New heights for China's arms diplomacy in South Asia
China is arming Pakistan and Azerbaijan with high-tech fighter jets, missile shields and surveillance aircraft — a bold play to redraw the balance of power in South Asia and the Caucasus.
This month, Breaking Defense reported that Pakistan confirmed China's offer of 40 fifth-generation Shenyang J-35 stealth fighters, KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft and HQ-19 air defense systems.
The deal was first leaked in December 2024 and now publicly credited by Islamabad to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's diplomacy.
Also known as the FC-31, the J-35 is developed for both China's air force and navy and made its debut at Airshow China 2024. It features stealth shaping similar to that of the US F-35 Lightning II. Deliveries to Pakistan are expected within the next few months.
The announcement follows a separate US$4.6 billion agreement between Pakistan and Azerbaijan, in which Baku will procure 40 JF-17 fighter jets co-manufactured by Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) and China's Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC).
China's defense exports to Islamabad signal deeper strategic alignment amid growing regional competition. As Pakistan pursues advanced capabilities, the deal highlights China's growing presence in global arms sales, particularly among states seeking alternatives to Western defense suppliers.
Defense Security Asia notes in an article this month that the J-35, HQ-19 and KJ-500 represent a considerable leap in Pakistan's air defense capabilities.
According to the report, the J-35 fifth-generation fighter armed with PL-17 missiles boasting a range of over 400 kilometers enables Pakistan to target high-value Indian aerial assets from beyond visual range.
It also states that the HQ-19 system, dubbed the 'Chinese THAAD,' is designed for the high-altitude interception of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and hypersonic threats up to 150 kilometers above the ground, utilizing hit-to-kill technology and promising exoatmospheric defense with tracking radars that reach 1,000 kilometers.
Meanwhile, Defense Security Asia mentions that the KJ-500 provides 360-degree radar coverage with its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, tracking up to 100 targets over a 470-kilometer range while coordinating air operations through advanced electronic intelligence.
China's transfer of interoperable systems reflects its approach to systems warfare, as explained by Michael Dahm in a May 2025 article for Air & Space Forces Magazine.
According to Dahm, one of the most essential takeaways from the April 2025 Kashmir clash is how Pakistan integrated its Chinese-origin weapons and air defenses against India, forming an effective kill chain.
Dahm says that Pakistan's J-10 downing of a prized Indian Rafale jet says more about the quality of intangible factors between the opposing sides, such as system-of-systems integration, training and tactics, rather than the capabilities of either aircraft.
Azerbaijan's decision to purchase JF-17 jets co-produced by China and Pakistan marks a significant departure from its traditional arms purchases from Russia.
Paul Iddon notes in an April 2024 Business Insider article that while Russia has previously marketed the Su-30SM, Su-35 and MiG-25 fighters to Azerbaijan, the former's arms exports to the latter ceased in 2019, creating a vacuum for other arms exporters, such as Turkey, Pakistan, and China, to fill.
In the same article, Federico Borsari notes that, as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and subsequent sanctions, Russia's arms exports have dropped as much as 64%, according to 2024 data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Borsari also notes that the poor performance of Russian aircraft in the Russia-Ukraine war may have prompted Azerbaijan to reconsider its arms purchases from Russia.
Highlighting the political aspect of Azerbaijan's decision to purchase JF-17 jets, Sebastien Roblin notes in the same article that Russia's unreliability as a supplier, along with Western concerns over Azerbaijan's human rights record and potential future conflicts with Armenia, has made Turkey, Pakistan and China ideal partners.
In terms of capability, Roblin says the JF-17 is a substantial upgrade over Azerbaijan's Soviet-era MiG-29 jets, with its newer electronics and the PL-15 missile possibly giving it an edge over Armenia's Russian-made Su-30SM fighters.
China's arms sales to Pakistan and Azerbaijan tie into its larger military-economic interests. Jake Rinaldi mentions in a November 2024 article for the US Army War College that China's arms exports are driven by the need to protect its economic interests, gain influence in conflict zones, enhance the capabilities of its partners, build diplomatic relationships and offset research and development costs.
Importantly, Pakistan and Azerbaijan are part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global land-and-sea infrastructure project that aims to offset the latter's 'Malacca Dilemma,' a strategic weakness wherein most of its trade and fuel imports passes through the narrow waterway, leaving it vulnerable to a US blockade in the event of a conflict.
In line with that, Mohit Choudhary mentions in a February 2023 article for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs that as China's sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) straddle the Indian Ocean, China leverages economic, diplomatic and security influence in a region fraught with fragile states such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
Choudhary notes that India views the Indian Ocean as its sphere of influence, and China's increasing presence in the region through dual-use port infrastructure and arms exports heightens India's sense of insecurity.
Likewise, Emil Avdaliani mentions in an April 2025 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article that China's ambitions in West Asia and the Black Sea region have grown in the past years, with the strategic goal of developing the Middle Corridor, a trade route that connects Europe and China via Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, requiring significant economic and security investment.
Avdaliani states that while Russia remains a significant source of military technology for Central Asia and, by extension, the Caucasus, the space for Russian arms exports is narrowing while China opens its defense industry, thereby eroding Russia's regional sphere of influence.
China isn't just selling weapons. It is building alliances, projecting power and rewriting the rules of the global arms game. It is transforming arms sales into strategic tools of influence — building alliances, displacing rivals and reshaping the rules of power projection from the Indian Ocean to the Black Sea.
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HKFP
9 hours ago
- HKFP
Pride Month: Celebrating equal love in Hong Kong is no brainer
The clock is ticking. In just four months, the Court of Final Appeal's order requiring the Hong Kong government to implement a framework for the legal recognition of same-sex relationships will hit its deadline. The government now must make a choice: either come up with a complex new legal framework from scratch or take the straightforward, proven path that nearly 40 jurisdictions around the world have already taken. That path is the inclusion of all couples in marriage. With nearly 25 years of worldwide experience to draw from, the lesson is clear: equal marriage is the only fair, simple and equitable solution. Marriage can offer same-sex couples the clarity, dignity and full protection they deserve – and the social harmony that Hong Kong values. Only ending the denial of marriage will settle the debate. The evidence is compelling: inclusive societies attract talent, investment and tourism. Thailand's recent legislation to include same-sex couples in marriage has been hailed as a favourable advance with substantial economic implications. According to a recent study, equal marriage could bring an additional four million visitors to Thailand per year, generating roughly US$2 billion (HK$5.7 billion) in added economic value over the next two years. Tourism is a key pillar of the Hong Kong economy. As the city strives to recover from the Covid-19 pandemic and reaffirm its status as a global hub, embracing equal marriage would send a powerful message: that Hong Kong is open and future-oriented. And beyond tourism, the simple inclusion of same-sex couples in marriage will make it easier for businesses to thrive. The case for marriage equality, of course, is not just about economics; it's also a matter of public health. Research from around the world has shown that equal marriage leads to better mental and physical health outcomes. It reduces the stress, anxiety and depression that arise from institutional discrimination and social exclusion. Most strikingly, jurisdictions that have ended marriage discrimination have reported significant drops in suicide attempts among LGBTQ+ youth – a powerful reminder that dignity and legal recognition can save lives. A government survey released five years after Taiwan legalised same-sex marriage in 2019 – the first in Asia – showed that the legislation had a positive impact on public attitudes. More than 69 per cent supported equal marriage in 2024, up from 60.4 per cent in 2021 and 37.4 per cent in 2018. Equal marriage also streamlines public administration. It removes the need for parallel legal structures such as civil union, which not only create administrative inefficiencies, but also reinforce stigma by treating same-sex relationships as inferior. Opponents of change often invoke 'traditional values.' In truth, what we frequently call tradition is often more fluid than we think. In Hong Kong, Chinese customary marriages weren't abolished until 1971 – a reminder that the institution of marriage has always evolved with the times. Same-sex couples share the same aspirations as everyone else: to love, commit and care for their families. These are the values the law should protect and affirm. Today, Hong Kong is ready to welcome same-sex couples in marriage. A 2023 survey found that 60 per cent of the population supported marriage equality. Likewise, a 2025 survey revealed that 70 per cent of individuals in committed same-sex relationships expressed a strong desire to marry. The popular will is clear – it's time for the law to catch up. Fortunately for the government, the right law is also the easiest one to write. It does not need to create a new non-marriage marital status that provides legal protections and responsibilities across the hundreds of legal and economic provisions at stake – a status that will perpetuate, not end, discrimination and debate. Instead, the government can enact in effect a one-sentence change to the law, affirming the right to marry regardless of the sex of the two parties seeking to marry. The legal deadline will be met, and, more importantly, the people of Hong Kong will celebrate and move forward together, to the applause of the world. With courage and leadership, Hong Kong can become the 40th jurisdiction in the world– and the fourth in Asia – to show that families are helped and no one hurt when the law respects the dignity and inclusion of all. It's time for love to win here in Hong Kong. HKFP is an impartial platform & does not necessarily share the views of opinion writers or advertisers. HKFP presents a diversity of views & regularly invites figures across the political spectrum to write for us. Press freedom is guaranteed under the Basic Law, security law, Bill of Rights and Chinese constitution. Opinion pieces aim to point out errors or defects in the government, law or policies, or aim to suggest ideas or alterations via legal means without an intention of hatred, discontent or hostility against the authorities or other communities.
Asia Times
a day ago
- Asia Times
Western democracies are actually pretty good at war
'They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and they will fight, too.' — William T. Sherman I am not a military analyst or expert. Usually, I look at the world through the lens of economics, which I actually have some training in. But if you want to get a good holistic picture of the world, you need to understand at least a little bit about war and conflict. I think most pundits intuitively understand this, which is why you see them weighing in on things like the usefulness of military aid to Ukraine, or the cost-effectiveness of the F-35, or the need to establish military deterrence against China. And so I do the same, while being careful to remember that I'm not any kind of expert in the field. One of the most persistent and annoying tropes I see, in discussions about war, is the idea that autocracies are inherently tough and martial, and that democracies — especially Western democracies — are irresolute, decadent, flaccid, and generally not very good at fighting. You see this when rightists praise Russian military ads where soldiers do a bunch of push-ups, and decry the state of America's 'they/them army' in comparison. You can see it when leftists declare that America loses every war it fights (which is obviously false). The idea is ingrained in our deep history — Thucydides lamented that 'a democracy is incapable of empire', and plenty of modern people will cite autocratic Sparta's victory over democratic Athens in the Peloponnesian War.1 In fact, if you just looked at the results of the last two decades, you might be forgiven for buying the authoritarian hype. America was pushed out of Afghanistan, and its proxies quickly collapsed under the Taliban assault. Most people also say the US lost the Iraq War.2 Democratic Armenia quickly lost a war to autocratic Azerbaijan in 2020, Israel broke its teeth on Hezbollah in 2006, Russia smashed Georgia easily in 2008, and Russia easily took Crimea from Ukraine in 2014. Since the turn of the century, military victories for Western democracies have been few and far between. But over the past three years, the tide seems to have turned once more. Ukraine, astonishing the entire world, fought mighty Russia — a country four times its size and with far higher GDP per capita — to a standstill. In 2024, Israel smashed Hezbollah within just a few weeks; the Iranian-backed militia retreated from the border and its authority is now being replaced by the elected Lebanese government. And now there's the war between Israel and Iran. The war just started; all of us are still just monitoring the situation. It seems hard to think that Israel can prevail in a protracted confrontation with a nation with nine times its population and more than three times its GDP (PPP).3 But as of right now, the tiny David is smacking around the big Goliath. Israel quickly established air supremacy over much of Iran itself, despite the huge distances between the countries, using a mix of traditional aircraft and drones: Just four days into its ferocious air campaign, Israel appears to have gained a decisive edge in its escalating conflict with Iran: aerial supremacy over Iran…The Israeli military said Monday that it can now fly over the country's capital, Tehran, without facing major resistance after crippling Iran's air defenses in recent strikes, enabling Israel to hit an expanding range of targets with relative ease…Such control over Iran's skies, military analysts say, is not just a tactical advantage—it's a strategic turning point…Israel has carried out one of the most intense and far-reaching air operations in its history, targeting nuclear sites, missile launchers, airports, and senior figures in Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps… For Israel to claim this over Iran just days after the strikes began is an impressive military accomplishment, says Michael Knights, the Bernstein Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute who specializes in Middle Eastern security. 'It's exceptional to get this level of freedom. I'm quite surprised that they've managed it,' he says[.] Israel has destroyed Iran's best fighter jets on the ground. Iran has been reduced to firing off ballistic missiles into Israeli cities in retaliation. But the strikes, while visually impressive, have not been very deadly (the Israelis all have bomb shelters). And the Israelis are managing to quickly degrade Iran's missile capabilities: Iran is firing fewer missiles at Israel each day after Israel secured dominance over Iranian skies, enabling it to destroy launchers and take out missiles before they even leave the ground…Israel said on Sunday that it had created an air corridor to Tehran. By Monday, it said its air force had complete control over the skies of Tehran…This aerial control is proving crucial. Iran fired some 200 missiles in four barrages in its first round of attacks against Israel on Friday and Saturday. But between Tuesday and Wednesday, Iran fired 60 missiles at Israel over eight different waves of strikes, at times sending fewer than a dozen at a time…Israel's aircraft and other security forces have destroyed 120 missile launchers[.] Israel hasn't yet decapitated the Iranian regime, but it's killing lots of key figures. This is a pretty stunningly bad performance for Iran — a country that is sometimes touted as a key member of a new Axis with Russia and China — against a country with the population and land area of New Jersey. Israel isn't quite Western — more than half of its population is descended from Middle Easterners — and its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has shown some authoritarian tendencies. Nor is Israel a particularly liberal state, at least as far as its treatment of the Palestinians goes. But it's a heck of a lot closer to being a 'Western democracy' than Iran is. Rumors of the weakness and decay of the West, and of the inferiority of democracies in the face of autocratic power, seem to have been at least somewhat exaggerated. What's going on? In fact, the first two decades of the 21st century may have been an aberration; democracies actually do tend to win wars more often than they lose. A quick glance at history will disabuse any neutral observer of the notion that Western-style democracies are militarily weak. Consider how France held off attacks by all of Europe for decades after its revolution, or how the Anglo-American side won both World Wars, or how Israel beat a bunch of its neighbors in a series of wars, etc. Hitler and Mussolini both loudly proclaimed that democracies were weak and decadent, yet it was they who ended up in history's graveyard. In fact, there's pretty robust evidence that democracies — at least, as we currently identify them — tend to win wars more often than autocracies do. Dobransky (2014) finds that 'democracies win the large majority (84%) of wars that they are involved in.' Reiter and Stam (2014) find the same: Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. Mathematically, this must mean that democracies tend to defeat autocracies when the two fight, because if two autocracies or two democracies fight each other, a win for one nets out to a loss for the other. Political scientists have any number of theories to explain why this happens. One obvious possibility is that democratic countries fight fewer wars in the first place, and only tend to fight when they have a good chance of winning. This is David Lake's theory, which he calls the 'powerful pacifists' theory. Reiter and Stam, who have a book called 'Democracies at War', agree with Lake that autocracies tend to start riskier wars than democracies do. But they have very different reasons for thinking this. Lake thinks dictators tend to start wars for resources because running a dictatorship is very costly. Reiter and Stam, on the other hand, think that dictators start wars because they're more secure in their power, and thus are less afraid of the negative consequences from a war going badly. Honestly, I'm not very convinced by either of these explanations. Yes, there are some wars over economic resources — Saddam Hussein invading Iran to try to capture its oil fields in 1980 comes to mind. But I don't think most wars are mostly over treasure in the modern age. The World Wars were mostly over ideology and perceived threats rather than imperial conquests. Putin didn't invade Ukraine for money, and money has nothing to do with why Iran has been sending proxies to attack Israel for decades. Even when wars do have an economic component, the benefit of winning rarely justifies the cost of fighting in the first place — witness America's inability to extract significant value from the oil fields of Iraq. Likewise, I think it's unlikely that dictators are less afraid of losing wars. Yes, they may be better positioned to cling to power in the event of a loss, while democratic leaders will be promptly voted out of office. But the lower probability of an autocrat being tossed out of power comes with a much greater severity . A US president who loses a war might be voted out of office; when Mussolini lost a war, he ended up hanging from a gas station, riddled with bullets. So honestly, I'd be more cautious if I were a dictator. I think there's a much more obvious reason why democracies choose their wars more carefully. In general, the people who actually have to go fight a war tend to like war less than the leaders who simply order their armies forward from the safety of their bunkers. So democracies, where the people are more in control, tend to be pacifist; they only tend to fight either when they have a good chance of winning, or when their back is to the wall and they can't afford to lose. When they are finally moved to fight, the stakes tend to be high, the people tend to be united and motivated, and the cause tends to be one that draws in lots of allies. Economic factors probably play a role too. Lake thinks democracies have more economic resources to devote to war, because he believes they tend to spend more money on building up their economies, while autocracies tend to be extractive.4 This makes sense sometimes — think of how America outproduced the Axis in World War 2. On the margin, I think it makes a difference, but I'm skeptical of how much it can explain overall, because population size often differs so much between combatants that per capita GDP differences become less important. Consider Israel versus Iran — at PPP, Iran's economy is much larger, because it's a much larger country, even though it's poorer. There's another economic factor at work, which is technological advancement; having a higher per capita GDP generally means having better technology, which can be used for weaponry. Israel has a smaller economy than Iran, but because it has a richer, more technologically advanced economy, it can do a lot fancier stuff — with drones, aircraft, missile defense, precision weaponry, hacking, digital intelligence gathering, and so on. As for whether democracy actually makes a country richer and more technologically advanced, that's a topic of ongoing debate. Some people think democracy is good for growth; others think that as countries get richer, their citizenry starts to demand a transition to democracy. Other people think it's a historical accident. But whatever it is, democracies do statistically tend to be richer than autocracies, and being rich helps in war. Actually, you don't always need to be richer in order to have superior technology. Ukraine is much poorer than Russia on a per capita basis, but it has a lot of great computer programmers and engineers — it has repeatedly innovated in drone warfare during the current war, forcing Russia to scramble to keep up. Reiter and Stam also argue that the way dictatorships make decisions is not very conducive to effective war-fighting. In an op-ed written shortly after the start of the Ukraine war, they explain: [L]ike most dictators, Putin probably has some concerns about being overthrown by his own military. Dictators guard against this potential threat by centralizing military command authority and reducing the ability of lower-level commanders to take the initiative in battle… These moves may reduce an army's ability to seize power in a crisis — but also undercut the military's ability to defeat foreign foes…Putin's army today demonstrates the calcification and rigidity of a dictatorship. He appears unwilling to delegate decision-making autonomy to lower-level commanders, reducing military effectiveness… [D]ictators often surround themselves with yes-men and political cronies, who deceive or remain silent rather than tell the unvarnished truth…In contrast, democratic leaders are more likely to have the benefit of robust debate inside and outside government…Every indication is that the Russian president is isolated and getting poor information…Putin's generals and intelligence chief reportedly refused to tell him the truth before the war: that years of Russian military reform had not made substantial progress, instead producing a 'Potemkin military.' That makes lots of sense. To this I'd add the simple fact that if your country happens to have a dictator, he's probably simply more politically capable of micromanaging — and mismanaging — the military, whether or not he's doing it because he's afraid of a coup. So I'd say the three main hypotheses for why democracies tend to win more wars are: Democracies fight less, so they tend to only fight more winnable wars Democracies have better economies and technology Autocracies have structural tendencies toward military mismanagement and poor information flow Most of these make sense in explaining Ukraine's success in holding off Russia. Ukraine didn't want to fight this war, or any war; they only fought because their backs were to the wall and the survival of their nation was at stake. They have proven to be technologically innovative and resourceful, even with their much smaller economy. And their decision-making has been consistently better and quicker than that of the plodding Russians. These factors also help explain Israel's success against Iran. Israel does fight a lot of wars, but that's because it has a lot of enemies who attack it a lot; other than their slow colonization of the West Bank, Israel has no imperial designs. Iran, in contrast, is constantly meddling in conflicts all around it, supporting proxy armies in Yemen, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Gaza. With Israel, Iran picked on someone who was able to stand up and punch it in the nose. Israel also has superior technology, better command and control, and a more unified, engaged populace. But there's one other important hypothesis for why democracies have tended to win wars — help from the United States. For about as long as democracy has been around, the US was the world's mightiest economic and technological power, capable of sending game-changing weaponry anywhere in the world. That didn't always guarantee victory, obviously — America's proxies in Vietnam and Afghanistan were so weak that they collapsed even with US supplies. And no country will be successful in war unless it makes plenty of weapons itself — as Ukraine and Israel both do. But it's undeniable that American assistance has been at least somewhat important for both Ukraine and Israel in their current conflicts. And that's a big problem right now. Because the US is no longer the world's leading economic power — at least, not by any metric that would matter in a war. And whatever remains of its technological leadership is quickly vanishing. For the first time since the Industrial Revolution, it's an autocracy — China — that commands the greatest resources. Even if the US hadn't allowed its defense-industrial base to wither, China would still manufacture as much as America and all of its democratic allies combined: Source: UN Industrial Development Organization As for technology, there are still a few areas where America is ahead, such as leading-edge computer chips and aircraft engines. But in most areas of manufacturing and software, China has caught up or almost caught up, including in AI. And in some crucial areas, like batteries and magnets, America has voluntarily forfeited and isn't even in the race. That means that if China does choose to fight America, one big traditional advantage of democracies — economic and technological supremacy — won't exist. Instead, a best-case scenario is that it would be more like World War I before the entry of the US, where Britain, France and Russia found themselves evenly matched against a somewhat autocratic but technologically and economically advanced Germany. Nor is China likely to rush clumsily into war the way Putin did. In the 20th century, China did get involved in some reckless, stupid wars — in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in 1979, neither of which it won. But since then, China has shown extreme caution. Its leaders definitely seem determined to build up overwhelming power before taking Taiwan or other territories in Asia. If the U.S. has to fight China, it will be at a time and place of their choosing, not ours — and they will likely have most of their people unified behind the effort. This doesn't mean the democracies would have no advantage against China. The structural problems of autocracies — poor information flow, overcentralization of power, paranoid infighting — all seem present, as Xi Jinping completes his transformation of Deng Xiaoping's bureaucratic, technocratic system into something closer to a traditional dictatorship. Xi has already made a ton of mistakes, many of them related to micromanagement — Zero Covid, Belt and Road, the crackdown on IT in 2021, the real estate bust, 'wolf warrior' diplomacy, and so on. It's likely he would micromanage a war as well. Meanwhile, Xi has been purging his top military officers, many of whom he himself appointed, at a stupendous rate, for reasons unknown. So if China does fight America, it will have some of the same sorts of disadvantages that Russia has with Putin. But it's far from clear whether these would be enough to overcome China's massive manufacturing advantage. Democracy is a lot tougher than people give it credit for, but it's not magic. 1 Though note that Sparta itself was promptly defeated by Thebes, which had transitioned to democratic rule several years earlier. 2 This is clearly false. The US didn't just overthrow Saddam with ease; it also defeated Sunni and Shia militias alike, and then defeated ISIS. The regime that the US set up in Saddam's wake is still in control in Iraq, and is still friendly to the US By every conceivable past and present definition of what it means to 'win' a war, the US won the Iraq War. However, the victory didn't benefit the US strategically — it diminished America's geopolitical standing and broke the global norm of non-aggression that the US had championed since World War 2, paving the way for Russia's invasion of Ukraine. So the Iraq War is a demonstration of the fact that victory in war isn't always worth fighting the war in the first place. In contrast, the Afghanistan War was a loss for the US, but Al Qaeda was effectively destroyed, Osama bin Laden and all other 9/11 planners were captured or killed, and the Taliban were neutralized as a strategic threat. 3 PPP is probably better than market exchange rates when comparing economies for military purposes, since most military goods — especially soldiers' salaries and provisions — are produced domestically rather than acquired on world markets. This is especially true for Iran, which is under international sanctions. 4 This is a key implication of Selectorate Theory, which is popular among political scientists. This article was first published on Noah Smith's Noahpinion Substack and is republished with kind permission. Become a Noahopinion subscriber here.
HKFP
a day ago
- HKFP
Hong Kong gov't needs bold action to introduce senior civil servant accountability system
Chief Executive John Lee revealed in an interview on June 13 that he was studying the possibility of a 'senior civil servant accountability system' for Hong Kong. The purpose would be to 'strengthen leadership' of government departments to solve long-standing problems. The first priority, he said, was to establish responsibility for the problems. These are the sorts of problems highlighted in Ombudsman and Audit reports, often involving weak coordination across departments and failure to implement policy. Lee is saying to department heads, If you see a problem, take the initiative and fix it. This is a welcome development. We have seen too often that department heads fail to address cross-department problems. For example, the initial lack of coordination during the Covid-19 pandemic between the Social Welfare Department and the Department of Health to vaccinate the elderly in care homes. This failure had lethal consequences. The chief executive is considering laying an additional bureaucratic accountability system on top of existing systems. We have many systems. First, authorities carry out annual reviews of all civil servants' performance, including those at the top. The reviews consider civil servants' leadership potential. Officials place those with potential in 'acting' positions to assess their performance on the job. In theory, good performers (problem solvers) would receive more permanent appointments. The chief executive is telling us that these systems are inadequate for the job. I agree. Second, annual budget estimates include targets for specific departments, the extent to which they were achieved and targets going forward. Many of the targets appear to be easily reached. For example, the Buildings Department's target of 'responding to emergencies during office hours within 1.5 hours in urban areas' was set at 100 per cent. The target was fully achieved in 2022, while in 2023, it was 99.8 per cent. Moreover, the targets appear to be for items that are entirely within the control of a single department. Yet the issues the chief executive has identified as persistent, serious problems are mostly cross-departmental problems. Authorities need a new way of setting targets that focus on these problems. Third, annual policy addresses now also include Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). The government's KPIs are often written in general language, for example, to start such and such an activity within the X quarter of year Y. Or, explore such and such an activity within year Y. Generally, authorities assign KPIs to bureaus, not to departments. Officials leave it to bureau secretaries to sort out which department or departments are responsible. The chief executive is now telling us that bureau secretaries have difficulty encouraging those responsible to take the initiative to fix 'persistent, serious problems.' Indeed, those responsible may be beyond the bureau secretary's reach. Do department heads or team leaders in departments have the authority to replace team members? Can they reaching down into their own department, or into other departments to find those motivated with the necessary expertise? These issues run up against the siloed nature of the civil service, divided by departments and grades. They also confront the permanent nature of civil service employment. Once passed probation, civil servants are employed until retirement unless they commit some egregious error. Very few do and are dismissed. A bold reform, then, would be to abolish permanent positions in the government, making civil service employment more like employment in the private sector. Many countries have done this. Alternatively, the government could employ senior civil servants only on say three- to five-year contracts. This would align with the contract employment system for political appointees, who serve for the duration of a chief executive's tenure. It could allow the chief executive to achieve his objective of integrating the political appointee and civil service responsibility systems. A further reform would allow political appointees to select senior civil servants. Currently, bureau heads have little say in the selection of permanent secretaries in their bureaus or the selection of department heads. Giving politically appointed principal officials this selection authority could help align the goals of the chief executive and the government. In his remarks, the chief executive suggested he was studying many ways to punish civil servants. He suggested pay freezes, denying them an annual increase in their salary. Focusing only on punishment fosters a culture of risk aversion. Yet, it is a culture of caution that is fearful of making mistakes that the CE is trying to change. The chief executive may also examine the reward end of the compensation system. Why not a specific chief executive's award for solving long-standing cross-departmental problems? This could be material – say a one-off but substantial boost to relevant departmental budgets – or non-material recognition, also a powerful motivator. Unless the chief executive replaces permanent employment with contracts for at least senior civil servants, any change is likely to be mostly symbolic. By suggesting a new senior civil service accountability system, the chief executive is telling the public, civil servants, and the central government that authorities care about performance. More is required to change the culture and behaviour. The government needs to consider bold action. HKFP is an impartial platform & does not necessarily share the views of opinion writers or advertisers. HKFP presents a diversity of views & regularly invites figures across the political spectrum to write for us. Press freedom is guaranteed under the Basic Law, security law, Bill of Rights and Chinese constitution. Opinion pieces aim to point out errors or defects in the government, law or policies, or aim to suggest ideas or alterations via legal means without an intention of hatred, discontent or hostility against the authorities or other communities.
