Latest news with #militaryinvolvement
CNN
a day ago
- Politics
- CNN
Iran watches decades-old red lines vanish from view, but Trump still faces a huge risk
It's a big decision, but one where the outcomes get slowly better, either way, every day. President Donald Trump has yet to determine whether to militarily involve the United States on Israel's side in its six-day old conflict with Iran. But there is only so much further that the fight can escalate. There is a very palpable – and growing – limit on what Tehran can do. Israel has already crossed every red line imaginable in Iran's diplomatic lexicon. It has bombed Iran's nuclear facilities, killed so many military leaders the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is on its third commander in a week, and claimed air supremacy over the country. Short of killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and convincing the US to bomb the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, it is running out of taboos to break. Iran, for its part, has launched barrages of ballistic missiles at Israel, terrifying civilians, causing some extensive damage, killing nearly 30 people and wounding hundreds more. Yet this is not the existential catastrophe many feared Tehran could unleash. Iran lost nearly 10 times as many civilians as Israel did in the opening 48 hours of the conflict, according to its ministry of health. Tehran is already having to temper its punches – the volleys of missiles it fires vacillating wildly night by night – as it struggles with a depleting inventory of the medium-range ballistic missiles that can hit Israel. Daily, the list of targets Israel is steadily hitting – at will, largely unopposed – grows. And with that, Iran's ability to threaten the region shrinks. This must be key to Trump's impenetrable calculations. And it echoes lessons perhaps learned after his decision – unprecedented and rash as it seemed at the time – to kill the most prominent figure in Iran's military, Qassem Soleimani, in 2020. At the time, the assassination, in response to rocket attacks that killed an American soldier in Iraq, seemed a fantastical 'gloves off' moment, in which Tehran's great military might could be unleashed. But that failed to transpire – Iran responded by hitting another American base, where the injuries were mostly concussion. It just did not have the muscle to risk an all-out war with the United States, and that was five years ago. Things have since got a lot worse for the Iranians. Their main strategic ally, Russia, has come unstuck in an attritional three-year war of choice with Ukraine, meaning Tehran will likely have heard little back from Moscow if it asked for serious military support. Iran's nearby proxies – Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria – have been removed as effective fighting forces. Hezbollah was undone in a staggeringly brief, brutal but effective Israeli campaign last fall, revealing the militant group to be a hollow threat wildly outdone by the superior technology and intelligence of its southern adversary. The Assad regime suddenly collapsed in December – following years of diplomatic isolation over its horrific abuses in a savage civil war – after Syria's northern neighbor, Turkey, helped rebels overwhelm Damascus. Iran has found itself outmatched locally. It has known for years it cannot take on the US. Those two facts considered, the risk of conflagration ebbs, and Trump's choices look easier. He could simply hit Fordow, and other relevant nuclear sites, in a single wave of stealth B-2 bomber strikes, inform the Iranians that the US seeks no further confrontation, and anticipate a muted, acceptable retaliation. Iran lacks the inventory to seriously bombard Israel, let alone another, better equipped adversary's military bases in the region. Trump could continue to let the Israelis hit targets at will for weeks, while permitting European foreign ministers, who will meet their Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi in Geneva on Friday, to present Tehran with slowly worsening terms for a diplomatic settlement. Or Trump could do nothing, and permit Iran's broad powerlessness to come more clearly into view as its missile stocks dwindle. But inaction might make Trump look weak and ponderous. Resolving the issue of Iran and the prospect of it developing nuclear weapons would be a much-needed foreign policy win for a White House mired in bratty spats with allies, a stop-start trade war with China, and erratic diplomacy with Moscow over Ukraine. Even Germany's chancellor, Friedrich Merz, said Israel was doing the Western world's 'dirty work' by taking out the Iranian nuclear threat. Barely anybody apart from Iranian hardliners thinks an Iranian nuclear bomb is a good idea. The one remaining, huge risk Trump faces is that Iran, which has always insisted its program is peaceful, has a more advanced and secretive nuclear program than his bunker-busters can disable – perhaps now removed from Fordow or other publicly known sites after days of speculation they might be hit. Such fears seem to fit with the Israeli intelligence assessments they claim expedited their recent campaign. But they would also seem to clash with the idea that further strikes can end any Iranian ambition for an atomic bomb indefinitely. Secondly, one might argue that, by now, with its Supreme Leader directly threatened and capital's skies wide open, Iran would have decided to race for nuclear weapons already, if it could. What else would Iran need to have happen to it? The 'known unknowns' – the things we know we do not know, as Donald Rumsfeld would have put it before Iran's neighbor, Iraq, was invaded by the US in 2003 – are plentiful. And they more or less point in a direction where Iran is weakened, and whatever choice Trump makes is met with a muted or manageable response from Tehran, which will soon need a diplomatic solution to ensure the survival of what remains of its government and military. The 'unknown unknowns' are what mired the US in Iraq. They probably abound, although by definition we don't know what they are. But they are overshadowed by the simple fact that neither Israel nor the US intends to occupy Iran. And Iran is increasingly too weak to strike back meaningfully, as it watches its decades-old red lines vanish fast from view.
CNN
a day ago
- Politics
- CNN
Iran watches decades-old red lines vanish from view, but Trump still faces a huge risk
It's a big decision, but one where the outcomes get slowly better, either way, every day. President Donald Trump has yet to determine whether to militarily involve the United States on Israel's side in its six-day old conflict with Iran. But there is only so much further that the fight can escalate. There is a very palpable – and growing – limit on what Tehran can do. Israel has already crossed every red line imaginable in Iran's diplomatic lexicon. It has bombed Iran's nuclear facilities, killed so many military leaders the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is on its third commander in a week, and claimed air supremacy over the country. Short of killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and convincing the US to bomb the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, it is running out of taboos to break. Iran, for its part, has launched barrages of ballistic missiles at Israel, terrifying civilians, causing some extensive damage, killing nearly 30 people and wounding hundreds more. Yet this is not the existential catastrophe many feared Tehran could unleash. Iran lost nearly 10 times as many civilians as Israel did in the opening 48 hours of the conflict, according to its ministry of health. Tehran is already having to temper its punches – the volleys of missiles it fires vacillating wildly night by night – as it struggles with a depleting inventory of the medium-range ballistic missiles that can hit Israel. Daily, the list of targets Israel is steadily hitting – at will, largely unopposed – grows. And with that, Iran's ability to threaten the region shrinks. This must be key to Trump's impenetrable calculations. And it echoes lessons perhaps learned after his decision – unprecedented and rash as it seemed at the time – to kill the most prominent figure in Iran's military, Qassem Soleimani, in 2020. At the time, the assassination, in response to rocket attacks that killed an American soldier in Iraq, seemed a fantastical 'gloves off' moment, in which Tehran's great military might could be unleashed. But that failed to transpire – Iran responded by hitting another American base, where the injuries were mostly concussion. It just did not have the muscle to risk an all-out war with the United States, and that was five years ago. Things have since got a lot worse for the Iranians. Their main strategic ally, Russia, has come unstuck in an attritional three-year war of choice with Ukraine, meaning Tehran will likely have heard little back from Moscow if it asked for serious military support. Iran's nearby proxies – Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria – have been removed as effective fighting forces. Hezbollah was undone in a staggeringly brief, brutal but effective Israeli campaign last fall, revealing the militant group to be a hollow threat wildly outdone by the superior technology and intelligence of its southern adversary. The Assad regime suddenly collapsed in December – following years of diplomatic isolation over its horrific abuses in a savage civil war – after Syria's northern neighbor, Turkey, helped rebels overwhelm Damascus. Iran has found itself outmatched locally. It has known for years it cannot take on the US. Those two facts considered, the risk of conflagration ebbs, and Trump's choices look easier. He could simply hit Fordow, and other relevant nuclear sites, in a single wave of stealth B-2 bomber strikes, inform the Iranians that the US seeks no further confrontation, and anticipate a muted, acceptable retaliation. Iran lacks the inventory to seriously bombard Israel, let alone another, better equipped adversary's military bases in the region. Trump could continue to let the Israelis hit targets at will for weeks, while permitting European foreign ministers, who will meet their Iranian counterpart Abbas Araghchi in Geneva on Friday, to present Tehran with slowly worsening terms for a diplomatic settlement. Or Trump could do nothing, and permit Iran's broad powerlessness to come more clearly into view as its missile stocks dwindle. But inaction might make Trump look weak and ponderous. Resolving the issue of Iran and the prospect of it developing nuclear weapons would be a much-needed foreign policy win for a White House mired in bratty spats with allies, a stop-start trade war with China, and erratic diplomacy with Moscow over Ukraine. Even Germany's chancellor, Friedrich Merz, said Israel was doing the Western world's 'dirty work' by taking out the Iranian nuclear threat. Barely anybody apart from Iranian hardliners thinks an Iranian nuclear bomb is a good idea. The one remaining, huge risk Trump faces is that Iran, which has always insisted its program is peaceful, has a more advanced and secretive nuclear program than his bunker-busters can disable – perhaps now removed from Fordow or other publicly known sites after days of speculation they might be hit. Such fears seem to fit with the Israeli intelligence assessments they claim expedited their recent campaign. But they would also seem to clash with the idea that further strikes can end any Iranian ambition for an atomic bomb indefinitely. Secondly, one might argue that, by now, with its Supreme Leader directly threatened and capital's skies wide open, Iran would have decided to race for nuclear weapons already, if it could. What else would Iran need to have happen to it? The 'known unknowns' – the things we know we do not know, as Donald Rumsfeld would have put it before Iran's neighbor, Iraq, was invaded by the US in 2003 – are plentiful. And they more or less point in a direction where Iran is weakened, and whatever choice Trump makes is met with a muted or manageable response from Tehran, which will soon need a diplomatic solution to ensure the survival of what remains of its government and military. The 'unknown unknowns' are what mired the US in Iraq. They probably abound, although by definition we don't know what they are. But they are overshadowed by the simple fact that neither Israel nor the US intends to occupy Iran. And Iran is increasingly too weak to strike back meaningfully, as it watches its decades-old red lines vanish fast from view.
The Guardian
10-06-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Trump is deliberately ratcheting up violence in Los Angeles
Donald Trump was on his way to Camp David for a meeting with military leaders on Sunday when he was asked by reporters about possibly invoking the Insurrection Act, allowing direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement. Demonstrations against Trump's draconian immigration arrests had been growing in Los Angeles, and some of them had turned violent. Trump's answer? 'We're going to have troops everywhere,' he said. I know Trump is 'a delusional narcissist and an orange-faced windbag', to borrow the words of the Republican senator Rand Paul, and that this president governs using misdirection, evasion, and (especially) exaggeration, but we should still be worried by this prospect he raises of sending 'troops everywhere'. Already, Trump and his administration have taken the unprecedented steps of calling up thousands of national guard soldiers to Los Angeles against the wishes of the California governor, of deploying a battalion of hundreds of marines to 'assist' law enforcement in Los Angeles, and of seeking to ban the use of masks by protesters while defending the use of masks for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Ice) agents. Needless to say, none of this would be happening if these times were normal. What makes this moment abnormal is not the fact that Los Angeles witnessed days of mostly peaceful protests against massive and destructive immigration arrests. We've seen such protests countless times before in this country. Nor is it the fact that pockets of such protests turned violent. That too is hardly an aberration in our national history. What makes these times abnormal is the administration's deliberate escalation of the violence, a naked attempt to ratchet up conflict to justify the imposition of greater force and repression over the American people. The Steady State, a non-partisan coalition of more than 280 former national security professionals, has issued a warning over these events. 'The use of federal military force in the absence of local or state requests, paired with contradictory mandates targeting protestors, is a hallmark of authoritarian drift,' the statement reads. 'Our members – many of whom have served in fragile democracies abroad – have seen this pattern before. What begins as provocative posturing can rapidly metastasize into something far more dangerous.' The hypocrisy of this administration is simply unbearable. If you're an actual insurrectionist, such as those who participated in the January 6 attack on the United States Capitol by destroying federal property and attacking law enforcement officers, you'll receive a pardon or a commutation of your sentence. But if you join the protests against Ice raids in Los Angeles, you face military opposition. Then there's Stephen Miller. The White House deputy chief of staff unironically posts on social media that 'this is a fight to save civilization' with no apparent awareness that it is this administration that is destroying our way of life, only to replace it with something far more violent and sinister. Are we about to see Trump invoke the Insurrection Act? It's certainly possible. On the White House lawn on Monday, Trump explicitly called the protesters in Los Angeles 'insurrectionists', perhaps preparing the rhetorical groundwork for invoking the act. And by invoking the Insurrection Act, Trump would be able to use the US military as a law enforcement entity inside the borders of the United States – a danger to American liberty. The Insurrection Act has been used about 30 times throughout American history, with the last time being in Los Angeles in 1992. Then, the governor, Pete Wilson, asked the federal government for help as civil disturbances grew after the acquittal of four white police officers who brutally beat Rodney King, a Black man, during a traffic arrest. The only time a president has invoked the Insurrection Act against a governor's wishes has been when Lyndon Johnson sent troops to Alabama in 1965. But Johnson used the troops to protect civil rights protesters. Now, Trump may use the same act to punish immigration rights protesters. One part of the Insurrection Act allows the president to send troops to suppress 'any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy' in a state that 'opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes the course of justice under those laws'. According to Joseph Nunn at the Brennan Center, '[t]his provision is so bafflingly broad that it cannot possibly mean what it says, or else it authorizes the president to use the military against any two people conspiring to break federal law'. No doubt, Trump finds that provision to be enticing. What we're discovering during this administration is how much of American law is written with so little precision. Custom and the belief in the separation of powers have traditionally reigned in the practice of the executive branch. Not so with Trump, who is dead set on grabbing as much power as quickly as possible, and all for himself as the leader of the executive branch. To think that this power grab won't include exercising his control of the military by deploying 'troops everywhere', whether now or at another point in the future, is naive. Such a form of governance, with power concentrated in an individual, is certainly a form of tyranny. But tyranny, as Hannah Arendt reminds us in On Violence, is also 'the most violent and least powerful of forms of government'. And while a government may have the means to inflict mass violence, it is ultimately the people who hold the power. These are the lessons we need to be studying, and implementing on our streets everywhere, while we still can. Moustafa Bayoumi is a Guardian US columnist
