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Time of India
a day ago
- Politics
- Time of India
A man waits in the shadows for the Iranian regime change
Live Events Who is Reza Pahlavi? Does Reza Pahalvi stand a chance? (You can now subscribe to our (You can now subscribe to our Economic Times WhatsApp channel As tensions soar in the Israel-Iran conflict, calls for regime change in Iran have grown louder – from hawks in the United States Congress to Israeli officials and some Iranian activists contend that the Islamic Republic is vulnerable, making this an opportune moment to exploit internal turmoil and widespread dissatisfaction to push for the collapse of the clerical regime led by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told Fox News on Sunday that Israel's operation 'could certainly' result in regime change, as the government in Iran is 'very weak.' He claimed that '80% of the people would throw these theological thugs out.' Although the country's President Isaac Herzog has recently said that regime change was 'not an official objective of ours,' and the goal was 'to remove the Iranian nuclear program.'Either way, the buzz around regime change is picking up steam, and there's one name that is coming to the front: Reza Pahlavi Reza Pahlavi, officially named Crown Prince of Iran, is the son and successor of Iran's last monarch, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. He left Iran in 1978, at the age of 17, just before the Iranian Revolution overthrew his father and abolished the monarchy, paving the way for the establishment of the Islamic Republic that rules the country the Pahlavi dynasty was credited by many for its modernising influence in Iran, it was also criticised for its attacks on religion and alleged human rights Pahlavi, the founder and leader of the National Council of Iran, an exiled opposition group, participates in the Iranian democracy movement and is a prominent critic of Iran's Islamic Republic has sought to exploit the void created by the Israeli strikes to claim to speak for the regime's opponents from his base in the he said, he was offering himself as a 'transitional leader' of a secular, democratic alternative to the a scathing attack on Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his regime, Pahlavi recently said, "My fellow Countrymen, the 'Islamic Republic' has reached its end and is in the process of collapsing. Khamenei, like a frightened rat, has gone into hiding underground, and has lost control of the situation. What has begun is irreversible.""For years, I have tried to prevent our homeland from being consumed by the fire of war. The end of the Islamic Republic is the end of its 46-year war against the Iranian nation. The regime's apparatus of repression is finally falling apart."Urging the people to unite and revolt against the Khamenei-led regime, Pahlavi said, "All it takes now is a nationwide uprising to put an end to this nightmare once and for all. Now is the time to rise; the time to reclaim Iran.'The Islamic regime has for years been battling public disgruntlement as anger intensified among an aspirant, youthful population disillusioned with decades of oppressive rule, isolation and economic now, with Israeli bombs raining down on the Islamic Republic and the regime locked in a battle for its survival, Pahlavi, the highest-profile regime opponent in exile, is betting that his moment may finally arrive.'This is the first time in all these years that we see the playing field being more even for an opportunity for change,' Pahlavi told the Financial he has been a peripheral figure, accused by critics of lacking credibility and unable to form an organised opposition to challenge the theocratic leaders who seized power in told FT that Pahlavi does have some support in Iran, as he has tapped frustrations with the regime and nostalgia for the pre-revolutionary era. But the extent of that support is 'debatable', and the Iranian diaspora has long been blighted by internal divisions and accusations that it is out of additional risk for Pahlavi, who met Netanyahu while visiting Israel in 2023, is that he will be viewed as a collaborator with Iran's aggressor, eroding what support he has in the republic, analysts 64-year-old insisted that Iranians were 'smart enough' to know this is not 'Israel's war with Iran'.Mehrzad Boroujerdi, a US-based Iranian-American academic, told FT, even in a scenario where Israel and the US — if it intervened — defeated Iran and sought to put Pahlavi in power, the story would not end there.'Considering the degree of political polarisation in the country . . . many are going to view him as a puppet of the Israelis and the Americans.'
Saba Yemen
2 days ago
- Politics
- Saba Yemen
Iran's UN Mission Responds to US President Donald Trump's Claims
New York - Saba: The Islamic Republic of Iran's Mission to the United Nations responded to the US President's statements. Tasnim International News Agency reported that the Iranian Mission to the United Nations confirmed: "No Iranian official has ever asked to kneel at the gates of the White House. The only thing more outrageous than his lies is his cowardly threat to 'eliminate' the Leader of the Iranian Revolution." Whatsapp Telegram Email Print
New Statesman
2 days ago
- Politics
- New Statesman
From the archive: The revolution turns to repression
The Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah and installed Ruhollah Khomeini, whose successor Ali Khamenei rules Iran today, as Ayatollah in February 1979. The NS's man in Tehran, Fred Halliday, assessed the state of things six months into the new Islamic Republic. George Monaghan It does not take one long to sense the ferocious right-wing Islamic fervour that grips much of Iran today. In the airport arrival hall, in front of the (unattended) health controls, hangs a poster on which the dove of peace is being ripped open by a hammer and sickle. Underneath runs the simple message: 'The Mirage'. Along the walls on the way into Tehran the slogans 'Death to Communism' and 'Death to the Fedayin' can be seen, and amid the plethora of renamed streets none is called after any left-winger who gave his or her life in the 25 year struggle against the Shah. Huge placards show an Iranian revolutionary breaking through shackles imposed by both the Russian and US flags, and the walls of the massive Soviet embassy compound in the centre of the city are daubed with hostile slogans. The second night I was in Iran I attended the first major public rally held by the Tudeh, or Communist Party, in the 30 years since it was banned by the Shah. A crowd of around 50,000 people had gathered to hear Ehsan Tabari, the party's leading theoretician and the grandson of an Ayatollah, who was now a candidate in the coming elections for a Council of Experts to discuss the constitution. Most of the crowd appeared to be students, but there was more than a sprinkling of older people, gnarled representatives of another age. As several hundred stewards with linked arms guarded the perimeter of the meeting, groups of right-wing youths, named 'Phalangists' by their opponents, roamed around shouting 'Death to the Tudeh and the Fedayis, Social Parasites' and repeating the most frequent rightist slogan heard in Iran: 'There is no Party but the Party of God, No Leader but the Spirit of God', the latter being a reference to Khomeini. Thwarted in their main aim of disrupting the meeting, these Islamic militants turned on a hapless Iranian press photographer, and, after chasing him across the campus grounds, smashed his equipment and pummelled him to the ground amid chants of 'Allah is Great'. This hysteria is not confined to Muslim activists on the street, but can be found at the centre of the Islamic government from which it receives strong encouragement. Three of Khomeini's top advisers whom I interviewed – Foreign Minister Yazdi, Radio and TV Director Ghotbzadeh, and Economics Adviser Bani-Sadr – all blamed the left for Iran's present troubles and claimed that the left had played no role in the revolution that overthrew the Shah. A similar view is held by Ayatollah Nuri, one of the key organisers of last year's anti-Shah demonstrations in Tehran. For weeks, offices and bookshops belonging to left-wing organisations in the provinces have been attacked. On Friday 10 August, for example, crowds coming out of the mosque in the Azerbaijani town of Urumieh burnt down the Fedayin bookstore, and this was followed by attacks on left-wing offices and bookstalls in Tehran on the following Monday. The new press law, which makes criticism of the Ayatollahs illegal and enforces wide-ranging censorship of domestic and foreign reporting, is another blow at those who criticise the policy of the Islamic government. The attack on the left by leading government officials often takes the form of a rather crude scape-goating. Bani-Sadr told me that the left was to blame for the standstill in industry, and both he and Ghotbzadeh blamed the unrest among Turks, Arabs and Turcomans on leftist interference, avoiding the question of whether the demands of these people were legitimate or not. Their defence of current policy towards the Kurds sounded like Ethiopian officials legitimating their repressive policies in Eritrea on the grounds that the regional opposition forces were also 'agents' of foreign powers. In a tragic irony many of those who were in the forefront of the struggle against the Shah are now once again on the receiving end of government repression and right-wing violence . Mohammad Reza Sa'adati, a member of the Kojahidin of the People guerillas, who spent years in jail under the Shah, has now been arrested on charges of being a 'Soviet spy' and has the dubious distinction of being the first of the new political prisoners known to have undergone torture. Slogans calling for his execution have been written on walls in Tehran. Over a dozen members of the Socialist Workers Party, arrested weeks ago in the southern town of Ahvaz, still await trial, as does the poet Nasim Khaksar, who earlier spent eight years in the Shah's prisons. A lawyer I met had spent three years in jail, had been tortured by hanging on a cross – 'like Spartacus and his poor friends' as he put it to me – and had then had both his legs broken by SAVAK agents after his release. He was recently kidnapped by unknown assailants and taken up into the hills north of Tehran where he was badly burnt on his back and chest. Subscribe to The New Statesman today from only £8.99 per month Subscribe Mossadeq's grandson, lawyer Hedayat Matin-Daftari, who was flogged and thrown over the side of a mountain in 1967 and imprisoned by the Shah last year, had to flee last week into hiding in order to escape arrest after the National Democratic Front, of which he is one of the leaders, organised the demonstration to protest the closure of opposition papers. A few days earlier I had lunched with him and had found him, despite the evident tension in the country, to be quietly optimistic. He sensed, as other opposition members did, that the akhunds or religious leaders were overreaching themselves by interfering in so many areas of public life and by their apparent inability to run the country. Many people felt that despite the current government onslaught the left, allied with the movement for regional autonomy, could in the longer-run establish a democratic system. One Azerbaijani poet I met went so far as to argue the daring thesis that events in Iran would mean 'the end of Islam', as popular revulsion against the akhunds led to backlash in the months ahead. Some signs of such resistance can be seen on the streets of northern and central Tehran. Music banned on the state radio is available in cassette form, and even though this is the month of Ramadhan when all-day fasting is obligatory, stalls selling soft drinks are open. People were smoking and playing music in public, and hosts proudly produced the odd bottle of whisky or champagne. In the fields, so I was told by a reliable source, the government is taking no chances with the oil workers who demonstrated their power so effectively last year: there the workers' canteen remains open all day, Ramadhan or not. Yet the power of the Islamic right must not be underestimated. Its appeal is not just an ideological one, since its strength rests on a set of institutions that retain great power at the neighbourhood level. Ayatollah Nuri, for example, explained how he could call on thousands of people all over Tehran who had been students at his lectures over the past few years, and the new anti-left tone of Khomeini's regime is transmitted not just over the radio but in the Friday sessions at the mosque and through local Islamic associations. The position of women illustrates the uncertain status of the new Islamic regime. Khomeini's claim before his return to Iran that Islam guarantees the equality of men and women was always untrue, given the theory and the practice of all Islamic societies. But the attempt to impose Muslim clothing, whether the cloak-like chador or the scarf-like hejab, was successfully resisted by the women's demonstrations of last March. Since that time, there has been no marked increase in the wearing of Muslim clothing by women in the centre and north of Tehran, and many women even in government offices remain without it. However, Khomeini may well try to enforce the hejab in the future and he is reported to have told a woman poet who visited him that he would do so after the Islamic constitution becomes law. In the meantime other factors are eating away at women's position. Although there are still women announcers on the radio, all solo women singers have been taken off the media – and Director Ghotbzadeh tried to tell me this was because they had all been connected with the Imperial Court. Women's sports have been virtually stopped, and the few women judges serving in the courts have been reallocated to other positions. A young male judge told me, with evident disgust, that once Muslim law is imposed in the courts the Islamic prescription that one man's testimony as a witness must be considered equal to that of two will come into force. One woman was elected to the 73-person Council of Experts now discussing the draft constitution, but she was a nominee of Khomeini's and her election poster was a tragi-comic one , showing two eyes and a nose emerging from behind a black chador. Probably the gravest attack on women's position has come in the realm of employment, where discrimination, as in other countries, is justified on grounds of economic constraint. Additionally, the organised feminist tide that was so successful in March has not continued. Most left groups seem to regard the question of women as a secondary one, but while I saw no women at the Fedayin headquarters wearing headscarves the Mojahidin told me that all women who join their organisation must wear one. One change the government will find hard to put through is the segregation of schools, since only 15 per cent of primary school teachers are men and an almost reverse situation operates in secondary education. But the everyday pressures on women continue and it is easy for the demagogues of the right to talk of women's emancipation as part of some 'alien' imposition on Iran. Even the late Dr Ali Shariati, supposedly the theorist of a new enlightened Islam, argues in his Omat va Imamat that woman's liberation is a plot by the western cosmetic monopolies to boost their exports to the third world. Here again, the power of Islamic reaction over women must not be underestimated and one has only to see the phalanxes of chanting black-cloaked women on right-wing demonstrations to realise that Khomeini and his people can mobilise large numbers of women for their cause, such as fascist movements in Europe did in the 1930s. The position of the urban working class is, as yet, uncertain. Many factories are idle or running at a reduced level of output, and the masses of migrant workers who flocked to the cities to work in construction have been dispersed by the standstill in this sector, evident in the lines of unmoving cranes along the Tehran skyline. In the factories some of the workers' committees set up during the last months of the struggle against the Shah have continued to operate. But it seems that many of these have been taken over by the akhunds or by the Revolutionary Committees and no substantial organisations linking different factories have yet emerged to form the basis of a new trades union structure. The Islamic forces have been quick to see the need to pre-empt any threat from this source. While he fulminates against the left, Khomeini appeals to the workers in the name of Islam and a widely distributed poster depicts an industrial worker holding an Islamic banner beneath a quotation from the Koran promising a speedy victory. The rhetoric of the regime places great emphasis on what it is doing for the mostazifin, a neologism based on the Arabic word for 'weak', and usually translated as the 'deprived'. A classic populist concept, it is designed to appeal to the working class without thereby scaring off the other class allies of the Islamic movement. Yet it would seem that despite the immense suns of money available from oil, the new regime has not brought tangible benefits to these people. Loans for housing of up to £12,000 (300,000 Tomans) are available but only to those who can make a deposit of one tenth this amount. The economics correspondent of one pro-Islamic paper told me that apart from providing electricity of under 100 Kilowatts free of charge nothing had been done to benefit the poor in the six months since Khorcini came to power. Meanwhile inflation runs at over 30 per cent. The standard themes of Islamic theorists are those familiar to right-wing populist, and indeed, fascist movements elsewhere. Bani-Sadr's 'Unitary Economics', a farrago of Islamic and socialist ideas, is little more than confusionist rhetoric, laced with some religious allusions, and has so far led to no concrete programme that could begin to solve Iran's economic problems. When I met him, Bani-Sadr laid great emphasis upon how Iran remained a dependent country in which imperialism still played a major role, but neither what he told me, nor what he had previously written, led me to believe that he has a coherent grasp o f the Iranian economy. Earlier, he told me that the spirituality of Khomeini had an important consolatory role to play given the serious material privations to which the people would be exposed. The oft-heard slogan that 'There is No Right nor Left in Islam' and Khomeini's appeals for Islamic unity are the conventional fare of overtly fascist regimes, coupled as they are with attacks on all opponents as being 'enemies of Islam' and with a facile attribution of links with imperialism to all who question his views. Although he hardly ever mentions Iran, much of Khomeini's Islamic rhetoric is nationalistic and his favourite ploy is to attack the left for being western-influenced and alien to Iran's traditions, His denunciation of the intelligentsia, especially writers and lawyers, and his attacks on the press, indicate a willingness to stifle all critical discussion on the grounds that they are part of an 'imperialist conspiracy'. Yet so devalued have accusations become that more than one Iranian I met was able to argue at great length how Khomeini himself had been installed by the CIA… It is as yet hard to evaluate the forces opposed to Khomeini, but they certainly go beyond the organised parties of the left. While Ayatollah Taleqani seems o have fallen into line behind Khomeini's rightist crusade, Ayatollah Sharriat-Madari, who called on his followers to boycott the recent elections, remains a powerful force, especially in his native Azerbaijan and among the estimated 1.5 million Azerbaijanis who live in Tehran. The other non-Persian nationalities are also resistant to the centralising tendencies of the Islamic government, and the Kurds in particular are well-armed and should be able to resist the central government for a long time. While they stress that they do not want to secede from Iran, the Kurds do want some form of substantial regional autonomy, and the draft constitution, offering only some ill-defined local councils which bear no relation to the nationalities themselves, is clearly inadequate to their demands. The left itself, based in Tehran but with substantial provincial support, comprises a number of competing groups. The National Democratic Front, which broke away from the National Front in March, comprises a number of liberal and socialist groups. Although not a party, and formally nearer the centre than other left organisations, it has so far been the most consistently critical of the Khomeini government. Not only did the NDF call for a boycott of both the referendum on the Islamic Republic and the Council of Experts elections, but it took the initiative in organising the protests against censorship that sparked the recent clashes. The two main former guerrilla groups, the Fedayin and the Mojahidin, enjoy substantial support among young people and could probably mount some kind of armed resistance to a right-wing onslaught. But their leadership, drawn from people who have spent much of their adult life in jail, is inexperienced and they have been indecisive in their attitude to Khomeini's regime, trying to conserve their militant following while not breaking completely with the government. Like the Peronist guerrillas who emerged into the open after the fall of the Argentinian military dictatorship in 1973, they have found it difficult to turn their undoubted prestige as militant fighters against the old regime into a durable political movement. The oldest and wiliest of the left groups is the Tudeh, in effect the Communist Party. Founded in 1941 their leadership is much older than that of other groups, and they evidently have a substantial organisation. They have chosen to back Khomeini without major reservation at this time: 'We consider him on balance progressive, and since we cannot lead, we have to choose', was how one party leader explained it to me. They remain in the most traditional sense a pro-Soviet party, something that must do them immense harm in the current Iranian situation where anti-Russian feeling runs high. It is unlikely that their concessions to Khomeini will in the end spare them from the force of the rightist onslaught, and their paper is among those closed this week. Indeed, on Monday the authorities sealed the offices of the party. The core of Khomeini's support lies in the poorer, southern district of Tehran and in the cities running southwards from there along the edge of the great desert that forms the core of Iran – Qom, Isfahan, Kashan, Yazd, Shiraz. The second main holy city after Qom, Mashad, may also favour him and the resistance to his concept of an Islamic Republic in the rest of the country is still fragmented. But with the economy in a major recession, and unrest in the regions, the initiative is slipping from the government's hands. It is in these circumstances that the state of the army and other repressive units becomes of major importance. Most estimates I heard indicate that about half of the pre-revolutionary army, say upwards of 150,000 men, remains in existence and there certainly seemed to be plenty of soldiers in the barracks I saw in Tehran and in the mountains to the north. The air force is still flying missions, although Foreign Minister Yadzi categorically denied the reports put out by opposition papers that some dozens of US technicians had been brought back to the country. The army and air force have, however, lost most of their top commanders, and it will certainly take time to rebuild the esprit de corps and the command structure previously reliant on the Shah which were shattered in the revolutionary period. An extremely ominous development in the growth of irregular military units, recruiting young unemployed men to carry out vigilante duties. Security Chief and Deputy Premier Mostafa Chamran is said to command a force called the Regiment of Youth, and a group named the Black Shirts has been growing in south Tehran. The Jamshidabad barracks in Tehran are the centre of another semi-official force called the Army of Guards, and then there are both the Guards of the Islamic Revolution, organised by the government, and the Committee Guards, under individual mollahs and district chiefs. Ill-trained and divided as these units may be, and incapable of facing seriously armed foes like the Kurds, they are nonetheless a formidable force for urban repression and can be sure of further expansion in a time of high unemployment. In late July up to 60,000 of such irregulars paraded through the streets of Tehran. In a clampdown on the left it would be to these elements, as much as to the regular army, that Khomeini would be likely to tum. Equally sinister is the rise of a new secret police organisation called SAVAME–SAVAK with one word altered ('Country' changed to 'Nation'). According to one man who recently came out of Evin jail, the imprisoned members of the former Counter-Espionage section of SAVAK were summoned to the central office there some weeks ago and asked to start working again, for SAVAME. Some of the indictments against left-wingers now in jail are based on old SAVAK files. Amid the clamour and confusion of contemporary Iran, it has become obvious, more quickly than was generally expected, just how incapable Khomeini and his associates are of running Iran and how quickly they are falling back, turbaned akhunds and western-educated ministers alike, on demagogy about 'foreign plots' and on repression. Unwilling to guarantee basic democratic rights to the press, the opposition or the nationalities, or to implement a serious programme of social change, they are dragging the country towards a bloodbath the outcome of which no one can predict. Khomeini may believe that Allah is Great, but it certainly seems to be the Devil who is working overtime in Iran today. [See also: From the archive: The apotheosis of Tammany Jim] Related This article appears in the 18 Jun 2025 issue of the New Statesman, Warlord
Axios
2 days ago
- Politics
- Axios
Trump: Iran proposed White House meeting, but it's "very late" for talks
President Trump said Wednesday that Iran still wants to negotiate with the U.S. and even proposed sending a delegation to the White House, but that it was getting "very late" for talks and he might soon authorize strikes on Iran's nuclear program. Why it matters: Trump is seriously considering U.S. strikes on Iran's underground nuclear facilities, which would spark retaliation on U.S. bases and other targets in the region and potentially draw the U.S. into a protracted conflict with Iran. But his remarks suggest he has not closed the door entirely on diplomacy. A senior U.S. official confirmed Iran proposed talks at the White House but said there are "no set plans" for such a visit, which would be the first such meeting since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. But Iran's mission to the UN swiftly denied that any such proposal had been made. "No Iranian official has ever asked to grovel at the gates of the White House. The only thing more despicable than his lies is his cowardly threat to 'take out' Iran's Supreme Leader. Iran does NOT negotiate under duress, shall NOT accept peace under duress, and certainly NOT with a has-been warmonger clinging to relevance," the statement reads. Trump also reiterated his demand for "unconditional surrender" from Tehran during his remarks to reporters outside the White House. When asked if he gave Iran an ultimatum, Trump said: "You could say so. Maybe you could call it the ultimate ultimatum." Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responded to Trump's"surrender" demand in a televised address Wednesday, saying the Islamic Republic "will not surrender" and if the U.S. takes military action "it will undoubtedly cause irreparable consequences to them." What he's saying: "They want to negotiate. I ask: why didn't they negotiate two weeks ago they could have done fine. It is very sad to watch this. I told them to negotiate and last minute they said no and they got hit," Trump told reporters at the White House. He stressed that "nothing is too late" when it comes to diplomacy, but then added that when the Iranians reached out in recent days he responded that "it is very late to be talking" and that "there is a big difference between now and a week ago." "They even suggested they would come to the White House. That is courageous and not easy for them to do", he added. Reality check: Iran was negotiating with the U.S. right up until Israel began its operation, with talks planned for last Sunday. Trump has contended that they did not move quickly enough. Driving the news: Trump declined to say whether he made a decision to join the war but made clear he is considering it. "I may do it, I may not do it... nothing is finished until it is finished," he said. "We are not looking at a long term war. I just want them not to get a nuclear weapon." Trump said he didn't tell Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu whether the U.S. would get more involved in the war. "I told Netanyahu, 'keep going.' I talk to him every day. So far he is doing a good job," Trump said. The president stressed that Iran is "defenseless" and added he doesn't know how long they can keep on fighting under the circumstances.
Asia Times
3 days ago
- Politics
- Asia Times
Regime change wouldn't likely bring democracy to Iran
The timing and targets of Israel's attacks on Iran tell us that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's short-term goal is to damage Iran's nuclear facilities in order to diminish its weapons program severely. But Netanyahu has made clear another goal: he said the war with Iran 'could certainly' lead to regime change in the Islamic republic. These comments came after an Israeli plan to assassinate the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was reportedly rebuffed by United States President Donald Trump. It's no secret Israel has wanted to see the current government of Iran fall for some time, as have many government officials in the US. But what would things look like if the government did topple? Founded in 1979 after the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has democratic, theocratic and authoritarian elements to its governing structure. The founding figure of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, envisioned a state run by Islamic clerics and jurists who ensured all policies adhered to Islamic law. As Iran was a constitutional monarchy before the revolution, theocratic elements were effectively grafted on top of the existing republican ones, such as the parliament, executive and judiciary. Iran has a unicameral legislature (one house of parliament), called the Majles, and a president (currently Masoud Pezeshkian). There are regular elections for both. But while there are democratic elements within this system, in practice it is a 'closed loop' that keeps the clerical elite in power and prevents challenges to the supreme leader. There is a clear hierarchy, with the supreme leader at the top. Khamenei has been in power for more than 35 years, taking office following Khomeini's death in 1989. The former president of Iran, he was chosen to become supreme leader by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of Islamic jurists. While members of the assembly are elected by the public, candidates must be vetted by the powerful 12-member Guardian Council (also known as the Constitutional Council). Half of this body is selected by the supreme leader, while the other half is approved by the Majles. The council also has the power to vet all candidates for president and the parliament. In last year's elections, the Guardian Council disqualified many candidates from running for president, as well as for the Majles and the Assembly of Experts. Among those disqualified was a moderate former president, Hassan Rouhani. As such, the supreme leader is increasingly facing a crisis of legitimacy with the public. Elections routinely have low turnout. Even with a reformist presidential candidate in last year's field – the eventual winner, Masoud Pezeshkian – turnout was below 40% in the first round. Freedom House gives Iran a global freedom score of just 11 out of 100. The supreme leader also directly appoints the leaders in key governance structures, such as the judiciary, the armed forces and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). So, Iran is far from a democracy. But the idea that regime change would lead to a full democracy that is aligned with Israel and the US is very unlikely. Iranian politics is extremely factional. Ideological factions, such as the reformists, moderates and conservatives, often disagree vehemently on key policy areas. They also jockey for influence with the supreme leader and the rest of the clerical elite. None of these factions is particularly friendly with the US, and especially not with Israel. There are also institutional factions. The most powerful group in the country is the clerical elite, led by the supreme leader. The next most powerful faction would be the IRGC. Originally formed as a kind of personal guard for the supreme leader, the IRGC's fighting strength now rivals that of the regular army. The IRGC is extremely hardline politically. At times, the IRGC's influence domestically has outstripped that of presidents, exerting significant pressure on their policies. The guard only vocally supports presidents in lockstep with Islamic revolutionary doctrine. In addition to its control over military hardware and its political influence, the guard is also entwined with the Iranian economy. The IRGC is heavily enriched by the status quo, with some describing it as a 'kleptocratic' institution. IRGC officials are often awarded state contracts, and are allegedly involved in managing the 'black economy' used to evade sanctions. Given all of this, the IRGC would be the most likely political institution to take control of Iran if the clerical elite were removed from power. In peacetime, the general consensus is the IRGC would not have the resources to orchestrate a coup if the supreme leader died. But in a time of war against a clear enemy, things could be different. So, what might happen if Israel were to assassinate the supreme leader? One scenario would be a martial law state led by the IRGC, formed at least in the short term for the purposes of protecting the revolution. In the unlikely event the entire clerical leadership were decimated, the IRGC could attempt to reform the Assembly of Experts and choose a new supreme leader itself, perhaps even supporting Khamenei's son's candidacy. Needless to say, this outcome would not lead to a state more friendly to Israel or the US. In fact, it could potentially empower a faction that has long argued for a more militant response to both. Another scenario is a popular uprising. Netanyahu certainly seems to think this is possible, saying in a recent interview: 'The decision to act, to rise up this time, is the decision of the Iranian people.' Indeed, many Iranians have long been disillusioned with their government – even with more moderate and reformist elements within it. Mass protests have broken out several times in recent decades – most recently in 2022 – despite heavy retaliation from law enforcement. We've seen enough revolutions to know this is possible. After all, modern Iran was formed out of one. But once again, new political leadership being more friendly to Israel and the West is not a foregone conclusion. It is possible for Iranians to hold contempt in their hearts for both their leaders and the foreign powers that would upend their lives. Andrew Thomas is a lecturer in Middle East Studies at Deakin University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. 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