Latest news with #JNIM
DW
2 days ago
- Politics
- DW
Mali's junta tightens grip after five years of military rule – DW – 06/17/2025
When General Assimi Goita seized power in 2020, many hoped it would bring positive change to Mali, a country grappling with jihadist attacks and an economic crisis. What has actually happened in the past five years? In 2020 and 2021, General Assimi Goita siezed power of Mali, bringing the country under military rule. Elections scheduled for February 2024 were postponed due to "technical reasons," including issues related to the adoption of a new constitution and a review of electoral lists. A new date has not been announced. In June 2025, the National Transitional Council approved a bill granting Goita an additional five-year term, extending his presidency until at least 2030. Stalled fight against Islamist rebels One of the main justifications for the coup was to improve the nation's security amid a growing number of jihadist attacks. However, this plan has not worked, said Ahmed Ould Abdallah, president of the Sahel Sahara Center for Security Strategies. "Not only has terrorism not disappeared, it is actually increasing and becoming more intense. It no longer affects only the north and center of the country, but also the south toward Sikasso, and the Kayes region in the west," he told DW. In early June 2025, several Malian army positions were attacked by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, known as JNIM. At least 30 people were killed in the attack on a camp. In September 2024, JNIM succeeded in attacking Bamako and occupied the airport for several hours. In July 2024, heavy fighting took place in the town of Tinzaouatene near the Algerian border. Tuareg separatists inflicted heavy losses on the Malian army and the Russian-backed Wagner Group. What's driving Russia's ambitious push into Africa? To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Fousseyni Ouattara, vice president of the Defense and Security Commission of Mali's transitional parliament, the National Transitional Council, told DW he blames "invisible hands" for the recent attacks, without offering a specific explanation. He claims that Mali is in control of its territory. "There is no doubt that the situation has improved compared to four years ago," he said. "Today, we are acting with full sovereignty. The capture of Kidal shows that there has been a major change." In November 2023, the Malian Armed Forces, with the help of Wagner Group mercenaries, recaptured the northern city of Kidal from the CSP rebel alliance. The Ministry of Defense's 2025 budget is 485 billion CFA francs (about $858 million), accounting for nearly 20% of the national budget. Some voices feel it's disproportionate. "At some point, you have to negotiate," Yoyana Baniara, a former judge and politician in Chad, told DW. "If you put a larger portion of resources into war, you put the country in a difficult economic situation." Dissolution of political parties, suppression of free speech in Mali In May 2025, the Malian authorities decided to dissolve all political parties. Many, including Sidylamine Bagayoko, professor of anthropology at the University of Bamako, feel it was the wrong move. "It is political debate that enriches the diversity of discussions and opinions so that the country can move forward," says Bagayoko. Since Mali had close to 300 political parties, many agreed that the system was in need of reform. But such an extreme decision, according to Ulf Laessing, director of the Sahel regional office for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bamako, amounts to an "abolition of the opposition." May 3, 2025: Pro-junta demonstrators in Bamako chant slogans as opposing political parties protest against their dissolution Image: AFP Indeed, opposition voices seem to come increasingly under threat. The opportunities to freely express one's opinion in Mali have deteriorated over the past five years, said Claus-Dieter König, head of the West Africa office of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS) in Dakar. "Goita is becoming a dictatorial ruler. Opposition members live in fear of being arrested. Radio stations have been banned and it is more difficult to obtain licenses," König says. Journalists in the country feel pressure not to write about army losses in the fight against jihadists or about Russian mercenaries, say experts, Oppression in every corner Several pro-democracy activists have recently been detained in Mali. According to Human Rights Watch, two opposition leaders who took part in protests in early May have disappeared. Research by the journalist consortium Forbidden Stories found that Malian civilians have been arbitrarily arrested, kidnapped, and tortured in secret prisons. They say Mali's army and the Wagner Group are behind this. Government member Fousseyni Ouattara rejects such accusations: "In Mali, our prisons are open to everyone. Anyone can visit them. No one is arbitrarily arrested," he told DW. Mali's academic sector is also under threat, says professor Sidylamine Bagayoko: "From 2020 to the present, we have seen several academics imprisoned. As a result, other intellectuals who want to write about restrictions on freedoms, or express their opinions about it. remain cautious." Assimi Goita took control of Mali through two coups Image: AP Photo/picture alliance However, despite concerns related to freedom of expression, the current regime still has many supporters, said Laessing. 'I do believe that the predominantly young population still supports the government because they did not want a return to the old elites, who, although elected, were considered corrupt and very close to France.' Fighting corruption while Mali's economy struggles When it comes to corruption, some observers are cautiously optimistic. "In the population survey we conduct annually, respondents say they see an improvement," says Svenja Bode, resident representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's Mali office in Bamako. In 2021, about 90% of respondents said they believed corruption in Mali was very high. This figure has fallen to 58% according to this year's survey which was released in May. Yet regardless of whether or not such perceptions are accurate, it is clear that the government has taken some steps towards reducing corruption — and made sure they were covered by the media, said Bode. Yet fighting corruption is one thing; improving everyday life is another. 'I don't yet see the major economic progress that will ultimately translate into better living conditions,' said Claus‑Dieter König of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Mali recently introduced an unpopular new tax on mobile communications and mobile‑money transfers. Explainer: What the German troop withdrawal from Mali means To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Education initiatives suffer Meanwhile, power shortages remain a serious problem, and the cost of living has risen sharply due to inflation linked in part to Russia's war in Ukraine, which has driven up the cost of materials worldwide. "Mali imports everything from gasoline to grain, is heavily dependent on the world market and has no access to the coast,' said Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. At the same time, experts such as Laessing say Western countries, including France, are suspending their work in Mali as Russia becomes more involved. The shift is negatively affecting education initiatives. Laessing said he spoke with Malian participants at an education conference in Tunisia who told him that although there are many initiatives and plans, few are implemented. Reliou Koubakin and Etienne Gatanazi contributed to this article. It was edited by Sarah Hucal.
DW
3 days ago
- Politics
- DW
A look at Mali after five years of military rule – DW – 06/17/2025
When General Assimi Goita seized power in 2020, many hoped it would bring positive change to Mali, a country grappling with jihadist attacks and an economic crisis. What has actually happened in the past five years? In 2020 and 2021, General Assimi Goita siezed power of Mali, bringing the country under military rule. Elections scheduled for February 2024 were postponed due to "technical reasons," including issues related to the adoption of a new constitution and a review of electoral lists. A new date has not been announced. In June 2025, the National Transitional Council approved a bill granting Goita an additional five-year term, extending his presidency until at least 2030. Stalled fight against Islamist rebels One of the main justifications for the coup was to improve the nation's security amid rising jihadist attacks. However, this plan has not worked, said Ahmed Ould Abdallah, president of the Sahel Sahara Center for Security Strategies. "Not only has terrorism not disappeared, it is actually increasing and becoming more intense. It no longer affects only the north and center of the country, but also the south toward Sikasso, and the Kayes region in the west," he told DW. In early June 2025, several Malian army positions were attacked by the al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, known as JNIM. At least 30 people were killed in the attack on a camp. In September 2024, JNIM succeeded in attacking Bamako and occupied the airport for several hours. In July 2024, heavy fighting took place in the town of Tinzaouatène near the Algerian border. Tuareg separatists inflicted heavy losses on the Malian army and the Russian-backed Wagner Group. What's driving Russia's ambitious push into Africa? To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Fousseyni Ouattara, vice president of the Defense and Security Commission of Mali's transitional parliament, the National Transitional Council told DW he blames "invisible hands" for the recent attacks, without offering a specific explanation. He claims that Mali is in control of its territory. "There is no doubt that the situation has improved compared to four years ago," he said. "Today, we are acting with full sovereignty. The capture of Kidal shows that there has been a major change." In November 2023, the Malian Armed Forces, with the help of Wagner Group mercenaries, recaptured the northern city of Kidal from the CSP rebel alliance. The Ministry of Defense's 2025 budget is 485 billion CFA francs (about $858 million), accounting for nearly 20% of the national budget. Some voices feel it's disproportionate. "At some point, you have to negotiate," Yoyana Baniara, a former judge and politician in Chad, told DW. "If you put a larger portion of resources into war, you put the country in a difficult economic situation." Dissolution of political parties, suppression of free speech In May 2025, the Malian authorities decided to dissolve all political parties. Many, including Sidylamine Bagayoko, professor of anthropology at the University of Bamako, feel it was the wrong move. "It is political debate that enriches the diversity of discussions and opinions so that the country can move forward," says Bagayoko. Since Mali had close to 300 political parties, many agreed that the system was in need of reform. But such an extreme decision, according to Ulf Laessing, director of the Sahel regional office for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bamako, amounts to an "abolition of the opposition." May 3, 2025: Pro-junta demonstrators in Bamako chant slogans as opposing political parties protest against their dissolution Image: AFP Indeed, opposition voices seem to come increasingly under threat. The opportunities to freely express one's opinion in Mali have deteriorated over the past five years, said Claus-Dieter König, head of the West Africa office of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation (RLS) in Dakar. "Goita is becoming a dictatorial ruler. Opposition members live in fear of being arrested. Radio stations have been banned and it is more difficult to obtain licenses," he says. Journalists in the country feel pressure not to write about army losses in the fight against jihadists or about Russian mercenaries, say experts, Oppression in every corner Several pro-democracy activists have recently been detained in Mali. According to Human Rights Watch, two opposition leaders who took part in protests in early May have disappeared. Research by the journalist consortium Forbidden Stories found that Malian civilians have been arbitrarily arrested, kidnapped, and tortured in secret prisons. They say Mali's army and the Wagner Group are behind this. Government member Fousseyni Ouattara rejects such accusations: "In Mali, our prisons are open to everyone. Anyone can visit them. No one is arbitrarily arrested," he told DW. Mali's academic sector is also under threat, says professor Sidylamine Bagayoko: "From 2020 to the present, we have seen several academics imprisoned. As a result, other intellectuals who want to write about restrictions on freedoms, or express their opinions about it remain cautious." Assimi Goita took control of Mali through two coups Image: AP Photo/picture alliance However, despite concerns related to freedom of expression, the current regime still has many supporters, said Ulf Laessing. 'I do believe that the predominantly young population still supports the government because they did not want a return to the old elites, who, although elected, were considered corrupt and very close to France.' Fighting corruption while the economy struggles When it comes to corruption, some observers are cautiously optimistic. "In the population survey we conduct annually, respondents say they see an improvement," says Svenja Bode, Svenja Bode, resident representative of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation's Mali office in Bamako. In 2021, about 90% of respondents said they believed corruption in Mali was very high. This figure has fallen to 58% according to this year's survey which was released in May. Yet regardless of whether or not such perceptions are accurate, it is clear that the government has taken some steps towards reducing corruption — and made sure they were covered by the media, said Bode. Yet fighting corruption is one thing; improving everyday life is another. 'I don't yet see the major economic progress that will ultimately translate into better living conditions,' said Claus‑Dieter König of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. Mali recently introduced an unpopular new tax on mobile communications and mobile‑money transfers. Explainer: What the German troop withdrawal from Mali means To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 video Education initiatives suffer Meanwhile, power shortages remain a serious problem, and the cost of living has risen sharply due to inflation linked in part to Russia's war in Ukraine, which has driven up the cost of materials worldwide. 'Mali imports everything from gasoline to grain, is heavily dependent on the world market and has no access to the coast,' said Ulf Laessing, director of the Sahel regional office for the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bamako. At the same time, experts such as Laessing say Western countries, including France, are suspending their work in Mali as Russia becomes more involved. The shift is negatively affecting education initiatives. Laessing said he spoke with Malian participants at an education conference in Tunisia who told him that although there are many initiatives and plans, few are implemented. Reliou Koubakin and Etienne Gatanazi contributed to this article. It was edited by Sarah Hucal.
Daily Maverick
3 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Why a jihadist takeover of a Sahelian capital is unlikely
Despite a recent surge in terrorist attacks, the region is more at risk of fragmentation than centralised jihadist rule. Insecurity has risen sharply in the Sahel in recent months. Between late May and early June, major attacks claimed by Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) targeted various locations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This resurgence underscores the two groups' adaptive capabilities and questions the efficacy of counterterrorism strategies implemented by the Alliance of Sahel States' (AES) military-led governments. Consequently, some analysts are concerned about the potential for a Sahelian capital to fall under jihadist control – drawing parallels to the December 2024 capture of Damascus by terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, there are critical contextual distinctions between the two scenarios. Unlike HTS, which has consistently pursued regime change to position itself as a political-religious alternative, JNIM and ISGS show no intent to seize power in the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey or Ouagadougou. Rather, their strategies emphasise the gradual erosion of state authority in rural peripheries where they mediate local conflicts, enforce norms and collect taxes. This underscores their comparatively limited operational capacity. JNIM and ISGS primarily operate in remote rural areas, using light weapons such as rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars. They also use motorcycles, improvised explosive devices and weaponised civilian drones. Although they have taken and temporarily controlled towns in the interior, such as Djibo and Diapaga, they lack the firepower and logistical capabilities to sustain a prolonged siege and occupation of a major city. Their strength lies in mobility and local knowledge rather than the capacity to occupy and govern territory for long periods. HTS, by contrast, developed a structured military force with centralised command and tactical units capable of coordinated assaults supported by drones and heavy artillery. The group had sustained access to sophisticated weaponry through well-organised transnational supply lines. The fall of Damascus represented the culmination of a broader regime-change dynamic set in motion by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and bolstered, to varying degrees, by some Western and Gulf countries. For a while, HTS capitalised on key cross-border corridors – particularly with Turkey – that enabled the steady influx of foreign fighters, medical aid, munitions and advanced weapons systems. No comparable geopolitical architecture exists in the Sahel. While weapons trafficking from Libya has strengthened some armed groups, there is no declared international effort aimed at toppling the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Although AES leaders frequently accuse foreign actors – notably France – of supporting terrorism or destabilising the region, open-source data offers little evidence of this. Even Algeria, whose role in northern Mali has occasionally been ambivalent, has never sought to overthrow the government in Bamako. Another point of distinction is the internal dynamics of state militaries. The fall of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and ultimately Damascus, occurred within just two weeks. This was primarily due to the limited resistance by the Syrian Army – weakened by a decade of conflicts, widespread defections and deteriorating living standards. In contrast, the capabilities of armies in Sahelian countries are increasing. These militaries are ideologically and institutionally resistant to jihadists, perceiving them as existential threats to their respective governments. Furthermore, having assumed political power, AES military leaders have entrenched their authority within the state apparatus, bolstering their responsibility and accountability. Also, the rise of HTS was enabled by the exhaustion of a war-weary Syrian population and economic collapse, further aggravated by international sanctions. Disillusioned by Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian regime, many Syrians viewed HTS as either a lesser evil or, in some cases, a more favourable alternative. The Sahel situation is starkly different. Although hardline Islamist ideologies have found some traction in urban centres, public sentiment in the capital cities remains hostile towards jihadists who are perceived as instigators of violence, instability and national suffering. For now, these factors together render the capture and sustained control of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces improbable. JNIM and ISGS are likely to restrict themselves to guerrilla and destabilisation tactics. As history shows, however, this does not make these cities immune to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup was triggered by military setbacks in the north. Similarly, Burkina Faso's January 2022 coup occurred following a mutiny prompted by escalating casualties among security forces. Considering the AES countries' protracted military transitions and constrained political environments, further upheavals leading to institutional breakdowns and a disorganisation of security forces cannot be ruled out. This could have unpredictable consequences for the Sahel and west Africa at large. To avoid this, AES governments must acknowledge the strategic limitations of their militarised approach to terrorism. While increasing troop numbers and acquiring advanced weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures haven't incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the world's epicentre for terrorism for the second consecutive year, accounting for half of all global casualties. The youthful appearance of the assailants in the foiled 2 June Timbuktu attack should be a wake-up call to AES strategists. It reflects a generation of children deprived of schooling due to chronic insecurity, and whose families lack access to income, justice and essential social services. These factors are potent drivers of recruitment into armed groups – and cannot be solved through military means alone. AES governments need a coherent, region-wide counterterrorism strategy that goes beyond military interventions. Valuable insights can be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin's disengagement and reintegration programmes, Mauritania's religious dialogue initiatives, and Algeria's non-kinetic approach. Equally important is the need to engage with communities stigmatised by counterterrorism operations, fostering trust and reducing the risk of recruitment. Enhanced relations with Algeria and the Economic Community of West African States could bolster regional cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening the collective capacity to reduce the threat posed by armed groups. Without a meaningful recalibration of strategy, the Sahel could descend into prolonged fragmentation, with profound consequences for west Africa's stability. DM
AFP
3 days ago
- AFP
Video shows militants abducting Malian soldiers, not Nigerian troops
'Sorosoke!!! Shocking clip of some bandits boldly loading men of the Nigerian army on bikes after raiding their camp,' reads the caption of an Instagram post circulating in Nigeria since June 7, 2025. The term 'bandits' in Nigeria refers to organised criminal gangs. Image Screenshot showing the false post, taken June 16, 2025 'Sorosoke' is a Yoruba expression meaning 'speak up'. It became a popular slogan during Nigeria's 2020 protests against police brutality (archived here). Liked more than 2,000 times, the video shows men in military uniform being forced onto motorcycles by gunmen wearing turbans. Comments below the post questioned the identity of the captured soldiers. 'This is chad army not Nigerian army (sic),' wrote one user, while another said the incident happened in 'Burkina Faso, that's where you can get those types of bikes'. The video was published by an account called 'Sorosoke Gossip' which posts lifestyle content and general news about Nigeria. However, the video does not show Nigerian soldiers being abducted by bandits. Clip from Mali At the 0'54' mark in the one-minute clip, AFP Fact Check noticed a Malian military patch stitched to the sleeve of one of the abducted soldiers. The visible part of the logo reads 'FAMa', an acronym for Forces Armees Maliennes, or the Malian army. Image Comparison of the Malian armed forces logo as it appeared in an AFP photo (left) and on the sleeve of an abducted soldier in the video Using Google Lens to conduct reverse image searches on keyframes from the video, we were led to a June 8, 2025, X post by Brant Philip, a terrorism researcher focusing on West Africa and the Middle East. In it, he described how the Al-Qaeda-backed Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) fighters killed scores of Malian soldiers in the Boulkessi military camp near the Burkina Faso border on June 1, 2025. AFP had reported on the incident, saying the Malian army said it lost at least 30 soldiers but security sources and a local official said they believed the death toll to be at least 60 (archived here). One of the videos in Philip's posts shows 30 seconds of the clip in the false post, with the media logo of the JNIM at the top right corner (archived here). JNIM then displays the loot and the prisoners captured, 8 days later their fate is still unknown, JNIM could keep them for a prisoner swap in the future 5/5 — Brant (@brantphilip1978) June 8, 2025 Nigerian army spokesperson Onyechi Anele also told AFP Fact Check that the video in the claim 'does not involve Nigerian troops'.
Express Tribune
5 days ago
- Politics
- Express Tribune
The rise of Islamic extremism across the world
Listen to article Islamic extremists and their organisations have now turned their attention towards the parts of Africa where there are large Muslim populations but weak governments. The Islamists are now working through a new set of organisations. Asia is no longer their focus. After several years spent building its strength, Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) is now the strongest military force in West Africa and among the most powerful in the world. It has overtaken al-Qaeda. The JNIM was founded in Mali in 2017 as an umbrella organisation assembling four extremist groups. It is headed by Iyad Ag Gali and Ahmad Koufa, leaders of the 2012 uprising that came to be known as the "Arab Spring". Their organisation took over much of Mali's north. JNIM is "creating a state that stretches like a belt from western Mali all the way to the borderlands of Benin. It is substantial — even exponential expansion," said Heni Nsaibia, senior analyst for the Armed Conflict Location & Event or Data or ACLED, a non-profit research organisation that keeps of track of the militant organisations. Ag Gali belongs to the mostly Muslim Tuareg which has fought for decades to establish an independent Muslim state in northern Mali. Koufa is a Fulani preacher based in northern Mali. The differences between the two men have caused considerable uncertainty about the way Mali is likely to evolve. According to ACLED, in most African countries the security situation has deteriorated. In 2024, Burkina Faso ranked as the nation most affected by terrorist violence for a second straight year, and Niger saw the largest increase in terrorism-related deaths in the world. Increasingly, experts see JNIM's informant and supply chains stretching into stable nations such as Ghana, Senegal and Guinea. Several people who spoke to the journalists who were gathering material for an analysis for The Washington Post recounted how gun-toting JNIM members burst into mosques in Burkina Faso in recent years, announcing that strict Islamic laws would be implemented, schools would be closed and state institutions would be targeted. Violating the rules would carry a heavy price, probably public execution. According to ACLED, nearly 6,000 civilians have been killed, mostly for not following the rules being imposed by JNIM. There are real-time contacts between the Islamic groups operating in various parts of the world. The JNIM programme echoes the one being followed by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Somalia, a highly disturbed county in the horn of Africa, has also suffered because of the changing global approach by the United States under the leadership of President Donald Trump. Because of the pullout of America from the area, al-Shabab, one of the affiliates of al-Qaeda, has taken control of important towns from Somali forces since the beginning of 2025. The new administration in Washington does not believe that this group poses a direct threat to the US forces. But according to Matt Bryden, founder of Sahan, a Nairobi-based think-tank, the gaining strength of al-Shabab "would have far-reaching implications for US policy in Africa and much of the Middle East". The sudden breakup of the Soviet Socialist Republics, the USSR, in 1991, was the result of the defeat of its troops to save from collapse the Communist regime Moscow had installed in Kabul. Moscow was defeated be seven Islamic groups that called themselves the mujahideen who were able to march from the Pak-Afghan border to Kabul. They did this with the help of the security services of Pakistan. Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Geneva agreement, with Pakistan included as one of the signatories, which assured a peaceful exit of the Soviet troops in 1989. The countries along the periphery of the collapsed Soviet Union gained independence. Among those that became independent states were the Muslim states of Central Asia. There were attempts by some elements in these countries to bring Islam into the pattern of governance. These developments were analysed by Barnett R Rubin, noted American authority on the Middle East, who has studied the threat of radical Islam to stability in the Middle East and Central Asia. In a presentation organised by the Asia Society's Asian Social Issues, he focused on local developments in the republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and how they might affect the spread of radical Islam in the area. According to Rubin, the JNIM leadership is watching the developments in Syria. Corrine Dufka, another Middle East watcher, based in Washington, believes there is a model for mainstreaming the trajectory of Islamic movements. Some of JNIM senior leaders are looking at Ahmed al-Sharra — Syrian leader who has recast himself as a moderate after once being closely associated with al-Qaeda. He was embraced by the Americans when, during the recent visit to the Middle East, President Trump found him to be an attractive person to lead Syria. The way the United States left Afghanistan after having been present in that country for 20 years has followed the same approach in West Africa and the Middle East. According to the Defense Department in Washington, there are now fewer than 200 United States troops in the area — down from 1,400 as recently as 2023. "JNIM is now ascendant, but would likely collapse into many parts," one former senior official said to me in a conversation, aware that I was writing on the development of Islamic radicalism around the world. "In a region where we used to monitor and influence developments, we no longer have the tools that follow those policies." According to the official I spoke to, "we are concerned about President Hassan Sheikh Mohammad's prioritization of internal politics and leaving the ground to al-Shabab, the most lethal associate of the once-powerful Al-Qaeda which has pushed the government forces out of several towns in the country's west." Somalia's fractious government which operates from Mogadishu, the country's capital, was propped up by the United States aided by an extensive African Union peace-keeping operation. The AU also had the help of the United States, receiving both training and equipment from Washington. With the Americans no longer closely involved, there is opportunity to act on the part of other regional powers. The obvious candidates are Iran, Turkey and possibly Pakistan. If Pakistan were to be involved, it would do so with the backing of China. This is a subject on which I will write later.
