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Libyan Express
09-06-2025
- Politics
- Libyan Express
Libya's troubled GNU is not going just yet, further clashes are likely
Protesters gathered in Martyrs' Square in Tripoli, to demonstrate against the Government of National Unity led by Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, on May 30, 2025. AFP Tripoli's Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, is under immense strain, but it would be premature to consider it finished. Despite mounting unrest, the GNU remains entrenched, deploying every tool at its disposal—from subtle propaganda and financial incentives to leveraging armed militias—to maintain control. The turmoil of mid-May may have dealt the most serious blow yet to what many see as Libya's most corrupt and dysfunctional government since the fall of Gaddafi. This post-Gaddafi regime—born from NATO's 2011 intervention, the largest war coalition of the modern era—was sold as a mission of liberation, security, and prosperity, but instead plunged the country into more than a decade of chaos, lawlessness, and foreign interference unlike anything seen since Libya's independence over 70 years ago. Late in the afternoon of May 12, reports began circulating that Abdulghani Al-Kikli—better known as 'Ghneiwa'—had been killed by the 444th Brigade at a military barracks in southern Tripoli. He had reportedly been lured to his death under the guise of a reconciliation meeting, intended to ease tensions that had been simmering around the capital for weeks. News of his death spread rapidly across social media and independent outlets, while government-linked media remained silent for two days before issuing vague, distorted reports. The government made no official comment until after fighting had already erupted across Tripoli's streets. A short time after Ghneiwa's death was confirmed, fighting erupted across the capital. It was concentrated initially on the densely populated southern district of Abu Salim, where he had operated with near-total impunity for years. His grip on the area long predated his 2021 appointment as head of the government-sanctioned Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) by then Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. By midnight on 12 May, the clashes had spread across nearly every major neighbourhood of Tripoli—from Sarraj in the west to the outskirts of Tajura in the east, including the city center. When a fragile truce finally brought calm to Tripoli, unofficial figures reported eight civilian deaths, over a hundred injuries, and widespread destruction of both public and private property across the city. For all the chaos, it appeared the GNU had once again survived, emerging from one of the most threatening confrontations in its four-year history of lurching from one crisis to the next. However that proved to be a mirage. On 16 May, fed up with militia infighting, collapsing services, and a host of grievances, protesters poured into the streets of Tripoli in a rare public outburst—united by a single demand: Dbeibah and his government must go. Under mounting pressure and fear, three ministers resigned, while the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Parliament announced it would begin the process of replacing both the prime minister and his GNU administration. Meanwhile, the Tripoli-based High Council of State accused Dbeibah of losing public trust and openly called for his resignation. Dbeibah's 18 May televised address was widely derided. Framing the violence as an effort to rid the capital of militias, the prime minister attempted to deflect blame. But many reminded him that he had empowered Ghneiwa himself—appointing him as head of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) and granting his militia $132 million in 2022 alone. Rather than calm tensions, Dbeibah's words sparked ridicule and disbelief. Accusations that demonstrators were paid agitators only deepened public anger. The rare wave of public demonstrations has largely subsided, settling into a quieter pattern of weekly protests held every Friday night—for now, at least. Several factors contributed to the lull, including the Eid al-Adha holidays and a rush to banks amid an unusual window of cash availability. Meanwhile, the House of Representatives (HoR) proceeded with hearings for 14 self-nominated candidates—all men—vying to replace Dbeibah as prime minister. But the process has since stalled, with little expectation that any of the contenders will be chosen. Concerns over a lack of UN and international recognition appear to have convinced the chamber to pause its plans—for the time being. In the background, the UN mission in Libya quietly released an advisory report prepared by its hand-picked committee, outlining four potential roadmaps to end the country's drawn-out transitional phase and pave the way for elections. All four proposals converge on one key recommendation: the GNU must be replaced by a new government tasked solely with organizing national elections within a fresh 24-month transitional period—arguably too long for a country in crisis, but perhaps the most realistic option under current conditions. UN envoy Hanna Tetteh is expected to brief the Security Council on 24 June, likely seeking its endorsement of the advisory committee's recommendations—without committing to any single option. The approach would give her the flexibility to shape a roadmap she deems most viable. Meanwhile, the GNU may be weakened, but it's far from finished. Dbeibah, backed by well-armed Misrata militias, is unlikely to step aside quietly—raising the spectre of a new, potentially more destructive round of conflict in an already battered Tripoli. Dbeibah and the GNU aren't going anywhere anytime soon. The militias still hold sway in the capital, public funds will continue to be squandered, and the prospect of a new government remains distant at best. As one Western diplomat, speaking anonymously, put it bluntly: 'No one wants to be seen as endorsing a failed state—but no one's willing to fix it either.'
Libya Review
26-05-2025
- Politics
- Libya Review
'Libya Build' Expo Turns to Battleground as Militias Overrun Capital
Libya may have just hosted 'the world's worst conference.' The event, held in Tripoli on May 12 under the title 'Libya Build', was promoted as the largest construction expo ever organized in North Africa, according to The Economist. It attracted international delegates from China, Turkey, and Malta, with the optimistic slogan: 'Let's Build Libya Together.' Instead, what unfolded was a descent into chaos. As guests arrived, mortars began falling. Gunmen in trucks mounted with heavy machine guns seized control of half the capital. Burned-out cars lined the streets. Schools, banks, and markets shut their gates. Militias stormed the Central Bank. Even the gazelles were stolen from Tripoli's zoo. Britain abruptly reversed its recently eased travel advice, urging citizens to avoid the capital, while Turkey airlifted its nationals to safety. This breakdown underscored the failure of Tripoli's post-Gaddafi 'reset.' The Government of National Unity (GNU) in the west, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbaiba, once a construction tycoon, was always weaker than Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the General Commander of the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA). Unlike Haftar, Dbaiba's authority relies on a precarious coalition of militias. As Libya's oil revenues declined and government funds dwindled, Dbaiba's payouts decreased, prompting unrest among the very groups that once supported him. The immediate trigger was reportedly financial: with the coffers empty, militias sought new income by, for instance, kidnapping utility executives. Then, in a move meant to neutralize a threat, Dbaiba's forces killed militia leader Abdul Ghani al-Kikli during a meeting. The assassination provoked Tripoli's most powerful armed group, the Salafist Special Deterrence Force (Rada), which retaliated and took control of half the capital. In the aftermath, Tripolitanians, exhausted by years of misrule and broken promises, took to the streets demanding elections, an end to militia dominance, and reunification of Libya. Many now view Dbaiba as one of the 'fulul'—a term used to describe holdovers from the Gaddafi era. Dbaiba, seen by many diplomats as a fading figure, is said to have sent his family to London. Desperate to appear in control, he called fighters from his hometown of Misrata to secure Tripoli. They reportedly fired on demonstrators. With Tripoli's main airport under Rada's control, Dbaiba reopened the long-closed international airport and vowed to turn Kikli's former militia base into a public park. He has branded remaining militias 'blackmailers, criminals, and sharks.' But without their support, his grip grows increasingly fragile. His ministers have begun to resign. Parliament has declared Dbaiba 'illegitimate' and named potential successors. Meanwhile, reports suggest troop movements in Sirte, Zawiya, Zintan, and Ghadames, possibly in preparation for a broader push by Haftar's forces. For now, Dbaiba remains in office, but, as The Economist concludes, 'Libyans and foreign diplomats have begun to speak of his rule in the past tense.' At least, with the airport reopened, 'he has a way to escape'.
Libya Review
23-05-2025
- Politics
- Libya Review
Libya Renews Request for Hannibal Gaddafi's Release or Transfer from Lebanon
The long-standing case of Hannibal Gaddafi has resurfaced, as Libyan authorities formally demand his immediate release or deportation to a third country—ten years after he was detained in Lebanon. According to senior judicial sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, Lebanon's judiciary has received an official letter from Libyan Prosecutor General Al-Siddiq Al-Sour, urging the Lebanese government to release Hannibal Gaddafi without delay and either return him to Libya or transfer him to his country of asylum, Syria. The letter also blamed Lebanese authorities for the deterioration of Gaddafi's health and warned of potential consequences. However, the request is expected to be swiftly rejected by the Lebanese judiciary. Legal officials say Libya's communication lacked any new information regarding the fate of Imam Musa Al-Sadr, Sheikh Mohammad Yaacoub, and journalist Abbas Badreddine—who were abducted and forcibly disappeared in Libya in 1978. The Libyan request has reportedly disappointed Lebanese legal circles, especially after earlier promises of cooperation from Libyan authorities. Lebanon had previously been informed that the Libyan judiciary was willing to share documents and findings from post-Gaddafi era investigations with Judge Zaher Hamadeh, the judicial investigator in the Sadr case. Yet, the recent letter made no reference to such cooperation. Instead, it reiterated Libya's demand for Hannibal's release—ignoring Lebanon's requests, and failing to respect a 2014 memorandum of understanding signed between the two judicial authorities. The letter, received via diplomatic channels, was addressed to top Lebanese judicial figures, including the President of the Judicial Council Judge Suhail Abboud, Prosecutor General Judge Jamal Al-Hajjar, and Judge Zaher Hamadeh. It outlined Hannibal's kidnapping from Syria, transfer to Lebanon, his questioning, and the arrest warrant issued for withholding information regarding the disappearance of Al-Sadr and his companions. The Lebanese judiciary remains firm: no release without reciprocal cooperation. Judge Hamadeh is reportedly preparing a formal response rejecting the Libyan demand unless credible and comprehensive documents are provided. The judiciary believes Hannibal Gaddafi may hold crucial information, particularly due to his former role overseeing political prisons in Libya. Hannibal has stated that he is willing to share information only after being freed and allowed to leave Lebanon—a position seen as evidence that he possesses valuable insight into the decades-old disappearance case. Lebanon, however, insists that the truth must come first. Tags: BeirutHannibal GaddafiLebanonlibyaMusa al-Sadrtripoli
Al-Ahram Weekly
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Intense skirmishes in Libya - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The flareup of violence in the Libyan capital Tripoli last week was a stark remainder of the fragility of the security situation in the country and the looming possibility of a slide back into civil war The Libyan Presidential Council, in cooperation with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), launched a mechanism to stabilise the truce and ceasefire in Tripoli on 18 May. Meanwhile, the Libyan capital was rocked by intense skirmishes last week between the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Terrorism and Organised Crime (RADA), which is affiliated with the Presidential Council, and the 444th Combat Brigade, which is part of the internationally recognised Libyan Government of National Unity (GNU). As these forces clashed, several armed groups in Western Libya attempted to march on the capital. The unrest erupted after a security operation carried out by the GNU against the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) following the assassination of SSA commander Abdulghani Al-Kikli in Tripoli on 12 May. The circumstances surrounding his assassination remain unclear. Al-Kikli (also known as Ghnewa) had commanded one of the largest militia groups in Tripoli. While nominally subordinate to the Presidential Council, it operated independently. According to some reports, Al-Kikli was killed following disputes with leaders of other armed factions from Tripoli and Misrata over control of key government facilities in the capital, such as the Libyan Telecommunications Holding Company and the Audit Bureau. During the GNU security operation, government forces took over the Abu Salim district in Southern Libya, which had served as Al-Kikli's and the SSA's stronghold. Tensions in the capital then heightened further when GNU Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah issued a decree dissolving the RADA and dispatched the 444th Brigade to seize the RADA headquarters in Eastern Tripoli. In response, Abdelraouf Kara, the commander of the RADA, sought support from militia factions in Warshefana and Zawiya, tribal areas west of Tripoli opposed to Dbeibah. As has occurred before with many of the armed factions that proliferated in post-Gaddafi Libya, Kara and 444th Brigade Commander Mahmoud Hamza had once been allies. Both are from the Souq Al-Jumaa district of eastern Tripoli, share a similar radical Salafi ideological outlook, and worked closely together until their rupture in 2022. According to Libyan sources, the Warshefana and Zawiya militias aimed not just to defend Kara and the RADA but also to join forces with him to topple Dbeibah and replace him with a new prime minister representative of various influential forces in Western Libya. The clashes between the RADA and the 444th Brigade last week brought life in the capital to a halt and caused significant damage to public and private property in Tripoli. Although a ceasefire was announced after two days of fierce fighting and neutral forces have been deployed as peacekeepers, the authorities have yet to release any official casualty figures. Meanwhile, Dbeibah is also facing pressure from other quarters. Speaker of the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) Aguila Saleh called on the Attorney General to launch an investigation into the GNU prime minister in connection with the assassination of Al-Kikli and the events in the capital and impose a travel ban on him. Khaled Al-Mishri, who is contesting the validity of the elections that led to his replacement as the head of the High Council of State (HCS) by Mohamed Takala, has called for the formation of a new government in coordination with the HoR. The GNU has lost its legitimacy, Al-Mishri declared. As though to confirm this, anti-government protests then erupted over the weekend, demanding Dbeibah's removal and the appointment of a new interim prime minister to oversee the rest of the transitional period until national elections are held. To quell the violence and de-escalate tensions triggered by Dbeibah's actions, Mohamed Al-Menfi, head of the Presidential Council, officially annulled Dbeibah's decrees to restructure the security agencies, including the order to dissolve the RADA. He also proclaimed a truce and reached an agreement with UNSMIL to secure the current ceasefire and enhance security in the capital. The agreement was concluded in the presence of UN Special Representative and UNSMIL head Hanna Tetteh and her Deputy for Political Affairs Stephanie Khoury. The mechanism calls for a 'Truce Committee' tasked with promoting a permanent ceasefire among the militia factions in Tripoli, protecting the civilian population, and reaching an agreement on security arrangements for the capital. In a televised address on 17 May, Dbeibah attempted to explain the government's security operation in Abu Salim. It was part of broader security arrangements for Tripoli that had targeted a militia that was beyond the control of the state, had extorted public institutions, had taken over six banks, and had exploited the Internal Security Agency for private gain, he said. The militia had committed many violations in the areas it controls and had contributed to the fragmentation of sovereign institutions. Dbeibah attributed the subsequent violence to an attempted 'coup' masterminded by Aguila Saleh, commander of the Libyan National Army in Benghazi, and Khaled Al-Mishri. He stressed his commitment to restoring order and consolidating state authority in Tripoli and expressed his dismay over the protests calling for his removal and the formation of a new government. He cast the GNU, which is not an elected body or created by an elected body, as a manifestation of the democratic gains of the 17 February 2011 Revolution. The sudden flareup of violence in the capital last week was a stark remainder of the fragility of the security situation and the looming possibility of a slide back into civil war. Dbeibah's insistence on implementing what he called new security arrangements but what others read as a bid to consolidate power is a reflection of his government's fragility, as manifested in the HoR's withdrawal of confidence and the resignation of several ministers. Some reports suggest that he is now engaged in talks with various political forces to engineer a cabinet reshuffle. Towards this end, he hopes to take advantage of the fragmentation among his political rivals as well as the general animosity between the HoR and HSC, which continue to haggle over details regarding the electoral laws and the constitutional framework. Meanwhile, international stakeholders are still divided over how to handle the Libyan crisis. Dbeibah is in a delicate position. He wants to demonstrate his ability to enforce the new security arrangements in Tripoli, dismantle the power centres of rival militias, and remove them from government institutions that they saw as their own turf. However, achieving this will require international support, something that was largely absent during the recent clashes, although now it may have quietly reemerged in the form of UNSMIL's coordination with the Presidential Council on ceasefire stabilisation. If Dbeibah succeeds in eliminating the RADA, as he did the SSA last week, he will have secured his personal control over the capital, sidelining rivals and bolstering his influence as the main power in Western Libya. This presents a dilemma for both Libyans and the international community. On the one hand, if the Tripoli-based GNU can assert its control over the capital and Western Libya, this might ensure the success of efforts to reform the government institutions. However, tensions would seethe dangerously beneath the surface due to the ongoing opposition to Dbeibah and his government among significant political forces. Conversely, Dbeibeh's failure to secure control over the capital would contribute to perpetuating the ongoing security chaos and institutional collapse, which are hampering efforts to rebuild and improve the country's degraded public services. This is why many believe that institutional and structural reform should take priority, especially given the ongoing deadlock in the political process. The aim of this is to lay the legislative and practical groundwork for the long overdue Libyan presidential and parliamentary elections to restore the legitimacy of the country's institutions and leadership. * A version of this article appears in print in the 22 May, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Time of India
18-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Trump' ‘Gaza Remake' Plan Implodes? U.S. Embassy's Shocking Disclosure On Plans For 1 Million Gazans
The U.S. Embassy in Libya has denied a report claiming the Trump administration is considering relocating up to one million Gazans to Libya. The embassy called the alleged resettlement plan "completely untrue." NBC News had cited five sources, including a former U.S. official, suggesting discussions were underway with Libyan leadership, potentially involving billions in unfrozen Libyan assets. The report follows Donald Trump's past remarks about taking control of Gaza after the 2023 Hamas attack. Libya, still reeling from post-Gaddafi instability, would be a highly controversial choice for such a plan. Read More
