G7 is no more than a relic of the past. India should focus more on G20, BRICS

It's worth remembering how the G7 began. A 'fireside chat'-turned-'Library Group' started by US treasury secretary George Shultz in 1970 to address currency turbulence bloomed into G6 five years later. On 15 November 1975, about five months after Indira Gandhi had imposed Emergency in India, leaders of six democracies — the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan — met at the Castle of Rambouillet near Paris.
By keeping India out, Canada has missed a golden opportunity to reset bilateral ties and make a new beginning for peace and development. The exclusion is not only unfortunate but might prove to be a great setback for the G7's own ambitions, whether it is addressing climate change and global inequality or building cooperation with emerging economies, agendas it has taken up in the last three decades or so.
Canada, which took over the G7 presidency from Japan in December 2024, has made a surprising and controversial decision: to exclude India from the upcoming G7 summit. At a time when the world's economic centre of gravity is shifting towards Asia, and when India has proven its leadership on multiple global platforms — including its recent G20 presidency — this move is not just irrational, it may be self-defeating.
Today, none of the leaders from the 'Summit of the Six' — James Callaghan (UK foreign secretary), Henry Kissinger (US secretary of state), Gerald Ford (US president), Takeo Miki (Japan prime minister), Helmut Schmidt (German chancellor), Jean Sauvagnargues (French foreign minister), Valery Giscard d'Estaing (French president), and Mariano Rumor (Italian foreign minister) — are alive, and most of the countries no longer dominate the global economy.
The G6 became the G7 in 1976 with Canada's inclusion, and the G8 between 1997 and 2013 with Russia onboard— until Russia's suspension after the Crimea annexation in 2014.
Collectively, the group expressed concern about their respective economies, donned the mantle of the 'white man's burden' to discharge their responsibilities toward the 'Third World', and decided to meet again. Fifty years later, none of the world's problems have been solved by these countries, and except for the US, the rest are no better off than the countries of the 'poor South.'
Also read: India is walking a geopolitical tightrope. It can shape New Delhi's diplomatic power
G7's expanding mandate, shrinking impact
Over the years, G7 summits have taken on a broad agenda: gender equality, global health, climate change, and sustainable development. In 2021, the UK-led summit committed itself to a 'green revolution' and net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Germany's 2022 presidency established a 'Climate Club' to implement the Paris Agreement, and the 2023 Hiroshima summit reaffirmed commitment to phasing out fossil fuels.
India participated in all these meetings, contributing immensely to the resolution and their implementation. Ironically, it was Donald Trump-led 'G1 within G7' that derailed consensus, dismissing global warming as a 'hoax.' Now, with Trump 2.0 back in the mix and India 3.0 out, can the G7's green agenda survive?
Patronising rhetoric, no real support
The G7's agenda of connecting with emerging economies and adopting an inclusive approach has often rung hollow. Italy included an 'African Segment' in the 2001 summit, but without serious financial commitments and steps to resolve issues of poverty and migration. African leaders left disappointed, questioning the G7's sincerity. In contrast, India, during its G20 presidency, successfully pushed for the African Union—representing 55 African countries—to become a permanent G20 member.
Who, then, is more relevant and committed to inclusive global development: the G7 or the G20?
The 2021 G7 summit in London also introduced the Global Minimum Tax (15 per cent), aiming to rewrite international tax rules and discourage multinational corporations from taking undue advantage of lower taxes in smaller or developing economies. This again faced serious objections, with critics arguing that the G7 had no democratic legitimacy to act as the captain of the global economy.
India: From Bandung to BRICS
India's global economic role didn't begin yesterday. New Delhi has emerged as the fulcrum of Asian economic development since hosting the 1947 Asian Relations Conference and leading the Bandung Conference in 1955, where the foundation of the Non-Aligned Movement was laid. Now, it has positioned itself at the centre of South-South Cooperation.
The successful Indian presidency of the G20 followed by its developmental agenda with IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) are proof of India's unique leadership position in the geo-economic dynamics of Asia and South Asia. It has also championed inclusive global governance in a way that the G7 often only gestures toward.
Time to re-evaluate the relevance of G7
The economic, political, and cultural divides of the 1950s and 1960s are out of syllabus, phased out of academic discourse due to globalisation and rapid rise of 'Southern' economies. Between the 19th and the 21st century, there was a total metamorphosis that has left several centuries-old theories, perceptions and ideas redundant.
The old binaries of the Cold War — East vs West, North vs South — have blurred into insignificance in the face of a new and emerging global economic order, necessitating a new approach to the contemporary history of global economic development.
The G7, once seen as the anchor of global economic stability, is no more than a relic of the past today. India would do well to invest its diplomatic energy elsewhere: G20, BRICS, IBSA, and regional platforms that better reflect the world as it is, not as it was. Let the G7 gently go into oblivion — and take the outdated and irrelevant worldview it represents with it.
Seshadri Chari is the former editor of 'Organiser'. He tweets @seshadrichari. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prashant)

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Time of India

36 minutes ago

• Time of India

World Bank and IMF climate snub 'worrying', says COP29 presidency

The hosts of the most recent UN climate talks are worried international lenders are retreating from their commitments to help boost funding for developing countries' response to global warming. Major development banks have agreed to boost climate spending and are seen as crucial in the effort to dramatically increase finance to help poorer countries build resilience to impacts and invest in renewable energy. But anxiety has grown as the Trump administration has slashed foreign aid and discouraged US-based development lenders such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund from focussing on climate finance. Developing nations, excluding China, will need an estimated $1.3 trillion a year by 2035 in financial assistance to transition to renewable energy and climate-proof their economies from increasing weather extremes. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Buy Brass Laxmi Ji Idol For Wealth, Peace & Happiness Luxeartisanship Shop Now Undo Nowhere near this amount has been committed. At last year's UN COP29 summit in Azerbaijan, rich nations agreed to increase climate finance to $300 billion a year by 2035, an amount decried as woefully inadequate. Azerbaijan and Brazil, which is hosting this year's COP30 conference, have launched an initiative to reduce the shortfall, with the expectation of "significant" contributions from international lenders. But so far only two -- the African Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank -- have responded to a call to engage the initiative with ideas, said COP29 president Mukhtar Babayev. "We call on their shareholders to urgently help us to address these concerns," he told climate negotiators at a high-level summit in the German city of Bonn this week. "We fear that a complex and volatile global environment is distracting" many of those expected to play a big role in bridging the climate finance gap , he added. - A 'worrisome trend' - His team travelled to Washington in April for the IMF and World Bank's spring meetings hoping to find the same enthusiasm for climate lending they had encountered a year earlier. But instead they found institutions "very much reluctant now to talk about climate at all", said Azerbaijan's top climate negotiator Yalchin Rafiyev. This was a "worrisome trend", he said, given expectations these lenders would extend the finance needed in the absence of other sources. "They're very much needed," he said. The World Bank is directing 45 percent of its total lending to climate, as part of an action plan in place until June 2026, with the public portion of that spilt 50/50 between emissions reductions and building resilience. The United States, the World Bank's biggest shareholder, has pushed in a different direction. On the sidelines of the April spring meetings, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent urged the bank to focus on "dependable technologies" rather than "distortionary climate finance targets." This could mean investing in gas and other fossil fuel-based energy production, he said. Under the Paris Agreement, wealthy developed countries -- those most responsible for global warming to date -- are obliged to pay climate finance to poorer nations. Other countries, most notably China, make voluntary contributions. - Money matters - Finance is a source of long-running tensions at UN climate negotiations. Donors have consistently failed to deliver on past finance pledges, and have committed well below what experts agree developing nations need to cope with the climate crisis. The issue flared up again this week in Bonn, with nations at odds over whether to debate financial commitments from rich countries during the formal meetings. European nations have also pared back their foreign aid spending in recent months, raising fears that budgets for climate finance could also face a haircut. At COP29, multilateral development banks (MDBs) led by the World Bank Group estimated they could provide $120 billion annually in climate financing to low and middle income countries, and mobilise another $65 billion from the private sector by 2030. Their estimate for high income countries was $50 billion, with another $65 billion mobilised from the private sector. Rob Moore, of policy think tank E3G, said these lenders are the largest providers of international public finance to developing countries. "Whilst they are facing difficult political headwinds in some quarters, they would be doing both themselves and their clients a disservice by disengaging on climate change," he said. The World Bank in particular has done "a huge amount of work" to align its lending with global climate goals. "If they choose to step back this would be at their own detriment, and other banks like the regionally based MDBs would likely play a bigger role in shaping the economy of the future," he said. The World Bank declined to comment on the record.

The Print

an hour ago

• The Print

Iran has fewer options & more risks than before. Its choices will affect all of Middle East

At the heart of this tectonic move was the deployment of the most penetrative weapon in the US arsenal—the GBU-57—used to target Iran's most fortified nuclear sites: the deeply hidden Fordow, along with Natanz and Isfahan. And with this strike, Trump continues the unbroken legacy of American presidents authorising military action in the Middle East. In a dramatic escalation this morning, the United States formally entered the war against Iran. While President Donald Trump had been publicly mulling his decision with vague references to a 'two-week window,' American B-2 bombers were already airborne—on a mission that would mark a seismic shift in the current US foreign policy. This marks a stunning departure for Trump, who won re-election on a promise that emphasised avoiding foreign military entanglements. Though initially hinting at restraint, he has now thrust the US directly into a volatile regional war. His abrupt mid-speech exit from the G7 summit in Canada suggested that something was brewing. That speculation was tempered by his two-week 'thinking period'—but all such ambiguity vanished with this morning's airstrikes, surprising Republicans, Democrats, and even Trump's own Make America Great Again (MAGA) base. Strategic deception The operation bore signs of strategic deception. Around 11 pm US time, six B-2 bombers were spotted heading west over the Pacific, refuelling midair near Hawaii, which now appear to have been decoys. In reality, another formation flew east from Missouri. These three B-2s undertook a 37-hour round-trip mission, refuelling midair before releasing a full payload of GBU-57s on Fordow. Each B-2 can carry two GBU-57s, suggesting that at least six of these 'Massive Ordnance Penetrators' (MOPs) were used. Fordow, located beneath a mountain and engineered to withstand conventional attacks, had been enriching uranium to 60 per cent—just short of weapons-grade—according to the recent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report. This is the first time the GBU-57 has been used in combat. Weighing 30,000 pounds and capable of drilling through 200 feet of reinforced concrete, it's the 'grandfather of all bunker busters.' Until now, only its smaller cousin (GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast) had seen combat use, notably in Afghanistan. In his address to the nation, Trump praised the military's precision and confirmed all aircraft had returned safely, with no American casualties. But has Fordow's enrichment capacity truly been neutralised? While initial Battle Damage Assessments (BDAs) are emerging from satellite providers like Maxar, they cannot fully reveal what occurred 200-300 feet underground. Preliminary reports and Iranian statements suggest that the enriched uranium (Iran has over 400 kilograms spread across different sites) was moved to safer locations in advance, perhaps in anticipation of an imminent strike. It's worth recalling that during Israel's own operation—codenamed Rising Lion on 13 June—the focus was on bombing and disrupting the power supply to centrifuges at Natanz. However, neutralising Fordow was always beyond Israel's capability, underscoring the indispensable role of American airpower and assets. Also read: B-2 stealth bombers, 6 'bunker busters'—how US strikes on Iran unfolded What comes next? Iran is unlikely to accept this blow passively. Its initial response—launching a limited missile barrage on Israel—was muted, but Tehran has since declared that 'all options are open.' So what might those options be? The Iranian regime faces four broad paths: retaliate, collapse, accelerate its nuclear ambitions, or accept an 'off-ramp' by freezing enrichment for three years, as some backchannel discussions suggest. Yet, autocratic regimes are seldom inclined toward humility. Some form of face-saving retaliation seems inevitable before diplomacy can resume. Let's consider Iran's six primary retaliatory options, from most likely to most dangerous: Continue strikes on Israel: Iran still possesses around 1,200 missiles, both ballistic and hypersonic, and a substantial drone arsenal. It could continue targeting Israeli cities. This would serve domestic propaganda only, but would fall short of responding to a direct US attack. Activate Proxy Groups: Iran could mobilise Shia militant groups in Iraq, Syria, and Bahrain. However, with Hezbollah and Hamas significantly weakened, their capacity for meaningful retaliation may be limited too. That said, they are easy to launch and perhaps a safer option for wrecking instability while not playing with fire. Close the Strait of Hormuz: Iran's parliament has reportedly already approved the closure of this crucial oil corridor. But it amounts to mere signalling right now, as the final decision on the matter will be taken by the Supreme National Security Council. This critical waterway, however, has been seeing reduced shipping activity since tensions began to rise. A full closure would disrupt global oil supply and raise prices sharply. However, Oman shares maritime responsibility for the strait with respect to its management, and other regional players—concerned about oil stability—may oppose this move. Remember that oil prices are spiking already, and the region's sensitivity to that fluctuation remains imminent. Target US bases in Iraq: This remains the least dangerous way for Iran to hit back at the US. Iraq's weak defence posture and complex political landscape make it a vulnerable target, especially for indirect, deniable attacks, at best carried out by proxies. Iran had, in fact, targeted the Al Asad airbase in 2020, after the US killed Quds Force leader Qasem Soleimani. Strike the U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain: Such an act would be seen as a declaration of war. The risks of escalation would increase dramatically, and it would compel a decisive U.S. second response. Attack Centcom Headquarters in Qatar: Perhaps the most extreme scenario. A strike at the United States Central Command – popularly abbreviated as Centcom – here would turn a contained conflict into a full-scale war and draw in global actors. Iran is certainly not prepared to handle this escalation. Based on the current scenario, Iran is unlikely to risk options five or six. Tehran understands that provoking the world's most powerful military could lead to its own destruction, when an off-ramp now exists. Also read: Iran's brutal regime is facing a reckoning. Consequences of US attack will go beyond Tehran Trump's gamble President Trump appears to be betting that one powerful blow, paired with stern rhetoric and overwhelming military might, will push Iran toward the negotiating table. It's a plausible theory—but not a guaranteed outcome. What if Tehran refuses? What if, out of desperation or pride, the Iranian regime takes an unthinkable step? The Trump administration may believe it's holding all the cards. But history shows that military superiority doesn't always translate to strategic success—especially in a region as combustible as the one in question. Iran today finds itself in an unprecedented moment of strategic loneliness. Russia, once a close ally and a steady buyer of Iranian drones for use in Ukraine, has stayed noticeably quiet, preoccupied with its own unending war in Europe. China, too, has offered no more than muted diplomatic platitudes and some technical help, which is not enough to help Iran alter the situation. Even Iran's religious and ideological partners in the broader Muslim world – the Ummah brotherhood – have resorted to lip service. In this strategic vacuum, Iran has fewer options and more risks than ever before. Its choices will now shape not just its own future, but the stability of the entire region. The Indo-Pacific costs Perhaps the most underdiscussed consequence of this strike so far is the reorientation of American focus back to the Middle East, at the expense of its Indo-Pacific commitments. For India, this is concerning. Relations between Washington and New Delhi have already strained in recent months, through issues ranging from trade demands to perceived US interference in India-Pakistan matters. Washington's post-Operation Sindoor closeness with Pakistan further complicates the equation. India, which had hoped for a deepened US presence in Asia to counterbalance China, may now find itself watching from the sidelines for the time being, wondering whether America can multitask or reorient in time, or whether its Middle East preoccupation will yet again overshadow its Indo-Pacific convergence. Where things go from here is still uncertain. Trump campaigned against endless wars, and yet, we are back in a familiar place: American bombers over the Middle East, oil prices rising, and an adversary vowing revenge. This could be a one-time strike meant to cripple Iran's capabilities and offer an offramp for all. Or it could be the beginning of a much longer, bloodier cycle of retaliation. For now, the GBU-57 has officially entered the theatre of war, and the world just got a lot more dangerous. Swasti Rao is Consulting Editor (International and Strategic Affairs) at ThePrint. She tweets @swasrao. Views are personal. (Edited by Zoya Bhatti)

India.com

2 hours ago

• India.com

Not US, NATO, Israel, G7, BRICS, or EU; Iran is most scared of THIS group due to..., the group consists...

(File) Israel-Iran war: Iran has shown unprecedented resilience despite being pummeled by US-backed Israel, and now the US itself, in the ongoing Israel-Iran war. Tehran has proven it does not fear any country or grouping, including the United States, Israel, G7, European Union, or NATO. However, there is one important grouping that impacts Iran's decisions, at least to some extent, the OPEC+, which includes Iran and 22 other crude oil-producing nations, most of them located in the Middle East. According to estimates, OPEC+ produces more than half of the world's total oil crude oil, with Iran being one of the largest oil-producing countries in the group. What is OPEC+ and how it influences Iran? Unlike the EU, NATO, BRICS, or G7, OPEC+ is not political, diplomatic or military alliance, but an economic grouping of major oil-producing nations, especially the oil-rich Gulf states of the Middle East. OPEC+ produces more than half of the world's crude oil, and essentially controls global oil prices, making it a powerful entity that can put pressure on nations by weaponizing oil prices. Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are the arguably the most influential countries in the OPEC+. Other oil-producing nations which are part of the group include Iraq, Kuwait, Venezuela, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Brunei, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Malaysia, South Sudan, Sudan and Oman. All these nations have vast reserves of oil and natural gas worth billions, if not trillions of dollars, and oil-production is a major contributor to their economies. How much oil is produced by Iran? Iran's daily oil production was an estimated 2.5 million barrels in March 2023, but this has increased to 3.3 million barrels, as per a recent Reuters report. More importantly, Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, through which more than half of the global supply of oil is shipped. Iran can trigger a global crisis if it decides to blockade this strategic shipping lane. Can the OPEC+ stop the Israel-Iran war? While Iran is not 'scared' of any country or alliance, the OPEC+ countries, most of whom have assured their tacit support to Tehran in the Israel-Iran war, hold some influence on the decisions made by the Islamic Republic. Experts believe Iran would not brush aside any mediation efforts or advice, and can play a key role in resolving the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict. Among non-OPEC countries, Iran also has the support of Russia, China, and Pakistan in the current conflict. Recently, Russian President Vladimir Putin told OPEC+ that the Israel-Iran is the major reason behind rising crude oil prices, while Iraq's Deputy PM warned that crude oil price would soon breach $200 per barrel if the war continues. The OPEC+ is not a diplomatic or political grouping, but has some power to act as a mediator to help de-escalate the current tensions between Iran and Israel. Putin recently talked about mediating between the two enemy nations, while several other countries have also made similar statements.