Libya says oil leak occurs in pipeline south of Zawiya city
An oil leak forced the shutdown of a pipeline south of Libya's city of Zawiya, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) said on Saturday.
Zawiya, 40 km (25 miles) west of the capital Tripoli, is home to Libya's biggest functioning refinery, with a capacity of 120,000 barrels per day. The refinery is connected to the country's 300,000-barrels-per-day Sharara oilfield.
The NOC posted a picture showing a stream of leaked oil in the desert. Flow from the Hamada oilfields through the affected pipeline was immediately halted, the company said in a statement.
"In parallel with the maintenance work, a team of specialists is conducting an investigation to determine the causes of the leak. Arrangements and coordination are also underway to recover the leaked oil and address any resulting environmental pollution," the company added.
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Arab News
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Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country's most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums. Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya's institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya's border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces. The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar's forces control the city, while Dbeibah's militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.
