Belt and robot: Chinese start-up to open first robotics facility in Central Asia

China's fast-growing humanoid robotics industry is set to establish its first foothold in Central Asia, after a Shanghai-based start-up agreed a deal with Kazakhstan to partner on a series of ventures in the country.
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The deal will see the Chinese company, AgiBot, establish a joint venture in Kazakhstan to build robotics manufacturing facilities, a 'data factory' for training robotic systems and a research and development centre, among other projects.
The agreement between AgiBot and Kazakhstan's Ministry of Digital Development, Innovation and Aerospace Industry will mark the first time a Chinese robotics company has localised production in a Central Asian country.
For Kazakhstan, the move aligns with its recent push to attract foreign investment as it seeks to diversify its economy beyond natural resources, with a focus on artificial intelligence, manufacturing, green energy and other emerging industries.
'Partnership with an advanced company like AgiBot is an important milestone in the history of Kazakhstan's robotics industry,' said Zhaslan Madiyev, the country's minister of digital, innovations and aerospace.
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'This will not only help launch a facility in one of the most promising branches of mechanical engineering, but also strengthen local expertise and create a domestic centre of competence in robotics,' he added, according to the Times of Central Asia.
Kazakhstan, which is China's northwestern neighbour, is also reportedly expanding its IT sector by building a global network of tech hubs, with new offices in the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and Singapore.

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Asia Times

17 hours ago

• Asia Times

The woman quietly leading a BRICS bank revolution

Former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff is nearing the end of her first term as head of the New Development Bank (NDB), also known as the BRICS Bank, which is set to conclude in July. She has been re-elected for another two-year term, while Brazil will take over the BRICS presidency later this year. Appointed in early 2023, Rousseff's presidency of the Shanghai-based NDB has been groundbreaking in many respects. She was not only the first woman to lead the NDB but also the first former head of state to hold the position. As one of the bank's original architects – she helped found the NDB in 2014 during her presidency of Brazil – Rousseff viewed the institution as a tool to challenge Western dominance in development finance. She initially expressed a desire to boost investment in environmental projects and to circumvent the 'geopolitical impact of Western retaliations against Russia.' In addition, she made clear that NDB financing would come 'without imposing conditionalities' on borrower nations, a direct contrast to traditional Western-led institutions. The idea was that developing countries should have access to funds without the political or austerity strings often attached by the likes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank. Rousseff has made local currency lending central to her agenda, aiming for 30% of NDB loans in members' own currencies by 2026, reducing dependence on the US dollar and sidestepping the risks of Western sanctions in the process. By late 2023, Rousseff touted a pipeline of 76 new projects worth US$18.2 billion for 2023-24, on top of the 98 projects worth $33 billion the NDB had reportedly already financed. Her tenure kicked off with a symbolic visit from Brazil's President Lula in Shanghai in April 2023, where Lula attended her inauguration ceremony. At the ceremony, Lula praised the NDB as a partnership of emerging nations 'very different from traditional banks dominated by developed countries,' and expressed high hopes that it could help create a world with less poverty and inequality under Rousseff's watch. Her presence at the G20, alongside leaders of the world's largest economies, signaled the NDB's growing profile on the global stage. Earlier in 2024, Rousseff had even traveled to Russia to attend the St Petersburg International Economic Forum, where de-dollarization and alternative financial architectures were key themes. Rousseff has not shied away from using her political stature to give the NDB a seat at tables traditionally dominated by Western-led institutions. She has signaled to members and prospective members alike that the NDB under her leadership is open for business. Brazil was a key testing case for the NDB's rising emergency finance efforts. In May 2024, following devastating storms and floods in southern Brazil, she announced that the NDB would extend an aid package of $1.1 billion to rebuild infrastructure in Rio Grande do Sul state. The funding, coordinated in partnership with Brazilian public banks, was earmarked for everything from small business recovery to new roads, bridges and sanitation systems in the disaster-hit areas. Such a rapid mobilization of over a billion US dollars was unprecedented for the NDB in response to a member's natural disaster. Under her leadership, the NDB has aligned closely with China's priorities, reflecting the NDB's utility as a tool for China to use international institutions to achieve revisionist goals. During Rousseff's first weeks in Shanghai, Brazil and China reached an agreement to set up a clearinghouse to conduct trade in Chinese yuan and Brazilian reals, thereby reducing their dollar dependence. In May 2025, the People's Bank of China and Brazil's Central Bank signed a renewed local-currency swap agreement worth 190 billion yuan, about $27.7 billion, valid for five years and extendable. In 2024 and so far in 2025, China-Brazil trade has increased by about 10% year to year, with Rousseff being instrumental in China-Brazil dealings. Lula's government has treated the NDB as an extension of its strategic partnership with China, a venue through which Chinese capital can more safely flow into Brazilian projects under multilateral cover. By steering the bank to focus on local-currency lending and alternative payment systems, Rousseff indirectly aided Moscow's goal of a financial safety net outside of the US's reach. However, Russian entities themselves have not received new NDB loans since the Ukraine war began. India and South Africa, for their part, benefited from the continuation of multi-billion-dollar NDB funding for infrastructure, transportation and renewable energy projects but saw no obvious special boost under Rousseff compared to prior NDB leadership. If anything, some Indian analysts quietly fretted that the Rousseff-led bank became too closely aligned with China and Brazil's political understanding, potentially at India's expense, a reflection of India's wariness of overt anti-West posturing by BRICS. Perhaps the biggest new entrant on Rousseff's watch was Indonesia (also a G20 member), which, according to BRICS officials, was approved for NDB membership by early 2025. Rousseff has actively promoted this expansion, seeing it as part of her legacy of making the NDB 'a bank of the Global South' in substance. Still, Rousseff's appointment was polarizing from the start. Critics in Brazil's right-wing opposition accused Lula of provoking the US and aligning too closely with autocracies, while her 2016 impeachment and praise of China's governance model made her a controversial figure abroad. Externally, Rousseff had to manage the fallout from Russia's war in Ukraine, which forced the NDB to suspend Russian loans to maintain compliance with global markets. This geopolitical balancing act, along with rising interest rates, constrained the bank's ability to expand lending. Nonetheless, the NDB preserved its AA+ rating from S&P Global, even as Rousseff faced pressure to prove that an emerging-market-led bank could operate with high standards under global scrutiny. Rousseff was originally expected to step down in July 2025, with Russia set to nominate her successor as part of BRICS' rotating presidency system. But due to sanctions and geopolitical constraints, which could have potentially tanked the BRICS' prospects and more neutral image as a viable international bloc, Moscow backed her continuation. In March 2025, the NDB's Board of Governors unanimously reappointed Rousseff for a second term. Rousseff has redefined the NDB's presidency and helped elevate the bank as a key lever in China and the Global South's revisionist goals against Western financial dominance. Under her leadership, the NDB has deepened alignment with Beijing's broader strategy of building alternative global governance institutions, ones that reflect multipolarity and reduce dependence on the US-led financial institutions. Rousseff's enthusiastic support for de-dollarization, promotion of yuan- and real-denominated lending, and facilitation of Chinese-backed infrastructure in Latin America, particularly in Brazil, positioned the NDB as a complement to China's Belt and Road Initiative in a post-Pax Americana order. Looking ahead, Rousseff will likely stay focused on infrastructure, sustainability and social inclusion, though with perhaps sharper priorities. She reportedly plans to accelerate de-dollarization by expanding local currency lending, supporting tools like BRICS swap lines and digital payments. By any measure, these plans represent a seismic shift in development finance. Membership expansion is also likely, with countries like Saudi Arabia and Argentina in focus, along with deeper ties to regional banks like the Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean (CAF) and the African Development Bank. But her second term will also test her ability to manage global financial volatility and protect the bank's stability amid rising debt and geopolitical uncertainty. To date, and not without criticism, Rousseff has been instrumental in positioning the NDB as a challenger to Western financial hegemony, offering real competition and choice to countries in the Global South previously subjugated by an often oppressive world lending system. And with that helped to usher in a quiet but consequential revolution in the international order. Joseph Bouchard is a journalist and researcher from Québec covering security and geopolitics in Latin America. His articles have appeared in Reason, The Diplomat, The National Interest, Le Devoir and RealClearPolitics. He is an incoming PhD student in politics at the University of Virginia and SSHRC doctoral fellow on Latin American politics.

Asia Times

19 hours ago

• Asia Times

China's industrial policy has an unprofitability problem

Analyzing American economic policy isn't that interesting these days, except perhaps as a grim spectacle. So I've been thinking a little about Chinese economic policy. China's leaders leave much to be desired, but to their credit, they still think economic policy is about strengthening their nation, enriching their people and improving their technology instead of pursuing domestic culture wars by other means. Anyway, China has a lot of policy initiatives right now — cleaning up the fallout from the real estate bust, retaliating against America's tariffs, improving their health care system, and so on. But their most important policy — and the one everyone talks about here in the US — is their big industrial policy push. If you want to understand Chinese industrial policy, I recommend starting with Barry Naughton's free book, 'The Rise of China's Industrial Policy: 1978 to 2020.' The basic story is that until the mid-to-late 2000s, China didn't have a national industrial policy as such. It had a bunch of local governments trying to build up specific industries, usually by attracting investment from multinational companies. And it had a central government that tried to make it easy for local governments to do that, using macro policies like making sure coal was cheap, holding down the value of the Chinese currency in order to stimulate exports and so on. But it was not until the end of Hu Jintao's term in office — and really, not until Xi Jinping came to power — that China developed a national industrial policy, in which the government tries to promote specific industries using tools like subsidies and cheap bank loans. If you want a good primer on just how big those loans and subsidies are, and which industries they're going to, I recommend CSIS' 2022 report, 'Red Ink: Estimating Chinese Industrial Policy Spending in Comparative Perspective.' It's a lot. Here are the authors' estimates from 2019: Source: CSIS In some respects, this policy was successful. For example, it moved China up the value chain — instead of doing simple low-value assembly for foreign manufacturers as in the 2000s, China in the 2010s learned to make many of the higher-value components that go into things like computers, phones and cars, as well as many of the tools that create those goods. This had the added security benefit of making China less dependent on foreign rivals for key manufacturing inputs. China has doubled down on its centralized, big-spending industrial policy since then. In 2021-22, China suffered a huge real estate bust, crippling a sector that had accounted for almost one-third of the country's GDP. China's leaders responded by doubling down on manufacturing, encouraging banks — essentially all of which are either state-owned or state-controlled — to shift their lending from real estate to industry. In 2023, you saw charts like this: Source: Shanghai Macro via Bert Hofman Along with this industrial policy, you saw a massive surge of Chinese-manufactured exports flowing out to the rest of the world. The most recent export surge has been labeled the 'Second China Shock', but in fact, the trend was already headed in that direction well before the pandemic: Source: CSIS China's competitive success in manufacturing industry after industry has been nothing short of spectacular. In just a couple of years, China went from a footnote in the global car industry to the world's leading auto exporter: Source: Visual Capitalist Obviously, this export surge is the most important way that people in countries like the US experience the results of China's industrial policy. So most commentary on the policy has focused on exports, trade balances and so on. But it's important to remember that most of what China is producing in this epic manufacturing surge is not being exported. For example, take cars. Even though China is now the world's top car exporter, most of the cars it makes are sold within China: Source: Brad Setser China's auto industry is actually unusually domestically focused, compared to other auto powerhouses like Germany, South Korea, and Japan: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion In fact, this pattern holds across the whole economy. For an industrialized country, China is unusually insular — its exports as a percent of its GDP are higher than the US, but much lower than France, the UK, Germany, or South Korea: Source: World Bank Most of China's enormous manufacturing subsidies are not actually for export manufacturing; they're for domestic manufacturing. The rest of the world is just getting a little bit of spillover from whatever Chinese companies can't manage to sell domestically — except for a country as huge as China, a 'little spillover' can seem like a massive flood to everyone else. And here lies the rub. Essentially, China is huge and most of its trading partners are pretty small. There's a limited amount of Chinese cars, semiconductors, electronics, robots, machine tools, ships, solar panels, and batteries they can buy. And on top of that, some of China's biggest trading partners are levying tariffs against it. For most Chinese manufacturers, export markets are simply not going to replace the domestic market. And this means that Chinese manufacturers will be forced to compete against each other for a domestic market whose size is relatively fixed, at least in the short term. That competition will eat away at their profit margins. In fact, this is already happening. Vicious price wars have broken out in the Chinese auto industry, and even the country's top carmakers are under extreme pressure: Chinese carmakers' price war is putting the industry's balance sheet under strain…Current liabilities exceeded current assets at more than a third of publicly listed car manufacturers at the end of last year…China's leading carmakers are being forced to…fight for market share amid heavy [price] discounting… The dominant electric-vehicle maker BYD is deepest in negative territory with its working capital, followed by rivals Geely, Nio, Seres and state-backed BAIC and JAC, while the total net current assets of 16 major listed Chinese carmakers [saw] a 62 per cent decline from…the first half of 2021… 'Given the current downward trend, China's auto industry is expected to enter an industry-wide elimination phase . . . in 2026 at the latest,' [an analyst] warned. 'During the process, some companies will die of liquidity crises.'… BYD recently came under pressure to defend its financial numbers and business practices after Wei Jianjun, chair of rival Great Wall Motor, called for a comprehensive audit of all major domestic carmakers…'An Evergrande exists in [China's] auto sector at the moment — it just hasn't blown up,' he told local media, raising the spectre of the industry following the property sector into a spiralling debt crisis. How can these mighty world-conquering automakers be skating on the edge of bankruptcy when the government is pouring so many subsidies and cheap loans into the auto industry? The answer is simple: China's government is paying its car companies to compete each other to death. The Chinese government pays a ton of different car companies to make more cars. Chinese banks, at the government's behest, give cheap loans to a bunch of different car companies to make more cars. So they all make more cars — more than Chinese consumers want to buy. So they try to sell some of the extra cars overseas, but foreigners only buy a modest amount of them. Now what? Unsold cars pile up, prices are cut and cut again, and all the car companies — even the best ones, like BYD — see their profit margins fall and fall. It's not just autos, either — similar things are happening in solar, steel, and a bunch of other industries. Manufacturing profit margins are plunging across China's entire economy: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion A Chinese buzzword for this sort of excessive competition is 'involution.' Why is this bad, though? Who cares about profit, anyway? After all, China's workers are getting jobs, and China's consumers are getting a ton of cheap cars and other manufactured stuff. So what if rich BYD shareholders and corporate executives take a loss? Well, in fact, there are several problems. The first is macroeconomic. Price wars across much of the economy create deflation. In fact, China is already experiencing deflation: China's consumer prices fell for a fourth consecutive month in May…with price wars in the auto sector adding to downward pressure…The consumer price index fell 0.1% from a year earlier…CPI slipped into negative territory in February, falling 0.7% from a year ago, and has continued to post year-on-year declines of 0.1% in March, April, and now May…Separately, deflation in the country's factory-gate or producer prices deepened, falling 3.3% from a year earlier in May[.] A lot of this is probably due to weak demand from the ongoing real estate bust, but price wars prompted by industrial policy will make it worse. Deflation will exacerbate the lingering problems from the real estate implosion. Debts are in nominal terms, meaning that when prices go down, those debts become harder to service. More of the debts go bad, and banks get weaker — all those bad loans on their books make them less willing to make new loans. Consumer debts get more onerous too, making consumers less willing to spend (and consumers, unlike banks, are not government-controlled). This effect is called debt deflation. On top of that, a massive wave of bankruptcies could cause a second bad-debt crisis on top of the one that's already happening from real estate. Wei Jianjun of Great Wall Motor has been warning of exactly this happening. In fact, we can already see Chinese banks beginning to slow the torrid pace of industrial loans they were dishing out a couple of years ago: Source: Bloomberg via Noahopinion All of this could extend China's growth slowdown for years. There are also microeconomic dangers from overcompetition. Competition could spur Chinese companies to just innovate harder. But if China's top manufacturers are constantly skating on the edge of bankruptcy, that means they'll have fewer resources to invest in long-term projects like technological innovation and new business models. Basically, prices are signals about what to build, and China's industrial policies are sending strong signals of 'build more stuff today' instead of 'build better stuff tomorrow.' There's also the danger that China's government won't allow the price wars to end. Ideally, you'd want these price wars to be temporary; eventually, you'd want weak producers to fail, allowing top producers to increase their profitability. This good outcome relies on the government eventually cutting subsidies and letting bad companies die. But letting bad companies die means a bunch of people get laid off. Bloomberg recently had a good report about the political pressures on the Chinese government to keep the subsidies flowing: Local leaders laden in debt are rolling out tax breaks and subsidies for companies, in a bid to stave off the double whammy of job and revenue losses…For China's top leaders, employment is an even more politically sensitive issue than economic growth, according to Neil Thomas, a fellow for Chinese politics at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Center for China Analysis…Already there are signs the weakening labor market is becoming a touchy subject: One of China's largest online recruitment platforms Zhaopin Ltd. this year quietly stopped providing wage data it's compiled for at least a decade. Already, Bloomberg reports that economic protests are proliferating across the country; with the real estate crisis ongoing, the government will be under even more political pressure to keep manufacturing employment strong. This could mean keeping crappy companies on life support. These so-called 'zombie' companies, kept alive only by a never-ending flood of cheap credit, were a big part of why Japan's economy slowed down so much in the 1990s. So this is the scenario where China's industrial policy ends up backfiring. Subsidies and cheap bank loans dished out to high-quality and low-quality companies alike could flood the market with undesired product, spurring vicious cutthroat price wars, destroying profit margins, exacerbating deflation, and generally making the macroeconomic situation worse. And then China's government could double down by trying to protect employment, by never halting subsidies for companies that fail. Usually, when we think of the costs of industrial policy, the main thing we think about is waste, and there is certainly plenty of waste in China's current approach. But China's experience is illuminating a second problem with industrial policy — the risk of vicious price wars and deflation due to the subsidization of too many competing companies. This article was first published on Noah Smith's Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion subscriber here.

South China Morning Post

a day ago

• South China Morning Post

Another brick in the wall: world's largest Legoland opens in Shanghai next month

Trial operations started on Friday at the world's largest Legoland theme park in Shanghai, as the city presses ahead with its goal to boost its status as a major global tourist destination The US$550 million Legoland Shanghai Resort, located in the southwestern Jinshan district, could attract up to 2.4 million visitors a year once it officially opens on July 5, according to estimates by local government officials. The 318,000-square-metre entertainment complex – featuring eight themed areas, 75 interactive rides and a 250-room hotel – has used more than 85 million 'Lego bricks'. 'It will be yet another world-class amusement park that adds lustre to Shanghai's tourist industry,' said Li Wenjie, CEO of Shanghai Yaheng International Travel. 'The Legoland Resort's synergy with the city's Disneyland and Haichang Ocean Park will offer tourists enjoyable, unique experiences that are not available in any other Chinese city.' Children pose for a photo with a mascot as they visit Legoland Shanghai Resort ahead of the theme park's opening on July 5. Photo: Reuters Construction of the Legoland resort began in 2021 as part of the city's efforts to establish itself as a major international tourist destination.