Latest news with #UNSC
LBCI
17 hours ago
- Politics
- LBCI
Tom Barrack meets Lebanese leaders as US-Lebanon talks stall on Hezbollah arms
Report by Bassam Abou Zeid, English adaptation by Mariella Succar There is no agreement between Lebanon and the United States regarding the approach to addressing Hezbollah's weapons. Washington, through its presidential envoy Tom Barrack, reiterated the urgent need to implement the state's commitment to disarmament, regardless of the developments in Lebanon and the region. Lebanon, which previously linked disarmament to Israel fulfilling its obligations—such as withdrawing from occupied areas, halting violations, and releasing detainees—tied the issue during Thursday's talks to the ongoing regional situation. According to a statement posted on the Presidency's official X account, President Joseph Aoun told Barrack that communications to achieve the principle of exclusive weapons control on both Lebanese and Palestinian levels are ongoing and will intensify once the regional situation stabilizes amid the escalating Israeli-Iranian conflict. Aoun also noted that the army's mission in southern Litani to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire agreement has been hindered by Israel's continued occupation of the Shebaa Farms and its surroundings. In this context, Aoun reportedly reiterated the 'step-for-step' approach, meaning Israel must take steps on issues such as withdrawal, violations, and detainees, which would be met by corresponding Lebanese steps related to Hezbollah's weapons. The U.S. envoy also heard from President Aoun that Lebanon does not wish to be drawn into the ongoing war between Israel and Iran. Barrack urged Lebanese authorities to intensify cooperation with the new Syrian regime, particularly regarding border control and demarcation between the two countries. From Ain al-Tineh, the headquarters of the Parliament Speaker, Barrack said in response to a question that Hezbollah's involvement in the current war would be a very bad decision. Reports indicate that the message Barrack received from Speaker Nabih Berri was similar to that conveyed by President Aoun in Baabda. Berri emphasized that Lebanon has fulfilled its responsibilities, while the problem lies with Israel, which continues to violate U.N. Resolution 1701 and the ceasefire agreement, and maintains occupation, attacks, and assassinations. At the Grand Serail, Tom Barrack continued talks with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. They agreed on keeping Lebanon out of the war and on continuing state efforts to assert sovereignty, address Hezbollah's weapons, and resolve issues with Israel. They also agreed to pursue reforms and strengthen communication with Syria. Barrack, who has officially and temporarily taken charge of Lebanon affairs following his work on Syria, is expected to return to Beirut soon after briefing President Donald Trump on the results of his initial visit.
The Hindu
19 hours ago
- Politics
- The Hindu
Blame not the messenger in India's diplomacy
History and literature are replete with references to not 'shooting the messenger' for bringing bad news. In Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra, the Egyptian queen assaults a messenger and threatens to have him 'whipped with wire and stewed in brine, smarting in ling'ring pickle', for bringing her the news that the Roman General Mark Antony has married another. 'I that do bring the news made not the match,' the messenger replies, before making a hasty exit. Over the past two months, India's 'diplomatic messengers' too have faced an ire that is unprecedented — criticised not for the message they bring, but for failing to convey effectively enough, the message New Delhi has sent out after Operation Sindoor (May 7-10, 2025). Criticism of Indian diplomacy Public commentary that is critical of the Ministry of External Affairs and its missions has focused broadly on three counts. First, that India received condolences and statements condemning the Pahalgam terror attack from all quarters, but not the kind of unequivocal support, especially from the neighbourhood, for retaliatory strikes on Pakistan, of the kind seen in 2016 (post-Uri) and 2019 (post-Pulwama). In 2016, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives backed India's decision to stay away from the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit in Pakistan after the Uri attack. In 2019, global solidarity with India forced even China to back a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) terror designation for Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar. Earlier, in 2008, there was international consensus in India's favour after the Mumbai attacks, when Hafiz Saeed and a number of Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists were designated by the UNSC, and Pakistan was put on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list for the first time. Instead, this time, unfavourable comparisons have been made to Pakistan for the lines of support it received from China, Turkiye, Azerbaijan, Malaysia and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Second, the perception is that Pakistan has scored some diplomatic wins, despite widespread global understanding that Pakistan uses terrorists as state proxies. In April, Pakistan, a non-permanent member of the UNSC, managed to amend the resolution on Pahalgam to delete any reference to The Resistance Front (TRF), that claimed responsibility for the heinous attack. Earlier this month, Pakistan was chosen as chair of the Taliban Sanctions Committee and vice-Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Committee at the UNSC, and secured loans from the International Monetary Fund and Asian Development Bank despite New Delhi's opposition. Next was the White House's lunch invitation to Pakistan Army chief (now Field Marshal) General Asim Munir, despite the belief in India that his 'jugular vein' speech was a virtual green signal for the Pahalgam attack. In July, as Security Council President for the month, Pakistan will try to schedule meetings on the India-Pakistan conflict and Kashmir, even as India accelerates efforts to designate the TRF at the UNSC, and place Pakistan on the FATF greylist. India's diplomats will be tested again. The third aspect pertains to United States President Donald Trump, who, despite official denials from India, has chosen to muddy the narrative of how the May 10 ceasefire was achieved, hyphenating India and Pakistan in more than a dozen public statements, and offering to mediate on Kashmir. His latest iteration of the comments this week, just hours after a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and just before his meeting with Gen. Munir, was possibly the most blatant. Thus far, Mr. Trump's statements, post-ceasefire, have not had a single word on the scourge of terrorism itself, showing just far apart the understanding between Delhi and Washington is at this time. A flurry of diplomacy does not seem to have moved the needle on these criticisms. After Operation Sindoor, special delegations of Members of Parliament and former diplomats travelled to 32 countries. The most time (six days) was spent in the United States. After the G-7 meet, Mr. Modi has meetings ahead with BRICS leaders. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar is visiting the U.S. for the Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting soon, after several visits to European capitals recently. The government had not essayed such a campaign after the 2016 or 2019 actions against Pakistan, indicating that it too feels that diplomatic efforts by the Ministry of External Affairs and missions abroad have been found wanting and need bolstering. But much as the messenger in Shakespeare says, India's diplomats do not decide the message that India wishes to send after Operation Sindoor, and cannot be held responsible for its resonance. It is necessary for the government to study the contents of that message, the shift in geopolitical narratives and in how India is perceived, in order to build a more realistic assessment of how far international diplomacy can ensure the outcomes New Delhi desires vis-à-vis Pakistan. The 'new normal' With reference to the content of the message, Mr. Modi's three-pronged 'New Normal' has raised eyebrows in some capitals. The first prong — 'Any act of terror is an act of war' — lowers the threshold for future conflicts, passing the trigger for Indian strikes into the hands of any terrorist, acting on orders on their own. The second — 'India will not bow to nuclear blackmail' — is not necessarily new, but has been left unarticulated thus far because it gives the appearance of a heightened nuclear risk for the region. The third — India will not distinguish between state and non-state actors henceforth — sends out an escalatory message, indicating that the next terror attack could well invoke 'Armageddon', rather than the controlled four day conflict in Operation Sindoor. While India's partners have not asked for evidence of Pakistan's links to Pahalgam, they look askance at other aspects — like why India has been unable to trace the terrorists responsible yet. Next, it is necessary to note that global shocks in the past few years have changed how the world views India's tough messaging. Take for example, a growing number of statements by Indian Ministers about 'taking back Pakistan occupied Kashmir' by force if necessary. These make many of India's interlocutors uncomfortable, given the current number of conflicts over territorial aggression underway, from West Asia, to Ukraine to the South China Sea. In the light of Israel's retaliation for the October 7, 2023 terror attacks, few wish to give any state a free hand for 'retribution'. New Delhi's refusal to criticise Russia for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and to raise its oil imports from Russia in the face of sanctions, lost it some support in the western world, especially Europe. The Modi government's silence on Israel's devastation of Gaza has also been met with disappointment in the Global South. India, as Mr. Modi told Mr. Trump this week, views terrorism emanating from Pakistan, 'not as a proxy war, but as a war itself'. India's diplomats have been left explaining why their stock responses that 'this is not an era of war' and that 'dialogue and diplomacy' are the only way forward do not apply to India and Pakistan. Thus, it may be necessary for New Delhi to rethink how it frames its message in view of these changes, notwithstanding the global double standards inherent in the expectations from India. Democracy in decline Finally, there is need for introspection over how the Modi government's image itself has altered in the world since 2019, leading to diplomatic challenges on a number of fronts. These range from concerns abroad over laws such as the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, the amendment of Article 370, Internet bans and summary arrests in different parts of the country, and accusations against Indian government agents of involvement in transnational killings in the U.S. and Canada. Questions over the broader decline in democracy and the status of minorities within India have also increased in the past few years. India's delegations abroad (Operation Sindoor) had to field some of those questions during their travels. India's right to defend itself from decades of Pakistan-backed, trained and funded terrorists is unassailable. But carrying a tough message on terror is easier for the diplomats tasked with the role, if in a strife-roiled world, the government plays to India's advantages, and what differentiates it from Pakistan — as a secular, stable, pluralistic, rule-abiding democratic and economic power. suhasini.h@
South China Morning Post
a day ago
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Why a UN Security Council seat is so important to the Philippines
The Philippines has a strong chance of gaining a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), according to observers. Manila has renewed its bid, with its foreign secretary stressing the country's track record as a 'pathfinder and peacemaker'. Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo reiterated the Philippines' UN aspirations in a speech in New York earlier this week to more than 300 diplomats and guests at his country's Independence Day celebrations. He pointed to the country's role as Asia's first republic, its long-standing dedication to equality among nations, as well as its commitment to multilateralism and global peace. 'The Philippines will bring to the Security Council 80 years of multilateral experience, a tradition of principled diplomacy, and a readiness to listen, engage, and lead with purpose,' Manalo said in his keynote speech at a diplomatic reception at the Philippine Centre on Sunday. The UNSC comprises five permanent members and 10 elected ones that serve a two-year term. It is primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the UN Charter. Israeli Ambassador Danny Danon addresses a meeting of the UN Security Council on Friday, following Israel's attack on Iran. Photo: Reuters Manalo said the Philippines 'wishes to harness our track record and the trust and goodwill we enjoy with UN member states as we work with all states in advancing the principles and our common purpose in the UN Charter', adding that the country would 'uphold the UN Charter with sincerity and resolve'.
The Wire
a day ago
- Politics
- The Wire
The Opposition's Silence Has Let the BJP Diminish India's Political Discourse
The rhetoric being employed by the multi-party delegations sent by India to other countries – ostensibly to shape the global narrative around Operation Sindoor – is puzzling. Far from offering any fresh geopolitical perspectives, opposition members of these delegations have limited themselves to enthusiastically endorsing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government's foreign policy on Pakistan. While it is unclear as to why a foreign audience is expected to find the same arguments more compelling when endorsed by members of Indian opposition, this endorsement has been portrayed as a matter of national duty. Two weeks in, it would appear that far from influencing international opinion, this outreach has barely been there have been no groundbreaking shifts in the way in which Pakistan is viewed globally. They have, in this period, secured further funding from the ADB and also been appointed to chair the UNSC's Taliban Sanctions Committee as well as sit as the vice-chair of the UNSC counter-terrorism committee. The political compulsion felt by the opposition to perform in this seemingly fruitless public charade is interesting. It is unlikely that seasoned politicians in the opposition could not foresee this outcome. Their participation was therefore likely driven by what they imagine their own voters expect of them. These expectations are the product of a domestic public discourse where foreign policy has increasingly been taken out of the realm of political contestation and elevated to the realm of security, where the act of criticism is in itself seen as 'anti-national'. Securitisation in international relations refers to a practice whereby issues are presented as existential threats, taking them beyond the realm of ordinary politics. The securitisation of an issue generally requires it to be framed as an existential threat to what is called a referent object, and for the audience to accept it as such. Once the audience accepts an issue to be an existential threat, it legitimises the breaking of previously accepted rules (whether international or domestic) to guard the referent object. This referent object can be a population, or even a broader principle or idea. The American 'war on terror' for example was framed as combatting a global existential threat and that was used to deviate from both established international legal principles – including on the use of force, criminal jurisdiction and the treatment of prisoners – and to curb individual rights within countries in the West (including through the mass surveillance infrastructure created pursuant to the PATRIOT Act). The securitisation discourse is not limited to international issues. Globally, the immigration discourse serves as perhaps the most tragic example of the securitisation of a domestic concern. Some of the most vulnerable and persecuted people in the world – asylum seekers – are repeatedly framed as existential threats to an imagined 'western' way of life generating cross party consent for their violent removal, often through means of questionable legality. In India, similar rhetoric has been targeted at 'illegal' immigrants from Bangladesh and against Rohingya refugees, and has been widely employed by the government as well as by several opposition parties. This has contributed to the legitimisation of practices like Assam 'pushing' people made stateless by the draconian NRC over the border into Bangladesh. There have also been extremely serious allegations raised with respect to Rohingya refugees being pushed off navy vessels with life jackets in the sea near Myanmar. Tellingly, the Indian Supreme Court refused to expedite the hearings on the matter stating the 'nation is going through difficult times'– a classic case of a security framing being used to dismiss serious human rights concerns. Theorists generally agree on two things with respect to securitisation. First, securitisation does not automatically follow from a grave threat. It is a language act where rhetoric is used deliberately to create this perception of an existential threat. For example, not all wars or terrorist attacks, become removed from the political discourse. In 1962, during the war with China, Francine Frankel points out that Nehru was severely criticised both by capitalists who insisted that the state should have focused on defence and left heavy industry under private control, and others who blamed defence minister V.K. Menon's perceived communist leanings, and Nehru himself, for what they saw as the failure of non-alignment and the collapse of the Panchsheel agreement. Similarly, the 26/11 terrorist attacks, and the UPA government's handling of it were subjected to near continuous scrutiny and political debate. Second, an issue being framed by the state as an existential threat does not by itself elevate it to the status of a security issue – for an issue to become securitised, this framing must be broadly accepted by the audience. This is where the absence of the opposition in recent years in India has really been felt. The securitisation of political issues has been a defining feature of the BJP years in India. Domestically, this has been accomplished by invoking anti-terror statutes against members of civil society, student leaders and to punish minorities for communal violence. A vast majority of these instances have not been rhetorically resisted by the political opposition to the BJP. In 2019, for example, the Congress voted in favour of amendments that dangerously broadened the scope of the draconian Unlawful Activities Prevention Act in the Rajya Sabha. Few opposition political parties have stood in clear solidarity with the detainees of either the Bhima Koregaon case or the Delhi riots conspiracy case. Some of the biggest beneficiaries of this relentless push towards the securitisation of political issues have been the Indian television news and entertainment media. The framing of every issue as an existential threat, especially to the majority Hindu population, has been profitable for them. Popular news channels have seen massive spikes in TRPs around such framings. Films like Kashmir Files and Kerela Story that have been used to create the perception that the Hindus in India are under serious threat have also done extremely well at the box office. This means that in addition to any state imperative to avoid scrutiny by turning political issues into security issues, there is also a strong commercial imperative to keep the audience in this perpetual state of existential anxiety. Once an audience is brought to this state of existential anxiety, it is very difficult to reverse. This traps both the audience and the government into a framework where the only acceptable solution to any problem is increasing militiarisation in the sphere of foreign policy and the rolling back of rights domestically. It is telling that the Congress' only consistent criticism of Operation Sindoor today is that a ceasefire was agreed upon too easily. Their criticism of the BJP government's handling of border disputes with China also revolves around the same theme. Without going into the merits of either position, it is important to note that this is because the only criticism possible of a government in front of an audience under the sway of a securitizing discourse is that they didn't go far enough or act aggressively enough. This discourse becomes a particular handicap in situations where increased military force cannot deliver the desired outcome. If, as Joseph Nye puts it, power is the ability to change the behaviour of states, then a situation where one state is compelled by domestic public opinion to use military force against another, even as such displays of force do not change the behavior sought to be changed, is not an effective demonstration of power. On the contrary, a public discourse that prevents the government from introspecting on its strategies, returning to the drawing board, or exploring alternative pathways, including diplomacy, arguably reduces its power. Theorists generally agree that in any democratic society, national security must never be idealised. And while some issues will need to be securitised from time to time, desecuritisation must always be the long-term goal – to move issues out of this threat defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere. For the last decade or so, the Indian opposition has preferred to allow the ruling party to set the boundaries of what issues can be debated politically and what issues are elevated to the realm of security. Given the hold the BJP has on the media and consequently, the public imagination, perhaps they believed that to do otherwise would be electorally harmful. It is important to remember that securitisation is not an innocent reflection of an issue being a security threat. To securitise, or to accept a securitisation framing is always a political choice. And this isn't a political choice that requires political power to exercise. It is a battle fought in the realm of rhetoric. And by refusing to challenge any of the state's securitization framings over the last decade, in domestic policy, as well as in foreign affairs, the opposition has contributed to the shrinking of the political discourse in India. Today, the opposition faces a choice – they can either continue to allow the boundaries of political engagement in the country to be decided by the ruling party or they can ground their opposition in democratic principles, and challenge the boundaries themselves, when required. But they would do well to note that to continue along the former path is to contribute to their own growing irrelevance. Sarayu Pani is a lawyer by training and posts on X @ Link is her column on the social aspects of the events that move India.
Mint
2 days ago
- Politics
- Mint
Israel-Iran war updates: UN Security Council to meet Friday after Iran's request, with support from Russia, China
After an urgent meeting last Friday convened by the United Nations Security Council after Israel attacked Iran last Friday, another meeting has now been requested from Iran's end, with support from Russia, China, and Pakistan. This UNSC meeting will be held on Friday, and the Israel-Iran agenda will be the primary one on the table, according to the UN Security Council President Guyana, says an AFP report. The call for this meeting has been issued by Iran after a fresh scale of attacks launched by Israel amid the conflict. Russia has supported this stance for a meeting at the UNSC, with China and Pakistan supporting the concept of round-table talks as a means to understanding the extent of the conflict. 'The UN human rights office urges de-escalation and urgent diplomatic negotiations to end these attacks and find a way forward,' said UN deputy human rights chief Nada Al-Nashif, according to UN News. 'We are following closely and are aware of reports that many thousands of residents are fleeing parts of the capital, Tehran, as a result of warnings covering broad areas,' Al-Nashif had also said. Meanwhile, speaking at the Council after the Deputy High Commissioner, Iran's Permanent Representative of Iran, Ambassador Ali Bahreini, took to condemned the Israeli strikes on Iran, saying, 'There has been no violation worse than the 13 June act of aggression against Iran. Continuous blind attacks on residential areas, bombardment of vital supplies, explosion of drinking water resources, and reckless strikes on nuclear facilities are immediately impacting the civilians and people of Iran.' Israel has also admitted to the loss of Israeli properties and symbols, with their PM Benjamin Netanyahu thanking US President Donald Trump for his timely contribution in 'protecting Israeli skies', while missiles from Iran rained down upon Tel Aviv.
