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Economic Times
07-06-2025
- General
- Economic Times
Understanding India's cultural representation: The impact of Operation Sindoor
As Shashi Tharoor's articulation in Victorian-era Wren and Martinese continues to bowl over the civil service examinee that lies inside each one of us, I was reminded of my elucidation of 'sindoor' a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away. In the hoary 80s before Operation Bluestar, when googol was just a number - 1 followed by 100 zeroes - and General Zia-ul-Haq was Pakistan's president, I went to school in a small New Zealand town called Whakatane. My mother must have dropped me off once. A classmate later asked me, 'What's that red mark on your mum's head?' Now, one of my virtues as an 11-year-old was to paint a pretty picture of where I had come from - the thriving megalopolis of Calcutta. In the course of answering many queries of a distant land in those pre-Google days, I would dress up some facts with elaborate explanations. For instance, I told my classmates that I actually was a very ordinary student 'back home' and most young Indians of my age were quite brilliant. We also lived in large multi-storied buildings all to ourselves where house help was abundant. As you can make out, these were not really lies, but slight exaggerations to correct misrepresentations of India - especially Calcutta - abroad. In a similar vein, I had explained to my culturally curious classmate that the red mark on my mother's head - and she wore just a fine line of a comb-end dipped in sindoor - was called 'shidur' (I used the Bengali word for it) and was a streak of my father's blood that Ma freshly wore every week to signal that she owned him. I don't know what my friend made of that explanation, but she was suitably satisfied with my exposition of Indian matriarchic customs that treated married men as married women's chattel. Explaining cultural behaviour and practices to people unaware of them is as important as explaining political action and positions to them. So, in that sense, I get what the Indian version of the Harlem Globetrotters' 14-day explanatory mission to various capitals of the world was about. It was about highlighting India's stand on terrorism following Operation Sindoor. To anyone who was listening. As a travelling exposition, though, I wonder whether it succeeded in doing what it set out to do. Now, I'm not part of the crowd that believes that taxpayers' money was spent for MPs to have a nice 'world tour'. Public money has been worse spent on matters less measurable. And this travelling gig was more than just about explaining Operation Sindoor - it was about showcasing Indians who live India and updating their image from the land of 'Ghandi' (sic), Mother Teresa and customer service line voices to something modern, modular, and muscular. But what left me scratching my stubble were two things. One, in this day and age of much more enhanced avenues of communication, having outreach teams - one of them fronted by a gentleman's whose USP seems to be speaking in impeccable Jeeves-Wooster English in these multiculti times - seemed very Nehruvian. Two, our boys and girls calmly fingerwagging in foreign capitals to no one in particular barring Indian news outlets like ANI and PTI seemed to be in a different universe compared to the thunderbolt and lightning, very, very frightening here in India. The venerable home minister, for instance, saying earlier this week that Mamata Banerjee had opposed Operation Sindoor to placate her 'Muslim votebank' was doubly odd. After all, Trinamool general secretary and Didi's nephew Abhishek Banerjee was part of the MP delegation trotting about Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia (the country with the world's largest Muslim population), and Malaysia as part of the Sindoor tour. In effect, our Harlem Globetrotters were globetrotting to impress us sitting here in India. Much in the same vein I would return to India just before Kapil Dev would lift the World Cup and tell my new schoolfriends - and some 40 years later, tell you, my dear reader - how I served to upgrade the image of India to a world that needed it to be updated. Elevate your knowledge and leadership skills at a cost cheaper than your daily tea. The answer to companies not incurring capex may lie in stock markets We are already a global airline, carry the national name and are set to order more planes: Air India CEO How Uber came back from the brink to dislodge Ola Banks are investing in these funds instead of lending the money. Why? Sebi, governing markets for 3 decades, in search of governance rules for itself F&O Radar | Deploy Short Strangle in Nifty to benefit from volatility, Theta Stock picks of the week: 5 stocks with consistent score improvement and return potential of more than 28% in 1 year These large- and mid-cap stocks can give more than 30% return in 1 year, according to analysts
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First Post
01-06-2025
- Politics
- First Post
How religion, and not patriotism, motivates the Pakistan Army
The idea of patriotism never seems to have appealed to the Pakistani army, which grew up from the colonial past only to become an ideologically motivated force imagining itself as the legatee of the mediaeval Arab and Turkish armies read more Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif, Director General Inter-Services Public Relations (DG-ISPR), Pakistan, recently stated during a press briefing in Rawalpindi that Islam was not just integral to the faith of individual soldiers but part of the army's overall training. It was a lacklustre event on May 11, which, despite being delayed by four hours, failed to produce any visual evidence to back up its tall claims and was therefore dismissed as a poor attempt to emulate India's DGMO Press Conference. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD However, Lt Gen Ahmed Sharif's claim about Islam being part of Pakistan's Army's training is undoubtedly true. Late General Zia-ul-Haq, soon after he became the Chief of the Army Staff in 1976 — informs Shuja Nawaz (2008) — changed the motto of the army from Jinnah's 'Unity, Faith, and Discipline' to 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabilillah' (Faith, Obedience of God, and Struggle in the Path of Allah). Apart from encouraging commanders to join their troops in congregational prayers and elevating the regimental status of maulavis (though not with demur from old-type officers), he even allowed Tablighi Jamaat missionaries to preach at the Pakistani Military Academy (PMA) at Kakul, near Abbottabad in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Tablighi Jamaat preachers would deliver khutba (sermon) after Friday prayers at the PMA until 1984. In 1985, Major General Asif Nawaz prohibited their entry into the premises, stating that the place was a military academy, not a seminary (Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, P.384-385). General Zia-ul-Haq also contributed the foreword to Brigadier SK Malik's book The Quranic Concept of War (1979). It was pithy but instructive, which might explain the current scenario. 'JEHAD FI-SABILILLAH is not an exclusive domain of the professional soldier, nor is it restricted to the application of military force alone… The professional soldier in a Muslim army, pursuing the goals of a military state, CANNOT become 'professional' if in all his activities he does not take on the 'colour of Allah'. The non-military citizen of a Muslim state must, likewise, be aware of the kind of soldier that his country must produce and the ONLY pattern of war that his country's armed forces may wage.' STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Recent evidence about the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the constituted authority and terror network in Pakistan might appear to be a legacy of Zia-ul-Haq's policies. The visuals that have emerged from Pakistan, in the aftermath of India undertaking Operation Sindoor, are revealing. Corpses of slain terrorists were draped in the national flag of Pakistan during their last journey, with personnel of the Pakistani army and police giving them a ceremonial gun salute. A designated terrorist, Hafiz Abdur Rauf, led the Salat-ul-Janazah (funeral prayer) flanked by senior officers of the Pakistani Army. It is an ocular proof that the boundaries between the government and terror apparatus have been somewhat blurred in Pakistan. Even the fig leaf, which previously concealed this relation, has been dropped. How to deal with such a country, at a theoretical level, should constitute a challenge for the global community. Whereas India might be the immediate victim of Pakistan's terrorism, the threat has a wider canvas. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Pakistan's Army has two-fold origination — a) historical and b) ideological. Historically, the Pakistan Army, like its Indian counterpart, has its origin in the colonial Indian Army (or the British Indian Army). The ranks, formations, drills/manoeuvres, uniforms, badges, lifestyle/mode of recreation, etc, are a legacy of the colonial army. While this colonial army no doubt ensured the external security of India for almost two centuries, whereby notorious foreign aggressions were relegated to history, it was in no sense a national army. Not patriotism but colonial interests at home and abroad formed the motivating factor of this army. No wonder Indian battalions participated in the battles of World Wars I & II in foreign war theatres. 'As now constituted', — reads a pamphlet published by the All India Congress Committee, 'the armed forces under the Government of India are Indian in one sense only— in that their cost is borne by the people of India. In everything else they are either British or, at any rate, non-national, though an overwhelming proportion of their personnel is furnished by India' (Defence of India or Nationalisation of Indian Army, P.3). The author of the pamphlet was Nirad C Chaudhuri, who was literally an 'unknown Indian' at that time, before he became an internationally known scholar. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The transfer of power to the domains of India and Pakistan led to the formation of two sovereign armed forces. In a sovereign nation, patriotism must replace colonial interests as the driving force of the army. Interestingly, the Azad Hind Fauz (Indian National Army) led by Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose had provided a model of a patriotic national army to Indians during World War II. The INA, which shunned racial/religious divides and formed its brigades named after national leaders, had drawn participation from Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians alike in Southeast Asia. The INA was path-breaking not just in Indian but also global contexts, which taught uniformed men and women to fight and die for the nation's independence. Love of the country was its motive force. It had directly or indirectly influenced the Indian Army as we know it today. Major Somnath Sharma, India's first Param Vir Chakra awardee, who laid down his life combating invasion on Kashmir less than three months after independence of India, was decisively fighting for his country's security and honour. Similarly, Brigadier Mohammed Usman, who died fighting Pakistani invaders at Nausera (July, 1948) and earned the nickname 'Nausera Ka Sher' (the Tiger of Nausera), upheld the validity of patriotism over religious trapping. It is this religion-neutral patriotism that forms the motive force of the Indian Army. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The partition of India, which accompanied the independence, led to the reorganisation of the armed forces in two dominions, viz, India and Pakistan. The Indian Army and Pakistan Army, despite their shared past, grew along different lines. India chose to have an apolitical and secular armed force where the religious or linguistic identity of a soldier was his/her private affair. The military is actuated by the principle of patriotism. The Indian Army follows an honour code –'Naam, Namak, Nishan', ie, a) name/honour of the unit/Army/Nation, b) loyalty to the nation and c) insignia flag of one's unit/regiment/army/nation. The esprit de corps, or the spirit of comradeship and brotherhood of the brave, transcends caste, creed, religion or language. The Indian Army has had Hindu, Zoroastrian, Christian and Sikh Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS) since independence. At least once a Muslim has been at the top post of the Indian Air Force. But never have they been categorised as such. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD This would be unthinkable in Pakistan, which had not seen any Hindu commissioned officer after the 1950s. Late Major CR Dutt, who later joined Bangladesh Mukti Bahini, was one such officer. Simultaneously, there is an ideological source of origin of the Pakistan Army, viz, Islam. Whereas it might be true General Zia-ul-Haq heralded the Islamisation of the Pakistan Army in particular and of the nation in general during his presidency, throughout which he continued to be the COAS, there were other compulsions to underscore Islam in the pre-1971 period. The idea of patriotism never seems to have appealed to the Pakistani army. The only observation Major General Shaukat Riza could make about Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in an official publication of the Pakistan Army was, 'The INA was headed by Subhas Chandra Bose, a former Congress President who was a rabid Hindu Brahmin' (The Pakistan Army 1947-1949, P.103). This observation was made in a chapter titled Indian National Army, though it was dealing with the Red Fort trial in particular. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose — not a Brahmin, anyway — was possibly the most secular nationalist. The chapter fails to explain why many Muslims, including General Shahnawaz Khan, General M Z Kiani, etc, fought in the Indian National Army alongside Hindus and Sikhs if Subhas Bose was 'rabid Brahmin'. This is because patriotism is a virtue alien to the Pakistan army. It fights on the zeal of Islam. Its army is merely a reflection of the Pakistani state, which was founded on religious rather than racial or territorial identity. Islam was the only glue that kept its western and eastern flanks of Pakistan together between 1947 and 1971. The eastern flank (today Bangladesh) was actually more populous than the western flank with its four provinces. Pakistan's army would like to imagine itself as the legatee of the Arab and Turkish armies of the mediaeval ages that carried the victorious banner of Islam through non-Islamic lands. Historically, this might be preposterous because Pakistanis, whether they were Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs, Pathans, Hazaras or Bengalis (before 1971), were not remotely connected to the Arabs, Turks or Kurds. Their forefathers, if they had converted to Islam, converted mostly under coercion to avoid the humiliation of Jiziya, if not to escape the sword of Islam on their necks. The Muslims of Pakistan were actually themselves frontline victims of historical Islamist military aggression on India. Thus, truly speaking, the garrison state of Pakistan exists not so much on the map as much as in the minds of Pakistanis. During the 1965 War, when the Pakistan Army launched Operation 'GIBRALTAR' on August 7, 1965, to wrest Kashmir from India's control, the historical inspiration was obvious. It sought to recreate the valour of Tariq ibn Ziyad (670-718 AD), the commander of the Arab-Berber Muslim army, who invaded Spain from Morocco across the Strait of Gibraltar. The Rock of Gibraltar is a Spanish derivative of the Arabic name Jabal-Tariq, or the mountain of Tariq. It was this conquest that brought Spain under Islam's control for the ensuing seven centuries. 'The Gibraltar force'—informs the then COAS of Pakistan, viz General Mohammad Musa (1983)—'consisted of approximately 7000 Mujahidin from 'Azad Kashmir'. Most of it was given some guerrilla training within a short time before it was launched' (My Version: India-Pakistan War, 1965, P.36). General Musa admits that the operation ended in a failure. This, however, proves that there was a definite connection between the Pakistan Army and Mujahidin (terrorists) even prior to Zia-ul-Haq's era. The names of the units in Operation Gibraltar were also revealing. Shuja Nawaz informs us that the units were named after historical Muslim military heroes, viz, Tariq (bin Ziad), (Mahmud) Ghaznavi, Salahuddin, (Mohammed bin) Qasim, and Khalid (bin Waleed). Only one unit was named Nusrat (meaning Victory) in honour of the wife of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Crossed Swords, P.206). The Pakistan Army uses a prayer, which is called Tariq's prayer in honour of the aforesaid Tariq ibn Ziyad. Its English translation, as available on the website of Pakistan's Army (though not accessible from India at present), reads, 'These Ghazis, these devoted souls of your lordship/whom you have blessed with the zeal of your worship/their legions overcame deserts and rivers/and trample mountain to dust with fervour/they care not for the world's pleasure/the love of the lord are their treasures/the mission and the aim of Momim is martyrdom/not the booty of war, nor crave for a kingdom'. This prayer proves that Pakistan's Army is not a normal national army, which, actuated by a sense of patriotism, defends the territory of a nation. It rather likes to imagine itself as the modern-day avatar of Islam's mediaeval army of conquest. In its quest it could co-opt mujahidin, an honourable term in Islam for the automatic weapon-wielding terrorists. Pakistan might like to celebrate the legacy of Islamic conquests. The question is whether such things have a place in the 21st-century world. The writer is author of the book 'The Microphone Men: How Orators Created a Modern India' (2019) and an independent researcher based in New Delhi. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
The Print
21-05-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Srinagar airbase is vulnerable to Pakistan attack. These are ways to secure it
Every single Army Chief in Pakistan since General Zia-ul-Haq, except probably General Jehangir Karamat, has espoused similar views. The centrality of Kashmir and the critical importance of striking Indian military assets at the Srinagar airfield has been a consistent feature in Pakistan's war plans. He presented the contest with India in religious terms by drawing a sharp distinction between Muslims and Hindus. These words might have surprised some, but to Pakistan watchers, this was nothing new. On 16 April 2025, the chief of Pakistan Army, General Asim Munir, while addressing the Pakistani diaspora, stated that Kashmir is Pakistan's jugular vein. As per him, Kashmir has been and would always remain the core issue for the Pakistani military. Historical context In 1947, India was able to retain control over the Srinagar airfield by the skin of its teeth. Thanks to the gallant efforts by the 1 Sikh under the able command of Lt Col Dewan Ranjit Rai and the Dakotas from No. 12 Squadron of the Indian Air Force, India was able to beat back the marauding hordes of Pakistani militia, who had advanced to within 30 miles of the airfield. Subsequently, in the wars of 1965 and 1971, Srinagar received frequent visits from the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Notably, IAF's sole Param Vir Chakra was awarded to Flying Officer Nirmal Jit Singh Sekhon for his intrepid bravery in air action over Srinagar on 14 December 1971. More recently, as part of Operation Bunyan-al-Marsoos, Pakistan launched air attacks on Srinagar airfield on 10 May 2025. The attacks involved drones, missiles, and fighter jets. It was a very determined attack, and the PAF was willing to take greater risks. However, despite these attacks, the Srinagar airfield remained operational and IAF's military operations continued unabated. These attacks highlighted Pakistan's intent to neutralise Srinagar's operational capacity, underscoring the need for robust defence strategies in the face of evolving threats. Also read: Pakistan can't test India's strategic patience anymore. The doctrine has flipped Emerging threats The air operations during India's Operation Sindoor, which started on 7 May, and Pakistan's retaliatory Operation Bunyan-al-Marsoos (10 May) revealed a new paradigm in aerial warfare. Pakistan deployed advanced technologies, including swarm drones, kamikaze drones with anti-radiation missiles (ARM) capabilities, long-range standoff weapons effective beyond 100 km, and beyond-visual-range (BVR) missiles with ranges exceeding 200 km. These systems pose a multifaceted threat to Srinagar Airfield, complicating India's ability to maintain air control. Geographically, Srinagar's proximity to the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border (IB) exacerbates its vulnerability. The LoC sectors at Uri, Baramulla, and Tangdhar are only 60–70 km away, while the IB at Akhnoor is 120 km. Pakistan's Qadri Airbase in Skardu, at 160 km from Srinagar, can house advanced PAF fighters like the J-10C, F-16, and JF-17. Closer bases at Kotli and Rawalakot, approximately 100 km away, can support helicopters and drone operations. In a broader conflict, PAF could deploy assets from distant bases, as far as PAF Base Masroor in Karachi, leveraging AAR (air-to-air refueling) and long-range precision weapons to target Srinagar. The PAF's modernised inventory, including data-linked fighters and Saab 2000 Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) systems, enhances its operational reach. A Combat Air Patrol (CAP) operating 100–150 km from Srinagar, within Pakistani airspace, could engage IAF fighters as they take off, particularly as they clear the crest line of surrounding terrain. That's when they'd be most vulnerable. Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles, with ranges exceeding 200 km, enable PAF to neutralise airborne threats before they gain altitude or can manoeuvre effectively to get into an advantageous position. Additionally, swarm drones and kamikaze drones with anti-radiation missiles (ARM) features can target radar and air defence systems, while surface-launched missiles and forward-deployed artillery threaten the airfield's infrastructure. A saturation strike, combining these elements, could disable the runway or critical facilities for hours, disrupting IAF operations at a critical juncture. The 10 May 10 attack, while symbolic, was limited in scale. Future PAF operations, potentially coordinated with ground manoeuvres from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) or a thrust into the Akhnoor bulge, could involve a larger, more sustained assault. Such a scenario would test India's defensive capabilities, particularly if Pakistan employs a combination of pre-emptive strikes and persistent aerial threats to overwhelm Srinagar's defences. Also read: India's military revival hinges on overestimating Pakistan Army Defending Srinagar Defending Srinagar Airfield against these emerging threats requires addressing a complex array of challenges: slow-moving drones, suicide drones, ARMs, surface-to-air missiles, long-range artillery, and air-launched precision weapons. The airfield's proximity to hostile bases and enemy's airspace makes it vulnerable to standoff attacks, which necessitate a re-evaluation of traditional air defence strategies. A saturation strike could temporarily disable the runway, grounding IAF fighters, while a BVR-armed PAF CAP loitering within kill ranges could neutralise aircraft attempting to take off. Both scenarios undermine India's ability to maintain air superiority over Srinagar, a cornerstone of our air strategy. India's current air defence posture in this area relies on maintaining 'guns tight' protocols, where surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air defence weapons engage only after clearance to avoid fratricide. This cautious approach, while necessary to prevent blue-on-blue (friendly fire) incidents, limits the responsiveness of ground-based defences against fast-evolving threats like swarm drones or low-flying kamikaze drones. Moreover, deploying IAF fighters from Srinagar itself is increasingly precarious, as PAF's AEW&C and BVR capabilities can detect and engage aircraft shortly after take-off. Pakistan's recent attack, though unsuccessful in causing significant damage, exposed vulnerabilities that could be exploited in a larger-scale operation. Pakistan's willingness to take greater risks, as demonstrated in Operation Bunyan-al-Marsoos, suggests that future attacks may prioritise saturation and coordination to overwhelm defences. The IAF cannot afford to assume that Srinagar's operational resilience will hold against a more determined assault, particularly in the context of a theatre-wide conflict. It is a fact that, based on our own capabilities, we can create similar problems for the other side. However, this analysis focuses solely on the challenges of defending Srinagar and the Kashmir valley in general. Strength versus vulnerability To counter these threats, India could leverage its strengths against Pakistan's vulnerabilities by adopting an air denial strategy over the traditional pursuit of air superiority. India's ground-based air defence infrastructure, bolstered by the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) and Akashteer for detection, and systems like the S-400, Barak-8 and Akash SAM for engagement, provides a formidable foundation. The S-400, with a detection range of 600 km and effective kill range of up to 400 km, can engage targets well beyond the IB/ LoC, deep into Pakistan's airspace. The medium/short range SAMs and air defence guns could provide additional layers of protection. By shifting to a 'guns free' default mode, instead of 'guns tight', India could create a no-fly zone extending 400 km from Srinagar, making it prohibitively risky for PAF aircraft to operate, even within their own airspace. This air denial strategy would involve keeping IAF fighters grounded at dispersed locations within Srinagar airfield, housed in hardened aircraft shelters (HAS), or relocating them to nearby bases. When needed, IAF fighters equipped with long-range BVR missiles, supported by airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), could operate from other bases to provide local air superiority over Srinagar without exposing themselves to a direct attack on the ground. This approach maximises the freedom of engagement for ground-based defences, allowing SAMs and guns to freely engage any aerial threat within range, regardless of the threat's origin. The air denial strategy exploits Pakistan's reliance on airborne platforms to target Srinagar by making them extremely vulnerable to formidable air defence architecture on ground. This would deter PAF, and should they wish to press home the attack, they would have to expend significant additional resources to penetrate the airspace. The psychological and operational impact of such a strategy could disrupt PAF's planning, as the risk of heavy losses outweighs potential gains. For an Air Force, led by fighter pilots, that worships at the altar of air superiority, this would be a bitter pill to swallow. Having been one myself, I understand that we consider gaining and maintaining control of the air as the primary airpower role. For IAF, air superiority is primus inter pares. The air denial strategy could seem like a defensive move. Historical precedent The air denial strategy draws inspiration from the 1973 Yom Kippur War, where Egyptian forces established a dense air defence network along the Suez Canal, denying the Israeli Air Force operational freedom. While Israel eventually regained air superiority, it did so at a significant cost in blood and treasure despite enjoying a significant technological advantage over Egypt. Pakistan, lacking a similar edge over India's advanced air defence systems, faces a steeper challenge. India's S-400, Akashteer, and IACCS provide a robust detection and engagement capability, making an air denial strategy viable. For the IAF, steeped in a culture that prioritises air superiority, adopting air denial may seem counterintuitive. Air superiority, often considered the primary role of airpower, ensures control of the skies for offensive and defensive operations. However, in Srinagar's unique context—geographically constrained, close to hostile bases, and facing advanced threats—air denial offers a pragmatic alternative. By neutralising PAF's ability to operate anywhere near Srinagar, India can maintain operational continuity at the airfield, without relying on fighter aircraft to man the operational readiness platform (ORP) or being airborne as part of an around-the-clock CAP from Srinagar. Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat (Retd) is a former IAF fighter pilot. He tweets @Ahlawat2012. Views are personal. (Edited by Ratan Priya)
Time of India
19-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Faiz's nazm of dissent and resistance
Written by renowned Pakistani poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz in 1979, just two years after the country came under martial law under Gen Zia-ul-Haq, ' Hum Dekhenge (We shall see)' is often used in anti-establishment protests both in India and Pakistan. The nazm of dissent and resistance gained larger recognition after singer Iqbal Bano defied the law and delivered a public rendition in Lahore in 1986. In India, 'Hum Dekhenge' has been especially popular with cultural activists and Left groups. At one point, the poem goes, "Sab taaj uchhaley jayenge/ Sab takht giraye jayenge (Every crown will be flung/ Each throne brought down)." During the anti-CAA protests in 2019, some professors in IIT Kanpur claimed that the song had anti-Hindu references. The probe was later closed.
News18
18-05-2025
- Business
- News18
Ceasefire With Pakistan: Remember A Leopard Cannot Change Its Spots
Last Updated: General Zia-ul-Haq's infamous bleed-India-by-1,000-cuts remains Pakistan army and government's pusillanimous permanent plank On May 10, US President Donald Trump announced through his X handle a ceasefire between India and Pakistan effective 5 pm IST. It was apparently after Pakistan had cried on his shoulders and played the victim card to the hilt. Never the one to pass up an opportunity for limelight and media Arclight, Trump used the opportunity to bail out the US client state which Pakistan is with a $1 billion loan. IMF loans come with a list of conditionalities including privatisation, global tender for major government contractors, downsizing of government departments, etc. One wonders if the impugned loan was hemmed in by the condition that it will not be diverted for military use including buying arms and ammunition. It is common knowledge that the US-based manufacturers and contractors normally benefit from such conditionalities. Be that as it may. Whatever the contours of the ceasefire, the entire world knows that one doesn't trust Pakistan any more than he trusts a rattlesnake except when he has the upper hand like China and the US have had for a long time in their relationship with Pakistan. Trump's hyphenating India with Pakistan is not new. That the US has bases in Pakistan is an open secret. But what has stumped Trump watchers is his egregious description of Pakistan as a great nation in his gushing and condescending tweet. Pray what makes it great? Like the articulate spokesperson of the BJP Sudhanshu Trivedi says while India has its TCS and Infosys to boast, Pakistan's only claim to notoriety is its vast network of terrorist nurseries, nine of which were destroyed by the Indian armed forces in a precision attack on May 7 in retaliation to the Pahalgam massacre orchestrated by Pakistan on April 22 on unsuspecting Hindu tourists. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's bold leadership, India has said it will not turn the other cheek. Instead, he enunciated a new doctrine — any act of terror would be treated as an act of war. Adversity brings the best out of one including a nation. He and his cabinet committee on security along with the armed forces chiefs crafted a strategy that is bound to keep India in a good stead for decades or even longer. Thus, was born Operation Sindoor that is going to be India's template to counter Pakistan terror in particular. It is anchored in: Terror and war are the same doctrine. Hitherto Pakistan was disingenuously hiding behind the argument that terrorists were at best non-state players and at worst they weren't Pakistanis at all. India will not launch a freewheeling, indiscriminate attack on the enemy nation like Israel and Russia have done in the recent past. Terror hotspots will be identified and destroyed with precision missiles and drones among others. It is this refreshingly humane approach to striking back that has won international respect albeit grudging from certain quarters. While India will not sit quiet unlike what the Manmohan Singh government did in the face of the 26/11 attacks by the Pakistan-sponsored terrorists, India cannot relax its guard any soon. General Zia-ul-Haq's infamous bleed-India-by-1,000-cuts remains Pakistan army and government's pusillanimous permanent plank. Pakistan is piqued by India's rapid growth. Therefore, it hates India viscerally. While the India-Pakistan hyphenation is flattering to its ego and boosts its low self-esteem a wee bit, the equation is ludicrously laughable. It is sad that a few Indian commentators too have become a prey to the misinformation campaign spearheaded by Pakistan with its ally the Global Times of China, and have started talking India and Pakistan in the same breath. They counsel restraint on both, touché, little realising that the provocation came from the stealthy neighbour who cannot be wished away as the former PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee famously remarked once. The Congress trying to score brownie points by pitchforking Indira Gandhi's feat in carving Bangladesh out of Pakistan in 1971 in juxtaposition to Modi's Operation Sindhoor is unfortunate, churlish and puerile. When chips are down, a political party tends to hark back to its past little realising that such backhanded compliment to the present leadership does a positive disservice to its own cause in the electoral sweepstakes. Be that as it may again. Eternal vigilance is not the price for protecting democracy alone but also from the evil eyes and designs of neighbours. That Pakistan harbours evil intents for India is trite and is not likely to slacken. It is good that the Indian armed forces have only pressed the pause button. It is also good that India has spurned mediation on Kashmir. With a rejigged strategy against Pakistan, India reserves the right to hit back with thunderous force against terror and military installations of Pakistan even if there is a hint of a small provocation. Suspension of the Indus Water Treaty is a classic example of non-kinetic attack on Pakistan. Together with precision hitting, India has moved to the exalted levels of modern warfare under PM Modi's mature leadership. (The writer is a senior columnist. He tweets @smurlidharan. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views) tags : Operation Sindoor Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: May 18, 2025, 18:10 IST News opinion Opinion | Ceasefire With Pakistan: Remember A Leopard Cannot Change Its Spots
