logo
#

Latest news with #post-WorldWarII

1 in 3 baby boomers say they'll never sell home: Redfin
1 in 3 baby boomers say they'll never sell home: Redfin

The Hill

time4 hours ago

  • Business
  • The Hill

1 in 3 baby boomers say they'll never sell home: Redfin

About a third of baby boomers who own their homes don't expect to ever part with them, according to a new poll. The survey, which was conducted by Ipsos last month for nationwide real estate company Redfin, found that another 30 percent of the post-World War II generation said they might sell at some point — just not within the next decade. Comparatively, about a quarter of homeowners who are part of Gen X — loosely defined as people born between 1965 and 1980 — say they will never sell their homes. About 20 percent of Millennials and the Gen Z cohort who own homes said they will never sell. According to Redfin, the tendency among older Americans to stay in the homes they own is putting additional stress on the housing market and making it more difficult for younger people to find affordable places to buy that are fit to raise families. Nearly 90 percent of the boomer-owned dwellings are single-family homes. 'While inventory is improving, supply is tight for young house hunters looking for family homes, especially in suburban areas where homes priced like starter homes, yet large enough for families, are scarce,' Redfin chief economist Daryl Fairweather said in an analysis of the poll's findings. 'With baby boomers opting to age in place rather than sell, it's challenging for younger buyers to find affordable options that fit their lifestyle.' 'But it's worth noting that even though many older Americans say they're not planning to sell their homes, many are likely to eventually part ways as it becomes harder to live independently and/or keep up with home maintenance,' he added. The survey included responses from about 4,000 U.S. residents across the country.

Why Trump May Ignore 80 Years of U.S. Regime Change Mistakes
Why Trump May Ignore 80 Years of U.S. Regime Change Mistakes

Time​ Magazine

timea day ago

  • Politics
  • Time​ Magazine

Why Trump May Ignore 80 Years of U.S. Regime Change Mistakes

This article is part of The D.C. Brief, TIME's politics newsletter. Sign up here to get stories like this sent to your inbox. Donald Trump expected his first face-to-face meeting with Barack Obama would be all of '10 or 15 minutes.' After all, the pair had spent years circling each other, trading barbs from afar and using the other's political movement as a blend of punching bag and strawman. The mutual enmity was hardly a secret; Obama's trolling of Trump at a White House correspondents' dinner set in motion the New Yorker's serious contemplation of Redemption By White House Win. [time-brightcove not-tgx='true'] The 2016 summit between the President-elect and the incumbent ended up going 90 minutes, during which North Korea was, to Trump's mind, the big takeaway. (Obama's team recalled the conversation differently.) The message was pretty clear: that rogue nation was one of the biggest problems Trump was inheriting as he rose to power after the 2016 election. The election clearly did not go as Obama had hoped so he had this one set piece to convey to his successor just how fraught the situation on the Korean Peninsula was, and how any misstep could be fatal to millions. The outgoing President's concern was that Trump, or some of his top advisers, might want to try to swap regimes. But history is lined with examples why these trades have never gone as planned. And Obama wanted to convey the risks of both a nuclear-armed free agent and a country decapitated without a clear next step. Obama hated the threat of a nuclear North Korea but also understood how things might escalate in some pretty terrible ways if unchecked emotions and amateur gut sense took over. Maybe—despite his own instincts—Trump understood that regime change was not compatible with this worldview. Instead, he courted the North Koreans and broke a half century of protocol in visiting with the reclusive regime's chief. In fact, as a candidate, and even well before that, Trump resisted any suggestion of intervention. That positioning helped Trump remake the Republican Party by elevating its isolationist wing. It's why the current moment is such a challenge for Trump: Israel's strikes on Iran lure dreams of a time after an Ayatollah runs the Islamic Republic. But dreams can easily turn into nightmares, and this particular lullaby is more than a little discordant. 'Regime change' has become shorthand in national-security circles the same way 'nation building' and 'mission accomplished' have devolved from well-considered policy goals into collapsed folly. U.S. intervention into foreign nations' governance in pursuit of friendlier—if not less-lethal—regimes has proven a loser. In recent years, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya have all provided proof of the model's overly optimistic lens on the map. Going back in the post-World War II era, history has shown the United States very capable at both toppling governments and then promptly getting the sequel disastrously wrong. For every regime change at the hands of Americans that went well—think Adolf Hitler's exit from Germany and Benito Mussolini from Italy—there are multitudes that went off the rails: six overt attempts during the Cold War and another 64 in covert operations. And just about no one on the political stage this century has been more clear-eyed on that reality than Trump. Dating to his days as a celebrity host of a reality show, Trump hated foreign adventurism, although he did tell Howard Stern he supported the Iraq war a month before Congress voted on it. After launching his presidential bid in 2015, he campaigned endlessly against so-called 'forever wars' and creeping American meddling. He blasted decisions to engage beyond U.S. borders as simply stupid. He called regime change a dangerous precedent that violated sovereignty and wasted cache. For Trump, the ability to topple rivals was enough of a threat without taking it out of the safe. 'Obviously, the war in Iraq was a big, fat mistake, all right?' Trump said in a February 2016 debate. Months later, after he won election but before he took office, Trump seemed to redouble his skepticism of the military's reach into other governments. 'We will stop racing to topple foreign regimes that we know nothing about, that we shouldn't be involved with,' the President-elect said in December of 2016. There's a reason why regime change has been a non-starter. Democrats hated it when George W. Bush tried it, particularly with Iraq. Republicans hated the blowback they faced for Bush's errors. Independents loathed the fallout. Swing-state voters hated that their kids were sent onto battlefields they didn't understand. Fiscal conservatives hated the costs. Fiscal liberals hated the opportunity costs. In Iraq alone, 4,000 Americans and 100,000 Iraqis lost their lives. Trump gets that. He may not have a grasp on the nuances of the foreign policy but he certainly gets the zeitgeist. And, as has been the case for two decades, the patience for a thrust beyond U.S. borders is limited. Want proof? Look at the post-WW2 landscape. South Korea, Greece, and Syria all fell to U.S. meddling before 1950 even got here. Burma, Egypt, Iraq, Guatemala, Indonesia, Syria (again), Cambodia, and Cuba all followed. Far-flung efforts in the Dominican Republic, Laos, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, Bolivia, Afghanistan, and even Poland followed. Grenada, Panama, and Haiti left U.S. administrations in the political muck. Vietnam was the biggest catastrophe to most Americans' memories. Put in the crudest terms, the United States is really good at ignoring what Washington has coined the Pottery Barn Rule: you break it, you own it. Yes, we can break a whole lot, and have. But the United States does not exactly have total control over what it knocks off the shelf. Which brings us back to Iran, which sits dangerously close to the ledge's edge. In public comments, Trump is being very cagey about what he does next. 'I may do it, I may not do it, nobody knows what I'm going to do,' Trump said Wednesday about the prospect of launching an air strike on an Iranian nuclear facility. Read more: A New Middle East Is Unfolding Before Our Eyes Yet undermining that cautiousness is Trump's apparent acceptance of Israel's view that Iran is racing toward building a nuclear weapon. That assessment is at odds with the U.S. intelligence community's view, which remains consistent that that's not the case. 'I don't care what she said,' Trump said on Tuesday, referring to recent testimony of Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard that Iran isn't actively trying to build a bomb. Trump may have been brutal about Bush getting the intel wrong on Iraq, but it seems he may not have learned the risks of rushing into the mix with incomplete or manipulated facts. Trump is, at his core, a gut-driven figure who has proven adept at finding voices that confirm his instinct—and banishing those who challenge it. Trump might despise the existing regime in Tehran, but he also does not want to be left with another shattered nation in that region with little more than epoxy as a plan. Yet even members of his own base fear he may be about to do just that, dragging the country into the very kind of boondoggle he won office by denouncing and abandoning the isolationism that he inserted into the GOP's new DNA. Make sense of what matters in Washington. Sign up for the D.C. Brief newsletter.

Kuwait envoy pushes for Arab voice on UN Security Council
Kuwait envoy pushes for Arab voice on UN Security Council

Kuwait Times

time3 days ago

  • Politics
  • Kuwait Times

Kuwait envoy pushes for Arab voice on UN Security Council

KUWAIT: Ambassador Tareq Al-Bannai, Kuwait's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Chair of the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform, says reforming the UN's most powerful body is not just inevitable—it is essential to restore trust among member states and their peoples, particularly in the Arab world. In a wide-ranging interview with UN News published on May 29, Al-Bannai acknowledged the growing sense of disillusionment among Arab populations over the Council's failure to address regional crises, especially the ongoing situation in Gaza. 'Honestly, that feeling is understandable—especially from an Arab perspective,' he said. 'We see our issues discussed but without solutions. We see resolutions passed, but not implemented—especially in our region. So, of course, there's frustration and despair.' '1945 is not 2025' Al-Bannai has chaired the IGN process for nearly three years, a role assigned to him by the President of the General Assembly. His term is set to conclude in September. As chair, he has worked to mediate longstanding divisions between member states over how to expand the council and reform its structure and working methods. Although the negotiations have yet to produce consensus, Al-Bannai remains optimistic. 'I assure you, and I can confidently say: everyone sees the importance of reforming our council,' he said. One of the core challenges, he explained, is that the current council reflects a post-World War II power structure that no longer matches today's geopolitical realities. '1945 is not 2025,' Al-Bannai said. 'We took a snapshot of the world in 1945 and expected that this image would remain prevailing and permanent until today. But everyone knows that politics is ever-changing, and so are international relations.' Arab voices left behind For many in the Arab world, the UN Security Council's perceived inaction on Palestine—and its inability to reach consensus due to the veto power held by the five permanent members—has called into question the credibility of the entire United Nations system. 'When we see the council failing to fulfill its tasks and responsibilities, as we've seen repeatedly in recent years—especially regarding Gaza—we see the image of the United Nations shaken in the eyes of these peoples. The UN's credibility vanishes,' he said. Al-Bannai argued that the frustration is not just political—it strikes at the heart of the UN's legitimacy. 'The United Nations is the shared home of the world's peoples. And if this house is flawed, we won't achieve the desired results,' he said. Despite the political deadlock, he remains committed to steering the IGN process forward. He said there is broad agreement that the council must become more representative of today's world—particularly of regions like Africa, Asia, and the Arab world, which remain underrepresented despite shouldering the majority of issues on the council's agenda. 'If we agree that there will be an expansion in the permanent membership with full rights—including the veto—then there must be an Arab country represented,' he stated. 'Arab states are divided between Asia and Africa. Especially since the Security Council's agenda is packed with Arab and African issues. Together, they represent about 70 percent of the council's agenda.' What's stalling progress? Expanding the Security Council has raised deeper questions about who qualifies for a permanent seat. Currently, the council consists of five permanent members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly. But if new permanent seats are added, Ambassador Al-Bannai said the selection criteria would become another obstacle. 'the (UN) Charter currently sets criteria for elected members only—it does not set any standards for permanent members,' he said. 'This raises the question: If we expand the permanent category, what should the criteria be? Population size? Nuclear capability? Economic status? Military strength?' Beyond conventional measures like population, military power, or economic strength, Ambassador Al-Bannai emphasized that a broader set of values should guide any future expansion of the Security Council. 'We must also consider other criteria,' he said, 'such as a country's commitment to the UN Charter, its humanitarian contributions around the world, and its participation in international agreements—whether in human rights, disarmament, or other critical areas.' The debate goes hand-in-hand with ongoing negotiations about how many new seats the council should accommodate. 'Yes, there are countries calling for expansion in both categories,' he confirmed, referring to permanent and elected members. While most countries agree on increasing the total number of seats to between 21 and 27, there are strong and competing demands: African countries want two permanent seats, Arab states are asking for one, as are small island developing states and the Islamic group. 'We haven't yet found the best path forward,' he said. He stressed that any expansion must also preserve the council's effectiveness and cost-efficiency. Despite the repeated disappointments, Al-Bannai stressed the importance of holding on to the UN Charter and international legal frameworks. 'We must have hope,' he said. 'International law and the UN Charter are our safety valve. We—Arab countries and other developing nations—are mostly peaceful. Most of us are small states. Most of our populations are young. The future is ours.' He added: 'The best way to avoid descending into a world ruled by the law of the jungle is to uphold faith in international law, humanitarian law, and the UN Charter.'

PH using ‘right as our might' vs. China, says AFP
PH using ‘right as our might' vs. China, says AFP

GMA Network

time3 days ago

  • Politics
  • GMA Network

PH using ‘right as our might' vs. China, says AFP

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) likened the Philippines' strategy against China to a 'game of chess' in a recent press conference, and emphasized that the Philippines' rights in the West Philippine Sea are what it puts up against the might of China, a nuclear power. On Tuesday, AFP spokesperson Colonel Francel Margareth Padilla said that China's nuclear arsenal was a different playing field and that the Philippines was using its voice and the law to fight. 'The Philippines is playing somewhat like a strategic game. We're playing like a game of chess… We're using our voice to fight, and we're using the law. The arbitral ruling, UNCLOS, has already ruled in our favor, and thus this right as our might has shown its power. We cannot speculate on how others would fortify their defenses,' she said. Padilla noted that the Philippines continues to modernize and strengthen its alliances in order to face off against China. 'If they are doing might versus right, we'll still continue on with using our right as our might,' she added. Regarding the reports that China is expanding its nuclear arsenal, Philippine Navy spokesperson for West Philippine Sea Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad added that the Philippines had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty of Nuclear Weapons in 1968. 'We are among the most freedom-loving and hospitable people in the world… We do not look at any country as a threat unless this country would commence illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive actions against us unless any country would start intruding into our maritime zones,' said Trinidad. 'The build-up of nuclear weapons by the members of the nuclear club has been there since post-World War II. So that is a dynamic, a reality that all countries in the world will have to face,' he said. — Jiselle Anne C. Casucian/BM, GMA Integrated News

Rethinking Leadership: A Diplomatic Reflection on US Global Primacy in a Changing World
Rethinking Leadership: A Diplomatic Reflection on US Global Primacy in a Changing World

IOL News

time3 days ago

  • Business
  • IOL News

Rethinking Leadership: A Diplomatic Reflection on US Global Primacy in a Changing World

In a world increasingly defined by rivalry, Daryl Swanepoel explores the implications of US global primacy and the potential for a cooperative approach to leadership in a multipolar landscape. Image: Anna Moneymaker / Getty Images / AFP By Daryl Swanepoel In recent months, I have found myself increasingly reflecting on the shifting nature of global politics, specifically the intensifying polarisation between the United States and its perceived rivals. The increasingly assertive tone from Washington, the vilification of competing powers and the strategic hardening of positions have given rise to a growing sense of unease. What is driving this renewed emphasis on confrontation and to what end? As someone who believes deeply in the value of cooperation, mutual respect and inclusive progress, I worry that we are witnessing the re-emergence of a Cold War mindset. One that risks undermining the hard-won gains of multilateralism, development cooperation and global solidarity forged in the post-World War II and post-Cold War eras. This article is not written to cast blame or take sides. Not at all. Rather, it is a diplomatic reflection, offered in the spirit of constructive questioning. It is an invitation to consider whether the United States, in its response to rising global competitors, particularly China, might find greater strength not in reasserting dominance, but in reimagining leadership for a multipolar world. The question of economic supremacy: Zero-sum or shared growth? At the heart of US strategic thinking lies a long-standing belief that being the world's number one economy is essential, not just for domestic prosperity, but for global leadership. This belief is understandable, especially given the remarkable contributions the United States has made to global development, innovation and stability over the past century. However, in today's deeply interconnected world, the notion of absolute economic dominance may no longer be the most rational or productive aspiration. Global prosperity increasingly depends on collaboration, mutual resilience and inclusive growth. Nations benefit when others succeed. A more prosperous China, India, Brazil or South Africa, for instance, can become valuable partners in trade, climate action and technological progress. If the primary concern is the well-being of ordinary Americans, it may be worth asking whether the US economy truly requires global supremacy or whether a competitive, but cooperative international environment would better serve national interests. After all, many high-income, high-wellbeing nations have flourished without being number one. Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Advertisement Video Player is loading. Play Video Play Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration -:- Loaded : 0% Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Window Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Transparency Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Dropshadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Next Stay Close ✕ Military strength and strategic intentions: Security or supremacy? The United States maintains by far the world's most powerful military. Officially, this is framed as a commitment to protecting global peace and defending democratic allies. Yet, as with any great power, questions inevitably arise around intent. Are all military deployments and alliances purely defensive in nature or are they at times a means to maintain strategic dominance? This is not to cast doubt on America's intentions. Rather it is to raise a broader philosophical question: Can lasting peace be achieved through perpetual pre-eminence or does real security come from shared norms and mutual respect among sovereign states? Indeed, the human cost of military overreach is significant, not just for those abroad, but also for American taxpayers and veterans. Might some of these resources be more effectively channelled into serving domestic priorities, such as education, health, infrastructure and innovation, as well as multilateral diplomacy? The Rare Earths race: A case study in strategic anxiety Rare earth elements, crucial for green energy, high-tech manufacturing, and defence, have become a flashpoint in US - China competition. Understandably, the US seeks to secure its supply chains and reduce dependence. But here, too, a distinction should be made: Is the primary goal strategic autonomy or the preservation of industrial dominance? The answer matters, especially when we consider how resource competition can shape global policy. If the priority is sustainability and global equity, international cooperation, including with China, on responsible mining, environmental safeguards and technology sharing may be more ethical and effective than a scramble for control. Self-interest and the ethics of leadership It is fair and expected that nations act in their own interests. But the United States has long aspired to more than that. It has projected itself as a moral leader, a defender of freedom and a steward of international norms. From a global humanistic perspective, this moral leadership is best upheld not through dominance, but through example. That means: Applying human rights principles consistently, regardless of a country's strategic value. Supporting democratic institutions globally without coercion. Championing fair trade, climate finance and technology access for developing nations. The concern, increasingly voiced in academic and diplomatic circles, is that the moral clarity of US leadership may be muddied when values appear to be applied selectively. When the US critiques China's governance, but at the same time maintains close ties with other autocratic states for strategic reasons, the message becomes blurred. Again, this is not a criticism, but a concern that selective advocacy may inadvertently diminish the US's soft power and global legitimacy. China's rise: A threat or a test of adaptability? It is true that China operates under a vastly different political model and is increasingly assertive in its foreign policy. Differences as to the Chinese interpretation of human rights, assertiveness in the South China Sea and digital surveillance are valid and deserve attention. However, China's economic rise is not, in itself, an aggressive act. It reflects long-term planning, population scale and integration into global markets. In many ways, China's development mirrors that of other industrialised nations, only faster. Its growing influence, particularly in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, presents a real challenge to US influence. But is the best response to contain China or to renew US engagement with these regions on more equal, less conditional terms? The Global South increasingly sees China as a viable partner, not necessarily because of ideology, but because of perceived respect and responsiveness. The question I am pondering is whether the United States can respond to this shift not by resisting change, but by reimagining its own global engagement. Toward a shared future At this pivotal moment, the United States has a choice. It can double down on hegemony, viewing China's rise as a zero-sum threat to be countered at all cost. Or it can step into a more mature form of leadership; one that recognises the inevitability of a multipolar world and embraces cooperative stewardship over combative supremacy. This path does not demand retreat. Rather, it calls for confidence. Confidence in America's enduring strengths: its open society, its innovation culture, its civil society and its democratic ideals. Being 'number one' may no longer be the most important metric. Perhaps being first among equals, in ethics, generosity, and global cooperation, will define the most respected and resilient leaders of tomorrow. Conclusion The United States has long stood at the crossroads of power and principle. As global dynamics shift, its greatest strength may lie not in resisting change, but in embracing it with humility, adaptability and renewed moral clarity. The world does not need a guardian, it needs a partner. And there is perhaps no nation better positioned than the United States to lead in that spirit, if it so chooses. * Daryl Swanepoel is the Chief Executive Officer of the Inclusive Society Institute. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media.

DOWNLOAD THE APP

Get Started Now: Download the App

Ready to dive into a world of global content with local flavor? Download Daily8 app today from your preferred app store and start exploring.
app-storeplay-store