Latest news with #Islamists
Economic Times
20 hours ago
- Business
- Economic Times
Iran's ‘License Raj' resembles 1960s India — those close to the regime get permits and oil revenues, the educated get no jobs: Jeremy S. Friedman
Jeremy S. Friedman, author of 'Ripe For Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World', teaches at Harvard Business School. Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das, he discusses the Iran war — and Tehran's economy: Q. What keeps Iran going, despite decades of sanctions?A. Well, the short answer is, it's not going very well — Iranians aren't starving but the country is also not growing economically. They have an 'over-education' crisis with the most educated population in the region outside Iran but no jobs. The biggest reason for economic stagnation is sanctions. There was hope with 2015's original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that Western companies would start investing in even before Donald Trump came along, the United States didn't do that, largely due to the fear of sanctions being reimposed. Investment was thus mostly limited to the energy sphere, even though Iran is not really a petrostate. It has a large, educated population, a diverse economy, a big agricultural sphere and, ironically perhaps, it is a major destination for medical tourism and plastic surgery. I've been to Tehran and it seems like half the people in the airport got nose jobs just before flying out. It is no accident that Iran has its own nuclear program and isn't dependent on foreign expertise — it has the scientific capability many petrostates don't. Essentially, Iran's potential has remained unfulfilled. Q. Can you describe Iran's socialist trajectory? A. Being a theocracy, many people assume Iran must be conservative. That's not what 1979's Islamic Revolution was though — many of Iran's Islamists were socialist. There was a major socialist movement in the 1940s-50s which fought the Shah who also fought back — the Marxist left was eventually decimated by the secret police. By the 1960s, the Islamists began to step into the vacuum the socialists had left. The latter claimed they'd build an anti-imperialist, egalitarian, developed economy — the Islamists said they'd follow faith and do the same. Eventually, those people made the Revolution — later establishment personalities, like Akbar Rafsanjani, Mir Hossein Mousavi, etc., were socialist-leaning. They imagined Islamism would make Iran developed and equal. Land reform, nationalisation and national plan development began — but in 1980, just a year after the Revolution, Iraq invaded. For the next eight years, Iran was on war footing — rationing meant state control of goods. A huge state sector developed. In the 1990s, as some groups started dissenting from this arrangement, there was some privatisation but it never fully took effect because being isolated from the world economy, it was hard for Iran to privatise on that scale. Then, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rebuilt the nuclear program. Sanctions followed, really benefitting those who controlled the ability to produce and smuggle — the Revolutionary Guard. The economy stayed in state hands — and stagnated. There is some self-sufficiency as, owing to sanctions, they've had to manufacture many things countries would typically import. Iran's export revenue is largely dependent on energy and oil — those with access to government, the Revolutionary Guard and military get foreign items and licenses to manufacture. Similar to the License Raj that India had in the 1960s-70s, Iran has a smaller-scale License Raj now, with oil revenue going into the pockets of those who have the licenses. It's a two-tiered economy — those connected to the state get bits of oil money, monopolies, smuggling, etc. Those with no access to the state — which includes the aspiring middle class who thought they'd progress through education — have no jobs and nowhere to go. Iran is thus a bifurcated economy which depends on connections, not merit. Q. What role do China and Russia play? A. Well, a fully candid Iranian regime would say, a very disappointing role. After all the talk about a 'new axis' with China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, Russia and China are clearly not going to be there for Tehran. Iran gave Russia drones to use in Ukraine. Yet, Russia has done very little for it because it doesn't want to jeopardise its ties to Israel and Saudi only really cares about Iran's oil — if Iran disrupted those exports, Beijing would suffer the most and Iran can't afford to alienate it. So, it's a one-sided relationship between Iran, Russia and China, characteristic of the entire axis. China gets what it wants from Moscow but Russia doesn't get what it wants from Beijing. This is more a hierarchy than an axis, with China on top. Q. What does this Iran-Israel conflict mean for the global energy market?A. With China being the largest consumer of its oil, I'd be surprised if Iran significantly disrupted exports through the Strait of Hormuz. That would change China's attitude towards Tehran. There could be short-term disturbances, especially with Israel attacking Iran's energy infrastructure, sparking retaliation. Yet, it seems Iran doesn't really want a major war — the Iranian regime is afraid if that happens, they'll be overthrown as they are very vulnerable at home. A revolution in Iran, with chaos and potential disruption of energy exports, could be the bigger risk to global markets. Views expressed are personal
Time of India
a day ago
- Business
- Time of India
Iran's ‘License Raj' resembles 1960s India — those close to the regime get permits and oil revenues, the educated get no jobs: Jeremy S. Friedman
Jeremy S. Friedman, author of 'Ripe For Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World', teaches at Harvard Business School. Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das, he discusses the Iran war — and Tehran's economy: Q. What keeps Iran going, despite decades of sanctions ? A. Well, the short answer is, it's not going very well — Iranians aren't starving but the country is also not growing economically. They have an 'over-education' crisis with the most educated population in the region outside Iran but no jobs. The biggest reason for economic stagnation is sanctions. There was hope with 2015's original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that Western companies would start investing in Iran. However, even before Donald Trump came along, the United States didn't do that, largely due to the fear of sanctions being reimposed. Investment was thus mostly limited to the energy sphere, even though Iran is not really a petrostate. It has a large, educated population, a diverse economy, a big agricultural sphere and, ironically perhaps, it is a major destination for medical tourism and plastic surgery. I've been to Tehran and it seems like half the people in the airport got nose jobs just before flying out. It is no accident that Iran has its own nuclear program and isn't dependent on foreign expertise — it has the scientific capability many petrostates don't. Essentially, Iran's potential has remained unfulfilled. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Top-Podologe sagt: Das hier wirkt bei Nagelpilz wie ein Hochdruckreiniger Gesundheitswoche Mehr erfahren Undo Q. Can you describe Iran's socialist trajectory? A. Being a theocracy, many people assume Iran must be conservative. That's not what 1979's Islamic Revolution was though — many of Iran's Islamists were socialist. There was a major socialist movement in the 1940s-50s which fought the Shah who also fought back — the Marxist left was eventually decimated by the secret police. By the 1960s, the Islamists began to step into the vacuum the socialists had left. The latter claimed they'd build an anti-imperialist, egalitarian, developed economy — the Islamists said they'd follow faith and do the same. Eventually, those people made the Revolution — later establishment personalities, like Akbar Rafsanjani, Mir Hossein Mousavi, etc., were socialist-leaning. They imagined Islamism would make Iran developed and equal. Land reform, nationalisation and national plan development began — but in 1980, just a year after the Revolution, Iraq invaded. For the next eight years, Iran was on war footing — rationing meant state control of goods. A huge state sector developed. In the 1990s, as some groups started dissenting from this arrangement, there was some privatisation but it never fully took effect because being isolated from the world economy, it was hard for Iran to privatise on that scale. Then, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad rebuilt the nuclear program. Sanctions followed, really benefitting those who controlled the ability to produce and smuggle — the Revolutionary Guard . The economy stayed in state hands — and stagnated. Live Events There is some self-sufficiency as, owing to sanctions, they've had to manufacture many things countries would typically import. Iran's export revenue is largely dependent on energy and oil — those with access to government, the Revolutionary Guard and military get foreign items and licenses to manufacture. Similar to the License Raj that India had in the 1960s-70s, Iran has a smaller-scale License Raj now, with oil revenue going into the pockets of those who have the licenses. It's a two-tiered economy — those connected to the state get bits of oil money, monopolies, smuggling, etc. Those with no access to the state — which includes the aspiring middle class who thought they'd progress through education — have no jobs and nowhere to go. Iran is thus a bifurcated economy which depends on connections, not merit. Q. What role do China and Russia play? A. Well, a fully candid Iranian regime would say, a very disappointing role. After all the talk about a 'new axis' with China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, Russia and China are clearly not going to be there for Tehran. Iran gave Russia drones to use in Ukraine. Yet, Russia has done very little for it because it doesn't want to jeopardise its ties to Israel and Saudi Arabia. China only really cares about Iran's oil — if Iran disrupted those exports, Beijing would suffer the most and Iran can't afford to alienate it. So, it's a one-sided relationship between Iran, Russia and China, characteristic of the entire axis. China gets what it wants from Moscow but Russia doesn't get what it wants from Beijing. This is more a hierarchy than an axis, with China on top. Q. What does this Iran-Israel conflict mean for the global energy market ? A. With China being the largest consumer of its oil, I'd be surprised if Iran significantly disrupted exports through the Strait of Hormuz. That would change China's attitude towards Tehran. There could be short-term disturbances, especially with Israel attacking Iran's energy infrastructure, sparking retaliation. Yet, it seems Iran doesn't really want a major war — the Iranian regime is afraid if that happens, they'll be overthrown as they are very vulnerable at home. A revolution in Iran, with chaos and potential disruption of energy exports, could be the bigger risk to global markets. Views expressed are personal
Yahoo
3 days ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
How Minnesota shooting suspect was found
The suspect wanted for killing a Minnesota state lawmaker and her husband and shooting another state senator and his wife was arrested late Sunday night after a manhunt spanning two days and involving nearly 200 law enforcement officers. Vance Boelter was arrested near his farm in Green Isle, Minn., late Sunday night. The 57-year-old is accused of killing Minnesota state House member Melissa Hortman (D), who formerly served as Minnesota state Speaker, and her husband, Mark, at their home while posing as a police officer. State Sen. John Hoffman (D) and his wife, Yvette, were also shot at their home. They underwent surgery and are receiving care, Gov. Tim Walz (D) said. He called the attacks 'politically motivated.' The search for Boelter was renewed early Sunday morning after authorities found his car and cowboy hat not far from his residence. But even after speaking with his wife and relatives, investigators could not find more on him for more than 10 hours. After an officer spotted a man running into the woods, authorities confirmed Boelter's presence in the area using an image from a trail camera. Law enforcement set up a perimeter and closed the distance to him in about 90 minutes using a helicopter, then used a drone to track him as he crawled through thick shrubs before being arrested, Brooklyn Park Police Chief Mark Bruley said at a press conference Sunday night. Boelter worked for a local security company called Praetorian Guard Security Services and claimed to have an extensive resume in several countries, including Eastern Europe, Africa, and parts of the Middle East, including the West Bank and Gaza. More recently, he worked for two funeral homes in the Minneapolis area before going back to Africa. After he returned, he worked a job 'extracting eyeballs from cadavers so they could be used for organ donation,' a roommate told The Washington Post. Boelter had ties to several religious groups and worked in Africa and the Palestinian territories to spread Christianity to 'militant Islamists.' A video on YouTube shows him preaching to a large church in Congo in 2022. His roommate told local news that Boelter had voted for President Trump and was 'a strong [Trump] supporter' but called him a 'very good guy.' Law enforcement said Saturday it found in Boelter's car a list of individuals — including Hortman, Hoffman and Sen. Tina Smith (D-Minn.) — as well as flyers for the anti-Trump 'No Kings' protests. All coordinated 'No Kings' protests in Minnesota were canceled after state officials urged residents to avoid the demonstrations in the wake of the shooting. Thousands attended peacefully anyway. Copyright 2025 Nexstar Media, Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
Politico
3 days ago
- Politics
- Politico
The Logic of Preemption Drove Israel's Attack — But Has the Target Changed?
JERUSALEM — The war is five days old, and, like most Israelis, we are getting about as much sleep as the parents of a newborn, roused twice a night and running to our shelter. There, our condo neighbors gather, bantering through the newscasts, damp and in doubt. Living in Jerusalem half the year — the other half, I'm teaching at Dartmouth — this is hardly our first emergency. And our home is just a mile-and-a-half from the Al Aqsa mosque, so we don't feel particularly vulnerable to a targeted attack by Islamists. Yet high overhead, as sirens scramble us at 4 a.m., one can see the trailing flames of missiles headed west, to the coastal cities; and see flashes and hear the booms of anti-missile defenses. The danger for us is falling debris; It can penetrate two stories, nothing like the thousand-pound-plus warheads that have shredded multi-story apartments in Bat Yam and labs in Rehovot, but not to be toyed with. On those newscasts, as on television nightly, panels of security pundits, themselves mostly former generals and Mossad agents, are good with numbers and not particularly so at hiding their pride. The planning, over many years, was inarguably meticulous; the execution, apparently faultless. Seventy percent of Israelis support the strike, only 16 percent are opposed. Even opposition politicians, long disdainful of Benjamin Netanyahu's assaults on democratic norms, salute the air force, intelligence services, and, grudgingly, Bibi's pluck, sequence and timing. First, the radar was targeted, they say, then the anti-aircraft missile batteries, then the missile manufacturing centers, then the chain-of-command. These agents embedded on the ground, those drone components smuggled in; this adviser, this commander, these nuclear scientists 'eliminated' — leaders of the Revolutionary Guard and other nuclear enablers are, presumably, fair game. Now, we control the skies over Tehran, moreover, and refueling routes all the way to Iran. We've bombed even the regime's television broadcast. We're getting to nuclear facilities, too — at least those above ground, at Natanz and elsewhere, which unlike Fordow, 200 feet underground, can be reached without privileged American ordinance. And if we continue with such impressive success, will not Donald Trump be tempted to himself bust bunkers and, thus seal (and claim) victory? For our part, us civilians are exhorted to Stoicism, 'kor ruach,' 'composure.' This, we are told, is what existential war feels like. 'Jews know better than anyone,' an otherwise pokerfaced Channel Twelve correspondent declaims, 'that when somebody says he means to kill you, you have to believe them — and relieve them of their means to do so.' As I write, I can hear squadrons of Israeli Air Force fighters in the skies, heading east in waves. Soon enough, new missiles will fly, and I'm preparing to be composed. Indeed, those of us who've followed the diplomatic twists in the region since the 1960s feel mostly out of our depth. It has been our job to consider motivation on both sides: histories, ideologies, grievances. For our security experts, in contrast, analysis may entail an assessment of, yes, an enemy's motivation, but only in tandem with its military capability; and then, motivation boils down to military capability, because, 'Jews know,' if enemies have the capability to hurt you, they will have the motivation to do so. The inference for action is preemption, deterrence, intimidation. Discussion of diplomatic alternatives to 'kinetic action' is vaguely effete. Perhaps this is my own failure of imagination, but I am not so sure that this is what existential war feels like. Anyway, I have questions — worse, I cannot see how, given our experts' preemptive logic, this war ends. Make no mistake, I would be delighted to see the Iranian regime fall to a liberal-democratic counter revolution. I have never been to Iran, but I have spoken with enough refugee officials over 40 years to be persuaded that a large majority of educated Iranians would share in that delight. By all means, let's see our region's Shiite-jihadist-theocrats discredited and defeated. That would leave only Sunni-jihadist-theocrats and Jewish Land-of-Israel-theocrats to be discredited and defeated. But can the Israeli Air Force achieve that end? Doubtful. And yet, has not Benjamin Netanyahu — whom, until the war, a vast majority of Israelis wanted gone — maneuvered us into a war of attrition in which we can presumably settle for nothing less? Let us concede that, for Israel, an Iranian atomic bomb would be a disaster. Incidentally, Israel has a second strike capacity, 100 nuclear warheads of its own, many sitting on missiles in at least six submarines off the Mediterranean coast; so you have to concede, also, that the fine morning when the Supreme Leader decides to incinerate Tel Aviv (simultaneously irradiating most of Palestine) would be the same morning he decides to incinerate Tehran, Isfahan and Qom. But never mind. Sensible people don't want Iranian clerics to have the bomb, potentially giving it to terrorists; or enjoying a nuclear umbrella should they decide to push around weaker regimes, say, the Emirates across a narrow strait. And let's assume, in addition, that the International Atomic Energy Agency was right to sound the alarm, namely, that Iran had amassed sufficient material for nine atomic bombs, awaiting further enrichment and weaponization. Shame on me, but I always imagined that an attack to preempt Iran's nuclear program would be a last resort after negotiations failed. That it would be more 'surgically' focused on nuclear installations, and missiles that might be used to deliver an atomic bomb — not all missiles — and, anyway, undertaken with American military partnership and European diplomatic support. Then, one might hope to return to negotiations about the future. (Only a quarter of Israelis think, even now, that Israel can get safer without American support.) Besides, a limited action would notionally have had a more limited military blowback, putting the burden of escalation on Iran, which would have just been proven comparatively helpless to prevent a foreign attack. True, the regime might then strike back against, say, Aramco assets as it did in 2019. But then, the Gulf states would all rally to the U.S. and, implicitly, Israel, and form an alliance much more menacing to Iran than Iran, Hezbollah and Houthis would be to them. Such an alliance, twinned with further economic strangulation, might well have prompted dissident Iranians to take back the streets. What I did not imagine was that Israel would act alone, even assuming a 'green light' from Washington. Isn't Iran, even weakened, 10 times Israel's population and 75 times the landmass; doesn't it graduate five times the number of engineers a year? With the planet's fourth largest reserves of oil, has it no staying power? This isn't Hezbollah. Nor did I imagine that the regime's missile construction capacity itself, leadership, chain-of-command, scientists, oil facilities — all of these — would qualify as targeted infrastructure. Or, that in the course of a presumably preemptive war, Iranian missiles would themselves prove more seriously menacing than the atom bombs they would hypothetically (and almost certainly never) deliver. Now, given this inescapable conclusion, does not Israel have to 'eliminate' Iranian leaders who control those missiles and whose hatred we have to 'believe'? What have we learned from the past four days, after all? Just from missiles, 24 people in Israel have died and 500 have been wounded. Israel's cosmopolitan economy has been paralyzed; and all air travel and cargo to and from the country has been stopped. Every night, virtually the entire population, to bring things back to my shelter, lives in fear and disruption. The big question, in other words, is whether Netanyahu has not set his sights on regime change. Whether his sights have not been blinkered by a new logic deriving from the manifest results of his own escalation — that Iran's nuclear program and missile program are one; that given the danger to Israel merely from the missiles, leaving the Ayatollah's regime in charge itself amounts to an existential threat. 'As we achieve our objective,' Netanyahu addressed Iranians on YouTube last Saturday, 'we are also clearing the path for you to achieve your objective, your freedom.' On Monday, he told ABC News that killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would 'not escalate the conflict but end the conflict.' How does one retreat from this logic any more than from the demand for total victory in Gaza? Most vexing of all, why, under these circumstances, should the Iranian regime stop the war? It says it will be prepared to put enrichment back under international monitoring, as under the previous nuclear deal. But, for now, why capitulate? Why not launch a dozen missiles every night, or every third night, keeping Israeli business depressed, our airspace closed, our sleep foiled — and watch us squirm? Why not tie up virtually the entire Israeli Air Force looking for missile development in a territory the size of Alaska and over four hours away? Why not deplete our reserves of anti-missile missiles that cost a couple of million dollars each? True enough, the Israeli Air Force has destroyed a great many missile manufacturing sites. More damage will be inflicted. But destroy Iran's very capacity to produce missiles? Does not the Iranian regime, too, see itself in a war for survival — a 'war,' at any rate, according to the Supreme Leader — and does it not have the resources to sustain a war economy? Finally, will Bibi, of all people, the leader in charge of Gazan carnage, bring Iranians to overthrow their government? Israel has now killed over 200 Iranian citizens by going after human 'nuclear infrastructure' in various residential complexes. Just because ordinary people disdain the regime, that does not mean they welcome Israelis buzzing their neighborhoods, blowing up every economic asset from which the regime's missile program could conceivably profit from. Even some people who may 'not agree with the Establishment,' the journalist Abas Aslani told CNN on Monday, agree that Israel must be answered with 'a crushing response.' All of this, I suppose, does indeed toss the ball to Donald Trump. But has he ever played this position before — is he able to see more than one move ahead, and doesn't that move have to enhance his personal popularity? This week, Bibi, and the Israeli military more generally, are the winners he wants to take credit for. But next week? What if the Iranian regime just hangs tough and keeps the war going? Does Israel, in the long run, have the 'the cards'? Does all of MAGA want this? Israel, in short, may have taken a five-foot leap over a six-foot pit. The country has always been good at surprise attacks, one former Israeli general put it, but less so at sustained resistance. And counting on Trump to help — say, by bombing Fordow, or trying to extract a 'better deal,' or new sanctions, or all three — assumes, first, that he'll be able to see how Israel has fallen into a trap set by its own audacious strike, and, second, that he'll see an advantage in committing American forces, and risking oil infrastructure in the Gulf states, to release Israel from that trap. Trump may help, if that's the word. He is warning Iranians to 'evacuate Tehran.' He is sending the Nimitz strike group to the region. I am no longer sure what to hope for, except for the madness to be, well, trumped by quick movement to the regional settlement that's been dangled by the Saudis since the Gaza war began — a forlorn hope, perhaps. In any case, questions, not just sirens, are enough to keep us up at night.
The Guardian
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Guardian
Netanyahu speaks of regime change in Iran. But it's not the same as regime destruction
On Sunday in an interview with Fox News, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's prime minister, pontificated on a theme he has become increasingly attached to in recent years: that Israel under his leadership would not simply attempt to dismantle Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programmes through military attack, but in the process usher in regime change in Tehran. The government in Tehran, he said, was 'very weak', adding that given the opportunity, '80% of the people would throw these theological thugs out.' The list of targets in Iran hit by Israel in the last two days appear to confirm that Israel may be pursuing a broader agenda than simply destroying Tehran's nuclear programme – striking police headquarters, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps intelligence directorate, and the state television broadcaster while it was live on air. For all that he views himself as an expert on its internal politics, Netanyahu has never visited Iran. His knowledge of the country is filtered through intelligence briefings, which see Iran as a hostile problem, and through the lens of pro-Israeli thinktanks. If Netanyahu's comments appear eerily familiar, it is because they are. The same Netanyahu, and Iran hawks in the US, pushed a similar argument in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Iraqis then, like Iranians, the world was told, would welcome the removal of Saddam. The Middle East would be reshaped. Meaningful regime change, however (whatever that actually means in practical terms), is not the same as regime destruction. Iraq, where ultimately an incompetent US effort was made at nation-building, and Libya – where it was not – ushered in periods of bloody chaos, which continues in Libya. Ironically, it is not a story unfamiliar in Iran's own revolution. While there is a tendency, through historical foreshortening, to see the Islamic revolution emerging fully formed in 1979 – the reality is that the fall of the shah triggered a period of competition in Iran between conservative Islamists, communists and different factions within both the Shia clergy and revolutionary cadres. And the notion that Netanyahu and Israel will be seen as a distant saviour is a dubious one at best. 'Iranian activists, people who fought for freedom and justice all their lives, first of all know that their value has little to do with people like Netanyahu,' Arash Azizi, author of the book What Iranians Want, told CNN earlier this week. Ali Vaez argued on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Pivotal States podcast, only days before Israel launched its attack, that historically many Iranians – himself included – have been nervous of sudden change. 'I was born after the revolution. Obviously there was a high degree of dissatisfaction within the country even in the 1990s when I was a teenager. 'I think there was this sense in my generation and in my parents' generation that radical change often results in a worse outcome. It ends in grief. It rarely brings about a better situation. 'Reform is better. Evolutionary change is better. That was the concept that we were pursuing.' Democracy activists in Tehran have echoed that view in recent days: an Israeli war does not help them. What is clear is that Israel sees regime destruction as an end in its own right, with no interest in Iran's future beyond weakening and destabilising a regional rival. That is entirely in line with Israel's long-term approach to what it perceives as security issues. Israel backed Hamas against Fatah, a policy whose consequences are visible in the carnage in Gaza today. It backed the South Lebanese army (SLA) in Lebanon, until the SLA's collapse amid the emergence of Hezbollah. Now Israel is arming violent criminal factions in Gaza against Hamas amid the overwhelming sense that Netanyahu has no plan for Gaza's future even as he is reducing it to rubble. Netanyahu's enthusiasm for regime change appears to be viewed – for now at least – with some scepticism in Washington. 'They might be more comfortable with regime change than we are,' a US official told Axios. 'They may be more comfortable with destroying the country than we are.' Iraq and Libya also demonstrate the practical difficulties of a violent transition between regimes. In Iraq, US and other officials promoted figures from the Iraqi exile diaspora, such as Ahmed Chalabi, while having, for a protracted period, a negligible grasp of emerging centres of influence or tribal and sectarian tensions. In Libya – in the immediate aftermath of Gaddafi – that dynamic was even more in evidence as international missions, including European, struggled as midwives to a transitional government without authority, and challenged by warlordism, even as other powers including the UAE and Russia moved into the vacuum. Long-term Iran watchers are also highly dubious that Israel can engineer a path to regime destruction through aerial warfare, even in the event of decapitation with the killing of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. They point out that the Israeli offensive could just as easily allow the regime to retrench and accelerate efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon. More widely there is a risk that Israel's efforts to destabilise Iran could lend new legitimacy to the clerical regime, even in Middle Eastern countries profoundly suspicious of it as they grow increasingly anxious over Israel's increasingly violent reach. 'With Israel's expansion of its offensive to include Iran, there is no telling where the boundaries of this battleground will end,' King Abdullah of Jordan said on Tuesday. His country has faced the recent challenge of hosting both Syrian and Iraqis fleeing their civil conflicts. 'And that is a threat to people everywhere. Ultimately, this conflict must end,' he added. Peter Beaumont is a senior international correspondent for the Guardian and former Jerusalem correspondent. He covered the invasion of Iraq and its aftermath, the Libyan revolution and has reported from Tehran.
