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News18
4 hours ago
- Politics
- News18
BJP's Event To Mark 50 Years Of Emergency: Amit Shah, Heroes Who Fought Against Indira To Attend
Last Updated: This by-invitation exhibition will have a series of stands chronicling the Emergency era and the formation of first non-Congress government of Morarji Desai, News18 has learnt The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is making big plans for June 25, the day which will mark 50 years of the Emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi. The Centre, meanwhile, has scheduled events which will last a year. With the Congress-led Opposition often accusing the Modi government of causing 'death of democracy" and imposing 'undeclared emergency", the BJP plans to use the occasion to strike back. On the eve of the 50th anniversary of the imposition of Emergency in India, BJP's think tank Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation (SPMRF) has organised a mega event at Delhi's Prime Minister Museum and Library. This strictly by-invitation event will have a huge exhibition, with a series of stands chronicling the Emergency era and the fight against it and the formation of the first non-Congress government of Morarji Desai, News18 has learnt. 'Every prominent opposition leader of the time from all political spectrums who fought against the Emergency will be prominently displayed in the exhibition. After all, everyone fought it together," said a source privy to the developments. From Gujarat Navnirman agitation to Jayaprakash Narayan's movement — the exhibition is likely to feature all key moments that shaped India spanning from 1975 to 1977, which was marked by suspension of civil liberties, censorship of the press, and widespread persecution of political opponents. Union Home Minister Amit Shah will be the chief guest who will deliver the keynote address of the evening. Shah will speak for around 45 minutes, where he is expected to lash out at the Congress in his signature style. Invites are now being sent out. 'This eve of reflection will revisit the suppression of civil liberties, censorship of the press, and imprisonment of political voices during the Emergency and will reaffirm our enduring commitment to democratic values and constitutional freedoms," reads the invite that News18 has seen. Binay Kumar Singh, Director of SPMRF, wants to set the tone a night before the D-Day when the BJP's youth and the whole government apparatus goes into making it a big success. The Centre has already instructed all states and Union Territories to undertake a year-long commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Emergency's imposition as 'Constitution Murder Day' with a Mashal yatra launched from Delhi on June 25, which will end at Kartavya Path on March 21, 2026, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi in attendance.
Time of India
6 hours ago
- Politics
- Time of India
‘Indira Gandhi was made to wait by Nixon for an hour': BJP MP Dubey compares Indira's 1971 US visit with Modi's diplomacy, accuses Congress of falling for ‘Pakistan's trap'
NEW DELHI: BJP MP Nishikant Dubey on Friday launched a sharp attack on the Congress party 's foreign policy legacy, using a mix of historical anecdotes and recent controversies to question the credibility of the Nehru-Gandhi leadership in global diplomacy. In a post on X, Dubey recalled an incident from 1971, claiming former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was kept waiting for an hour by US President Richard Nixon during her visit to Washington. 'Iron Lady Indira Ji, Jairam Ramesh Ji, for your information, in 1971 when Indira Gandhi Ji reached Washington to meet the US President Nixon, President Nixon made her sit in his waiting room for 1 hour,' he wrote. He urged the Congress to reflect on this and compare it with Prime Minister Narendra Modi's global stature today. 'Think about the state of the Nehru Gandhi family's policy?' Dubey's comments came days after he criticised Congress MP Priyanka Gandhi Vadra and her party for allegedly falling for a misinformation campaign involving Pakistan's army chief general Asim Munir. 'The opposition, especially the Congress, has stopped reading and writing. For the last 2-3 days, the entire Congress party kept saying that Pakistan's army chief general Asim Munir is going to the US. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Buy Brass Laxmi Ji Idol For Wealth, Peace & Happiness Luxeartisanship Shop Now Undo This was a trap by Pakistan,' Dubey told ANI. 'People across the country turned the opposition to Modi into opposition to the country. Today, it is known that the White House or the US military never called Asim Munir. What is the difference between the Pakistan Muslim League and Jairam Ramesh?' Taking a deeper historical swipe, Dubey cited the 1985 Kanishka bombing by Khalistani extremists, alleging Canada's inaction at the time was symptomatic of how Indira Gandhi's diplomatic efforts were often ignored. 'When the Kanishka bomb blast happened in 1985, Canada began its investigation only in 2006. Former Canadian PM Pierre Trudeau, who was in power from 1968 to 1984, received seven letters from Indira Gandhi over 16 years, asking him to act against Khalistani terrorists,' Dubey said. 'He never responded. He never listened. And now Congress wants to teach us foreign policy?' The Congress party has not yet responded to Dubey's latest statements.
New Indian Express
a day ago
- Politics
- New Indian Express
Writing the Emergency: Early notes from the underground
Next week, it will be 50 years since the Emergency was proclaimed by Indira Gandhi. Like last year, when the new parliament was constituted, it is bound to generate a lot of rhetoric, blame, counter-blame and also false moral equivalences with the present. When it comes to documenting the brutalities of the Emergency, a good majority of the literature falls under the genre of memoir, which captures emotion, heroics and suffering. These came much after the Emergency was lifted, and after many cubic feet of water had passed under the arches of Indian politics. But equally or more fascinating was the vigorous real-time pamphleteering that happened during the Emergency. It is pamphlets, both anonymous and signed, that characterised the Emergency and scarred the Congress and the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty permanently. They constructed an enduring perception of the time. It may be instructive to revisit the very first underground pamphlet that was smuggled out of India via London during this time, and published in faraway United States by a diaspora group called Indians for Democracy (IFD). The pamphlet was provocative, polemical and plain angry, with colourful phrases of personal attack on Indira Gandhi.
Hindustan Times
a day ago
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
The Emergency and its external dimension
The pain inflicted by the 21-month Emergency rule in India on its body politic and its people continues to hurt even after 50 years. The domestic dimensions of the Emergency have been discussed at length. A recent study by Srinath Raghavan ably explores its structural dimensions – of the gradual evolution of a powerful executive, creeping encroachments on freedoms and rights and authoritarian tendencies of governance — that have been building for long. However, Indira Gandhi's oft repeated allegations about the role of 'foreign hand' (of the United States of America) in destabilising her government have often skipped rigorous scrutiny. Her political opponents, many media commentators, and even serious historians like Ramchandra Guha and Bipin Chandra have dismissed these allegations in want of hard, concrete evidence, as a pretext to justify her authoritarian streak. This was also the position of the various US official organs, as expected. The prevailing intellectual narrative clearly underlines that transformational changes in developing countries result from a conscious or coincidental coalition of domestic and external forces. Over the years, many new archives have opened and the present ruling dispensation in New Delhi has brought the issue back to the forefront of India's political dynamics. The narrative of the US pushing Indira Gandhi towards the Emergency decision and supporting the peoples' uprising against its repressive regime deserve a second dispassionate look. This may be done at three levels. First, regime change, through covert as well as overt means, against Communist/ socialist or Left-oriented governments in Latin America (Chile) and Asia (Iran) has been an integral part of the toolkit of US policy since the Cold War years. According to American scholar Lindsey O'Rourke, the US carried out 64 covert regime-change operations between 1947 and 1989. Another scholar, David S Levins (2020), claims that the US carried out the largest number of foreign electoral interventions during 1946-2000. The use of covert operations for regime change in developing countries brought about extensive criticism of the US's democratic credentials, forcing the US Congress to appoint The Church Committee to investigate the matter. In its report in 1976, this Committee came down heavily on CIA operations and blamed it for having a worldwide network of several hundred individuals to have access 'to a large number of news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial publishers and media outlets' for covert operations. Secondly, at the regional level in South Asia, the US National Security Council's policy document, NSC 98/1, was adopted by President Truman in January 1951. It asked US policy in the region to take 'more frequently accept calculated risks' in ensuring that the Communist (as also, socialist and Communist supported) governments did not remain in power. Only such governments were acceptable that 'would assist the United States and its allies to obtain the facilities desired in the time of peace or required in the event of war'. The Nixon (1969-1974)-Kissinger (1969-1977) team of the US had a strong focus on South Asian regimes in its endeavour to cultivate China and isolate the Soviet Union. Between 1975 and 1977, major developments took place in South Asia. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1975) in Bangladesh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1977) in Pakistan were deposed brutally by military regimes. Sheikh Mujib's Bangladesh in 1971 had emerged in strategic defiance of the US, and Bhutto had defied the US on the nuclear issue. Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, was reported to have disclosed Kissinger's threat in November 1976 to Bhutto to make a horrible example of him if he pursued the nuclear path. Nepal (Zone of Peace, 1975) and Sikkim (the American queen of the Chogyal sponsored independent status, 1974-75) had explicit support from the US so as to distance them from India. Lastly, at the bilateral level, Indira Gandhi's 'foreign hand' paranoia was a reflection of these regional developments. She had the worst of relations with the Nixon-Kissinger team both on the Bangladesh (1971) and the nuclear (implosion, 1974) issues. It was problematic for the US establishment that Indira Gandhi, whom the CIA supported in dethroning the Communist regime in Kerala in late 1950s, was during 1967-69, leaning on the Indian Communists in her struggle for power within her own party. The CIA activities during Indira Gandhi's regime had become so unacceptable even to the US embassy in New Delhi that ambassador Patrick Moynihan had to ask the state department to withdraw CIA operations. The imposition of Emergency was publicly disapproved by the US state department and American media. The US secretary of state Kissinger in his memo to President Ford in September 1975 said that the Emergency had discredited Indian democracy, adding, 'We should avoid any overt involvement that could confirm her allegations of foreign subversion'. Did this imply that covert operations to subvert the Emergency could go on? The post-Emergency regime was headed by Morarji Desai, who American journalist Seymour Hersh alleged was a CIA mole in Indira Gandhi's cabinet. Desai fought a libel case in the US against Hersh unsuccessfully. President Carter visited India in January 1978 to acclaim the post-Emergency regime, and asked Prime Minister Desai to desist from the nuclear path. Thus, there are ample leads at all the three levels to revisit the question of the 'foreign hand' and see if it had any links with the popular protests. British scholar Paul Garr in his study, Spying in South Asia (2024), says that Indira Gandhi's 'foreign hand' was an exaggeration sometimes, but her fears about the CIA were 'genuine' and valid. Our reliance only on the structural theories and Indira Gandhi's authoritarianism do not explain her decision to end the Emergency, as also how she managed to stage an impressive electoral comeback in less than three years. SD Muni is professor emeritus, JNU, former ambassador and special envoy, Government of India. The views expressed are personal.
The Hindu
a day ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
Review of Srinath Raghavan's new book on Indira Gandhi
Srinath Raghavan's latest book, Indira Gandhi and the Years That Transformed India, examines her political career as India's long 1970s. It takes a chronological arc: her assumption of prime ministerial office in 1966, her struggle to take tight control of the Congress party, her landslide electoral win of 1971, thereafter her leadership of the country in the war with Pakistan, the imposition of Emergency, loss to the Janata Party in 1977, her stint in opposition, return to office in 1980 and her assassination in 1984. Placing this extended decade in a global context, Raghavan argues that 'the long 1970s were the hinge on which the contemporary history of India turned, transforming the young postcolonial country into today's India.' In an interview, Raghavan explains various ideas and events that marked these tumultuous years. Excerpts: In this political history of the Indira Gandhi years, a word that recurs repeatedly is Caesarist/Caesarism. In your view, is it central to understanding the changes that she oversaw, and how it transformed the Indian polity? Caesarism refers to a style of politics in which the leader seeks directly to connect with the people, bypassing party structures or the parliament. I found it useful to understand an important change in the Indian politics ushered in by Indira Gandhi – more useful than currently modish terms such as populist or charismatic. Democratic politics has, by definition, an element of populism. And charisma is only one aspect of the Caesarist style of leadership. Was she already inclined to the Caesarist style? Did her style shift-shape along the way? Indira Gandhi adopted this mode of leadership in response to the specific problems confronting the Congress party. The party's drab performance in the 1967 elections underlined its inability to carry with it significant sections of the electorate. At the same time, it accentuated the power struggle within the party between the prime minister and the regional grandees who controlled the machine. Indira Gandhi moved towards a Caesarist style both to undercut her rivals in the party and revive its electoral fortunes. Her decision to split the Congress was undoubtedly a crucial first step. But equally important were the extraordinary performance of her party in the general elections of 1971 and the decisive military victory over Pakistan later the same year. These, in turn, propelled the party to a massive win in the State elections of 1972. None of these could have been predicted when she broke the old Congress. But cumulatively they cemented her control of the party. Without such dominance it is difficult to imagine the party tamely falling in with her decision to impose the Emergency in June 1975. The triumphs of 1971-2 to the imposition of Emergency in 1975 and the rapid consolidation of the Emergency regime — do you see a vein of risk-taking running through the entire arc? Or did, as in the popular view, fortitude give way to paranoia? I don't see her as an inveterate risk-taker. Rather she had a sharp, instinctive grasp of power relations (whether in domestic or international politics), an instinctive sense of timing and a willingness to make bold choices. These qualities worked for her in the crises of the early years, but they also led to counterproductive outcomes in later years—not only the Emergency but also her handling of the problems in Punjab, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir during her final term in office. All along, she tended to blame difficult situations on the machinations of her domestic or international opponents. This made her somewhat impervious to introspecting on her own choices and their consequences. Yet, as her bete noire Henry Kissinger once said, even the paranoid can have real enemies. You write that 'the long 1970s placed the Indian economy on the road to liberalisation, if only via a crooked path'. Do you think this point remains little appreciated? Indeed. The received wisdom on Indira Gandhi's economic policies is that they were 'socialist' and they tightened the grip of the state on private capital. This is true, but it is also a partial picture. In fact, the heyday of nationalisation and state control in the early 1970s proved brief, though it was damaging enough. The embrace of these policies coincided with the onset of a global economic crisis triggered by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of stable exchange rates and the oil shocks that followed the Arab-Israel war of 1973. Such was the impact of this global crisis on the Indian economy that Indira Gandhi was forced to embrace conservative macroeconomic policies and move in the direction of liberalising controls on the economy. Before and during the Emergency as well as in her last term in office she adopted strong anti-inflationary policies. During these periods, she also espoused pro-business policies — policies that were viewed favourably by established players like J.R.D. Tata and newer entrants like Dhirubhai Ambani. In so doing, she put the Indian economy on the long road towards liberalisation. The tenure of the Janata Party was a vital phase of the long 1970s. How much was Indira Gandhi a defining factor in the manner and pace at which the regime unravelled? The Janata government was united in its desire to fix Indira Gandhi after 1977, but divided on how best to proceed. This led to some spectacular own-goals such as the abortive move to arrest her in 1978. Indira Gandhi, for her part, proved more astute in playing on the faultlines within the Janata Party and on the thrusting ambition of some of its leaders. In particular, her move to support Charan Singh's bid for premiership ensured that the Janata Party was broken beyond repair or rapprochement. How important were these years out of power, 1977-1980, in her own eventual evolution? These were undoubtedly the most challenging years of her political life. Yet, her ability to retain a grip on a section of the Congress party, to revive her popular fortunes by dramatic moves (such as in support of the Dalits after the massacre in Belchi), and to bounce back by winning the 1978 by-election in Chikmagalur — all showcased her political instincts and tenacity. At the same time, these years also led her further down the path of personalising power in the party (which she split for a second time) and of relying on her younger son, Sanjay Gandhi, who was clearly the dynastic heir apparent. You conclude that while the Janata government had successfully rolled back the Emergency, it did not reconfigure the coordinates of parliamentary democracy put in place on Mrs. Gandhi's watch. Yet, did its record inform the coalition governments to come in later years, of the 'third front', BJP, and the Congress? The Janata government certainly foreshadowed the era of coalition politics that began in the late 1980s. While several of the main protagonists of this period were active in 1977-79, it is not clear they had learned much from that bitter experience. Rather, the record of some of the later coalition governments bore out the dictum that the only thing we learn from history is how to make new mistakes! You choose not to speculate about the reasons for her announcement of elections in 1977. But did this announcement embed in the Indian political system the centrality of elections? The outcome of the 1977 elections demonstrated that even the most powerful political leader could be unseated and humbled. Coming in the wake of the Emergency, when institutional checks and balances had manifestly failed to uphold democracy, elections were now regarded as central to Indian democracy. A decade ago you had published a profile of Indira Gandhi - from then to now, has your assessment of the arc of her prime ministerial career altered? My assessments have changed in a couple of ways. The availability of newly declassified archival materials, including from the Prime Minister's Secretariat, has enabled me to understand better the ideas and impulses that lay behind many of the choices and decisions made by Indira Gandhi and her contemporaries. This is true even of such well known episodes as the nationalisation of banks. At the same time, I have developed a deeper appreciation of the gulf between intentions and outcomes, and how the latter were decisively shaped by the wider, including the global, currents of the long 1970s. At the outset of her premiership, for instance, Indira Gandhi wanted to restore the economy to the track of planned economic development (on the Nehruvian model). But the economic imperatives and crises of the period effectively led to rather a different model of political economy — one that combined targeted anti-poverty programmes with a liberalising, pro-business outlook. This framework has proved durable and continues to shape Indian political economy today. The interviewer is a Delhi-based editor and journalist. Indira Gandhi and the Years That Transformed India Srinath Raghavan Allen Lane ₹899
