Unionists must ask themselves: ‘is this as good as it gets?'
I come from a unionist background in
Northern Ireland
. Nevertheless, I believe in Irish unity, but I
welcome the recent efforts
by those who believe that Northern Ireland should stay as part of the
United Kingdom
.
Like many others I want to hear the views of those who believe that Northern Ireland is better off as it is, and that its people should not contemplate joining with the rest of the island of Ireland, even if I disagree.
Open debate is a sign of a healthy democracy, and we need more of it, not less. Debate now will mean that when the unity referendums happen – and I believe that is when, not if – everyone will be better able to make an informed decision.
For some, Irish unity may be wrapped up in images of 'the fourth green field', or such like. For me, however, the key issue is deciding on what will offer the best quality of life for everyone who lives across this island.
READ MORE
Every metric measuring living standards today – life expectancy, waiting lists for surgery, education standards and job prospects – shows that the South today outperforms the North.
[
Kneecap and Boris Johnson have a lot in common
Opens in new window
]
Belfast writer and communications expert, Ben Collins
For those who want Northern Ireland to stay part of the UK, I would ask is this as good as it gets? Are we living in Nirvana now or do you envisage that things will improve? If you think that things will improve, how is that going to happen?
Northern Ireland is a small region within the United Kingdom. Everyone knows this, but some accept it more than others. But it is a significant part, a very significant part, of the island of Ireland.
In a world where the all-island economy grows, the place that is now Northern Ireland can be a vitally-necessary part of that engine with the chance of being part of one of Europe's fastest growing economies.
In a such a world, the quality of life of everyone across the island will be better. Every problem that we face will become no less problematic, but they can be better tackled together, not apart.
[
How to fix the Northern Ireland economy
Opens in new window
]
The uniting of the island of Ireland must, first, be about creating peace and prosperity, not merely about history, posterity, or some echoes of the past. That for me is the Irish Unity Dividend.
But we must prepare, for the referendum and for the new State to come afterwards, one where public services would have to be integrated, along with the island's infrastructure and economy.
This is not about assimilation, capture, or takeover. it is about building a world-class nation where everyone has an equal stake, where everyone can thrive, especially the Border counties most damaged by Partition a century ago.
Operating two of anything is more expensive, less efficient. Even people who are not economists, or know anything about economics know that. Partition has cost us all, and there is kinder, gentler form of partition.
Sovereignty is not a flag on a pole, it's a roof over people's heads and food on the table.
If unification is the will of the people on both parts of the island, I believe that Stormont should continue to exist, but for a finite period of time. Afterwards, the new State would have one parliament, in Dublin.
However, immediate integration would be needed in some cases. Some issues, notably public health, would have to be dealt with on an all-island basis from the off to ensure that lives are saved.
During the Covid-19 pandemic, Stormont followed the British Government lead, which left the two parts of the island, confusingly, with different rules at different times, but facing the same threat.
Climate change and the spread of zoonotic diseases means that pandemics in the future are more likely, not less. Contradictory actions on the two parts of the island serve no one, and must not happen.
With divided control, Stormont ministers could follow the approach of London, or somewhere else while the rest of Ireland runs to different rules. That makes no sense. Equally, immigration also be clearly better dealt together, from the off.
For too long we have heard critics of Irish unity say that talking about Irish unity is a bad thing, that merely mentioning an aspiration for a United Ireland is antagonistic or provocative.
However, the possibility of a Border poll when merited by circumstances was a key part of the Good Friday Agreement. Nobody should fear debate about an option that was part of an international agreement nearly thirty years ago.
Brexit is an example, and a warning. We have seen what happens when people vote for a vague idea of constitutional change, as happened then. Nearly a decade later, people still argue about what the vote meant.
Some argue that reconciliation must happen within Northern Ireland before a referendum is held. And, yes, we do not have a reconciled society, but Partition is and has been the source of that division.
The Irish Border was created by the British government, dividing the island into two states, causing friction and barriers ever since. Before it, the counties making up Northern Ireland were the most economically advanced part. No longer.
Like most UK regions, Northern Ireland has suffered, London and the Southeast of England has gained, and they continue to gain.
In addition to London, I have been fortunate to live and work in Edinburgh, Cardiff, and Dublin in my career, before returning to my home city of Belfast. In each of those three capitals, the indigenous language is embraced.
Unfortunately, it is seen as a source of division by some within Northern Ireland. I want to live in a country where diversity is celebrated and cherished. Culture should be something that can be appreciated by all, not a source of division.
When unionists politicians state that they want to 'Make Northern Ireland Work' does that mean with, or without embracing the indigenous language or Irish culture? Does it mean with, or without building Casement Park?
I understand that this is an unsettling time for unionism, especially because I come from that background. Brexit has not turned out well for unionism and unionists feel let down by the British government.
The beauty of the Belfast Agreement before Brexit was that you could be Irish, British, European, or all three. Ireland and the UK were part of the EU, so borders were of little consequence. Brexit changed all that.
Today, there are competing visions of the future – but the choice at one level is this: whether to stick in a UK with an uncertain future, or become part of a united Ireland that is firmly part of the European Union.
Such a debate must happen respectfully. Believing in the benefits of Irish unity is not being anti-British. How one expresses that, however, might be. And everyone needs to remember that.
This is not a debate that can be endlessly postponed. Life in Northern Ireland is changing. People's views are changing. Even Brexit has changed Northern Ireland. That is not a coincidence.
Northern Ireland was created to guarantee a permanent Protestant and unionist majority. Today, it has neither. It has a nationalist First Minister. Sinn Féin is the largest party in Stormont. Westminster has more nationalist MPs than unionists.
Sinn Féin is now the largest party in local government across Northern Ireland. Unionism holds a minority of seats in Westminster, in Stormont and across local councils in Northern Ireland.
I fundamentally disagree with those who say there was no alternative to violence. Terrible things were done, terrible things were suffered. Irish unity will be achieved through purely democratic means, not through violence.
One of the many benefits of a United Ireland is that unionist votes and voices will matter much more in an all-Ireland Dáil and Seanad, than they do in Westminster. The time for a referendum is fast approaching, perhaps in the next decade.
The very populists who forced a Brexit vote in 2016 and who provoked the economic decline and division that has so troubled the UK since may now be the people to gain from that disorder. Just look at t the Runcorn by-election in recent days.
A Westminster government led by such people will be actively hostile to the EU, will seek to undermine Ireland and will resent financially supporting Northern Ireland. The momentum for Irish unity may not just come from Ireland.
Unionists must be sure they will be shown respect in a new Ireland, that they will enjoy a higher quality of life, but, most importantly, that they enjoy the same rights and status as others. I am certain that this can happen, should unionists choose to accept it.
Ben Collins is the author of two books with Luath Press: The Irish Unity Dividend, which will be published in September and Irish Unity: Time To Prepare
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Irish Times
3 hours ago
- Irish Times
The Central Bank's hard-landing scenario: corporate tax crashes, budget deficit balloons to €18bn
For obvious reasons, officials in Ireland can't use the term 'soft landing'. It was trotted out so regularly, so erroneously in the late 2000s when the economy was hurtling towards the hardest of hard landings that it has become synonymous with the opposite. If the Central Bank told us the Irish economy was in for a 'soft landing' from the current US tariff debacle, people would panic. Perhaps in reaction to the misplaced optimism of the Celtic Tiger era, we now seem to have an inherent bias towards highlighting negative scenarios. READ MORE [ US tariffs could punch €18bn hole in public finances, Central Bank warns Opens in new window ] We were certainly prepared for a bigger assault from Brexit than the one we actually got. Some call it 'catastrophising', but regulators should take a sober view on things. In an article published alongside its latest quarterly bulletin, the Central Bank lays out three possible scenarios for how US tariffs and greater US protectionism might impact the economy here. In its baseline scenario, which involves 20 per cent tariffs on European Union goods going into the US from the third quarter of this year, with pharmaceuticals and semiconductors exempt, the economy grows by 2 per cent this year, in terms of modified domestic demand, and 2.1 per cent on average in 2026 and 2027, while the State continues to run a budget surplus out to 2030. Even if it won't say it, this is the regulator's 'soft landing' scenario. In a more adverse scenario with pharmaceuticals and semiconductors getting hit by 20 per cent tariffs and with the EU retaliating with 20 per cent tariffs of its own, growth is slower and the budget surplus shrinks to less than 1 per cent. But what grabbed the headlines was the Central Bank 'extreme scenario' which involves the State losing the entire windfall element of its corporate tax base, which is due to peak at €17 billion in 2026, alongside a 20 per cent reduction in multinational investment 'and a corresponding loss of export market share'. [ Rent pressure zone changes will be 'painful' for tenants, Central Bank warns Opens in new window ] This scenario would see the Government's healthy budget surplus – it was €8.9 billion last year – flip to a budget deficit of more than 4 per cent of national income by 2030, equivalent to €17.7 billion. While there are lots of caveats – the scenario assumes the Government takes no corrective action and continues to make contributions to the two long-term savings funds – such an outcome would pitch us back into another period of austerity. It also highlights how much the State's coffers have become intertwined with the financial fortunes of a small number of US multinationals. 'This could be considered a somewhat extreme scenario as it incorporates a loss of all excess CT [corporate tax] by 2030 along with weaker economic activity, but it is illustrative of a key vulnerability for Ireland relating to the future path of the foreign-owned capital stock,' it said. Central Bank director of economics and statistics Robert Kelly denied he was painting too bleak a picture, saying the bank's worst-case scenario did not envisage the possibility of a big multinational firm leaving the jurisdiction because of tariffs or changes to US tax law, which has been the fear since the corporate tax boom started more than a decade ago. The nightmare scenario for Ireland would be for an Apple or an Intel to up sticks and leave. Despite the threat hanging over Ireland's economic model, there are several reasons to believe that corporate tax receipts, which hit a record €28 billion last year (excluding the Apple tax money), will continue to increase in the medium term. For one, the biggest corporate taxpayers here are in the tech and pharmaceutical sectors, both at present exempt from US tariffs. The Irish Fiscal Advisory Council (IFAC) also expects receipts from the business tax to rise by about €5 billion from 2026 onwards as additional revenue from the new minimum tax rate of 15 per cent over and above the State's headline rate of 12.5 per cent flows into the Exchequer. Big multinationals with a turnover above €750 million have been liable to pay the higher rate since 2024, but are not due to make their initial payments under the new rate until the middle of next year. This is expected to boost tax receipts here by an additional €3 billion next year and €2 billion in 2027. Despite the US signalling its intention to withdraw from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) -brokered deal to establish a minimum global rate, tax authorities here and elsewhere are pushing ahead with it. Several big taxpayers here have been availing of generous tax-cutting capital allowances which are due to run out, meaning they will be liable to pay more tax – another factor likely to drive receipts. Some of the frothier predictions suggest corporate tax receipts here could grow to €40 billion and say we should be saving a lot more than the current allocations to the State's savings funds. The windfall has also coincided with a worrying increase in Government spending, over and above what IFAC deems sustainable. It might be that the bigger threats facing the Irish economy are coming from within – housing, government spending, energy security, the high cost of doing business – rather than those emanating from abroad.
Irish Times
3 hours ago
- Irish Times
Government plans for €35,000 fees cap to halt High Court delays to building projects
The Government wants to cap legal fees that can be claimed from the State in environmental planning cases, in a bid to discourage High Court actions against infrastructure and housing projects. Ministers have been taking advice on the measures from Attorney General Rossa Fanning this week. This is being done in the hope of stemming the tide of legal actions that have held up schemes relating to wastewater, roads and housing. The move reflects growing anxiety in the Coalition about the need to boost the State's basic infrastructure, as concerns grow about housing delivery being hindered by constraints in electricity and water networks. One option under discussion is to impose a limit of about €35,000 on legal costs that litigants can claim from the State if they succeed in a judicial review challenge against a planning decision. READ MORE Such moves would apply to High Court cases taken under the Aarhus Convention, an international agreement that governs access to justice in environmental matters. Minister for the Environment Darragh O'Brien is required, under new planning legislation, to 'prescribe monetary amounts' for costs in Aarhus proceedings, after consulting with Minister for Justice Jim O'Callaghan and Minister for Public Expenditure Jack Chambers. On this question, the law requires ministers to take into account 'the need to ensure that court and judicial resources are utilised for the common good and in the interests of justice'. They must also consider 'the cost to the Exchequer'. Such measures are included in the Planning and Development Act of 2024, an extensive body of law to overhaul and speed up the planning process. The act is one of the biggest pieces of legislation in the State's history. Minister for Housing James Browne is commencing the law in phases, with measures taking force this week to establish An Coimisiún Pleanála in succession to An Bord Pleanála. The new commission is chaired by Paul Reid , former chief executive of the Health Service Executive. Despite the worsening housing crisis, thousands of new homes in certain parts of the Dublin region have been delayed because they cannot access electricity . Uisce Éireann has separately warned it will have no capacity for new housing connections within three years if a new north Dublin wastewater plant does not proceed. Permission for the plant was struck down by the High Court five years ago. A cap in the region of €35,000 has yet to be settled and people involved in the talks stressed the debate was still open. 'There's a scheme being developed under the legislation but it hasn't been finalised,' said one figure with knowledge of the talks. Asked for comment on the prospect of a €35,000 cap, Mr O'Brien's spokeswoman said: 'Proposals are currently being developed and will be assessed. No decision has been made at this stage.' People familiar with the proposal believe it is likely to provoke resistance from environmental campaigners. Any move to impose a cap would drastically reduce lawyers' earning potential in judicial review cases taken on environmental grounds. Legal sources say successful litigants often rack up legal fees of hundreds of thousands of euro in cases taken on a 'no foal no fee' basis by lawyers, where litigants incur no fees if they lose.
Irish Times
3 hours ago
- Irish Times
How AIB, once worth less than its art collection, came back from the brink
In early March 2012, AIB's chief executive of three months, David Duffy , unveiled a swingeing plan to cut one in five jobs – 2,500 in total – to restore the ailing lender to profitability and make a start on paying back its €20.8 billion taxpayer rescue. 'If you were leaving, someone would bring out a Swiss roll and a packet of biscuits and people would gather around your desk. There was no talk of going out for a nice lunch,' recalls a former AIB staffer who went through their fair share of goodbyes at the time in the group's then headquarters in Ballsbridge . 'The contrast between the relief on the faces of those leaving and the anguish of those who were staying was often stark. It was a very difficult time to say you worked in one of the banks. If you got into a taxi at the time and were asked where you worked, you'd say something like Arnotts, given the level of public hostility towards bankers at the time. Others working in branches got the brunt of it, sometimes being spat at. The atmosphere was febrile.' Almost 13 years later – and 16 years after its initial rescue – AIB returned this week to full private ownership as the Government sold its final 2 per cent stake to market investors, at a share price almost 60 per cent above what it was when it carried out an initial public offering (IPO) of shares on the stock market eight years ago. READ MORE The Government is not alone in seeking to draw a line under crisis-era bailouts. The past month has seen Keir Starmer's administration in the UK sell its remaining shares in NatWest and the Dutch government reduce its holding in ABN Amro below 30 per cent. Elsewhere, Greece concluded the reprivatisation of its lenders late last year with the sale of a stake in National Bank of Greece. [ AIB share sale brings banker pay back into focus Opens in new window ] The sale of the final tranche of AIB shares leaves the State on track to fall about €700 million short of recovering its full rescue bill on a cash-in, cash-out basis, even after it goes about selling stock warrants held in the bank, estimated to be worth about €300 million. Still, it wasn't always a given that taxpayers would recover this much from the most expensive bailout of a surviving Irish lender – especially when AIB shares were trading below €1 apiece, a seventh of their current price, during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. 'It did look bleak at various points in terms of getting to this point,' said Des Carville, head of the Department of Finance's shareholding and financial advisory division, which managed the relationship with the bank. Des Carville, head of the Department of Finance's shareholding and financial advisory division 'These were risky investments. Owning equities is risky at the best of times. Owning shares in banks, as we've found out, is particularly so.' Three key factors have turned around AIB's fortunes in the past four years: a spike in interest rates globally as central banks fought inflation; the bank's return to loan-book growth after a decade and a half of contraction; and the shrinking of competition as Ulster Bank and KBC Bank Ireland exited the Republic. The biggest boost from higher interest rates has been thanks to inertia across Irish households as they continue to keep 85 per cent of their €166 billion of cash savings in on-demand and current accounts, earning little or nothing, rather than availing of rates of up to 3 per cent for certain accounts among domestic banks, including AIB. The fact that AIB's deposit base is much larger than its loan book also means that it has earned billions of euro in recent years from storing excess cash with the Central Bank of Ireland. AIB had €31.5 billion lying idle with the regulator at the end of last year. The going deposit rate across euro-zone central banks was as high as 4 per cent in 2024. Christ Cant of Autonomous Research in London, said in a report earlier this year that AIB is what Germans would call a 'eierlegende Wollmilchsau', or egg-laying woolly milk sow – a mythical jack-of-all-trades for investors. 'Amongst European banks, AIB provides an unusual combination of both exceptional capital return prospects [for investors] and strong balance sheet growth prospects, in a great zip-code,' he said, noting that the Republic was a 'structurally attractive market' and 'fiscally responsible sovereign'. Taxpayers felt over the years that bank bailouts left them holding eggs of a more sulphuric kind. AIB would lose more than €34 billion on soured loans – more than any other Irish lender – in the decade after Brian Cowen's government guaranteed the banks in September 2008, including bad-loan charges and losses on portfolio sales to the National Asset Management Agency (Nama) and overseas investment firms. The stench still lingers. Even though the Irish economy is now almost three times its Celtic Tiger peak of €197 billion in 2007, the banking crisis continues to be felt, with Irish households and businesses paying higher interest rates on loans than the EU average, creaking infrastructure and, most profoundly, a post-crash shortage of capital for residential development that has given rise to today's housing crisis. 'A real arrogance' Stephen Bell was part of a team of PwC consultants brought in to help AIB management in late 2010 as it headed into State control. 'One clear memory from my first days was sitting in an office with artwork on the walls and thinking to myself, each one of these pieces is probably worth more than the bank right now,' said Bell, who would serve as AIB's chief risk officer on secondment during 2011. AIB had an impressive collection of Irish art spanning the 1880s through the 21st century, including works from Jack B Yeats, Paul Henry, Sir John Lavery, and Roderic O'Conor. A few dozen of its best pieces would be handed over to the State after the bank succumbed to taxpayer ownership, ending up at the Crawford Art Gallery in Cork. 'There was a real arrogance about AIB ahead of the crisis. It saw itself as a multinational organisation, with its banking unit in Poland, interests in the Baltics and Bulgaria, a large stake in M&T Bank in the US, and a UK division,' said a former senior Central Bank official who dealt with the banks during the financial crisis, but who declined to be named. In the early days of the global crisis in 2007, the regulatory focus was more on Bank of Ireland because of its large mortgage book in the UK, a market where Northern Rock collapsed that September. 'Bank of Ireland had to circle the wagons earlier than AIB,' the former central banker said. It moved sooner to book large loan loss charges, setting aside €230 million for its then financial year to March 2008. [ How AIB went from boom to bust and back again Opens in new window ] AIB's hubris at the time was best captured in its decision to pay €270 million of interim dividends to shareholders that August as banks globally were hoarding capital. Two months later, then chief executive Eugene Sheehy said the bank 'would rather die than raise equity'. The bank's greater exposure than Bank of Ireland to commercial-property lending – which accounted for 36 per cent of its loan book in 2008, compared to 26 per cent at its rival – would ultimately result in it being effectively nationalised. Property and construction accounted for as little as 12 per cent of the bank's loan book in 1998. However, in 2004, AIB's then chief executive Michael Buckley set up a 'win-back team' to work out why it was losing business to Anglo Irish Bank. It subsequently ramped up lending, bankrolling big developers from Liam Carroll to Ray Grehan, whose property empires imploded during the crash. While AIB was known to have better IT systems than its main rival by the time of the crash, its decentralised commercial lending model – with local branches given significant autonomy to dole out loans – and weaker data and loan paperwork left it facing much deeper discounts from Nama when it took over risky real-estate loans. AIB transferred €20.4 billion of loans to Nama at a 56 per cent discount, while Bank of Ireland sent over half that amount, at a 43 per cent discount. 'Also, because the original management team at AIB was cleared out after the crash, it was on the back foot when it came to arguing about Nama discounts or stress tests,' the former central banker says. 'Bank of Ireland, which kept senior management and avoided State control, fought tooth and nail over everything. As it went through a number of leadership changes in the early years, AIB lost all continuity, strategic direction and became more risk averse for an extended period.' Bernard Byrne, who joined the bank in May 2010, initially as chief financial officer, would preside over a bank facing up to massive loan losses and booking a record €10.3 billion net loss that year. Bernard Byrne, former AIB chief executive. Photograph: Eric Luke 'The worst period was definitely 2010, trying to get close to the bottom of AIB's problems,' says Byrne. 'The deepening haircuts that it had to take on loans being transferred to Nama meant that any thought of the bank remaining mainly in private ownership evaporated.' It slunk into 99.6 per cent State ownership two days before Christmas – capping a tumultuous month that saw the State succumb to a €67.5 billion EU-International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout. Litany of controversies Michael Somers, who launched the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) in 1990, was resistant when the then finance minister, Brian Lenihan, started badgering him to join the board of AIB as he prepared to retire at the end of 2009. He had his reasons. Somers had previously found himself in the trenches on AIB when Garret FitzGerald's government was forced to take over the bank's Insurance Corporation of Ireland subsidiary and bail out the bank after the insurer suffered large losses on high-risk insurance policies. Somers was deputy secretary general with the Department of the Finance at the time. 'The fear at the time was that international banks would pull credit lines from AIB and other Irish banks,' recalls Somers. He – as many others – would look on aghast as a litany of other skirmishes with controversy followed. Michael Somers, former chief executive of the National Treasury Management Agency and former vice-chairman of AIB. Photograph: Eric Luke AIB reached a €90 million settlement at the turn of the millennium with Revenue in relation to evasion of Deposit Interest Retention Tax in 2000. In 2002, the bank revealed that a rogue currency trader at its then Allfirst unit in the US, John Rusnak, had racked up a $691 million trading loss. In 2004, it was revealed that the bank had been overcharging customers on foreign exchange transactions for up to a decade, and two years' later, four former AIB executives reached a €206,000 tax settlement resulting from their involvement in a secret offshore investment company, called Faldor. Lenihan made a final effort in mid-November 2009 to change Somers's mind. 'He managed to get hold of me one evening at about a quarter to 12, after I'd gotten home from a nice dinner at the Dutch embassy. He said he needed to announce a number of positions the next morning and asked me again would I join AIB's board as deputy chairman,' he says. 'I relented.' Remedial work The outlook for AIB began to change when Duffy – an Irish banker who had spent his career overseas working for the likes of Goldman Sachs, ING and Standard Bank, leaving him untainted by goings on during the domestic property bubble – took charge in late 2011. By then, AIB was a shadow of its former self, having been forced to sell its 70 per cent stake in Poland's Bank Zachodni, a 24 per cent stake in Buffalo-based M&T Bank, and its holding in Goodbody Stockbrokers, as it raced to raise capital to fill a growing hole in its balance sheet from bad loans – and appease competition authorities in Brussels after receiving state aid. The bank had also inflicted €5 billion of losses on holders of its riskiest, subordinated bonds. 'It's easy to underestimate how much remedial work was done between 2010 and 2011 just to get to a place of some stability. But David coming in as CEO was hugely important,' says Byrne. 'The strength of his personality saw him take a huge amount of pressure off AIB – both politically and generally – and allowed people to work on what needed to be done to chart a way forward.' Return to profit Duffy's cost-cutting plan would involve the shuttering of 67 branches, salary cuts across layers of management, and the closure of the bank's legacy defined benefit pension scheme, where retirement benefits were linked to final salaries. It saw the bank return to profit in 2014, helped as a recovering economy allowed it to release some provisions previously set aside to cover bad loans. The bank also started moving at pace that year to resolve a mountain of bad debt on its balance sheet – which peaked at €31 billion, or more than a third of total loans in 2013. Irish banks also began that year, under pressure from regulators, to finally start to grasp the nettle on a mortgage arrears crisis that had been allowed to fester following the crash. Duffy – who was widely expected to lead AIB through an initial public offering (IPO) – quit unexpectedly in early 2015 to take over as CEO of Clydesdale and Yorkshire Bank in the UK, where he immediately enjoyed a basic salary double the €500,000 allowed at bailed-out AIB – and a generous bonus plan. Mark Bourke, former AIB chief financial officer. Photograph: Eric Luke It would fall to Byrne, Duffy's successor, and his chief financial officer Mark Bourke to get AIB ready for an IPO. Two years in the planning, Project Viking, as it was dubbed, culminated in June 2017 when Paschal Donohoe, only days into the job as Minister for Finance, pressed the button on a sale of a 28.8 per cent stake in the bank to stock market investors, raising €3.4 billion. 'US investors, particularly the big hedge funds, were all talking about the 'reflation trade' at the time,' recalled Bourke, referring to an investment strategy of piling into certain sectors that tend to perform well immediately after a recession. Irish gross domestic product (GDP) soared almost 8 per cent in 2017, making it the EU's fastest-growing economy for the fourth straight year, even if the figures were flattered by the State's large multinational sector. 'It was clear that markets were open and US funds, who were crucial to the ultimate success of the transaction, were prepared to invest in Europe again,' added Bourke, who is currently CEO of Portuguese lender Novo Banco, which French banking group BPCE agreed to buy last week. On the IPO roadshow, AIB teams held hundreds of meetings with potential investors over a number of weeks in Europe, North America and Asia. 'Because we spent so much time answering questions from international investors on the macro Irish story, it created something of a 'halo effect' for other Irish companies and the sovereign,' says Byrne. Contraction to growth Byrne used an Oireachtas finance committee appearance in December 2017 to urge the government to sell down more shares, as the stock was riding high. A global stock market slump in the second half of 2018 killed off any such ambition. The market appetite for Irish banks was dented further in quick succession by the threat of a hard Brexit; low demand for loans amid weak housing starts and cautious businesses; an ultra-low interest rates environment as Europe grappled with an era of subpar inflation, and the Covid-19 pandemic. 'The investor demand certainly was there after the IPO and there was an opportunity to move quickly to sell more shares,' Byrne says. 'There is always a risk of being caught out by unfavourable markets if you don't go when the stars are aligned.' AIB's return to full private ownership took longer than Byrne expected back in 2017. [ The Irish Times view on the State selling out of AIB: competition in banking is now the issue Opens in new window ] His successor, Colin Hunt, who took charge in March 2019, found the initial strategic plan that he and his CFO Donal Galvin had spent a year working on quickly made redundant as Covid-19 threw Ireland and much of the rest of the world into lockdown within weeks of it being unveiled. Loan payment breaks for businesses and households hit by the pandemic superseded loan growth for a period. But the bank has seen a surge in profits in recent years – with net income hitting a record €2.35 billion last year – driven by soaring interest rates as central bankers fought inflation triggered by effects of the pandemic and war in Ukraine. AIB and the other two remaining domestic banks, Bank of Ireland and PTSB, have also been helped as they carved up the loan books and deposit bases of Ulster Bank and KBC Bank Ireland – before the interest rates cycle turned. AIB has also bought back Goodbody Stockbrokers and pushed back into the life and pensions business – which it exited in 2012 as it put Ark Life into winddown – by setting up a joint venture with Irish Life's Canadian parent, Great-West Lifeco, in an effort to catch up with rival Bank of Ireland in the wealth and life insurance market. Colin Hunt, AIB's current chief executive. Photograph: Shane O'Neill/Coalesce AIB saw its loan book contract by almost 60 per cent to €58.4 billion between 2008 and 2021, amid loan sales, and households and businesses, scarred by the crash, repaying debt faster than taking on new loans. However, it has posted underlying loan book growth over the past three years, even after stripping out acquired Ulster loans, following a series of false dawns. A big driver has been green and transition lending, spanning everything from domestic mortgages on energy-efficient homes to an international climate capital business that specialises in lending to large scale renewable and infrastructure projects across Ireland, Britain, Europe and North America. Hunt was asked by one of the overseas investment bankers who beat a track to his office on his appointment six years ago what he'd like to be remembered for 10 or 15 years later. Apparently, he was shocked by the answer: decarbonisation. 'The investment banker was concerned this might appear off-piste if uttered in public. No one was talking about green finance at the time,' says a person familiar with the meeting. 'That's clearly changed in recent years.' AIB's international climate capital unit – where gross loans grew by 34 per cent last year to €5.5 billion – has provided another growth angle for a bank that remains a shadow of its boom-era self. 'Don't expect us to go out and buy another eastern European or US regional bank any time soon,' a senior executive says. Era of normalisation The last government resumed share sales in AIB in early 2022, when its stake stood at 71 per cent. AIB's financial results since the crash have routinely included a lot of what analysts call 'noise' from exceptional charges and gains. Crisis-era loan losses would be followed by a drip-feeding of provisions – which totalled more than €600 billion – to deal with the group's role in the industry-wide tracker mortgage scandal, including almost €97 million for a Central Bank of Ireland fine. More recently, the bank has taken large provisions for customer compensation on speculative noughties UK commercial property investments, known as Belfry funds, that failed, and costs associated with acquiring Ulster Bank loans. Exceptional charges fell by more than half last year to €66 million – heralding, what Hunt told analysts in March, was an era of 'normalisation'. 'We don't expect any material exceptional costs in this year. And I certainly don't want to find ourselves in a position where we have to incur more exceptional costs going forward,' he said at the time. While AIB is not on track to repay all of its bailout, the Government estimates that it is currently about €600 million above water on a combined €29.4 billion pumped into AIB, Bank of Ireland and PTSB – thanks to a €2 billion cash surplus recouped from Bank of Ireland. [ AIB to sell its 49.9% stake in merchant services joint venture Opens in new window ] 'In overall terms this has to be seen as a very positive outcome for the exchequer – and effectively delivers on the Government's commitment many years ago to recoup all the monies invested, which seemed a very unlikely outcome for a long time,' says John Cronin, founder of SeaPoint Insights, an independent research and analysis firm specialising in banking. 'That being said, equity investors in banks usually expect a return of more than 10 per cent per annum – so looking at it through a return on investment lens tells a different story.' A recovery has been made up of bank guarantee fees, interest on bailout bonds, and dividends. It ignores interest paid on money borrowed to save the banks, the 'opportunity cost' to the State's former pension reserve fund (part of which is now part of the Ireland Strategic Investment Fund) investing in ailing banks rather than putting cash to work elsewhere – or, indeed, what inflation has done to the time value of money. Carville insists that State's objective was always clear. 'We viewed the investments on a cash-in, cash-out basis,' he says. Not everyone agrees. 'If you went to a bank to borrow money and offered only to pay back the principal, you'd be laughed out of the place,' says former NTMA chief Somers. Societal scar If top executives were cheered by Donohoe's decision to lift the €500,000 pay cap at the bank on Tuesday after the sale of the remaining State shares, they were keeping it to themselves. Senior AIB officials were keen that there would be no form of celebration as the bank saw off the State as an investor, according to sources. 'We owe an immense debt of gratitude to the Irish taxpayer for the support during one of the bank's most challenging times,' Hunt wrote in an email to employees that morning. Staff leaving the group's Molesworth Street headquarters that evening could not have missed a ruckus down the road as hundreds protested outside the Dáil about the housing crisis – providing a reminder of the deepest societal scar left by the banking crash.
