Kherson city, but also the fact that they were forced to leave their homes, rather than being willing to do so. 'Ukrainians came to Europe because of the full-scale aggression. They were not planning to do that. They feel, of course, in a way, homesick, and it's well understood," Chernyshov said. The bill also establishes new grounds for losing citizenship, including receiving a Russian passport or serving in the Russian military. Multiple citizenship will be recognised for foreigners from the listed countries who apply for Ukrainian citizenship, or if Ukrainian citizens apply for citizenship in these countries. It will also be recognised for Ukrainian spouses of foreign citizens and other specific cases.
Mint
4 days ago
- Politics
- Mint
Khamenei hands power to military as Israel tensions escalate — Is son Mojtaba emerging as Iran's key power broker?
As tensions with Israel intensify and pressure from the White House grows, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has transferred key authority to the Supreme Council of the Iranian military, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Iran Insight reported. This move follows claims that Khamenei has been moved to an underground bunker in northeastern Tehran, accompanied by close family members, including his son Mojtaba, according to a report by Iran Insight. Under Iran's system of government, Khamenei has supreme command of the armed forces, the power to declare war, and can appoint or dismiss senior figures including military commanders and judges. Distinct from Iran's conventional armed forces but officially part of the state, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintains its own army, navy, air force, and intelligence division. It operates under the direct authority of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The IRGC has operated as an elite military force loyal to Iran's Supreme Leader since its formation following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Its primary mission is to safeguard the Shi'ite clerical leadership and the Islamic Republic's political system. The IRGC claims a force of approximately 150,000 personnel across its various branches. It also oversees the Basij, a volunteer paramilitary group known for enforcing internal order and suppressing anti-government protests in support of the clerical regime. The United States designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation in 2019, as part of Donald Trump's policy of applying maximum pressure on Iran during his first administration, AP reported. The U.S. State Department said that the IRGC had been directly involved in terrorist plotting, accusing it of killing U.S. citizens and saying Iran was responsible for the deaths of at least 603 American service members in Iraq after 2003. Trump highlighted Iran's missile program as a major flaw in the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, citing its exclusion as a key reason for withdrawing from the agreement in 2018. The IRGC possesses significant conventional military hardware and capabilities, which it demonstrated through its active role in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. Khamenei has deployed the Revolutionary Guards and its affiliated Basij militia to quell national protests in 1999, 2009 and 2022. While the security forces have always been able to outlast demonstrators and restore state rule, years of Western sanctions have caused widespread economic misery that analysts say could ultimately threaten internal unrest. 'His son Mojtaba has grown ever more central to this process over the past 20 years, the sources said, building a role that cuts between the personalities, factions and organisations involved to coordinate on specific issues,' the sources told Reuters. A mid-ranking cleric seen by some insiders as a potential successor to his ageing father, Mojtaba has built close ties with the Guards, giving him added leverage across Iran's political and security apparatus, the people added, as reported by Reuters. 'Ali Asghar Hejazi, the deputy of political security affairs at Khamenei's office, has been involved in sensitive security decisions and is often described as the most powerful intelligence official in Iran,' the sources told Reuters. The deaths of senior Revolutionary Guard commanders have severely weakened the upper ranks of a military force that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has placed at the heart of Iran's power structure since assuming leadership in 1989. He has relied on the IRGC not only for domestic security but also to execute regional strategic objectives. Unlike Iran's regular army, which operates under the defence ministry and reports to the elected president, the IRGC answers directly to Khamenei. This direct link has allowed the Guards to acquire the country's most advanced military equipment across their land, air, and naval divisions, while also granting their commanders significant influence within the state. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, who was personally close to the Iranian leader, was killed by an Israeli airstrike in September last year and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was overthrown by rebels in December.
Yahoo
13-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Opinion - The Ayatollah's survival was no accident — it was Israel's choice, and a wise one
Israel just executed the most far-reaching decapitation strike in the history of Iran. Within hours, targeted airstrikes had eliminated Iran's top military planners — General Mohammad Bagheri, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and General Ali Rashid. Simultaneously, missile development facilities and key military coordination nodes were targeted, severing some of Iran's communication links with proxy networks in Syria and Iraq. And yet the man at the apex of the system, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not targeted. To some observers, this omission may seem inexplicable. But martyring Khamenei would have produced explosive consequences far beyond the battlefield. Under Iran's constitution, the death of the Supreme Leader triggers an emergency succession process managed by the Assembly of Experts. Since the March 2024 elections, this body has been dominated by clerics aligned with the hardline factions. Their candidate would likely be Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's son and behind-the-scenes enforcer. But Mojtaba faces a problem: He lacks the religious credentials necessary for the role. He has never issued a formal legal opinion, never taught in the traditional seminaries of Qom or Najaf and has never been accepted as a senior clerical authority. In Shi'a Islam, legitimacy must be earned through decades of scholarship and peer recognition — it is not inherited as with a monarchy. Had Israel killed Khamenei, this would likely have fast-tracked and legitimized Mojtaba's rise. Absent that, it would be very controversial. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq, for example, has long rejected Iran's system of having a cleric as a political ruler. As long as the Ayatollah lives to a ripe old age, Mojtaba is both too illegitimate to unify the system and too protected to be sidelined. Thus, he may stall Iran's succession process into a doctrinal stalemate — one that Israel has now made more likely by weakening his military protectors while leaving his father alive. Shi'a political theology is structured around martyrdom. The Seventh Century deaths of Ali and Hussein form the religious foundation of resistance and sacrifice. Had Khamenei been killed by an Israeli missile, it would not have been processed politically but mythologically. His death would have been viewed as a reenactment of the Karbala tragedy. That would have sanctified his son, unified Iran's factions, and legitimized violent escalation from Iran's regional proxies. These groups — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Kata'ib Hezbollah in Iraq — see themselves as guardians of the Supreme Leader's religious authority. Iranian defectors have long hinted at internal escalation plans that treat the assassination of the Supreme Leader as a trigger for full-spectrum retaliation: coordinated missile barrages, cyberattacks on Gulf energy terminals, and asymmetric operations against U.S. targets in the region. Sparing Khamenei denies Iran that trigger. It also preserves strategic ambiguity. By targeting Iran's ability to act but not its spiritual figurehead, Israel prevents the regime from invoking an existential crisis. The message to Iran's mid-level commanders and bureaucrats is clear: Escalation is not inevitable. There is still room for recalibration. Khamenei's regime has never relied solely on brute force. At the center of this is the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Supreme Leader. While nominally a clerical publishing organ, the office functions in reality as a doctrinal surveillance and enforcement bureau. Under the informal leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei, it regulates clerical discourse, curates access to the Supreme Leader, disciplines heterodox scholars, and manages a patronage economy for the seminaries. This system operates under the protection of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior command. The generals eliminated were the regime's enforcers of doctrinal compliance. Their presence deterred rebellion, reinforced Mojtaba's authority, and insulated the clerical apparatus from challenge. The strike helps to break this protective outer layer, leaving the regime's ideological core exposed and overextended. Israel should keep targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command. But it should not eliminate Mojtaba or high-profile hardliner clerics. That would risk martyrdom and consolidation. Instead, it should be to disrupt the infrastructure that sustains Mojtaba's influence. This includes severing the financial lifelines that fund loyalist seminaries, exposing internal contradictions within Qom's clerical elite, and quietly empowering transnational rivals — especially those aligned with Sistani in Najaf, who reject clerical political rule altogether. The goal should not be to decapitate the regime, but to delay, fragment, and deny. For the first time in decades, the Iranian religious establishment faces the threat of a vacuum of coercive insulation. In this new context, figures who once maintained quiet distance from the state may now emerge as active challengers to Mojtaba's succession, potentially leading to a schism that would dramatically affect the operations of pro-Iranian militias across the region. Their legitimacy not just to Tehran's treasury but also to the symbolic authority of the Supreme Leader. If that authority is contested — if Mojtaba is promoted without consensus — then these groups may begin aligning with other clerics or factions. Figures such as Qais Khazali or Hashem Safieddine, who combine militia leadership with religious aspirations, could become new centers of gravity. The result would be the transformation of the Axis of Resistance from a coordinated deterrent bloc into a constellation of semi-autonomous and potentially competing actors. In wars of theology, as in wars of missiles, the decisive blow is not the one that kills a man. It is the one that denies a myth. Carlo J.V. Caro is a New York-based writer who studied and lived in both Jordan and Israel. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
The Hill
13-06-2025
- Politics
- The Hill
The Ayatollah's survival was no accident — it was Israel's choice, and a wise one
Israel just executed the most far-reaching decapitation strike in the history of Iran. Within hours, targeted airstrikes had eliminated Iran's top military planners — General Mohammad Bagheri, General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, and General Ali Rashid. Simultaneously, missile development facilities and key military coordination nodes were targeted, severing some of Iran's communication links with proxy networks in Syria and Iraq. And yet the man at the apex of the system, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not targeted. To some observers, this omission may seem inexplicable. But martyring Khamenei would have produced explosive consequences far beyond the battlefield. Under Iran's constitution, the death of the Supreme Leader triggers an emergency succession process managed by the Assembly of Experts. Since the March 2024 elections, this body has been dominated by clerics aligned with the hardline factions. Their candidate would likely be Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader's son and behind-the-scenes enforcer. But Mojtaba faces a problem: He lacks the religious credentials necessary for the role. He has never issued a formal legal opinion, never taught in the traditional seminaries of Qom or Najaf and has never been accepted as a senior clerical authority. In Shi'a Islam, legitimacy must be earned through decades of scholarship and peer recognition — it is not inherited as with a monarchy. Had Israel killed Khamenei, this would likely have fast-tracked and legitimized Mojtaba's rise. Absent that, it would be very controversial. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani in Iraq, for example, has long rejected Iran's system of having a cleric as a political ruler. As long as the Ayatollah lives to a ripe old age, Mojtaba is both too illegitimate to unify the system and too protected to be sidelined. Thus, he may stall Iran's succession process into a doctrinal stalemate — one that Israel has now made more likely by weakening his military protectors while leaving his father alive. Shi'a political theology is structured around martyrdom. The Seventh Century deaths of Ali and Hussein form the religious foundation of resistance and sacrifice. Had Khamenei been killed by an Israeli missile, it would not have been processed politically but mythologically. His death would have been viewed as a reenactment of the Karbala tragedy. That would have sanctified his son, unified Iran's factions, and legitimized violent escalation from Iran's regional proxies. These groups — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Kata'ib Hezbollah in Iraq — see themselves as guardians of the Supreme Leader's religious authority. Iranian defectors have long hinted at internal escalation plans that treat the assassination of the Supreme Leader as a trigger for full-spectrum retaliation: coordinated missile barrages, cyberattacks on Gulf energy terminals, and asymmetric operations against U.S. targets in the region. Sparing Khamenei denies Iran that trigger. It also preserves strategic ambiguity. By targeting Iran's ability to act but not its spiritual figurehead, Israel prevents the regime from invoking an existential crisis. The message to Iran's mid-level commanders and bureaucrats is clear: Escalation is not inevitable. There is still room for recalibration. Khamenei's regime has never relied solely on brute force. At the center of this is the Office for the Preservation and Publication of the Works of the Supreme Leader. While nominally a clerical publishing organ, the office functions in reality as a doctrinal surveillance and enforcement bureau. Under the informal leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei, it regulates clerical discourse, curates access to the Supreme Leader, disciplines heterodox scholars, and manages a patronage economy for the seminaries. This system operates under the protection of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps senior command. The generals eliminated were the regime's enforcers of doctrinal compliance. Their presence deterred rebellion, reinforced Mojtaba's authority, and insulated the clerical apparatus from challenge. The strike helps to break this protective outer layer, leaving the regime's ideological core exposed and overextended. Israel should keep targeting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps command. But it should not eliminate Mojtaba or high-profile hardliner clerics. That would risk martyrdom and consolidation. Instead, it should be to disrupt the infrastructure that sustains Mojtaba's influence. This includes severing the financial lifelines that fund loyalist seminaries, exposing internal contradictions within Qom's clerical elite, and quietly empowering transnational rivals — especially those aligned with Sistani in Najaf, who reject clerical political rule altogether. The goal should not be to decapitate the regime, but to delay, fragment, and deny. For the first time in decades, the Iranian religious establishment faces the threat of a vacuum of coercive insulation. In this new context, figures who once maintained quiet distance from the state may now emerge as active challengers to Mojtaba's succession, potentially leading to a schism that would dramatically affect the operations of pro-Iranian militias across the region. Their legitimacy not just to Tehran's treasury but also to the symbolic authority of the Supreme Leader. If that authority is contested — if Mojtaba is promoted without consensus — then these groups may begin aligning with other clerics or factions. Figures such as Qais Khazali or Hashem Safieddine, who combine militia leadership with religious aspirations, could become new centers of gravity. The result would be the transformation of the Axis of Resistance from a coordinated deterrent bloc into a constellation of semi-autonomous and potentially competing actors. In wars of theology, as in wars of missiles, the decisive blow is not the one that kills a man. It is the one that denies a myth. Carlo J.V. Caro is a New York-based writer who studied and lived in both Jordan and Israel.
