Latest news with #underseaCables
Daily Mail
3 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Mail
Undersea cables vulnerable to Chinese and Russian sabotage
This is the network of critical underseas cables at the mercy of Chinese and Russian saboteurs - and the multiple ways they could be attacked. A new report has warned Britain remains 'woefully' underprepared for the threat of strikes on its maritime infrastructure in the face of growing aggression. The China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI) looked at 12 incidents of alleged undersea cable sabotage between January 2021 and April 2025 in Europe and Taiwan. Out of the 10 cases where a suspect vessel was identified, eight were linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership. Report author Andrew Yeh said the involvement of Chinese ships in cable breakages in Europe and Russian ships in those near Taiwan indicated 'plausible' coordination. The Institute identified the UK as a 'likely target' for future Chinese-Russian 'grey zone' operations - a term used to describe the state between peace and open war. This map produced by MailOnline shows the dizzying extent of the UK's network of cables, which are used to transmit data used for everything from online shopping to banking, personal messages and government communications. As the term 'grey zone' suggests, acts of cable sabotage are usually intended to be deniable, and usually involve ships dragging their anchors or deploying fishing nets. But more aggressive methods are available, including the use of divers or remote-operated subs to lay explosives fitted with timers. The UK is the landing point for at least 60 undersea cable systems, including nine of the 15 undersea cables that link Europe to North America. Mr Yeh wrote in his report: 'Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99 per cent of intercontinental data traffic. 'Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies. 'As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.' The analyst called for the UK to be 'clear-eyed and proactive' in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. He called for increased surveillance over critical cables, the publication of a blacklist of suspect vessels and the stockpiling of cable parts to allow for rapid repairs following acts of sabotage. The issue of undersea cables was mentioned in the recent Strategic Defence Review. It stated: 'Undersea pipelines and data cables are critical for sustaining daily national life. The maritime domain is increasingly vulnerable.' 'The Royal Navy must be prepared to deter maritime incidents similar to the sabotage of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and the cutting of undersea data cables in UK and international waters.' Since October 2023, at least 11 subsea cables in the Baltic have been damaged in suspected attacks. Last year, Finnish authorities took the unprecedented step of intercepting one of these ships, the Eagle S, and taking it back into its territorial waters. Eagle S is flagged in the Cook Islands but has been described by Finnish customs officials as part of Russia's shadow fleet of fuel tankers that state-run companies have used to circumnavigate sanctions. Its anchor was accused of causing damage to the Estlink-2 power cable, which takes electricity from Finland to Estonia across the Baltic Sea, after it went down just after noon on Christmas Day. Further incidents in the North Sea have seen cables running on the seabed damaged, while separately, Russian spy ships - including one called the Yantar - have been intercepted in the Channel while hovering over the communication lines. At a parliamentary committee hearing last month, MPs were warned that Britain had forgotten how important deep sea cables are to modern society. The robot will help deal with sabotage threats and clear unexploded ordnance, doing jobs that would normally put both divers and their vessels at risk. The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), part of the Ministry of Defence, has made the device with industry partners in an aim to save lives at sea. Experts have incorporated or developed systems so the ROV can detect unexploded ordnance and remotely place explosive charges to enable safe neutralisation. Trials for the project funded by the Royal Navy have already taken place at Horsea Island in Portsmouth, Portland Harbour in Dorset, South Wales and in Norway.
Daily Mail
4 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Mail
EXCLUSIVE The critical undersea cables at the mercy of Chinese and Russian saboteurs: Fears UK is 'woefully' unprepared for threat of coordinated attacks by 'shadow fleets' on vulnerable Western infrastructure
This is the network of critical underseas cables at the mercy of Chinese and Russian saboteurs - and the multiple ways they could be attacked. A new report has warned Britain remains 'woefully' underprepared for the threat of strikes on its maritime infrastructure in the face of growing aggression. The China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI) looked at 12 incidents of alleged undersea cable sabotage between January 2021 and April 2025 in Europe and Taiwan. Out of the 10 cases where a suspect vessel was identified, eight were linked to China or Russia by flag or ownership. Report author Andrew Yeh said the involvement of Chinese ships in cable breakages in Europe and Russian ships in those near Taiwan indicated 'plausible' coordination. The Institute identified the UK as a 'likely target' for future Chinese-Russian 'grey zone' operations - a term used to describe the state between peace and open war. This map produced by MailOnline shows the dizzying extent of the UK's network of cables, which are used to transmit data used for everything from online shopping to banking, personal messages and government communications. As the term 'grey zone' suggests, acts of cable sabotage are usually intended to be deniable, and usually involve ships dragging their anchors or deploying fishing nets. But more aggressive methods are available, including the use of divers or remote-operated subs to lay explosives fitted with timers. The UK is the landing point for at least 60 undersea cable systems, including nine of the 15 undersea cables that link Europe to North America. Mr Yeh wrote in his report: 'Undersea cables underpin economic security and global prosperity in the digital age, carrying 99 per cent of intercontinental data traffic. 'Undersea cables are vital for both civilian and defence infrastructure, including future AI-powered technologies. 'As a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure, the UK is a likely target for future Russian and Chinese grey-zone operations – posing a new and complex challenge for its maritime defence and surveillance systems.' The analyst called for the UK to be 'clear-eyed and proactive' in addressing grey-zone threats to undersea infrastructure. He called for increased surveillance over critical cables, the publication of a blacklist of suspect vessels and the stockpiling of cable parts to allow for rapid repairs following acts of sabotage. The issue of undersea cables was mentioned in the recent Strategic Defence Review. It stated: 'Undersea pipelines and data cables are critical for sustaining daily national life. The maritime domain is increasingly vulnerable. 'The Royal Navy must be prepared to deter maritime incidents similar to the sabotage of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and the cutting of undersea data cables in UK and international waters.' Since October 2023, at least 11 subsea cables in the Baltic have been damaged in suspected attacks. Last year, Finnish authorities took the unprecedented step of intercepting one of these ships, the Eagle S, and taking it back into its territorial waters. Eagle S is flagged in the Cook Islands but has been described by Finnish customs officials as part of Russia's shadow fleet of fuel tankers that state-run companies have used to circumnavigate sanctions. Its anchor was accused of causing damage to the Estlink-2 power cable, which takes electricity from Finland to Estonia across the Baltic Sea, after it went down just after noon on Christmas Day. Further incidents in the North Sea have seen cables running on the seabed damaged, while separately, Russian spy ships - including one called the Yantar - have been intercepted in the Channel while hovering over the communication lines. At a parliamentary committee hearing last month, MPs were warned that Britain had forgotten how important deep sea cables are to modern society. Military chiefs and political leaders were accused of putting a greater focus on 'distant wars' in recent years than protecting this crucial infrastructure. It comes as British defence experts revealed a new undersea robot that is designed to protect cables against sabotage attempts. Video footage shows the device, which is adapted from a commercially available remotely operated vehicle (ROV), approaching and blasting a simulated target. The robot will help deal with sabotage threats and clear unexploded ordnance, doing jobs that would normally put both divers and their vessels at risk. The Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL), part of the Ministry of Defence, has made the device with industry partners in an aim to save lives at sea. Experts have incorporated or developed systems so the ROV can detect unexploded ordnance and remotely place explosive charges to enable safe neutralisation. Trials for the project funded by the Royal Navy have already taken place at Horsea Island in Portsmouth, Portland Harbour in Dorset, South Wales and in Norway.
BBC News
5 days ago
- General
- BBC News
Kent Sea Link cables consultation enters final week
Kent residents now have a week left to have their say on plans for 90 miles (145km) of undersea electricity cables between the county and Grid's Sea Link project would see undersea cables coming ashore near Sandwich in Kent, and Thorpeness and Aldeburgh in company says the project is a "vital investment in Great Britain's energy future" but opponents say it would be damaging to the environment.A consultation on the project is due to close at 23:59 BST on Monday 23 June. The planning application, which is currently near the end of the pre-examination stage, will next be scrutinised by the Planning Inspectorate ahead of an official examination will last six months before the inspectorate will send a report to the government recommending whether to approve or reject the plans.A decision is expected in late 2026, National Grid added that, if the project is approved, construction could also begin in 2026 and be finished in 2031. 'Sensitive habitats' The proposed cable would carry renewable power from offshore wind, interconnectors and nuclear power to where it is needed.A sub-station and converter station has also been planned for Minster, near Ramsgate, Kent, and near Saxmundham in cables would transport renewable energy from generators such as the Sizewell nuclear power stationsKent Wildlife Trust previously set up its "Rethink Sea Link" campaign calling for the National Grid to consider a different route for cables which minimises the effect on Pegwell Bay, near Grid said it recognised the "sensitive habitats" in the area and has "studied the likely significant effects" of the project.
Japan Times
5 days ago
- Business
- Japan Times
The underlying risk of Japan's undersea cables
Recent reports of suspected sabotage targeting undersea cables near Taiwan and in the Baltic Sea are highlighting a vulnerability in Japan — an island nation that relies almost entirely on such cables to stay connected to the rest of the world. The government is increasingly aware of the risk. Tucked into this year's economic and fiscal policy guidelines, referred to as honebuto no hōshin, which set the tone for budget planning for the next fiscal year, is official recognition of submarine cables as strategic infrastructure vital to Japan's economic security. What exactly are undersea cables, and how real is the threat of disruption — especially for a country such as Japan, which faces frequent natural disasters and growing geopolitical tension? What are undersea cables and how connected is Japan? Roughly the thickness of a garden hose, undersea cables contain strands of optical fiber that allow for massive data transmission at lightning speed with high security. These fiber-optic lines handle 99% of Japan's international communications, powering everything from email and banking to video calls and cloud computing. They're the invisible infrastructure that keeps the global internet humming. There are some 600 subsea cables worldwide totaling over 1.48 million kilometers, according to TeleGeography, a U.S.-based telecommunications data provider. Japan — a hub of undersea cables connecting the United States and Asia — is directly connected to 20 to 30 international cables, according to the Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry. Would Japan's international communications be cut off if undersea cables are damaged or sabotaged? The short answer is no. Cutting one or two submarine cables won't send Japan — or any major country — offline. Global networks are designed with redundancy in mind, allowing traffic to be rerouted almost instantly via alternative paths. In fact, cable damage is actually quite common, but it's rarely dramatic. Most incidents are caused by aging infrastructure — cables typically last 25 to 30 years — or human activities such as fishing and anchoring. According to the internal affairs ministry, Japan recorded two cable ruptures due to natural causes in 2023, four the year before, and six in 2021. 'If you tried to make them completely indestructible, like by cementing them in concrete, you wouldn't be able to repair them,' said a senior internal affairs ministry official in charge of undersea cable policies, who requested anonymity in line with ministry practice. 'Everyone knows that the cables can snap. The point is to be prepared when that happens.' Could undersea cables be subjected to military attacks? Suspected sabotage cases have made headlines but they remain the exception, not the norm. The Baltic Sea incident in late 2024 drew international attention when a ship dragged its anchors along the seafloor for kilometers, severing cables along the way. The event led NATO to deploy military ships to patrol the area. Taiwan has also faced repeated undersea cable cuts involving China in recent years. But Jun Murai, a professor emeritus at Keio University and expert in undersea cables, noted that these incidents are likely caused by Chinese fishing vessels rather than military activity. 'It's difficult (to say)' he said. "Fishing boats often appear (in Taiwanese waters) because China claims the South China Sea as its territory. And when the boats pass by, the cables get cut.' The media reaction has nevertheless been intense, with accusations of deliberate sabotage. Murai, however, said that even countries in conflict often dispatch repair ships to fix damaged cables regardless of political tensions, as part of a long-standing industry norm. 'There may be security-related conflicts, but treating submarine cables themselves as weapons or military targets doesn't really benefit anyone,' he said. 'There are so many paths and providers that it's virtually impossible for everything to go down at once.' The real vulnerability arises when a small island relies on a single cable. If that gets severed, the island can go completely offline, and repairs may take time — as reportedly happened when Tonga lost communications after an earthquake damaged its cable in June 2024. What are the potential risks and challenges for Japan? Japan's greatest vulnerability lies not in sabotage, but in its geography. As one of the world's most seismically active countries, it faces an ever-present risk of natural disasters damaging the cables laid deep underwater. The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake severely damaged several undersea cables connecting Japan and the U.S. across the Pacific. However, thanks to preexisting redundancy measures, most users never experienced any disruption. Private companies had already secured alternative routes, and when cables were cut, they were able to borrow bandwidth or reroute traffic through other lines, preventing major outages. More recently, the Noto Peninsula earthquake underscored the importance of backup infrastructure. While some submarine cables were affected, the more immediate issue was on land, where collapsed cellphone base stations left large areas without mobile service. In such emergencies, alternative technologies such as satellites or high-altitude platform stations could serve as communication lifelines. 'I think there are limits to capacity, so it may be difficult for these to serve as a true substitute for submarine cables,' the internal affairs ministry official said. 'But if communication can still be established via satellite, then people would still be able to contact someone or send an SOS. In that sense, securing alternative means of communication is extremely important.' What is Japan's role on a global scale? Japan plays a key role in the global submarine cable industry — not just as a hub for data traffic, but as one of the few countries with a domestic cable manufacturer. Keio University's Murai noted that Japan is in a relatively strong position internationally, in part because so few companies in the world actually make these cables. There are currently three dominant players in the global market: France's Alcatel Submarine Networks (ASN), in which the French government has a majority stake, U.S.-based SubCom, and Japan's NEC. Chinese firm Huawei has also been increasing its global market share in recent years. Murai said that while political concerns have led some to hesitate over government-owned manufacturers such as ASN, NEC's status as a private Japanese company has helped grow its business, particularly as buyers seek stable, politically neutral sources for their infrastructure. 'So now ... NEC has become stronger,' he said. Another challenge is Japan's limited number of cable-laying ships. KDDI and NTT both own such vessels, but NEC is the only cable manufacturer that does not own any, although it started renting one in 2022. What's the government's role in preserving the cables? The economic ministry has labeled these cables 'extremely important assets' in recent revisions to national economic security policy, underlining just how vital they've become in the digital age. But what active steps are authorities taking to ensure that the critical infrastructure is protected? The internal affairs ministry official revealed that a budget of ¥10 billion ($69.6 million) was secured in the fiscal 2023 supplementary budget to support the diversification of submarine cable routes and landing stations in Japan, with specific projects to be selected later this month. 'We are creating and advancing cable projects in response to private sector demands, as international communications are extremely important for Japan, which is surrounded by the sea,' he said. While most submarine cables are built and operated by private companies, governments play a key role in securing global communications as businesses typically prioritize profitability. For example, that can mean concentrating infrastructure in metropolitan areas such as Tokyo and Osaka in response to public demand. Currently, most landing stations are clustered in the Kanto region's Boso and Shima peninsulas. Murai acknowledged this concentration poses a potential risk and said future infrastructure should be more evenly distributed to regions such as Okinawa, Hokkaido and Kyushu. 'Submarine cables used to be considered just communications infrastructure,' Murai said. 'But today, they're the foundation of the entire economy. Everything from artificial intelligence to health care, energy, and education depends on stable, high-capacity digital connections.'
The Guardian
5 days ago
- Business
- The Guardian
UK ‘woefully' ill-protected against Chinese and Russian undersea cable sabotage
China and Russia are stepping up sabotage operations targeting undersea cables and the UK is unprepared to meet the mounting threat, according to new analysis. A report by the China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI) analysed 12 incidents where national authorities had investigated alleged undersea cable sabotage between January 2021 and April 2025. Of the 10 cases in which a suspect vessel was identified, eight were directly linked to China or Russia through flag-state registration or company ownership. The involvement of 'shadow fleet' commercial vessels in these incidents is consistent with China and Russia's broader 'grey zone' strategy – a space between war and peace – which aims to coerce adversaries while minimising opportunities for response, the report claims. The patterns of activity – such as the involvement of Chinese vessels in suspicious incidents in the Baltic Sea, and Russian vessels near Taiwan – suggest possible coordination between Moscow and Beijing on undersea cable attacks, it said. It is estimated that up to 99% of intercontinental data transmission takes place through submarine cable systems, playing a vital role in civilian and defence infrastructure. Without undersea cables, much of the economy – from international banking and cloud computing to virtual communications and global logistics – would cease to function. The UK acts as a key hub in Euro-Atlantic cable infrastructure and is likely to become a frequent target for future sabotage operations. But a UK government submission to parliament's joint committee on the national security strategy admitted that it has limited capabilities to monitor commercial maritime traffic around undersea cables. The joint committee is mounting an investigation into the threat posed to the underseas cables and the possibility of more secure alternatives. The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology submission to the committee noted that 'the UK has limited capabilities for monitoring general maritime and white [commercial] shipping traffic, as coastal radar only covers about 22% of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the UK. 'The high volume of maritime traffic makes it challenging to identify every instance of abnormal maritime activity. As a result, the current capabilities cannot fully guarantee that all vessels adhere to UK laws and regulations, especially around sensitive infrastructure like undersea cables.' Andrew Yeh, the executive director of CSRI and author of the report, said: 'Undersea cables underpin prosperity and security in the digital age. We cannot afford to be naive about the unprecedented threat that China and Russia's grey-zone operations pose to the UK's undersea infrastructure. 'While well set up to deal with conventional threats, the UK's defence infrastructure is woefully inadequate in protecting against grey-zone tactics. The UK must bolster its monitoring and surveillance capabilities, while looking to partners such as Taiwan who have a wealth of experience in countering grey-zone threats.' The recent strategic defence review admitted that underwater cables were becoming an increasingly vulnerable maritime domain. Sign up to This is Europe The most pressing stories and debates for Europeans – from identity to economics to the environment after newsletter promotion The UK is the landing point for 60 undersea cable systems, including nine out of the 15 undersea cables connecting North America to Europe. Only this month a Taiwanese court sentenced the Chinese captain of a ship to three years in jail after finding him guilty of intentionally damaging cables off the island in February. Proof of intent, as opposed to carelessness, is one of the difficulties in pursuing these cases in court. In the Taiwanese case, the Chinese captain said it was a case of negligence. Much of the law of the sea in relation to these highly sophisticated cables carrying hi-tech data is governed by the Cable Convention passed in 1884. Baltic Nato countries meeting in January vowed to boost patrol missions after several telecom and power cables were severed in the Baltic Sea in recent months, with experts and politicians accusing a Russian 'shadow fleet' of sabotage.
