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The Irish Sun
14 hours ago
- The Irish Sun
Brit AI-drone gunships to fly alongside Apache helicopters in war of the future
BRITAIN'S new AI-drone gunships will fly alongside Apache helicopters in future battles. Apache pilots will command up to six drones, known as mules, carrying missiles, sensors and jamming kit. Advertisement 1 Britain's new AI-drone gunships will fly alongside Apache helicopters in future wars The mules will also be programmed to fight autonomously and control swarms of smaller drones on the ground. This triple-layer system will give the Army far greater firepower and aims to protect our fleet of Apache AH-64Es, Challenger 3 tanks plus soldiers on the ground. More integration of crewed and uncrewed aircraft had been hinted at in the Strategic Defence Review announced earlier this month. Advertisement READ MORE ON DRONES 'Our Autonomous Collaborative Platforms (the mules) will fly alongside the Apache attack helicopters and enhance the Army's ability to strike, survive and win on the battlefield. 'This will be a game-changer. It will be applying the lessons from Ukraine in a world- leading way. It will be putting the UK at the leading edge of innovation in Nato.' Chief of the General Staff Sir Roly Walker said 80 per cent of the Army's weapons in future wars would be drones — as it could take months to build Apaches and tanks and years to train their crews. He said drones were vital as the Ukraine war had 'shown how a £20million tank and four experienced crew can be lost to a £1,000 drone operated by a kid with a few days' training'. Advertisement Most read in Tech He added of the mule drones: 'You don't want to lose them but, if you do, it's not a tragedy because, although sophisticated, they are uncrewed.' Israeli drones obliterate Iranian F-14 fighter jets in explosive aerial assault


Scottish Sun
14 hours ago
- Politics
- Scottish Sun
Brit AI-drone gunships to fly alongside Apache helicopters in war of the future
Click to share on X/Twitter (Opens in new window) Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window) BRITAIN'S new AI-drone gunships will fly alongside Apache helicopters in future battles. Apache pilots will command up to six drones, known as mules, carrying missiles, sensors and jamming kit. Sign up for Scottish Sun newsletter Sign up 1 Britain's new AI-drone gunships will fly alongside Apache helicopters in future wars The mules will also be programmed to fight autonomously and control swarms of smaller drones on the ground. This triple-layer system will give the Army far greater firepower and aims to protect our fleet of Apache AH-64Es, Challenger 3 tanks plus soldiers on the ground. More integration of crewed and uncrewed aircraft had been hinted at in the Strategic Defence Review announced earlier this month. Defence Secretary John Healey told this week's RUSI land warfare conference in London: 'From this year, we will be investing more than £100million in new, initial funding to develop land drone swarms.' READ MORE ON DRONES GULF EXIT Brit & US spy planes quit Gulf amid fears of Iran reprisals over Israel's attack 'Our Autonomous Collaborative Platforms (the mules) will fly alongside the Apache attack helicopters and enhance the Army's ability to strike, survive and win on the battlefield. 'This will be a game-changer. It will be applying the lessons from Ukraine in a world- leading way. It will be putting the UK at the leading edge of innovation in Nato.' Chief of the General Staff Sir Roly Walker said 80 per cent of the Army's weapons in future wars would be drones — as it could take months to build Apaches and tanks and years to train their crews. He said drones were vital as the Ukraine war had 'shown how a £20million tank and four experienced crew can be lost to a £1,000 drone operated by a kid with a few days' training'. He added of the mule drones: 'You don't want to lose them but, if you do, it's not a tragedy because, although sophisticated, they are uncrewed.'


Asia Times
13-06-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
UK's strategic defense posture still includes East of Suez roles
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The launch of the United Kingdom's Strategic Defence Review has finally set down a clear direction for the UK's strategic posture for at least a parliament, perhaps longer. The most instrumental element in the paper is the decision to focus on the Euro-Atlantic as the priority region. This was already understood, but there have been at least two decades of the UK flirting with an East of Suez strategy. This included development of a robust defense attaché network in Southeast Asia, the long courtship of China – and then India – for growth, and the resurgence of UK military assets to the region in the name of defending maritime sea lanes and a 'free and open' Indo-Pacific. While it's true that this SDR was written by externals, led by Lord George Robertson, Dr. Fiona Hill, CMG, and General Sir Richard Barrons, the Labour government has already stamped its seal of approval by accepting all 62 recommendations. So what exactly does it say about the UK's 'Indo-Pacific strategy?' Well, the document is a realization that the US 'Pivot' to the Indo-Pacific region is here to stay. This was made clear after the Biden administration re-released an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 to put its stamp on the Trump strategy of 2019. Both strategies began with the starting point that the United States as an 'Indo-Pacific power' or 'Indo-Pacific nation.' While resources and political attention have – at times – remained stubbornly centered around the Middle East and CENTCOM and with Europe and EUCOM, the arrival of Elbridge Colby (a one-time Pacific Forum 'young leader') on the strategic scene in the United States has for now crowned the Indo-Pacific Pivot as the United States' priority region. The rise of China in this region, and the shift of political, military, and economic weight from Europe to Asia has cemented this shift. Colby's ratification as undersecretary of defense for policy has also added an explicit message to the Europeans: The dribbling of small amounts of assets to the Indo-Pacific is unnecessary; the United States would infinitely prefer that European powers – France, Germany and the UK – focus on the Euro-Atlantic and deal with Russia. The SDR wisely accommodates this resource imperative, while still providing a place for UK interests and support to the US and its allies in the region. If one looks at the number of times 'Indo-Pacific' is mentioned in the document (17), it is notable that this is down from a high of 32 mentions in the 2021 Integrated Review. Still, it is still better than the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 or the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, documents which mentioned 'Asia' five times and two times respectively. The 2025 SDR states that NATO-first does not mean NATO-only, putting the list of priorities as Euro-Atlantic, Middle East, and Indo-Pacific in that order. It states that 'the Indo-Pacific is strategically important to the UK as a global economic and political powerhouse and arena of increasing geopolitical tension.' It notes the strong partnerships the UK has in the region – ASEAN, Australia, Brunei, Japan, India, Indonesia, Nepal, New Zealand and Pakistan come in for special mention – and, of course, China. The SDR's position on China is probably closest to that of the UK Ministry of Defence and –sadly – does not reflect broader opinion across government in Whitehall. China is a 'sophisticated and persistent threat,' which behaves aggressively in the South China Sea and has escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait. It notes the fact that China has supported Russia in its invasion of Ukraine and that the US-China relationship will be a 'key factor' in global security. It also notes the threats provided by Beijing's military build-up, nuclear modernization and technological and cyber capabilities and recommends the maintenance of UK-China military-to-military communications. Given that US-China mil-to-mil relations are extremely limited now and constantly under pressure from China over US arms sales to Taiwan, this might prove a helpful channel in time. Notably, it recognizes that most of the UK's adversaries will likely field Chinese technology – an important observation in its own right. The SDR's integrated approach toward the Indo-Pacific region is consistent with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and consistent with the overall security interests of its closest partners, Japan and Australia, which are rapidly becoming the more important partners of choice across a number of different metrics. First, both are key partners in intelligence-sharing, both work closely with the United States to demonstrate deterrent capability in military exercises in the region and both are defense industrial partners of choice. With Japan, the UK is developing the Meteor, a joint new air-to-air missile (JNAAM) and the Global Combat Air Programme (with Italy), though this latter effort is under pressure. With Australia, there is even more by way of 'production deterrence' in the form of the AUKUS submarine and technology programs. The rotation of UK Astute-class submarines to HMAS Stiling, in Australia, planned as early as 2027 will be an immense boon to deterrence and warfighting capability. So what's missing from the SDR? Well, with respect to the authors, there are a few things: The recent murmurings of disquiet about a lack of progress in AUKUS Pillar 2 is an issue. London and Canberra now need to press upon newly arrived Trump officials their thoughts on the blockage and what can be done to expedite things at the resourcing, regulatory, and organizational level. This needs to be done at a time when the White House is shifting the US trade environment, so this will be difficult. In addition, the UK Ministry of Defence needs to think about what posture it needs to 'surge' military forces into the region in a crisis. The MOD needs to provide options and these range from inter-changeability exercises for UK assets visiting the region to developing a more mature presence in INDOPACOM – through a mid-size consulate in Honolulu run at the ambassadorial level by someone with close links to MOD. The options include joining the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience – if this has not already occurred – and supporting 'production deterrence.' It might mean co-production on long-range munitions in the wide expanse of the Pacific. And, finally, it needs to develop – alone or in tandem with the US – hubs for maintenance, repair, and operations (MRO) so that it can operate at the long-distances required by the operational environment. Dr. John Hemmings (john. @ is deputy director at the Council on Geostrategy in London and senior advisor at Pacific Forum.


Otago Daily Times
11-06-2025
- Politics
- Otago Daily Times
War worries keep Europe on alert
"There is a clear, present risk, particularly as Vladimir Putin does see himself as being at war with the West. The homeland is again (in peril) ... Air and missile attacks will potentially cause civilian casualties (in the United Kingdom) in very large numbers." Therefore, concludes General Sir Richard Barrons, the UK needs to bring back air raid sirens and air raid drills. I'm not making this up. Barrons, a former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff who retired from the British Army in 2016, is not just an ageing military fantasist longing to relive the Blitz he was too young to experience first time around. He co-wrote the British government's Strategic Defence Review, published last week, and the government adopted it wholesale. It's not just the UK. In only four months the Nato countries of Europe have managed to talk themselves into the belief that their continent is on the brink of war. Almost the entire Russian army has been bogged down in Ukraine for three years and there is no other military threat in sight, yet the rhetoric suggests that Armageddon is just around the corner. This is yet another consequence of that highly infectious disease, Trump Derangement Syndrome. The American president's penchant for making random radical comments, often just for the hell of it, has a way of panicking other countries into making policy decisions that are premature or just plain wrong. For example, the European members of Nato are now convinced that the United States is cancelling its eight-decade commitment to the defence of Europe. In particular they think that the US is ending its guarantee of nuclear retaliation against a Russian attack, which enabled all of them (except Britain and France) to avoid getting nuclear weapons of their own. They are right to be concerned about all that, because that is certainly being considered by some factions in the Trump circus. But it is far too early to base policy on these concerns, because Trump himself has no idea where he is going with all this. Could the United States end up in a de facto alliance with Russia when the dance ends (or at least pauses for a while)? Unlikely but possible, given Trump's highly personalistic style and his bizarre but undeniably very close relationship with the Russian leader. What would become of the existing Russian-Chinese alliance in such a case? Hard to say, but Putin might prefer an American alliance that would deliver Ukraine into Russia's hands. That would be a more equal partnership (assuming continuing American decline) than Russia's current precarious alliance with a Chinese giant that has aspirations on Russian territory. Does that then leave China free to join with Europe and the more or less free-trading countries of Asia in an effort to preserve or restore the rules-based, law-abiding world order that is under attack by Russia and the United States? The possible permutations and combinations are almost endless. It could even all end up back where it started, with Nato's transatlantic dimension intact including the US nuclear guarantee for Europe. After all, Trump's ambassador to Nato, Matthew Whitaker, is demanding that all Nato members start spending 5% of their GDP on defence. (The United States itself only spends 3.4%.) So might Trump really want a powerful Nato in Europe in his moments of clarity (assuming he has some), or is he just trying to sucker America's trade rivals in Europe into weakening themselves by overspending on defence? It's best not to overthink these alternative futures, and not to jump to conclusions too fast. It is unfortunately true that flurries of last-minute changes in alliances often happen just before the great powers go into a great war, but that is another reason not to rush into radical changes now. This will require a high tolerance for make-believe on the part of Europe, but wait-and-see is probably the Continent's least bad strategy for the time being. The European members of Nato should do everything possible to sustain Ukraine's resistance even when Trump cuts it off again, and rebuild their own defensive capabilities as fast as possible in case Trump does take the Russian option. But there's no need to practise bleeding, as the soldiers say: try to sustain the fiction of a united Nato as long as possible. And if you're in need of consolation as the talk of war swamps the news, remember that the only genuinely revisionist great power at the moment is Russia. People will tell you China is revisionist too, but that is untrue apart from Taiwan. Beijing believes it can overtake the United States by economic means alone and with Trump's help it may be right. • Gwynne Dyer is an independent London journalist


STV News
11-06-2025
- Business
- STV News
Major £250m redevelopment announced for Faslane naval base
A major £250m redevelopment has been announced for Faslane's HM Naval Base on the River Clyde. The money will be doled out over the next three years to help adapt and improve the infrastructure at the site, preparing it to welcome the new Dreadnought Class of deterrent submarines and SSN-AUKUS, the Royal Navy's next generation of attack submarines. According to the Ministry of Defence, it will kickstart a 'multi-decade multi-billion redevelopment, to help sustain the UK's fleet of nuclear-powered submarines'. The UK Labour Government's decision on came less than 24 hours after chancellor Rachel Reeves announced a £14.2bn investment into the Sizewell C nuclear plant in Sussex. The Government also said it would invest £4bn in the naval base at Plymouth over ten years, as well as £6bn to transform the UK's submarine industrial base. The UK Government said: 'In addition, we will embark on a multi-decade, multi-billion redevelopment of HMNB Clyde, with an initial £250m of funding over three years, supporting jobs, skills and growth across the west of Scotland.' Scottish secretary Ian Murray said the HMNB Clyde, which is the home of the Royal Navy Submarine Service, plays a 'crucial role' in supporting the the UK's first and final line of defence – the nuclear deterrent. He said: 'This extra £250m investment for HMNB Clyde is another fantastic example of how Scotland is at the heart of the UK defence policy. 'As home of the Royal Navy Submarine Service – including the UK's nuclear deterrent – HMNB Clyde will play a crucial role for decades to come as we restore Britain's readiness, deter our adversaries and help drive economic growth across the UK, as part of our Plan for Change.' Murray added: 'Over 6,500 military and civilian personnel are employed at HMNB Clyde, making it the second largest employment site in Scotland, with a total of around 25,600 jobs across Scotland supported by an annual multi-billion pound Ministry of Defence investment.' As part of the Strategic Defence Review, the government has committed to build up to 12 SSN-AUKUS submarines, which will replace the current fleet of Astute Class attack submarines. Get all the latest news from around the country Follow STV News Scan the QR code on your mobile device for all the latest news from around the country