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News18
13-06-2025
- Politics
- News18
Operation Sindoor And After: India Must Prepare For A Two-Front War
Last Updated: India should prepare for war not because it is imminent, but because peace must always be secured from a position of strength After Operation Sindoor, it has become abundantly clear that the spectre of a two-front war, where Pakistan and China work in tandem against us, is a reality that cannot be ignored anymore. The collaboration may not be overt, through a joint declaration of war, but the alliance of hostile congruence is undeniable. The idea of a collusive China-Pakistan military front against India is not new. Even before the ink dried on the Simla Agreement of 1972, Pakistan had begun cosying up to China. Their relationship, described over the years as 'higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans", is not just a diplomatic aphorism. It is a strategic reality that has gained menacing proportions in the last two decades. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship of Xi Jinping's Belt and Road Initiative, snakes through territory India claims as its own—Gilgit-Baltistan. This project is not merely an infrastructure endeavour but a visible assertion of China's strategic intent in India's immediate periphery. Add to this, regular joint military exercises, arms sales, intelligence sharing, and even potential nuclear cooperation, and one begins to grasp the nature of the challenge that confronts us. There are those who argue that war is improbable, if not impossible, in the nuclear age. To them, the logic of mutual deterrence ensures peace. But history has shown that even nuclear-armed nations can engage in limited wars or protracted conflicts below the threshold of nuclear engagement. Kargil in 1999, Galwan in 2020, Uri in 2016, Balakot in 2019, and Operation Sindoor (2025) are reminders of this reality. Moreover, one cannot ignore that China is no longer the aloof continental power it once was. Under Xi Jinping, it has adopted an aggressive, almost imperial posture—whether in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, or along the Line of Actual Control with India. Its claims are expansive, its patience limited, and its contempt for the rules-based international order increasingly visible. On the other hand, Pakistan, emboldened by its nuclear arsenal and sustained by a military that acts with near impunity, has found in China not only a patron but also a strategic mentor. The two have aligned not only militarily but ideologically—in their contempt for India's rise and its civilisational model. The time has, therefore, come to actively prepare to deal with this scenario. National security cannot be a matter of episodic attention triggered by the next skirmish on the border or an election season. It requires sustained investment—intellectual, financial, and diplomatic. In other words, we need to put in place a national strategic and defence policy. What could be its possible elements? Expand alliances with like-minded nations. Strategic autonomy does not mean strategic solitude. The ability to balance our interests with Russia and America is particularly important. Both are important sources of defence supplies. Simultaneously, we must strengthen Quad partnerships, further improve ties with ASEAN, and maintain a functional dialogue with China. Equally, we need to accelerate our ongoing defence indigenisation while selectively sourcing cutting-edge technologies from allies. We must also Invest much more in cyber and space defence, where the wars of the future will be shaped before the first bullet is fired. Our efforts to upgrade our border defence infrastructure must be urgently expedited. Finally, we must ensure internal political stability and social harmony. A nation divided within, cannot be united without. While pursuing the above, there is no need for paranoia. We have certain undeniable strengths, and both Pakistan and China have their obvious weaknesses. Pakistan is a nation on the verge of implosion. It is politically unstable—a sham democracy, ostensibly ruled by an unpopular civilian government, but actually run by an army junta that is fast losing credibility. It is also financially bankrupt, running on international doles, most of which goes to pay off old debts. It is internally facing secessionist threats, including unrest in Balochistan and POK. Its most popular leader is languishing in jail, and his party is under shackles. China's economy is lagging, internal resentments over unemployment are growing, and it lacks the safety valve of a democracy. Moreover, under Xi Jinping, its imperialist posture is creating an increasingly cohesive international pushback. Allying with a failed and unstable state like Pakistan could prove to be a proposition with diminishing returns for the Chinese. As against the above, India is a democratic country with close to 1.5 billion people, the fastest growing economy in the globe, and a nuclear power with one of the finest armed forces in the world. It is also one of the world's largest emerging markets, and an entrepreneurial hub. Yet, India must prepare for a two-front war. Not because war is imminent, but because peace must always be secured from a position of strength. For in the end, as Kautilya wrote in the Arthashastra: 'He who is prepared, is the master of his own destiny.' The writer is a former diplomat, an author, and a politician. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: June 13, 2025, 17:16 IST News opinion Opinion | Operation Sindoor And After: India Must Prepare For A Two-Front War
The Hindu
10-06-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
The hazards of going global on India-Pakistan issues
Operation Sindoor and subsequent events thereafter have, once again, highlighted the futility of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in resolving differences between India and Pakistan. An entangled web of frozen ideas has enveloped the situation making it impossible to separate the different strands. The developments following the Second World War and the evolution of the Cold War have also impacted heavily on the situation. Thus, any initiative, however sincere and logical it may be, will be hampered by the existing literature formulated by the United Nations and other international bodies, not to speak of Pakistan's stubborn position that Kashmir is the core issue. It is for this reason that Pakistan finds the smokescreen of resolutions and concepts relating to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), terrorism, self-determination, non-proliferation and peaceful settlement of disputes spread over the last 70 years or more. For instance, in the briefing given to India's seven teams of special envoys sent out to various countries after Operation Sindoor, the very first point they were asked to assert was that J&K is an integral part of India. Most countries, particularly those which do not follow developments closely, would look up the literature and the UN maps and find that there is an inscription on UN maps depicting the India-Pakistan border, particularly in the region of J&K. The inscription says, 'Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.' Sometimes, there is a more general disclaimer regarding boundaries on the map such as: 'the boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.' Therefore, most countries would not make a commitment on the question of borders. At best, they would tell us that a bilateral solution, as envisaged in the Simla Agreement, would be desirable. India's stand on terror Equally complex is India's position on terrorism. More than 30 years ago, India introduced in the UN General Assembly, a draft for a Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism, which was dismissed as an anti-Pakistan move in which others were not interested. A one man department against terrorism in Vienna was nothing more than a research post. It did not even define terrorism because of the dictum that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The support that India had given to fighters in Africa and Sri Lanka was pointed out as an example of the difficulty in defining terrorism. The only thing that the UN could do was to keep the definition of terrorism as vague as possible. The shocking events of 9/11 (2001) brought terrorism, which was considered to be confined to West Asia and South Asia, centre stage in the United States and Europe and it appeared that decisive action would be taken to deal with the menace globally. But after hectic activity in the political and legal bodies of the UN to finalise binding laws, the focus shifted to U.S. military action in Afghanistan, which resulted in the ouster of the Taliban government. The war in Afghanistan was meant to root out terrorism, but after decades of conflict, the U.S. fled the country, leaving the Taliban in power. The UN's approach The UN Security Council has established several mechanisms to combat international terrorism, that are primarily centred around the various resolutions. Under these all member-states are obliged to take various economic and security measures to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. The Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council was authorised to monitor the implementation of the overall plan. As for action against terrorists, this can be covered under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises the inherent right of self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member-state. Though the application of this right in the case of terrorist attacks is complicated, it can provide a basis for a state to take action against terrorist groups that have attacked it. India's position about surgical strikes on terrorist infrastructure will be judged as to whether such action is proportionate and in accordance with international humanitarian law. The Security Council's approach to counter-terrorism recognises that it requires a comprehensive 'whole-of-society' approach that respects human rights and the rule of law. It emphasises international cooperation, the importance of addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism, and the need to prevent and counter violent extremism. In these circumstances, it will be hard for India to get a clear endorsement of its actions against terrorism. India does bring up terrorist attacks to the Security Council, but the Counter Terrorism Committee has not taken a clear position on the right of nations to treat a terrorist attack as an act of war — the new doctrine advanced by India. The ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) and India's restraint in crossing the LoC even in conflict situations are the other factors which are likely to come into play in any discussion in the Security Council or other international fora on India's strategic strikes. India's special envoys may have faced these questions in discussions even with friendly countries. The issue of hyphenation When India took the issue of Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir to the UN, it was a pure case of aggression which should have been considered under Chapter VII of the Charter. But as it happened , the issue was discussed under Article VI on Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Consequently, several extraneous ideas were incorporated in the agenda. leading to western countries hyphenating India and Pakistan on every issue. When Pakistan and India acquired nuclear weapons, Kashmir was considered a nuclear hot spot. India has a non-first use doctrine, while Pakistan threatens to multiply its conventional military capability. India has an established position that any bilateral discussion would only be on terrorism and the status of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Therefore, diplomacy at the bilateral level or multilateral level is unlikely to be effective. Pakistan will continue to internationalise the Kashmir issue, but India should refrain from seeking international intervention or support. The reports of the special envoys will indicate, if anything, that such efforts are futile, given the history of the evolution of 'the India-Pakistan question' in the Security Council. India has nothing to gain by raising its concerns internationally as its narrative has got entangled in several controversial concepts in the UN. India's only option is to ensure its security by appropriate military action as long as Pakistan continues its policy of inflicting a thousand cuts on India to gain Indian territory. T.P. Sreenivasan is a former Ambassador of India, who has specialised in multilateral diplomacy. He is the only Indian diplomat who has served at the Ambassadorial level at the United Nations in New York, Vienna and Nairobi and headed the UN Division in Ministry of External Affairs
The Print
08-06-2025
- Business
- The Print
Our take on Srinagar rail link, Ukraine's drone strikes, census delays and more—in 50 words
RBI's 50 bps rate cut is a bold step. It will unlock funds for companies and consumers alike This week, we saw Ukraine's drone strikes deep into Russia, Goa taxi owners' protests against a possible introduction of app-based aggregators, and further delays in the population census. Read our 50-word editorials on them and much more. Musk has gotten away with his trade against Trump. It shows maturity of the American system Pakistan Defence Minister's Simla Agreement remark shows he has a foot-in-mouth disease All-weather rail link to Srinagar is demonstration of unputdownable Indian will to fight terror US Supreme Court has started the process of ending DEI. A new wave of lawsuits awaits 5 June Trump's bill in Congress will bring a deficit disaster for US. Economy isn't run on faith Census delay is inexcusable. Political convenience can't be prioritised over governance Goa taxi owners' protest against aggregators is about losing monopoly. Govt mustn't give in 4 June Bengaluru stampede will spark probe, blame game. Bottomline is India can't handle its crowds Quota for Ladakh residents is a good move. It should open talks about other core demands 3 June BJP's CT Ravi counting Kannadigas in RCB is absurd identity politics. Be a sport 2 June Ukraine and Russia are already at the negotiating table. That's how grown-up countries behave Prem Shukla's remarks on Congress spokesperson's mother are vile. BJP must expel him Drone warfare is well and truly here. And it has upended conventional strategic edge
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First Post
08-06-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Price of strategic autonomy: What Russia's reaction to Op Sindoor tells India
Both Washington and Moscow hesitate to 'go all in' for India. Without clear strategic commitments, neither side will offer India the kind of automatic, noncommittal support it might extend to a formal ally — whether in military terms, intelligence sharing, or diplomatic cover in multilateral forums read more War or conflict is often viewed as the failure of diplomacy. Yet, even during a war, diplomacy remains essential to statecraft. Justifying one's war effort as legitimate, legal, and invariably defensive requires proactive, sustained, wide-ranging diplomatic overtures. War is the ideal time to test the strength of alliances and the resolve of one's adversaries. During Operation Sindoor, India's diplomatic focus was on Saudi Arabia, the UAE, the US, European countries and Russia. Saudi Arabia's and the UAE's neutral positions were considered foreign policy successes for the Modi government. In its quintessential didactic habit, the European Union offered unsolicited advice on peace, underscored the fear of nuclear escalation, and was seen as patronising agents. The US initially appeared to throw its weight behind India's counter-terrorist strike well within Pakistan and eventually, in the course of a mysterious later development, positioned itself as a mediator in a cease-fire. What transpired between these two contradictory stands is in the realm of speculation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The most surprising element in these diplomatic overtures has been the stance of Russia, a longstanding, time-tested ally of India. The Russian response to Operation Sindoor was well-calibrated, formal, and essentially neutral if one goes by its public statement. There has been no public statement so far from the top leadership. Russia appeared to be noncommittal. Russian Foreign Minister's spokesperson Maria Zakharova, in her official statement, urged both India and Pakistan to exercise restraint to prevent further deterioration of the situation in the region. She further said that the two countries should resolve their differences through political and diplomatic means in accordance with the provisions of the Simla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999). Russia's South Asia Policy Two imperatives primarily drive Russia's South Asia policy: first, maintain and deepen its 'special and privileged strategic partnership' with India to create a multipolar Asia and a multipolar world. In this, India is the fulcrum of Russia's South Asia policy. Second, the creation of a firewall on the southern border of Central Asia to check the spillover of Islamic fundamentalism, narcotic trafficking, and refugees emanating from the South Asia region, particularly from Afghanistan. Ensuring regional stability is vital, and Russia cannot afford one more failing state (Pakistan in this case) in South Asia. Russia views Afghanistan as a key node in its regional security. Given Pakistan's entrenched penetration and influence on the sections of the Taliban, Russia is left with no choice but to take Pakistan on board in its Afghan policy. Since the mid-2010s, Russia has cautiously improved ties with Pakistan, focusing primarily on counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing and military exercises (eg, Druzhba). However, evolving developments in the Af-Pak region question the effectiveness and influence of Pakistan in Afghanistan and its northwest tribal region. Pakistan is no longer in a position to dictate terms in Afghanistan. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has intensified its campaign against the Pakistani state in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In light of these developments, India appears to have failed to convince that Pakistan is the fountainhead of terrorism, not a solution. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Historically, the global geopolitical setting has dictated Russia's position in South Asia, especially in the India-Pakistan conflict. In 1965, Russia played the mediator role, did not take sides and was instrumental in the Tashkent agreement. In the 1971 war, Moscow sided with India to counter the US-China-Pakistan axis. In the current geopolitical setting, Russia is heavily dependent on China in the wake of its ongoing war with Ukraine. This requires delicate balancing between India and China, and the Russian position on Pahalgam is a balancing act. Price of Strategic Autonomy India has pursued its policy of strategic autonomy, formally institutionalised through the Non-Aligned Movement in the 50s and 60s. Though strategic autonomy was not popular then, the term was popularised after the end of the Cold War, used mostly by the European Union vis-à-vis the US. Invoked by President K R Narayanan in 1999, it has been used by both the UPA and NDA leaders to chart an autonomous strategic course that India needs to undertake. Some scholars define it as 'a dependence control strategy aimed at safeguarding its independence in both foreign policy decision-making and protecting strategic assets against American pressure'. This pursuit of strategic autonomy has led India to participate in issue-based alliances actively or groupings, eg, Quad, SCO, BRICS, G-20, etc. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD India's recent push for issue-based alliances rather than long-term strategic partnerships comes with its strategic consequences, particularly in today's world of rising geopolitical contestation. Big powers often prefer dependable partners and camp followers — allies who align their interests, adopt similar strategic goals, and show a willingness to coordinate policy. For example, the United States provides robust security guarantees and diplomatic backing to NATO allies Japan and South Korea precisely because these partners are committed to shared defence and strategic alignment. India's non-aligned stance during the Cold War made Washington hesitant to extend full diplomatic or military support, viewing New Delhi as unpredictable or even sympathetic to the Soviet camp. Even with the Soviet Union, India's closest partner during the Cold War, the relationship stopped short of alliance. While Moscow supplied arms, diplomatic backing, and economic support, it understood that India would not become a satellite state or subordinate its interests to Soviet bloc priorities. This limited the extent to which Soviet support could translate into unreserved backing, especially when Moscow's own global calculations conflicted with India's. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In the contemporary context, the rise of China further complicates India's position. While India has moved closer to the United States, particularly through frameworks like the Quad, it continues to avoid formal alliances or security pacts. As a result, both Washington and Moscow hesitate to 'go all in' for India. Without clear strategic commitments, neither side will offer India the kind of automatic, noncommittal support it might extend to a formal ally — whether in military terms, intelligence sharing, or diplomatic cover in multilateral forums. This reveals a broader pattern in international politics: big powers reward alignment, not independence. Countries that position themselves as independent-minded actors often preserve their sovereignty and flexibility but pay the price of standing largely alone when power politics heats up. In India's case, this means that despite its size, economic weight, and geopolitical importance, it remains diplomatically constrained — drawing on a razzmatazz of transactional relationships with multiple powers, termed as multi-alignment, but lacking the kind of deep, reliable backing that comes with formal alignments. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In conclusion, India's Pahalgam diplomatic experience underscores a hard truth of international relations: strategic autonomy offers freedom but limits the scope of external support. This should drive home a lesson that India has to tread alone and can't rely on Russia or, for that matter, any other power. Strategic autonomy comes with strings attached. As global rivalries sharpen and the international order becomes more contested, India will continue to face the challenge of balancing its cherished independence with the need for dependable partnerships in a world where major powers expect loyalty in exchange for support. Amitabh Singh teaches at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. Ankur is a doctoral candidate at the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
Indian Express
08-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Tavleen Singh writes: Political poster boys
An unforeseen consequence of Operation Sindoor has been that South Asia's two poster boys of dynastic democracy surfaced and made fools of themselves. I speak of Bilawal Bhutto and Rahul Gandhi. They would not be considered political leaders at all if it were not for their illustrious surnames. As someone who believes dynastic succession should have ended when feudalism did, I watched the performance of these two political princes with real interest. The first performance came from Bilawal Bhutto, who made a speech on the banks of the Indus a day after India decided to suspend the Indus Water Treaty. In this speech, he threatened that either water would flow down the Indus or the 'blood of our enemies'. His Urdu remains bad, so he used melodrama to compensate and, in the manner of a crazed messiah, shrieked 'the Indus has always been ours, is ours, and will be ours'. This one speech was proof that not only was the heir to the mighty Bhutto dynasty linguistically challenged, but that he was politically challenged as well. But Pakistan's military rulers were clearly impressed with his performance and sent him off to Washington to convince people that it was Pakistan that was the victim of terrorism and that India's allegations were lies. It took Shashi Tharoor, who was also in Washington, one minute to demolish the narrative that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's heir was trying to weave. Tharoor said he sympathised with Bilawal because his mother had been killed by jihadi terrorists, but he seemed to have forgotten Hillary Clinton's warning to Pakistan. If you breed vipers in your backyard, you cannot expect that they will only attack your neighbour. Pakistan's terrorists are home-bred. Last week came a performance from the heir to our own storied dynasty. Rahul has, since Operation Sindoor, made statements that have been applauded in Pakistan even by Hafiz Saeed. But last week, he outdid himself. In the manner of a schoolboy discussing a cricket match, and with a sneery grin on his face, he imitated Donald Trump having a conversation with our prime minister on the phone and saying 'Narendra, Surrender'. And then he mimicked Narendra Modi saying 'ji huzoor'. The point the Leader of the Opposition was trying to make was that when his grandmother was prime minister, the Seventh Fleet was sent by Richard Nixon to warn her that breaking up Pakistan would have consequences. And she had courageously remained fixed on the course that she had set. A dangerous analogy to evoke, because Indira Gandhi also ended up snatching defeat from the jaws of victory (to use that useful cliché) by signing the Simla Agreement. All the cards were in India's hands. There were more than 90,000 prisoners of war in the custody of the Indian Army, so she could have told Bhutto that there would be no agreement without a signed guarantee that the Kashmir issue would end now. Instead, the agreement has a feeble reference to Kashmir being decided bilaterally. Years later, I happened to learn from a close associate of Bhutto that he boasted afterwards that he had outdone her. What exactly was the point that Indira's grandson was trying to make? Was he trying to prove the debunked falsehood that Modi agreed to a ceasefire because of pressure from Trump? Was he trying to say that the war should have continued indefinitely? Or was he trying to say what Congress spokespersons have said in TV debates, which is that the war should have continued until Pakistan is broken up once more? This was never the objective of Operation Sindoor. It had the limited objective of destroying Pakistan's terrorist infrastructure and from all accounts this objective was achieved. To return, though, to the poster boys of dynastic democracy. Bilawal has lost his relevance in Pakistani politics and is now merely a spokesman for the military men who control the political chessboard. Rahul remains relevant because he is fully in control of our oldest political party. And the only national party, we have other than the BJP. We have no choice but to take what he says seriously, which is why it is worrying that he continues to sound like a schoolboy with a special grudge against Modi for daring to usurp India, which he considers his birthright to rule since his family once did. It is this idea that India remains the private property of the Dynasty that is destroying the Congress Party. If you have been following recent events, you would have noticed that the Congress leaders in the parliamentary delegations have done an extremely good job. The only people who have let the party down are those who constitute the coterie around our own poster boy of dynastic democracy. It could be time for those who want Congress to survive and thrive to come together and urge the Dynasty's heirs to consider playing the role that the Chairman Emeritus plays in companies. If they agree, they can continue to have relevance in the family firm, but can move away from playing an active role. How long does the Congress Party want to pretend that Rahul is its prime minister-in-waiting when he has been unable to win a single Lok Sabha election for the party? One way or another dynastic democracy is a bad idea. And it is abundantly obvious that India's voters saw this before our political leaders have.
