Taiwan's new fighters struggle to close airpower gap with China
Taiwan's acquisition of upgraded F-16V fighters marks a significant step forward, but does little to close the yawning gap with China's rapidly modernizing air force.
Last month, multiple news outlets reported that the US delivered the first of 66 F-16C/D Block 70 fighter jets to Taiwan, marking a significant milestone in a US$8 billion arms deal signed in 2019.
The handover ceremony, held at Lockheed Martin's Greenville, South Carolina, factory, was attended by Taiwan's Deputy Defense Minister Po Horng-Huei and its representative to the US Alexander Yui.
The jets, to be stationed at Zhihang Air Base, will equip the newly formed 7th Tactical Fighter Wing, which is tasked with bolstering the island's air defense amid growing threats from China.
The Block 70 variant, the F-16V, features AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, advanced electronic warfare systems, conformal fuel tanks and upgraded avionics. \
These enable the carrying of a wide range of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, including the AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon. Although the first delivered jet may temporarily lack its intended electronic warfare suite due to production delays, Taiwan plans to integrate the missing systems later.
US officials highlighted the delivery as a demonstration of US commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act and the 'Six Assurances,' underscoring continued arms sales to Taipei despite China's opposition. Complete delivery of the 66 jets is expected by the end of 2026.
Taiwan's new F-16V jets represent a significant improvement over its older F-16A/B fleet, which has also been upgraded to the V-standard. However, recent combat insights raise questions about their effectiveness against China's modern airpower.
In a Defense Security Asia article last month, Yuriy Ignat, former spokesperson for Ukraine's Air Force Command, noted that Ukraine's upgraded F-16 AM/BM fighters – mid-life improved versions similar to Taiwan's older models – have struggled against Russia's Su-35s due to inferior avionics, maneuverability and weapon systems.
While Taiwan's F-16Vs feature more advanced radar and electronic warfare systems than Ukraine's F-16s, they could face a similar qualitative disadvantage against China's Su-35s and its growing fleet of J-20 stealth fighters.
Likewise, Global Security notes that Taiwan's fleet of Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) is underpowered and short-range, with speculation that US political pressure has prevented Taiwan from developing long-range fighters to avoid provoking China. Although Global Security suggests that Taiwan's IDFs may have been more advanced than any other combat aircraft China had at the time of their unveiling in the 1980s, China has since unveiled superior fighters.
Further, Steve Balestrieri mentions in a February 2025 article for 1945 that China operates 24 Su-35s, bought from Russia ostensibly as a stopgap platform until China's J-20 stealth fighters were ready. Additionally, Maya Carlin mentions in an August 2023 article for 1945 that China has already produced 200-250 J-20 stealth fighters, marking a significant surge in production since the type was first unveiled in 2011.
It is also unlikely that Taiwan will ever operate US stealth aircraft, such as the F-35. In a December 2021 Aviation Geek Club article, Zack Lu says that the US has zero expectation that Taiwan will hold out against a Chinese invasion. He notes any US military equipment sold to Taiwan will end up in China's hands if Taiwan capitulates.
He mentions that all US military items sold to Taiwan are either older or current-generation systems, which are of little value to China when reverse-engineered. He says the F-35 is considered too cutting-edge to be compromised.
In terms of sheer combat aircraft numbers, the US Department of Defense's 2024 China Military Power Report mentions that China's People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) Aviation are the largest aviation forces in the Indo-Pacific and third-largest in the world, with 3,150 total aircraft, of which 2,400 are combat aircraft, with 1,900 fighters. Additionally, Admiral John Aquilino mentioned in a March 2024 US Senate Committee on Armed Services hearing that China will soon have the world's largest air force, following its current status as having the world's largest army and navy.
Despite those disadvantages, Taiwan's new F-16V jets may offer the self-governing island a much-needed airpower boost. Shu Hsiao-Huang mentions in a Taipei Times article published last month that Taiwan's new F-16V jets are equipped with the General Electric F110 engine; these jets deliver 13,154.18 kilograms of thrust, surpassing the older F-16A/B models and enabling greater weapon-mounting capacity.
Shu notes other advanced features, including the APG-83 Scalable Agile Beam Radar, a helmet-mounted cueing system and an electronic warfare suite. He also says the jets boast a larger air intake and a US18E ejection seat.
Further, Taiwan's new F-16V jets may be compatible with newer US munitions, significantly enhancing their effectiveness in standoff strikes.
Last month, The War Zone reported that the US is integrating the AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) onto F-16V fighters, significantly enhancing their anti-ship capabilities. The report states that the LRASM's stealth and adaptability surpass those of the older AGM-84 Harpoon, which Taiwan currently has, offering a range of up to 965 kilometers.
However, Kitsch Liao mentions in a Newsweek article published ast month that an air-launched LRASM capability for Taiwan might not survive China's initial onslaught, rendering it useless to China's amphibious landing group.
In line with that, Sebastian Roblin points out in a March 2020 article for The National Interest (TNI) that for Taiwan's outnumbered fighters to make any impact, they must get off the ground – a task that may be impossible given the 1,300 ballistic missiles and hundreds of sea, air, and land-based cruise missiles China can array against the self-governing island.
While Roblin notes that Taiwan has hardened underground air bases, its fighters may be bottled up if the runways are destroyed. Though he says that Taiwan could use highways as makeshift runways, the tempo of such operations would be sporadic at best.
However, the biggest challenge for Taiwan's airpower may not be the self-governing island's resource constraints but rather the inefficient US arms sales processes. In a War on the Rocks article from last month, Kevin Ting-Chen Sun and Howard Shen mention that late deliveries of F-16 jets from US defense companies critically undermine Taiwan's defense capabilities amid escalating regional tensions.
Sun and Shen note that Taiwan's new F-16Vs faced delays due to pandemic-related supply chain disruptions, pushing the timeline to mid-2024. Compounding this issue, they point out that the F-16A/B upgrade program, which includes essential components such as electronic warfare pods and AGM-154C glide bombs, has been postponed from 2023 to 2026.
They stress that these delays hinder Taiwan's air defense modernization, leaving its forces reliant on outdated systems and eroding public confidence in defense spending. They emphasize that systematic inefficiencies in US arms sales execution exacerbate Taiwan's vulnerability.
In the end, Taiwan's F-16Vs may sharpen its defenses but without timely deliveries and an answer to China's overwhelming missile and airpower advantage, they risk becoming just another symbol of Taipei's shrinking military options.
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