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Bringing back abducted Ukrainian children a tough assignment for SA

Bringing back abducted Ukrainian children a tough assignment for SA

Daily Maverick06-05-2025

It will be a delicate but critical assignment for South Africa to secure the return from Russia of the 400 abducted Ukrainian children whom Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky last month asked President Ramaphosa to help bring home.
Zelensky gave Ramaphosa the list of 400 children he says Russia abducted and deported to Russia, when they met in Pretoria on 24 April 2025. Ramaphosa accepted what could be a tricky mission. It will require South Africa to walk a fine line between its humanitarian concerns and its friendship with Russia.
Pretoria's concern for the children began as far back as June 2023 when Ramaphosa led a peace mission of African leaders to Kyiv to meet Zelensky and then to St Petersburg to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, to present a peace plan.
Returning the Ukrainian children was part of the plan, but Putin dismissed this, insisting that Russia had merely moved children out of harm's way in a war zone.
The issue was highly charged politically and remains so as the International Criminal Court (ICC) had issued warrants of arrest for Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Russia's Commissioner for Children's Rights, on 17 March 2023, indicting them 'for the war crime of unlawful deportation of population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation'.
Ramaphosa and Zelensky evidently got on well at their meeting in June 2023 in Kyiv. This began to thaw the relations between the two countries, which had been chilly because of Pretoria's steadfast refusal to condemn Russia's invasion. This was most evident in South Africa's abstention from a series of resolutions in the UN General Assembly in 2022 and 2023, condemning the invasion as a violation of the UN Charter's demands that countries respect one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Zelensky invited Ramaphosa to participate in the international discussions on his own 10-point Peace Formula that were just then about to begin. Ramaphosa accepted and sent national security adviser Sydney Mufamadi and director-general of International Relations and Cooperation Zane Dangor to participate in several rounds of talks around the world, culminating in a summit in Switzerland in June 2024.
The return of the abducted children was also one of the points of Zelensky's Peace Formula. To date, Ukraine has verified 19,546 children who were deported or forcibly transferred, though it believes there are more. At last count, it said 1,307 had been returned to Ukraine, either through their families, or through NGOs or governments, particularly Qatar and the Vatican.
SA's mediator role
South Africa has definitely remained interested in the children, says Ukrainian legal expert Kateryna Rashevska, the lead on International Justice and legal analysis at the Regional Centre for Human Rights in Ukraine and also an expert on Ukraine's Bring Kids Back UA task force.
She recalls visiting South Africa in November 2023 and meeting officials in the Presidency and Dirco.
'I saw how this topic really interested the South Africans and how for them, it is also not only a Ukrainian matter, but … for the whole international community.'
There were intermittent later reports about South Africa's efforts to bring back some of the children, but none of any success. Raveshka is not sure why, but she assumes that some preparations were made to mediate.
'In particular, a representative office of Bring Kids Back UA was established in South Africa.'
South Africa's efforts became more formal and focused in October 2024 when it participated, through its High Commissioner to Canada Moe Shaik, in the Ministerial Conference on the Human Dimension of the (Zelensky) Peace Formula in Montreal.
The conference focused on trying to return prisoners of war, unlawfully detained civilians and deported children and included steps to strengthen the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children, which had been formed in February 2024.
At the Montreal conference, Pretoria offered to serve as an intermediary – alongside the Vatican and Qatar – 'to support and negotiate the return of children'.
Ukraine had wanted South Africa to formally join the international coalition, but the country did not do so.
Asked why not, Chrispin Phiri, spokesperson for Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola, would say only, 'The coalition is one of the initiatives to address the issue of Ukrainian children. South Africa is working on a separate initiative together with Qatar and the Holy See (who are also not part of the coalition) to address the return of the children. We are engaging with both sides on the matter to ensure the return of the children.'
Raveshka explained why she believed South Africa did not want to join the coalition.
She said that she believed Pretoria's thinking was similar to Qatar's, that most of the members of the coalition were Western nations, 'which are perceived by the Russian Federation as enemy states'.
Joining this coalition could harm South Africa's efforts to get the children back, she said.
However, Raveshka said that even after Montreal, there was no vision about how South Africa could help. 'But after the visit of President Zelensky, after the transfer of this list of 400 children, it became more clear.'
A delicate mission
South Africa will now have to present this list to Russia and ask it to return the children to Ukraine. This delicate mission would seem to imply that Pretoria thinks Russia has done something wrong, or even committed crimes.
But Raveshka said she supposed that South Africa would follow Qatar's approach, and that would be not to use words such as 'deportation' or 'abduction' or 'international crime'.
'It will be like South Africa helps Ukraine to reunify families separated because of war. So, for Ukraine, it is acceptable to use this wording because our first priority is the repatriation of children and then accountability.'
Raveshka said once South Africa handed over the list to Russia, Children's Commissioner Lvova-Belova's office would probably check the information about the children provided by Ukraine to select those who could be returned.
This would include verifying the legal guardians of the children.
Raveshka said several children on South Africa's list were particularly at risk because they had been forcibly removed to Crimea and elsewhere from the Kherson Regional Children's Home and the nearby Oleshky Specialised Boarding School. These well-respected institutions cared for children with special needs, such as orphans or children with disabilities.
Ukrainian media reports have said that parents, guardians and other carers are anxious because many of those removed from the orphanages are now not receiving the special care from the Russians that they need.
They want them sent home.
'Some of them have biological parents in Ukraine, some of them have legal guardians in Ukraine, others have foster families who are ready to care for them after their repatriation,' Rashevska said. 'Ukrainian institutions are also ready to take them in,' she said.
She foresaw problems in the recovery of several children on the list who had already been adopted by Russian families. Ukrainian authorities believe that about half of the children from the Kherson Regional Children's Home, for instance, are now with Russian families. One child was known to have been adopted by a high-ranking Russian official.
'However, this in no way means that South Africa should not focus its efforts on the return of these children. On the contrary, the situation is so complex that only an intermediary state can effectively influence the reunification of these children with their relatives in Ukraine.'
She said the list of 400 names was prepared by competent Ukrainian bodies who had verified all the information. The Russians often claimed the Ukrainian lists were inaccurate, she said.
'But I am sure, I can tell you, because I know people who work on this list, that these are real children who are needed here in Ukraine, who have families, but unfortunately they are in captivity of the Russian Federation. Sometimes Russians are even not confirming where these children are.'
Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told local journalists in Pretoria that the challenge of identifying the children had been aggravated by Russia changing the names and identities of those it had deported. Moscow then gave them Russian citizenship or handed them over to Russian families, says Rashevska.
Nonetheless, Sybiha was confident that Pretoria would achieve 'positive results' and said it was helpful that Ramaphosa 'has direct communication with President Putin…'
Coordinated approach
Rashevska notes that other countries like Qatar have also been given lists of children to try to bring home. During recent peace talks conducted by the US in Saudi Arabia, Ukraine also gave US officials a list of names.
Rashevska said Russia was not prepared to cooperate with the Biden administration, but they now seemed to be open to discussion on the children with the Trump administration.
It is understood that Saudi Arabia has also been given a list of 500 children.
'So, Ukraine is just trying to use all possibilities in order to return more and more,' said Rashevska.
She said she hoped at least some children on South Africa's list would be returned. Any failures would be attributable to Russia, not to any lack of political will by South Africa. She believed Moscow would be particularly reluctant to return any children old enough to testify in the ICC case.
Rashevska thought it was important to highlight 'that the participation of South Africa in the repatriation of Ukrainian children is very important, not only because it is a chance for families and their children to be reunified, but also because it is a sign that it is not only a matter for Ukraine when children are stolen or abducted during armed conflict,' she said.
'For demonstrating this solidarity with Ukraine, we are very grateful to South Africa.'
Ramaphosa's spokesperson Vincent Magwenya said: 'The outcome of the process of securing the return of Ukrainian children is going to require the full cooperation of the parties directly affected in the matter and interested parties with an interest in ensuring a lasting peace in Ukraine and the region.
'President Ramaphosa sees the return of the children as one of the key confidence-building measures that will underpin the peace process.
'Therefore, it's not going to be for South Africa alone to determine the process and outcome of such an exercise. It's going to take all parties involved to finally resolve this issue.' DM

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