US plans nuclear buildup to check and deter China, Russia
With the New START treaty set to expire, the US Air Force is gearing up to surge warhead deployments to outmatch and deter nuclear rivals China and Russia.
This month, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that the US Air Force is prepared to expand its nuclear arsenal upon the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026, according to General Thomas Bussiere, head of US Air Force Global Strike Command.
Speaking at an Atlantic Council forum, Bussiere said that, if directed, the service could increase warhead deployments across its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and bomber fleet.
The nuclear arms control treaty, which has been in effect since 2011 and has limited the number of nuclear launchers in the US and Russia, will lapse following Russia's 2023 decision not to extend it.
Efforts to modernize US deterrence capabilities, including the Sentinel ICBM, have faced scrutiny due to soaring costs and delays. Lawmakers pressed US Air Force officials to demonstrate urgency in correcting the troubled program, which is projected to cost nearly US$141 billion and fall years behind schedule.
Simultaneously, the US Department of Defense (DOD) is assessing the viability of expanding the B-21 Raider fleet beyond the planned 100 aircraft to counter growing nuclear threats from China and North Korea.
House Armed Services Committee members remain concerned about funding priorities and nuclear force readiness, while Secretary Troy Meink emphasized that strategic deterrence remains paramount for national defense. Bussiere hinted that future adversarial developments might necessitate a more robust nuclear force posture beyond existing plans.
Al Mauroni mentions in a December 2023 War on the Rocks article that the US could increase its readily deployed nuclear warheads beyond New START Treaty limits by utilizing warheads from the nuclear stockpile's active hedge, which are those that are not operationally deployed.
Mauroni points out that this effectively means the US could 'upload' additional nuclear warheads onto existing missiles and bombers without building new weapons.
Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a January 2025 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that while the US currently deploys 400 Minuteman III ICBMs, each armed with one warhead, the missiles can carry two or three warheads each.
Kristensen and others state that the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) can carry eight warheads each, although they typically carry an average of four to five.
In terms of bombers, a March 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that the US Air Force may require at least 200 stealth bombers to meet operational demands, particularly given the high tempo of Bomber Task Force missions and the reliance on Cold War-era platforms still in frontline use.
Putting a number on the potential increase of US warheads, Keith Payne and Mark Schneider mention in an article this month for the National Institute of Public Policy that without New START limitations, the US Trident SLBM force could increase from an estimated 960 to 1,626 deployed warheads, while the Minuteman III ICBM force could increase from an estimated 400 to 1,000 deployed warheads, for a deployed missile force of 2,626 warheads.
For bombers, Payne and Schneider estimate that the US could increase its stockpile of 528 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) to 716 to 784 warheads.
However, the US nuclear triad is in dire need of modernization. Heather Williams and Lachlan MacKenzie mention in an April 2025 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US Air Force is currently looking to extend the lifespan of its Minuteman III ICBMs, which are decades past retirement, while its Sentinel replacement is hounded by budget overruns and delays.
Regarding the US's undersea nuclear deterrent, a March 2025 US CRS report notes that the US operates 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, which are approaching the end of their service lives. The report states that the SSBNs were initially designed for a 30-year service life but were later recertified for an additional 12 years. The report notes that the Ohio SSBNs will reach the end of their operational lives from 2027 to 2040.
While the report states that the US is building 12 Columbia-class SSBNs to replace the Ohio-class fleet, the lead unit is facing a 12- to 16-month delay, which could impact the timely replacement of the Ohio-class fleet.
While Williams and MacKenzie note that the B-21 bomber program is on track, a June 2024 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states that the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) program, intended to replace the AGM-86 ALCM aboard US bombers, faces risks in schedule and cost estimates due to tight timelines and overlapping testing phases.
It also mentions that while the LRSO program has made design progress and early manufacturing preparations, challenges remain in software integration and meeting nuclear certification requirements, which could affect the missile's timely deployment and operational readiness.
Williams and MacKenzie assert that the US defense industrial base and nuclear enterprise have atrophied since the end of the Cold War, with decades of underinvestment and consolidation eroding its nuclear defense-industrial base, leaving it ill-equipped for renewed great power competition.
When New START expires next year, the US must ensure its nuclear deterrent effectively dissuades both China and Russia from nuclear aggression, including if the two US rivals act together.
Meanwhile, Russia is deploying new systems, such as the Avangard and Poseidon, and China is expanding its ICBM silo fields and maturing a true nuclear triad—thereby intensifying the arms race that the US appears to be struggling to keep pace with.
In an April 2023 Atlantic Council report, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press mention that in a nuclear tripolar world with China, Russia and the US all fielding large arsenals, the US must deter two peer rivals simultaneously, each capable of massive retaliation.
However, they point out that the US's current counterforce doctrine, which eschews threats to enemy cities while targeting military assets, requires a large, survivable arsenal capable of retaliating against one adversary while still deterring the other, thereby escalating the risks of an arms race.
In addition, they argue that a pure counterforce doctrine increases force demands without improving deterrence.
Lieber and Press propose a hybrid US nuclear doctrine, with counterforce options for limited scenarios but threatening countervalue retaliation targeting cities, industrial assets and population centers in extreme ones. They assert a hybrid doctrine would more credibly deter China and Russia while avoiding an excessive force buildup.
With New START set to expire in early 2026, the US's nuclear future hinges not just on how many warheads it can deploy but how credibly it can deter two giants bent on intensifying their nuclear threats.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Asia Times
6 days ago
- Asia Times
New US nuke missile drops first-strike gauntlet on China
The US Air Force has revealed the first image of its next-generation nuclear cruise missile, signaling a significant step in modernizing the aging air-based leg of America's nuclear triad. This month, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that the Air Force has publicly released the first conceptual image of the AGM-181 Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile, a stealthy nuclear cruise missile under development by Raytheon via the US Department of Defense's (DOD) Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS). Designed to succeed the AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the LRSO will serve as the B-52J's primary nuclear strike asset by 2030. The Air Force carefully curated the image to obscure key stealth features, depicting an air-breathing missile with anhedral wings, a ventral stabilizer, and possibly a top-side exhaust, resembling the AGM-158 JASSM. The absence of a visible air intake suggests strategic concealment to preserve low observability. Awarded an initial US$2 billion engineering and manufacturing development contract in 2021, the program is slated for low-rate production starting in February 2027. Budget documents indicate a significant increase in funding from $295.5 million in FY2026 to $1.22 billion in FY2027, with a planned purchase of 1,087 units at approximately $14 million each. Armed with the W80-4 warhead and capable of subsonic speeds, the LRSO passed its critical design review in 2023. General Thomas Bussiere, commander of Global Strike Command, affirmed the program's trajectory and noted its operational relevance, even after the B-52's retirement, hinting at future standoff-capable platforms. Underscoring the urgency of developing the LRSO, Patty Jane-Geller notes in a January 2021 Heritage Foundation article that the AGM-86B ALCM entered service in 1982 with an intended lifespan of 10 years but has undergone life extension programs to last until 2030. Jane-Geller explains that advancements in Russian and Chinese air defenses degrade the AGM-86B's ability to penetrate defended airspace and that life extension programs cannot keep pace with the increasing numbers of defects found in the missiles over time. Dennis Evans and Jonathan Schwalbe note in a 2017 report for the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) that the small number of nuclear-capable US strategic bombers in operation may enable a limited nuclear strike against a lesser adversary but could prove inadequate in a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power. In line with this, Keith Payne and Mark Schneider explain in an article published this month for the National Institute of Public Policy that, with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) set to expire in February 2026, the US could increase its nuclear-armed ALCMs from 528 to between 716 and 784 bomber-delivered warheads. Payne and Schneider argue that expanding the ALCM fleet won't be feasible until the LRSO becomes operational in the 2030s. By that point, they say the US may only have a limited number of nuclear-capable B-21 bombers, each expected to carry around eight nuclear bombs. They also note that due to the limited number of B-2s and the recent entry into low-rate production of the B-21, the B-52 will continue to be the primary component of the US air-based nuclear arsenal. However, they point out that the B-52's non-stealth configuration makes it dependent on ALCMs for survivability and that the legacy AGM-86B was not designed to penetrate sophisticated air defense systems in the 2020s or beyond. However, cost concerns may hinder the US's attempts to modernize its air-based nuclear arsenal. A March 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes that the US Air Force may need up to 200 B-21s, with the aging US bomber fleet providing a rationale for increased purchases from an initial 100 planned units. Despite that, the report notes that US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has reportedly asked the military services to propose an 8% reduction in their planned FY2026 budgets, with nuclear modernization exempt from those budget cuts. Additionally, the report states that placing US strategic bombers on constant alert may increase demands on costs and manpower, potentially biting into an already constrained budget. Critically, the report highlights the need for US airbase hardening in the Pacific, noting that hardening with reinforced shelters and passive defenses, such as fleet dispersion, camouflage, and concealment, is necessary to enhance protection against a surprise missile attack. Reports from Stimson and the Hudson Institute have highlighted the vulnerability of US airbases and aircraft on the ground, with US airbases in Japan, the Philippines, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands being within range of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles, with some estimates saying as few as 10 missiles could crater runways, preventing US aircraft from taking off. That vulnerability is also compounded by a lack of US airbase hardening, with the lack of hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) in most locations, which means that most US aircraft losses in a US-China conflict over Taiwan would happen on the ground. Furthermore, the US's deficient missile defenses on key installations, such as Guam, could prove to be a vulnerability. Robert Peters notes in a January 2024 Heritage Foundation report that Guam needs a full-spectrum, permanent, 360-degree missile defense capability, but US DOD efforts to implement such have moved too slowly, while China is investing enormous sums in developing capabilities that could put US and allied bases at risk with conventional and nuclear weapons. While the US has the resources to harden and fortify critical airfields, such a move could complicate strategic stability calculations. In the wake of the audacious Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian airfields, which took out several of the latter's strategic bombers, pro-Russian defense outlet Top War notes that New START requires the US and Russian strategic bombers to be parked out in the open to be subject to satellite monitoring and inspection-based verification to prevent misperception between the two nuclear powers. Top War notes that while Russia suspended its participation in New START in February 2023, it continues to de facto abide by its provisions. In line with that logic, Tong Zhao explains in a July 2024 report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that non-nuclear US strategic actions, particularly those aimed at improving survivability or enabling conventional precision strikes, may still be interpreted by Chinese analysts as aggressive or escalatory, especially when viewed through the lens of China's 'worst-case thinking' and fear of a disarming first strike. Such a move could lower China's nuclear use threshold, with Zhao emphasizing that even defensive or non-nuclear US moves may be viewed by China as escalatory or hostile if not well-communicated, contributing to nuclear instability.
South China Morning Post
6 days ago
- South China Morning Post
China's nuclear stockpile is growing fast, ICBMs may match US, Russia around 2030: SIPRI
China's nuclear arsenal is growing 'faster than any other country' and its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force could potentially match that of Russia or the US by the turn of the decade, a Swedish think tank dedicated to weapons research has said. Advertisement According to the latest yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China has added 100 more warheads to its nuclear stockpile each year since 2023. It held at least 600 and that number was expected to 'keep growing over the coming decade', according to a report released on Monday. 'China … has the fastest-growing nuclear arsenal in the world,' the report said. While most of these warheads are thought to be stored separately from their launchers, China could be deploying a small number on missiles, as is done on a much larger scale by the United States and Russia. According to SIPRI's estimate, 132 of the warheads have been assigned to launchers that are still being loaded. Hans Kristensen, an associate senior fellow at SIPRI and director of the Federation of American Scientists' nuclear information project, said there could be several factors behind the rapid warhead build-up, including President Xi Jinping's call that China 'must be a world-class military power by the middle of the century'. Advertisement '[There could have been] an apparent decision that the previous minimum deterrent was insufficient to deter potential adversaries, and possibly a conclusion that increasingly capable US missile defence systems could reduce the effectiveness of the Chinese retaliatory capability,' Kristensen said.
Asia Times
09-06-2025
- Asia Times
US plans nuclear buildup to check and deter China, Russia
With the New START treaty set to expire, the US Air Force is gearing up to surge warhead deployments to outmatch and deter nuclear rivals China and Russia. This month, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that the US Air Force is prepared to expand its nuclear arsenal upon the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026, according to General Thomas Bussiere, head of US Air Force Global Strike Command. Speaking at an Atlantic Council forum, Bussiere said that, if directed, the service could increase warhead deployments across its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and bomber fleet. The nuclear arms control treaty, which has been in effect since 2011 and has limited the number of nuclear launchers in the US and Russia, will lapse following Russia's 2023 decision not to extend it. Efforts to modernize US deterrence capabilities, including the Sentinel ICBM, have faced scrutiny due to soaring costs and delays. Lawmakers pressed US Air Force officials to demonstrate urgency in correcting the troubled program, which is projected to cost nearly US$141 billion and fall years behind schedule. Simultaneously, the US Department of Defense (DOD) is assessing the viability of expanding the B-21 Raider fleet beyond the planned 100 aircraft to counter growing nuclear threats from China and North Korea. House Armed Services Committee members remain concerned about funding priorities and nuclear force readiness, while Secretary Troy Meink emphasized that strategic deterrence remains paramount for national defense. Bussiere hinted that future adversarial developments might necessitate a more robust nuclear force posture beyond existing plans. Al Mauroni mentions in a December 2023 War on the Rocks article that the US could increase its readily deployed nuclear warheads beyond New START Treaty limits by utilizing warheads from the nuclear stockpile's active hedge, which are those that are not operationally deployed. Mauroni points out that this effectively means the US could 'upload' additional nuclear warheads onto existing missiles and bombers without building new weapons. Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a January 2025 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that while the US currently deploys 400 Minuteman III ICBMs, each armed with one warhead, the missiles can carry two or three warheads each. Kristensen and others state that the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) can carry eight warheads each, although they typically carry an average of four to five. In terms of bombers, a March 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that the US Air Force may require at least 200 stealth bombers to meet operational demands, particularly given the high tempo of Bomber Task Force missions and the reliance on Cold War-era platforms still in frontline use. Putting a number on the potential increase of US warheads, Keith Payne and Mark Schneider mention in an article this month for the National Institute of Public Policy that without New START limitations, the US Trident SLBM force could increase from an estimated 960 to 1,626 deployed warheads, while the Minuteman III ICBM force could increase from an estimated 400 to 1,000 deployed warheads, for a deployed missile force of 2,626 warheads. For bombers, Payne and Schneider estimate that the US could increase its stockpile of 528 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) to 716 to 784 warheads. However, the US nuclear triad is in dire need of modernization. Heather Williams and Lachlan MacKenzie mention in an April 2025 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US Air Force is currently looking to extend the lifespan of its Minuteman III ICBMs, which are decades past retirement, while its Sentinel replacement is hounded by budget overruns and delays. Regarding the US's undersea nuclear deterrent, a March 2025 US CRS report notes that the US operates 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, which are approaching the end of their service lives. The report states that the SSBNs were initially designed for a 30-year service life but were later recertified for an additional 12 years. The report notes that the Ohio SSBNs will reach the end of their operational lives from 2027 to 2040. While the report states that the US is building 12 Columbia-class SSBNs to replace the Ohio-class fleet, the lead unit is facing a 12- to 16-month delay, which could impact the timely replacement of the Ohio-class fleet. While Williams and MacKenzie note that the B-21 bomber program is on track, a June 2024 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states that the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) program, intended to replace the AGM-86 ALCM aboard US bombers, faces risks in schedule and cost estimates due to tight timelines and overlapping testing phases. It also mentions that while the LRSO program has made design progress and early manufacturing preparations, challenges remain in software integration and meeting nuclear certification requirements, which could affect the missile's timely deployment and operational readiness. Williams and MacKenzie assert that the US defense industrial base and nuclear enterprise have atrophied since the end of the Cold War, with decades of underinvestment and consolidation eroding its nuclear defense-industrial base, leaving it ill-equipped for renewed great power competition. When New START expires next year, the US must ensure its nuclear deterrent effectively dissuades both China and Russia from nuclear aggression, including if the two US rivals act together. Meanwhile, Russia is deploying new systems, such as the Avangard and Poseidon, and China is expanding its ICBM silo fields and maturing a true nuclear triad—thereby intensifying the arms race that the US appears to be struggling to keep pace with. In an April 2023 Atlantic Council report, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press mention that in a nuclear tripolar world with China, Russia and the US all fielding large arsenals, the US must deter two peer rivals simultaneously, each capable of massive retaliation. However, they point out that the US's current counterforce doctrine, which eschews threats to enemy cities while targeting military assets, requires a large, survivable arsenal capable of retaliating against one adversary while still deterring the other, thereby escalating the risks of an arms race. In addition, they argue that a pure counterforce doctrine increases force demands without improving deterrence. Lieber and Press propose a hybrid US nuclear doctrine, with counterforce options for limited scenarios but threatening countervalue retaliation targeting cities, industrial assets and population centers in extreme ones. They assert a hybrid doctrine would more credibly deter China and Russia while avoiding an excessive force buildup. With New START set to expire in early 2026, the US's nuclear future hinges not just on how many warheads it can deploy but how credibly it can deter two giants bent on intensifying their nuclear threats.
