How else could Iran retaliate over the ongoing Israeli strikes targeting the country?
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — As Israel pounds Iran with airstrikes targeting military facilities and its nuclear sites, officials in Tehran have proposed a variety of steps the Islamic Republic could take outside of launching retaliatory missile barrages.
Those proposals mirror those previously floated by Iran in confrontations with either Israel or the United States in the last few decades. They include disrupting maritime shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, potentially leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and attacks by allied militants.
Here's a look at what those options could mean — both to Iran and the wider Middle East.
Targeting the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf, through which some 20% of all oil traded globally passes.
The strait is in the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, which at its narrowest point is just 33 kilometers (21 miles) wide. The width of the shipping lane in either direction is only 3 kilometers (2 miles). Anything affecting it ripples through global energy markets, potentially raising the price of crude oil. That then trickles down to consumers through what they pay for gasoline and other oil products.
There has been a wave of attacks on ships attributed to Iran since 2019, following President Donald Trump's decision to unilaterally withdraw the U.S. from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and re-imposing crushing sanctions on Tehran.
U.S. forces routinely travel through the strait, despite sometimes-tense encounters with Iran's Revolutionary Guard, a paramilitary force answerable only to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The U.S. Navy's Bahrain-based 5th Fleet conducts those operations, known as freedom of navigation missions, to ensure the waterway remains open to business. Iran views those passages as challenging its sovereignty — as if it operated off the coast of the U.S.
Since the Israeli attacks began, Iranian officials have repeatedly raised blocking the strait — which likely would draw an immediate American response.
Withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
Experts fear Tehran could respond to the strike by deciding to fully end its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, abandon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and rush toward a bomb.
As a member of the treaty, Iran is obligated to explain any radioactive traces outside of declared sites and to provide assurances that they are not being used as part of a nuclear weapons program. Iran insists its program is peaceful, though it is the only non-nuclear-armed state to enrich uranium up to 60%, a short, technical step away from weapons-grade levels of 90%. U.S. intelligence agencies and the IAEA assess Iran hasn't had an organized military nuclear program since 2003.
There is precedent for the concern. North Korea said it withdrew from the treaty in 2003 and tested a nuclear weapon in 2006.
However, again, if Iran withdrew from the treaty, it could draw the U.S. into the fight, something Tehran so far has been seeking to avoid.
Asymmetric attacks by militants
Iran could encourage more asymmetric attacks, targeting Jewish tourists, synagogues or Israeli diplomatic missions as it has done in the past. However, it's been a rough few years for those forces.
Iran's allies, the self-described 'Axis of Resistance,' have been severely hurt by ongoing Israeli attacks since the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel, particularly Lebanon's Hezbollah and Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Iran has long used those groups as both an asymmetrical way to attack Israel and as a shield against a direct assault.
Iraqi groups backed by Iran so far haven't become involved, leaving just Yemen's Houthi rebels as the only member of the axis to launch attacks on Israel since its campaign against Iran began.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Yahoo
13 minutes ago
- Yahoo
An inflation surge could swamp Trump's presidency. This one investment will keep your money safe.
America's financial outlook has darkened under President Donald Trump's leadership. All three major credit-rating agencies now rank U.S. federal debt one notch below triple-A, and Jamie Dimon, the chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase JPM, has warned of a crack in the U.S. bond market. With the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield BX:TMUBMUSD10Y at 4.4% on Wednesday and the 30-year rate BX:TMUBMUSD30Y at 4.9%, holders of nominal U.S. debt should be prepared for significant real losses. The principal risk is not U.S. sovereign default, but rather unexpected increases in medium- and long-term interest rates, owing to market expectations of higher inflation. Fiscal policy under Trump is unsustainable, as it was under former President Joe Biden — but even more so if the Trump administration's 'big, beautiful' budget passes in anything like its current form. 'I'm at my wit's end': My niece paid off her husband's credit card but fell behind on her taxes. How can I help her? Why the biggest-ever 'triple witching' options expiration could deliver a jolt to Friday's trading Israel-Iran clash delivers a fresh shock to investors. History suggests this is the move to make. 'I prepaid our mom's rent for a year': My sister is a millionaire and never helps our mother. How do I cut her out of her will? I'm 75 and have a reverse mortgage. Should I pay it off with my $200K savings — and live off Social Security instead? The January 2025 Financial Report of the United States Government makes this clear. The U.S. ratio of federal debt held by the public to GDP at the end of the 2024 fiscal year was around 98%, although $4.7 trillion of the $28.3 trillion in federal debt was held by the Federal Reserve — meaning it is erroneously categorized as held by the 'public,' when really the central bank's accounts should be consolidated with those of the federal government. Under current policy and based on the report's assumptions, federal debt held by the public would reach 535% of GDP by 2099. Stabilizing the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio requires that the annual primary federal deficit (excluding interest payments) fall by an average of 4.3% of GDP over the next 75 years. And yet, the federal deficit and primary deficit were 6.4% and 3.3% of GDP, respectively, in fiscal-year 2024 — far above what can be justified with the economy near full employment. Read: America's debt is at a breaking point — Trump's tax bill might just push it over the edge With the U.S. Congress so dysfunctional, no one has any faith that it will deliver the required deficit reduction. Democrats do not do permanent spending cuts, and Republicans do not do permanent tax increases. The federal government does own about 28% of U.S. land (roughly 640 million acres), as well as other real commercial assets that could yield significant additional nontax revenues if properly managed. But neither party — nor even the misnamed Department of Government Efficiency — appears to have considered this option, so the federal deficit as a share of GDP is likely to rise over the next few years. With no foreseeable improvement in fiscal policy, there are two possible outcomes. First, the U.S. government could default. There has long been a small, but recurrent, risk of a technical, short-lived default if Congress fails to raise, suspend, extend, revise or abolish the federal debt ceiling on time. Fortunately, it has averted this scenario 78 times since 1960, and we expect it to continue doing so. As matters stand, the debt ceiling (including debt held by federal agencies) is set at $36.1 trillion, and debt subject to the limit is also $36.1 trillion. If needed, the Treasury has a highly liquid asset (the Treasury General Account held with the Fed) worth $332.9 billion that it can use to meet its obligations, and it may temporarily use 'extraordinary measures to continue to borrow additional amounts for a limited time.' The second, more likely possibility is that the Fed will monetize enough federal debt to prevent default. Since U.S. federal debt is serviced in dollars, 'printing money' is always an option. But, as the Fed well knows, a large-scale monetization of federal debt would result in significantly above-target inflation. We believe the Fed will do this without its operational independence being revoked by Trump. To get the Federal Open Market Committee to do something it does not want to do, the president would need to control the majority of its 12 voting members. These include the seven members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors and five (out of 12) regional Federal Reserve Bank presidents who vote at any given FOMC meeting. Neither the president nor Congress can appoint or fire Federal Reserve Bank presidents. The Board of Governors must approve them, and only the board can remove them. The president nominates board members, but the Senate must confirm them. Board members' current term limits imply that, assuming none are fired, Trump will have the opportunity to nominate only two new members. True, with the power to fire board members 'for cause' — meaning 'inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance' — Trump could try to replace a majority of the members with loyalists. But this seems unlikely. Whether the 'for cause' criterion has been met will be contested in the courts, and the Senate would have to confirm Trump's appointees. Read: Trump's pick to replace Fed Chair Powell could rock your mortgage and retirement. Buckle up. Similarly, Congress could revise the Federal Reserve Act to replace the Fed's monetary-policy objectives with a mandate to buy or sell sovereign debt according to the wishes of the Treasury. But this, too, is unlikely. And the same goes for a scenario in which the Treasury sets a rapidly depreciating exchange-rate target for the dollar DXY that can be achieved only through large-scale Fed purchases of U.S. public debt that generate high inflation. However, fiscal dominance — indeed, fiscal capture — is very likely, because the need to avoid a domestic and global financial crisis will force the FOMC's hand. It will do whatever is necessary to prevent a U.S. government default, because the Fed's financial-stability mandate (the Financial Stability Act of 2010 mentions the Fed 179 times) undoubtedly trumps its monetary-policy mandate of maintaining maximum employment, stable prices and moderate long-term interest rates. The Fed cannot credibly threaten to refuse to monetize debt and deficits to compel fiscal retrenchment by the Treasury, let alone Congress. Thus, the Fed will have no choice but to engage in sovereign-debt purchases that it knows to be incompatible with its monetary-policy objectives. With nominal interest rates for medium- and long-term U.S. sovereign debt far below the levels consistent with realistic expectations of future inflation, serious capital losses on nominal debt instruments (public and private) are likely. The inflation surge could be no more than three years away. As the prospect of fiscal capture comes into view, investing in Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) and other indexed public and private debt instruments will become increasingly attractive. Willem H. Buiter, a former chief economist at Citibank and former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, is an independent economic adviser. Anne C. Sibert is professor emerita of economics at Birkbeck, University of London. This commentary — 'U.S. Debt Holders Should Brace for Impact' — is published with the permission of Project Syndicate. Read: 'You are going to panic,' Jamie Dimon tells regulators about what will happen when the bond market cracks More: What's at stake if world's most powerful market finally buckles after decades-long U.S. debt splurge 20 companies in the S&P 500 whose investors have gained the greatest rewards from stock buybacks Israel-Iran conflict poses three challenges for stocks that could slam market by up to 20%, warns RBC I'm 51, earn $129K and have $165K in my 401(k). Can I afford to retire when my husband, 59, draws Social Security at 62? 'It might be another Apple or Microsoft': My wife invested $100K in one stock and it exploded 1,500%. Do we sell? Why the stock market will be performing a high-wire act over the summer, according to UBS
Bloomberg
16 minutes ago
- Bloomberg
Bloomberg Surveillance: Israel, Markets, Supply Chains
Watch Tom and Paul LIVE every day on YouTube: Bloomberg Surveillance hosted by Tom Keene & Paul Sweeney June 20th, 2025 Featuring: 1) Dan Williams, Bloomberg News reporter, on President Donald Trump signaling he would give diplomacy a chance before deciding whether to strike Iran, dialing back on recent comments that suggested military action could be imminent. 2) David Katz, President and CIO of Matrix Asset Advisors, on why he is hopeful there will be some clarity in the current conflict in the upcoming months. After that, however, we will then return to the week to week and month to month uncertainties with Tariff and the current tax and spending bill that's making its way through congress. 3) Alisa Rusanoff, CEO at Eltech, on what risks lender are currently facing in the shipping space. 4) Lisa Mateo joins with the latest headlines in newspapers across the US, including a WSJ story on how side hustles nowadays are more about necessity than a passion. Plus, a Bloomberg report about Capital One's New JFK Lounge Makes a Play for Premium Travelers
Forbes
18 minutes ago
- Forbes
Can Diplomacy Bring The Iran-Israel Conflict To An End?
TEHRAN, IRAN - JUNE 13: An excavator removes debris from a residential building that was destroyed ... More in today's attack by Israel in Tehran, on June 13, 2025 in Tehran, Iran. Early this morning, Iran was hit by a series of Israeli airstrikes targeting military and nuclear sites, as well as top military officials. (Photo by) Just over twenty years ago I had lunch in a roadside café near Natanz in Iran (on the way back from Isfahan to Tehran). At the time, it was well known that Natanz was a nuclear research site, and a location that was becoming more of a geopolitical focal point given George W Bush's inclusion of Iran in the 'Axis of Evil' (despite large 'Death to America' murals in Tehran, it had offered to assist the US in the war against the Taliban). Up until then, Iran was the host of one of the larger Jewish populations in the world (roughly 80,000 then) and historical ties between Iran and Israel were strong, as I outlined in a note last year entitled 'Persepolis', and I still believe that socially and culturally the populations of Tel Aviv and Northern Tehran have more in common than many would think. This speaks to the potential that Iran owes to its heritage, but that has been smothered by a small, inward looking and harsh theocracy, aided and abetted by the Revolutionary Guard who exert de facto control over the Iranian economy as well as other sectors. They were notoriously responsible for the death of Masha Amini in 2022, and on average the Iranian state has killed 2-3 of its young people every week, something that should really elicit more anger from students across Europe and Asia. What happens to Iran is now an open question. During the week I had the benefit of hosting a call for a group of investors with Ambassador Dennis Ross, the authority on the region from a Western point of view. His sense is that granted Israel views the threat from Iran's nuclear programme as existential (the jawboning of the former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did much to reinforce this), the permanent dismantling of Iran's nuclear program is the de minimus goal of Israel. It is reported that Iran has been reaching out to other countries in the region to signal that it is ready to negotiate, and a negotiation process that is stewarded by Russia for example would help the Iranian regime avoid embarrassment (I recall the advice of Seamus Mallon, a key participant in the Good Friday Accord, who said that a good negotiator makes sure that his opposite number 'can get up with his pants on'). If Iran is ready to offer serious, verifiable concessions, it is possible that this conflict can come to an end, something that may please Donald Trump who has been quicker to associate himself with the success of the Israeli operation than to offer Israel unconditional military support. Indeed, the next few weeks are a test of Trump's mettle and credibility. In reality his two week pause is yet another sign of indecision. A joint US/Israeli strike on the Fordow mountain nuclear centre, near the holy city of Qom, and strikes across the wider Iranian theatre may provoke a counter-reaction by Iran, notably so against the Emirates and Saudi Arabia and might ignite a response from other quarters that have been relatively quiet (Iraq and Yemen for example). There is very energetic communication from the Gulf to Washington that a US strike could have very negative consequences for the region and might lead to a broader, less predictable conflict. The tail-risk for the regime in Iran is a deeper recession, financial crisis and internal political strife, though it is most likely that the succession around Ayatollah Khamenei provides the best opportunity for a political turning point. Most Western observers vastly underestimate how difficult it would be to foment regime change in Iran, as much as that is highly desirable. On a more positive tack, an agreement from Iran that removes the existential risk to Israel might also provide the geopolitical climate to bring an end to hostilities in Gaza, and for a meaningful calm across the region with the potential of an economic recovery. This might well be the catalyst for my 'Fourth Pole' thesis of an increasingly coherent economic zone in the Middle East, whose diplomatic centre is Abu Dhabi, geopolitical and technological power is Israel, and where the populations of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Iran, to name a few, contribute to a growing regional economy. Europe would likely benefit from this, though my sense is that it is increasingly less relevant as a diplomatic power in the Middle East. Emmanuel Macron for instance has lost enormous sway in Israel, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. In this regard, there are two lessons for Europe to bear in mind relating to Israel's operation in Iran. The first, in parallel to Ukraine's resistance to Russia, is the demonstration that Israel has offered in military strategy and the multifaceted uses of technology. The second lesson is that Israel's action is also illegal and contributes to an increasingly lawless international geopolitical climate. Finally, Russia and China have been discretely critical of Israel, though they will be dismayed at the ease with which Iran's defences have been dismantled, and they should be cognisant of the role that corruption has played here. Losing Iran as a member of their club (the 'Shanghai Cooperation Organisation') would constitute a major blow, but in the short-run their attention will be focused on how America responds to Israel's move. Have a great week ahead, Mike
