India is losing information war—US backs Israel, hosts Munir, but asks Delhi to show restraint

This comes after the US president loudly trumpeted his pretentious so-called role in brokering a ceasefire between Pakistan and India. Trump added insult to injury by hosting Pakistan Army Chief, Asim Munir, for lunch at the White House. This clearly shows that the so-called strategic ties between the US and India are pretty much superficial and transactional.
While in the first case India was urged to show restraint, in spite of being the victim of terrorism for over four decades, no such restraint is being asked for from Israel, with Operation Rising Lion already in its 10th day. The US has even entered Israel's war, striking key nuclear sites, including the deeply hidden Fordow, in Iran.
India's Operation Sindoor and Israel's Operation Rising Lion have much in common – in that both were actions to neutralise future threats. The similarities end there. While India focused only on terrorist infrastructure and military installations, Israel went further and struck key figures in the political and military hierarchy, as also nuclear scientists – who are technically non-combatants – in the safety of their homes. The difference in the global reaction is even more stark.
When American generals openly admit that they consider Pakistan an ally in the war on terrorism, they are rewarding Pakistan for its policy of state-sponsored terrorism against India. Clearly, we have not been able to convince the global community to initiate any action against Pakistan, which is a fair indication of India's weakness in dominating the narrative and winning the perception battle – partly on account of an overactive and unbridled electronic media.
Various articles by international media publications support this view. The Washington Post points out that some media houses created a 'parallel reality', fuelled by several military experts giving their views on the subject. An article in the French daily L' Opinion underscores the same point – while India won militarily, it completely lost the information war. And this helped Pakistan shape the narrative in its favour.
On a different note, an opinion article by Ashley J Tellis in Foreign Affairs is downright dismissive of Indian aspirations, perhaps stemming from India's refusal to toe the American line. India did try to stage a comeback by sending seven all-party delegations led by senior leaders and diplomats from across the political spectrum to 32 countries, plus the European Union headquarters in Brussels, effectively covering 33 capitals. The primary aim was to highlight cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, and reinforce India's messaging on counter‑terror and self‑defence after Operation Sindoor. By then, though, the horse had bolted.
Also read: Threats to India are not over. Why it must build fortress-like defences
China's 'Three Warfares Strategy'
What stands out is that winning the perception battle is a continuous, non-incident-related effort. It has to be a concerted policy drawn out at the highest levels, with the implementation left to various organs of the government, and clear directions on what is to be conveyed by whom and in which forum. Off-the-cuff disparaging remarks by ministers past and present do irreparable damage to the information war campaign. The 'Three Warfares Strategy' followed by the Chinese is quite enlightening. In brief, it entails:
Information warfare: This facet involves shaping perceptions through controlled narratives disseminated via state-owned media, diplomatic channels, and global platforms. The objective is to garner international support for China's positions while undermining adversaries' credibility. For instance, during the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling against China's claims on territories in the region, Beijing utilised its media to label the ruling as a farce, thereby influencing global opinion in its favour.
Psychological warfare: Psychological tactics aim to demoralise and destabilise opponents by exploiting their fears and uncertainties. This includes the use of disinformation, threats, and historical references to induce doubt and hesitation. During the 2017 Doklam standoff, China invoked memories of the 1962 border conflict to intimidate India – though unsuccessfully – in an attempt to sway public sentiment and political will.
Legal warfare or 'lawfare': Legal warfare involves leveraging international laws and norms to legitimise own claims and actions and delegitimise those of adversaries. By framing its territorial claims and military activities within legal arguments, China seeks to gain diplomatic and legal advantages – as was evident when it dismissed the 2016 South China Sea ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, portraying itself as a defender of international law.
Also read: India has only pressed the pause button on Pakistan. It needs serious behavioural change
What India must do
Apropos, projecting the country's image on a variety of issues is a long-term strategy covering a range of issues, which cannot be evolved overnight or limited as a response to a terrorist related incident. That we have not succeeded in isolating Pakistan makes it imperative for India to have its own version, incorporating:
Integrated strategy development: Develop an integrated strategy that combines military readiness with robust information and legal capabilities. This includes enhancing cyber capabilities, strengthening legal frameworks, and improving credible media outreach to counter adversarial narratives.
Psychological resilience: Building psychological resilience within the Armed Forces and the civilian population is crucial. Sadly, the Indian public is prone to mass hysteria, a negative trait that is often exploited by our adversaries. Training programmes that focus on information warfare and psychological tactics can prepare the public to respond effectively to adversarial strategies.
Legal preparedness: India should strengthen its legal apparatus to challenge adversaries' actions in international forums. This involves training diplomats, defence attaches, and legal experts to navigate complex international laws and norms effectively.
Public diplomacy: Engaging in proactive public diplomacy can help shape international opinion in India's favour. This includes transparent communication, strategic media engagements, and participation in international forums to present India's perspectives.
While India's media landscape during Operation Sindoor was instrumental in rallying national support and conveying the government's message, it also faced challenges in managing the perception battle due to over-the-top reporting.
The amplification of nationalistic sentiment, coupled with the spread of misinformation, was actually detrimental to the national interest, highlighting the complexities of information warfare in contemporary conflicts. While this kind of coverage might have swayed domestic audiences, it did little in terms of garnering support internationally. Moving forward, a balanced information warfare strategy, which identifies the various target audiences and themes for each, along with the modes of dissemination, needs to be formulated.
A theme that works well for domestic audiences may fall flat on the global stage. Combining emotional resonance with factual reporting will be crucial in navigating the perception war, the campaign for which must start now.
General Manoj Mukund Naravane PVSM AVSM SM VSM is a retired Indian Army General who served as the 28th Chief of the Army Staff. Views are personal.
(Edited by Zoya Bhatti)

Try Our AI Features

Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:

Learn with AIFact CheckingText to SpeechAI Summary

Related Articles

Indian Express

24 minutes ago

• Indian Express

America bombs Iran: What does the US Constitution say about war

In 1973, a war-weary US Congress passed the War Powers Act to rein in presidents who overstepped in Vietnam. Five decades later, President Donald Trump's unilateral strike on Iran has reignited a debate the Founders thought they had settled in 1787. On June 22, when Trump announced a series of coordinated airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities — hitting targets in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan — he did so without notifying Congress, let alone securing its approval. The sites were hit with precision-guided missiles and 30,000-pound bunker-busters. While Tehran stopped short of a formal declaration of war, officials warned that retaliation was inevitable. At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, Iran's ambassador, Amir Saeid Iravani, accused the United States of having 'destroyed diplomacy,' warning that the Iranian military would determine the 'timing, nature, and scale' of its retaliation, the Associated Press reported. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi immediately flew to Moscow for consultations with Russia, a sign of how fast this confrontation could escalate beyond bilateral hostilities. Back in Washington, President Trump's aides termed the strike as a limited action. Secretary of State Marco Rubio appeared on Fox News to clarify the administration's position: 'This is not a war against Iran,' he said. 'It's a targeted operation to prevent nuclear escalation.' Yet just hours later, President Trump posted a message online: 'If the current Iranian Regime is unable to MAKE IRAN GREAT AGAIN, why wouldn't there be a Regime change??? MIGA!!!' The message prompted widespread speculation. Was the administration pursuing regime change in Iran? And if so, was the United States already engaged in war? Global markets reacted nervously. Oil prices surged, and analysts warned of long-term consequences for nuclear non-proliferation and regional stability. More profoundly, Trump's decision reignited a centuries-old question: who gets to declare war? The US Constitution is unequivocal: under Article I, Section 8, only Congress — not the President — holds the authority to declare war. This separation was no accident. It was a deliberate check on executive power, forged in reaction to the British monarchy, where kings could drag nations into conflict at will. The Founders sought to ensure that decisions as grave as war would require the consent of the people's representatives. The Constitution also designates the president as Commander in Chief under Article II, granting authority to direct military operations once war is authorised. The executive also retains the capacity to respond swiftly to sudden attacks. The most notable test came in 1861, when President Abraham Lincoln ordered a blockade of Southern ports at the outset of the Civil War, months before Congress officially declared war on the Confederacy. The Supreme Court ultimately upheld Lincoln's actions, ruling that the President has the authority to 'repel sudden attacks.' For much of US history, this balance endured. From the War of 1812 through World War II, major military engagements were accompanied by formal declarations of war from Congress. Formal declarations of war have remained rare. The United States has declared war only 11 times. (Source: But in the post-1945 world, that constitutional clarity began to blur. The first major rupture came in 1950, when President Harry Truman committed US troops to Korea without seeking congressional approval, framing the war as a 'police action' under the United Nations banner. Subsequent presidents followed suit. John F Kennedy escalated America's presence in Vietnam by sending military advisors and weapons, sidestepping a formal declaration. By 1969, President Richard Nixon was conducting a secret bombing campaign in Cambodia, entirely without the knowledge or consent of Congress. This executive overreach eventually sparked legislative backlash. In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, designed to reassert its authority, overriding Nixon's veto in the process. The act required presidents to consult with Congress before engaging in hostilities and to withdraw forces within 60 days unless Congress explicitly authorised further action. In theory, the War Powers Resolution of 1973 was crafted to restrain precisely the kind of unilateral action President Trump has now taken. Passed in the aftermath of Vietnam, the law requires presidents to notify Congress within 48 hours of deploying US forces into hostilities and to withdraw them within 60 days unless Congress grants explicit authorisation. In practice, it has proven all but toothless. Every president since its passage has sidestepped or outright ignored its provisions. Trump did not inform Congress before ordering strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, nor, critics argue, has he offered a convincing legal justification under the US or international law. 'The short answer is that this is, in my view, illegal under both international law and U.S. domestic law,' Oona Hathaway, a professor of international law at Yale Law School who has worked at the Defense Department, told the New York Times. The law, like many of its post-Watergate era peers, was built on trust and precedent. It had no true enforcement mechanism. And so, it has repeatedly failed to restrain the very power it was meant to check. Trump's decision fits a well-established pattern of executive overreach in foreign military engagements. President Ronald Reagan ordered the invasion of Grenada and airstrikes on Libya without congressional approval. President George HW Bush invaded Panama in 1989, triggering legal debate over constitutional boundaries. President Bill Clinton bombed Serbia in 1999 as part of the Kosovo conflict, again without seeking congressional consent. President Barack Obama launched a prolonged air campaign in Libya in 2011 and later against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, citing outdated authorisations rather than requesting new ones. Even President Joe Biden, a former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, authorised airstrikes on Houthi rebels in Yemen in 2024 without congressional sanction. Each administration justified its actions as necessary and time-sensitive. But cumulatively, these precedents have normalised unilateral war-making, eroding Congress's role and the public's voice in questions of war and peace. Technological change has accelerated this shift. Drones, cyber tools, and remote strike capabilities have made it easier to conduct military operations with minimal personnel and lower political risk. A key enabler of this executive drift has been the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed in 2001, in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The resolution granted the president authority to use 'all necessary and appropriate force' against those responsible for the attacks and those who harboured them. Originally intended to target al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the 2001 AUMF has since been used to justify military actions in at least seven countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan. It has also been invoked against newer groups like ISIS, despite no explicit congressional authorisation for those operations. Multiple presidents have promised to revise or repeal the AUMF. None have succeeded. Its broad language remains a legal foundation for perpetual military engagement. Trump's 2025 strikes have brought these longstanding tensions to a head. Legal scholars, military experts, and members of Congress are warning that US war-making has entered a constitutional grey zone. By allowing the executive to define and initiate acts of war without oversight, Congress risks ceding one of its most fundamental constitutional powers. Trump ran for office promising to end America's entanglements abroad. Instead, with his June strike, he has intensified one of the longest-running debates in US history. At its core, the question remains unchanged since 1787: who gets to take the United States to war? Aishwarya Khosla is a journalist currently serving as Deputy Copy Editor at The Indian Express. Her writings examine the interplay of culture, identity, and politics. She began her career at the Hindustan Times, where she covered books, theatre, culture, and the Punjabi diaspora. Her editorial expertise spans the Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Chandigarh, Punjab and Online desks. She was the recipient of the The Nehru Fellowship in Politics and Elections, where she studied political campaigns, policy research, political strategy and communications for a year. She pens The Indian Express newsletter, Meanwhile, Back Home. Write to her at or You can follow her on Instagram: @ink_and_ideology, and X: @KhoslaAishwarya. ... Read More

The Print

30 minutes ago

• The Print

Will Russia & China back Iran after US strikes? They're quiet, calculating allies

The Russian foreign ministry, in a wordy statement , condemned American strikes on 'several nuclear facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran.' Russia even reiterated its previous statement – that the US attack stood in 'violation of international law, the UN Charter, and relevant resolutions by the UN Security Council, which has consistently and unequivocally deemed such actions unacceptable.' How does this play out for powers like Russia and China, which have continued to speak out against any military action? In March this year, Russia, China, and Iran jointly stated that Tehran's nuclear programme is 'exclusively for peaceful purposes, and not for the development of nuclear weapons.' Israel's Operation Rising Lion seemed to be an independently led series of strikes against Iran. But after six bombers flew 18 hours to attack three nuclear sites in Iran, Israel's action now seems to have been part of a broader deception strategy—which the United States utilised to dismantle Iran's nuclear programme. In its call for peace, Russia further demanded 'an immediate end to aggression and for stepping up efforts to bring the situation back onto a peaceful, diplomatic track.' Russia's position on the crisis remains standard—calling for peace, negotiations, and diplomacy as effective channels for a resolution. Meanwhile, no part of Russia's statement claims direct intervention in the crisis, which must come as no surprise. Although a strategic partner of Iran, Russia's offerings have been more implicit, such as supporting Tehran's civilian nuclear programme or defence exports. While the Kremlin itself is fighting a war next door, it may still offer to play the role of a cardinal peacebroker between the US and Iran—and prove to be the most effective of all. Russia remains the best-suited friend for Iran in the present crisis. Moscow stands as Iran's most strategically placed partner in the region. It not only possesses deep regional expertise but has operated militarily and diplomatically across the Middle East for decades. And if Iran is to receive any meaningful backing against the US and its allies, it can come only from a capable nuclear power like Russia. A most unlikely situation. Meanwhile, as Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi proceeds to meet President Vladimir Putin, Russia could project a few probable security guarantees on Iran's behalf. This could include assurances against regime-change operations—an option President Donald Trump has openly considered on his social media—recognition of Iran's sovereignty and right to self-defence, and possible military non-aggression agreements brokered through multilateral channels. As for the United States and its allies, Russia may push for Iran's recommitment to nuclear limits under renewed international supervision, ending any proxy attacks on American and allied forces and perhaps securing more regional support for Iran. Aside from peace brokerage, Russia can offer its military-technical cooperation—which can include upgrading Iran's advanced air defence systems, sharing real-time satellite surveillance data to help Iran monitor US troop movements or detect incoming attacks, and providing space surveillance support. But what about this conflict's likely impact on Russia? It's less of a blow and more of an opportunity. As global crude oil prices surge, Moscow might return as the most reliable oil exporter globally. Second, there will likely be reduced American attention toward the Black Sea, Eastern Europe, and the Arctic—which are fundamental to the Kremlin's strategic vision for the region. It has also restored Russia's position in the global power lexicon, which had weakened after the Ukraine war. Also read: Trump tried to belittle India, but his Iran gamble has handed Modi unexpected diplomatic space China's response China, too, has condemned the attack, citing violation of the UN charter and international law. While this seems to be the standard response, Tehran values solidarity. China, however, would not directly engage in the conflict for two big reasons. First, Beijing likes to maintain strategic ambiguity over military risks and prefers to exert influence through diplomacy, economic leverage, and other indirect means. Directly confronting the US—whose prominence, mainly in terms of naval presence, has only grown—offers little advantage. Second, China's primary concern is energy stability. Direct involvement in a Gulf conflict would jeopardise its vital oil imports. While disruptions to Iranian oil exports would undoubtedly impact China, any direct military involvement would force Beijing to undertake a substantial and risky reconfiguration of its broader energy import strategy with other Gulf partners—which would be risky and unaffordable. However, there are other possible ways for Beijing to support Iran. While China avoids overt arms transfer to hot zones, it can covertly share technology that may include missile guidance technology, drones, cyber tactics, and so on. There was a strong role of space technology in the US's attacks on Iran, allowing it to strike nuclear bases with precision and without being detected. China could covertly offer limited space technology to support Iran, which Russia is also likely to offer. As permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Russia and China possess significant diplomatic influence that they can jointly utilise to advocate for Iran's position and pressure the UN to take meaningful actions. Meanwhile, the effectiveness of this diplomatic support against America's non-concessional stance on Tehran's nuclear ambitions remains to be seen. But both Russia and China are well-positioned to lead global efforts through multilateral institutions such as the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency. They can push for an international recognition of the potential radioactive and humanitarian consequences of further escalation, and urge a shift from punitive frameworks to preventive diplomacy. Rishi Gupta is a commentator on global affairs. Views are personal. (Edited by Zoya Bhatti)

The Hindu

31 minutes ago

• The Hindu

U.S. to screen personal social media accounts of F, M, and J category non-immigrant visa applicants

Just days after the United States announced that foreign students applying for a visa must unlock their social media accounts for government review, the U.S. government has extended this condition to all individuals applying for an F, M, or J nonimmigrant visa. In a social media post, the U.S. Embassy in India, said that 'every visa adjudication is a national security decision,' while adding that the applicants will have to 'adjust the privacy settings on all of their personal social media accounts to 'public' to facilitate vetting necessary to establish their identity and admissibility to the United States.' Noting that the United States has required visa applicants to provide social media identifiers on immigrant and nonimmigrant visa application forms, since 2019, it added that all available information will be used in the visa screening and vetting 'to identify visa applicants who are inadmissible to the United States, including those who pose a threat to U.S. national security.' The Trump administration last month temporarily halted the scheduling of new visa interviews for foreign students hoping to study in the U.S. while preparing to expand the screening of their activity on social media, officials said. With regards to the information regarding visa scheduling, the U.S. State Department in a June 18 statement had said that the overseas posts will resume scheduling F, M, and J nonimmigrant visa applications soon. Applicants should check the relevant embassy or consulate website for appointment availability. The United States must be vigilant during the visa issuance process to ensure that those applying for admission into the United States do not intend to harm Americans and our national interests, and that all applicants credibly establish their eligibility for the visa sought, including that they intend to engage in activities consistent with the terms for their admission.