Latest news with #MSCELSA-3
Time of India
5 days ago
- General
- Time of India
Exposing Systemic Flaws: The Sinking of MSC ELSA-3 and Its Lessons for Global Shipping, ET Infra
Advt Advt By , ETInfra On Saturday, May 24 around 1.30 p.m., container ship MSC ELSA-3 was just 38 nautical miles off the coast of Kochi when it developed a list or tilt to one side due to flooding in one of its holds, prompting a distress call from the ship's Captain Alexander Ivanov , a Russian call triggered panic among the authorities and as the news spread, the maritime and fishermen community feared the the 640 containers the ship carried (some of which had already fallen into the Arabian Sea due to the listing), 12 were loaded with calcium carbide, a hazardous chemical known for its violent reaction with water. In its tanks, the ship had 367.1 metric tonnes of very low sulphur fuel oil and 84.4 metric tonnes of oil/hazardous chemical spill would be disastrous for the environment and coastal communities apart from the expensive clean limited capacity to mount a coordinated emergency response and the absence of Tier 1 oil spill and salvage capacity in Indian ports such as Cochin, where the ship was headed, played on the minds of the authorities as the day wore on and the ship listed dangerously to Cochin Port Authority did not even have ocean going tugs or oil spill response units to assist the oil or chemical spill response equipment from abroad (nearest being Singapore and Bahrain) can take anywhere between 24 to72 hours, a delay that could prove the morning of Sunday, May 25, the ship capsized and sank in one of the biggest shipping disasters on the Indian the authorities scampered to get details of the ship to pin responsibility for the next course of action and check environmental hazards, they encountered, first-hand, what is regarded as one of the most opaque and under-regulated dimensions of global maritime commerce: the fragmented ownership, registration, management, and manning structures that define global shipping operations from being an anomaly or an isolated incident, the ship's convoluted configuration is emblematic of a deliberate design that prioritizes legal insulation over the 28-year-old container ship went down, it was flying the flag of Liberia - a classic Flag of Convenience ( FoC ) choice known for minimal regulatory intervention. A Flag of Convenience (FoC) or open registry is a business practice whereby a ship owner registers a vessel in the ship register of a country other than that of his own. The FoC regime does not levy any tax on ship owners but charge an annual amount based on the gross registered tonnage (GRT) of a ELSA-3's Liberian registry was only the beginning of a deeper maze. The vessel is owned by a German company, chartered on a slot-sharing basis by Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A., the world's biggest container line headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland and managed operationally by a firm based in Cyprus. The ship classification responsibilities were assigned to the French classification society Bureau Veritas (ship classification societies such as BV certifies a ship for its sea worthiness), while the ship was manned by a multinational crew comprising seafarers from Russia, Philippines, Ukraine, and other complex matrix of international ownership and management represents a microcosm of jurisdictional detachment that bedevils modern day implications of this web of opaque configuration are enormous. When the MSC ELSA-3 capsized and sank, it became virtually impossible to pin down a single point of liability or even a coherent chain of operational command. The flag state, Liberia, declined to participate in the investigation. The classification society that had certified the ship as seaworthy only months prior was not accountable for oversight failures. The German ship owner has maintained a legal distance through limited liability constructs. The manager in Cyprus held operational control, but not ultimate legal liability. MSC, the container shipping behemoth, claimed only a commercial interest through chartering of the fragmented control structure – typical of FoC regimes – obstructs clear liability and limits enforceability. The flag state's (Liberia) refusal, in writing, to participate in the post-incident investigation exemplifies the dilution of responsibility that FoC registration extreme fragmentation of responsibility is not accidental; it is engineered. It allows shipowners and charterers to dilute exposure to environmental damage claims, labour violations, tax liabilities, and safety lapses. In the case of MSC ELSA-3, this is further evidenced by the vessel's documented history of frequent name changes and ship registry shifts. From ' CSAV Barcelona ' to 'TMM Hidalgo' to ' Delmas Tourville ' to 'Jan Richter' to 'MSC ELSA-3', the ship had changed its identity at least ten times in less than two decades. Each change of name, flag, or manager coincided with opportunities to shed liability, evade scrutiny, or reposition under a more favourable regulatory practices, while not illegal, are at odds with the principles of transparency and responsibility embedded in the global maritime regulatory framework. The International Maritime Organization (IMO), the United Nations agency that regulates global shipping, has long promoted uniform safety and environmental standards, but in reality, fragmented governance severely weakens container ship had a history of deficiencies, the most recent of which were detected at Tuticorin Port in a ship like MSC ELSA-3, legally registered in Liberia, owned by a German company, managed from Cyprus, classed with a French entity, operated from the Mediterranean, and manned by a multilingual crew, suffers a major casualty, coastal states like India are left to manage the colossal crisis involving a clean-up costing hundreds of crores with minimal issue is compounded by the lack of mandatory public disclosure on beneficial ownership, the actual role of commercial operators in daily navigation decisions, and the operational influence of ship managers. Even in cases where insurers such as the Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs (third party liability underwriters) are involved, jurisdictional complications and multi-layered contracting structures delay compensation, investigation, and India is to protect its coast, trade routes, and maritime environment, it must challenge this structural opacity. Ships calling at Indian ports must be subjected to stricter requirements on transparency in ownership, crew composition, and management accountability. India must also push the IMO for reforms mandating full disclosure of beneficial ownership, enhanced flag state obligations, and clearer delineation of managerial versus operational control MSC ELSA-3 was not just a casualty of rough seas or human error. It was the predictable outcome of a system designed to divide responsibility to the point of disappearance. If left unchecked, this model will continue to shift the consequences of maritime failures onto states and communities least equipped to bear them. It is time for coastal nations to reclaim regulatory authority over ships that enter their waters, regardless of the paper trail they carry.
Economic Times
5 days ago
- Business
- Economic Times
Clear up the paper boat trail: Lessons from Kerala coast shipwreck
Too many hands on deck On May 24, MSC ELSA-3 was 38 nautical miles off the Kochi coast when it developed a list, or tilt to one side, prompting a distress call. Among the ship's 640 containers, 12 were loaded with calcium carbide, a hazardous chemical known for its violent reaction with water. It had 367.1 MT of low- sulphur fuel oil and 84.4 MT of diesel in its tanks. A day later, the ship capsized and sank in one of the biggest shipping disasters on the Indian limited capacity to mount a coordinated emergency response and the absence of tier-1 oil spill and salvage capacity in Indian ports such as Kochi, where the ship was headed, played on the minds of authorities. An oil/hazardous chemical spill would be disastrous for the environment and coastal communities, apart from the expensive clean-up. Even the state- owned Cochin Port Authority did not have ocean-going tugs or oil spill response units to assist the ship. As authorities scrambled to get details of the ship for the next course of action, they encountered an opaque and under-regulated dimension of global maritime commerce: the fragmented ownership, registration, management and manning structures that define global shipping operations today. Far from being an anomaly or an isolated incident, the ship's convoluted configuration is emblematic of a deliberate design prioritising legal insulation over the ship went down, it was flying Liberia's flag - a classic Flag of Convenience (FoC) choice known for minimal regulatory intervention. An FoC, or open registry, is a business practice whereby a shipowner registers a vessel in the ship register of a country other than their own. The FoC regime does not levy any tax on shipowners but charges an annual amount based on the ship's gross registered tonnage (GRT).MSC ELSA-3 is owned by a German company, chartered on a slot-sharing basis by Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A., headquartered in Geneva, and managed operationally by a firm based in Cyprus. The ship classification responsibilities were assigned to the French classification society Bureau Veritas, while a multinational crew manned the MSC ELSA-3 capsized and sank, it became impossible to pin down a single point of liability or even a coherent chain of operational command. Liberia declined to participate in the investigation. The classification society that had certified the ship as seaworthy was not accountable for oversight failures. The German shipowner has maintained a legal distance through limited liability constructs. The manager in Cyprus held operational control, but not ultimate legal liability. MSC, the container shipping behemoth, claimed only a commercial interest through the chartering of the fragmented control structure obstructs clear liability and limits enforceability. The flag state's refusal to participate in the post-incident investigation exemplifies the dilution of responsibility that FoC registration extreme fragmentation of responsibility is engineered. It allows shipowners and charterers to dilute exposure to environmental damage claims, labour violations, tax liabilities and safety the case of MSC ELSA-3, this is further evidenced by the vessel's documented history of frequent name changes and ship registry shifts. The ship had changed its identity at least 10 times in less than two decades - an opportunity to shed liability, evade scrutiny, or reposition under a more favourable regulatory practices, while not illegal, are at odds with the principles of transparency and responsibility embedded in the global maritime regulatory framework. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has promoted uniform safety and environmental standards, but fragmented governance severely weakens a ship like MSC ELSA-3 suffers a major casualty, coastal states like India are left to manage the colossal crisis, involving a clean-up costing hundreds of crores, with minimal issue is compounded by the lack of mandatory public disclosure on beneficial ownership, the actual role of commercial operators in daily navigation decisions, and the operational influence of ship managers. Even in cases where insurers such as the protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs (third-party liability underwriters for ships) are involved, jurisdictional complications and multilayered contracting structures delay compensation, investigation and India is to protect its coast, trade routes and maritime environment, it must challenge this structural opacity. Ships calling at Indian ports must be subjected to stricter requirements on transparency in ownership, crew composition and management accountability. India must also push the IMO for reforms mandating full disclosure of beneficial ownership, enhanced flag state obligations, and clearer delineation of managerial versus operational control left unchecked, this model will continue to shift the consequences of maritime failures onto states and communities least equipped to bear them. It is time for coastal nations to reclaim regulatory authority over ships that enter their waters, regardless of the paper trail they carry. Elevate your knowledge and leadership skills at a cost cheaper than your daily tea. Worrying cracks hiding behind MG Motor's own 'house of Windsor' Is India ready to hit the aspirational 8% growth mark? INR1,300 crore loans for INR100? Stamp duty notice to ArcelorMittal, banks. Why failed small businessmen die by suicide when those behind big blow-ups bounce back? 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Time of India
14-06-2025
- General
- Time of India
Who pays the price?
When the MSC ELSA-3 sank off the Kerala coast, identifying a clear line of liability or even a coherent chain of operational command proved almost impossible. The flag state, Liberia, refused to participate in the investigation. The Classification Society that had certified the ship as seaworthy only months earlier bore no accountability for oversight lapses. The German owner company maintained distance through limited liability. The Cyprus-based manager handled operations but carried no ultimate legal responsibility. Meanwhile, MSC—one of the world's largest shipping conglomerates—claimed only a commercial interest through charter. This tangled structure is no anomaly. It is the result of a deliberately opaque system designed to prioritize legal insulation over accountability. The MSC ELSA-3 had changed names and flags at least 10 times in under two decades—moving from CSAV Barcelona to TMM Hidalgo to Delmas Tourville to MSC ELSA-3—each change coinciding with opportunities to limit legal exposure, avoid scrutiny, or benefit from lenient regulation. While not illegal, this practice of shifting ownership, registry, and management undermines transparency and accountability. It stands at odds with the spirit of the international maritime framework set by the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which promotes safety and environmental responsibility. At the time of the incident, MSC ELSA-3 flew the Liberian flag—a classic example of a Flag of Convenience (FoC), often chosen for minimal regulatory scrutiny. But the vessel's operational complexity ran far deeper. It was owned by a German company, managed from Cyprus, chartered by MSC—a Swiss-based conglomerate—and certified by French classification society Bureau Veritas. Its crew was multinational, comprising seafarers from countries including Russia, the Philippines, and Ukraine. This spiderweb of ownership, management, registry, and operation illustrates how modern commercial shipping is designed to disperse responsibility across jurisdictions. In such setups, legal obligations are diluted across national borders, making it extraordinarily difficult for coastal states like India to enforce accountability or secure timely cooperation. The issue is compounded by the lack of mandatory public disclosure on beneficial ownership, the actual role of commercial operators in daily navigation decisions, and the operational influence of ship managers. Even in cases where insurers such as P&I Clubs are involved, jurisdictional complications and multi-layered contracting structures delay compensation, investigation, and resolution. For India, the lesson is urgent and clear. It must challenge this structural opacity. Ships calling at Indian ports must be subject to stricter requirements on transparency in ownership, crew composition, and management accountability. India must also push at the IMO for reforms mandating full disclosure of beneficial ownership, enhanced flag state obligations, and clearer delineation of managerial vs. operational control responsibilities. The MSC ELSA-3 wasn't merely lost to rough seas or human error. It was a victim of a system that fragments responsibility until it disappears. Unless this system is challenged, similar disasters will keep playing out in coastal waters, with little hope for justice or meaningful accountability. At the same time, such tragedies test not only our systems of rescue and recovery but also our sense of fairness, proportion, and justice. The contrast in societal, legal, and media response to such events reveals a disquieting inconsistency in how accountability is perceived—and demanded—depending on the domain of disaster. In the MSC ELSA-3 case, India's directorate general of shipping (DGS) promptly invoked provisions under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, launching a statutory investigation aligned with IMO's Casualty Investigation Code. Pollution control and salvage efforts began swiftly. Nonetheless, public anger surged. Kerala Police filed criminal cases under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). The high court questioned why arrests hadn't been made. Demands arose to apply international oil pollution laws—even though such conventions don't govern container vessels. Now contrast this with the Air India Dreamliner crash. No FIRs were filed. No pilot's family was harassed. The ministry of civil aviation launched an ICAO-compliant probe. Public debate remained within the bounds of regulatory procedure. The US handling of the Baltimore bridge collapse offers a further contrast. Despite major loss and global media coverage, there was no rush to criminalise the incident. A factual investigation was led by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), consistent with IMO protocols. Only after evidence emerged did the US department of justice weigh criminal action. India, too, is a party to multiple international conventions. The law is clear. The Merchant Shipping Act outlines a well-established process for marine casualty investigations. Internationally, the IMO framework is built on objectivity, fairness, and due process. Short-circuiting that process to satisfy public sentiment erodes global confidence in India's maritime administration. Investigations must be about finding facts—not scapegoats. The writer is a senior official with the shipping ministry. The views expressed are personal. Identity has been withheld on request Follow more information on Air India plane crash in Ahmedabad here . Get real-time live updates on rescue operations and check full list of passengers onboard AI 171 .
Time of India
13-06-2025
- Business
- Time of India
Loss of fish due to shipwrecks is economic loss: Kerala HC
Kochi: High court has observed that the loss of commercially harvested fish due to marine pollution caused by the recent shipwrecks in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) qualifies as an economic loss. The observation was made while considering a petition by former MP T N Prathapan, who sought a comprehensive compensation package for fishermen and other stakeholders affected by the ship accidents off the Kerala coast. The court emphasised that the EEZ — extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline — falls under the sovereign rights of the Union for exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of both living and non-living natural resources. The Union also holds exclusive jurisdiction to protect the marine environment and prevent marine pollution within this zone. Therefore, losses sustained in the EEZ must be considered for compensation, the court noted. The court is examining two recent maritime incidents: the sinking of MSC ELSA-3, a Liberian-flagged cargo vessel, on May 25 off the Kerala coast, and the fire aboard cargo ship WAN HAI 503, off the Kannur coast on June 9. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Memperdagangkan CFD Emas dengan salah satu spread terendah? IC Markets Mendaftar Undo As per the HC's directive, the cargo manifest of MSC ELSA-3 has been published on the official website of the Kerala State Disaster Management Authority (KSDMA). According to the owners, MV WAN HAI 503 was carrying 1,754 containers, many of which contained flammable liquids, solids, corrosive chemicals, pesticides and other environmentally hazardous substances such as printing ink and thinning agents. HC noted that such materials pose a serious threat to marine ecology. Citing various statutory provisions, including the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017, the court noted that the govt is empowered to initiate both civil and criminal proceedings against the vessel and its owners to recover damages. The court also appointed Adv Arjun Sreedhar as amicus curiae in the case. Follow more information on Air India plane crash in Ahmedabad here . Get real-time live updates on rescue operations and check full list of passengers onboard AI 171 .
United News of India
11-06-2025
- General
- United News of India
Tonnes of plastic pellets on beaches, tourism affected
Kochi, June 11 (UNI) Stakeholders of tourism industry and fishermen communities have expressed deep concern over tonnes of plastic pellets accumulating on the beaches of Kerala after Liberian cargo vessel MSC ELSA-3 sank off Alappuzha coast. Plastic pellets, known as nurdles, from the containers of the Liberian cargo vessel have started accumulating on the beaches of several tourism destinations including Kovalam, Varkala, Ernakulam, Alappuzha. They alleged that the State Government failed to address this serious environmental issue causing inconvenient for fishermen and tourists coming during monsoon season. Seeing the back-to-back ship accidents posing threat to marine life in Kerala, the CMFRI decided to conduct a study on environmental impact due to shipwreck, which осcurred 38 nautical miles off the Kerala coast. UNI DS GNK
