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Economic Times
2 hours ago
- Politics
- Economic Times
Missiles, Militants, and Markets: Pakistan's quiet alliance with Iran runs deeper than you think
Few know this, but 'Pakistan' comes from Persian: Pak, meaning 'pure', and -stan, 'land'. In Iran, the name quite literally means 'Land of the Pure'. As tensions flare between Israel and Iran, an unexpected regional realignment is unfolding quietly but unmistakably. While Gulf Arab states walk the tightrope between maintaining ties with the West and managing regional outrage, Pakistan has been bold in its stance: openly condemning Israeli aggression, expressing solidarity with Iran, and strengthening bilateral trade and strategic cooperation with its Shia-majority this is not just about ideology. Behind Pakistan's rhetorical support for Iran lies a complex web of shared threats, historical affinities, economic dependencies, and strategic repositioning that defy easy of the most significant factors linking Pakistan to Iran is geography. The two countries share a 900-kilometre (560-mile) border, primarily between Pakistan's Balochistan province and Iran's Sistan-Baluchestan region is populated by ethnic Baluch, a Sunni Muslim minority group that has long complained of marginalisation in both countries. These grievances have birthed separatist movements and armed insurgencies on both sides of the border. The militant group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), formed by Iranian Baluch and operating from within Pakistan, is just one of several transnational threats both countries confront. According to Reuters, following Israeli strikes on Iran in mid-June, the group issued a call for widespread resistance, stating, 'Jaish al-Adl extends the hand of brotherhood… and calls on the people of Baluchistan to join the ranks of the Resistance.'As Israel targets Iran's nuclear infrastructure with a series of airstrikes, its officials have made no secret of a broader goal: to undermine, if not outright topple, the Iranian regime. In addition to fears of regional instability spilling over from Iran, Pakistan is also alarmed by the precedent Israel is setting by launching strikes on another nation's nuclear facilities. The concern is particularly acute given Pakistan's own rivalry with nuclear-armed neighbour India. The two countries were engaged in an intense four-day conflict as recently as alarmed Pakistani officials, who fear the radicalisation of their own Baluch population and the possibility of a broader, united 'Greater Baluchistan' movement. This scenario was described by Islamabad-based analyst Simbal Khan to Reuters as a real risk. 'They're all going to fight together if this blows up,' Khan warned. 'There's a fear of ungoverned spaces, which would be fertile ground for terrorist groups,' said Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to Washington. The fear is not just theoretical. In January 2024, Iran launched unprecedented drone and missile strikes into Pakistan's Balochistan, targeting alleged militant sanctuaries. Pakistan responded with retaliatory airstrikes in Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan province, claiming to have hit "terrorist hideouts" belonging to Baloch separatist insurgents engaged in conflict against Pakistan, specifically the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF). Pakistan stated that these strikes were a manifestation of its "unflinching resolve to protect and defend its national security against all threats." The Iranian government stated nine foreign citizens, including three women and four children, were killed in the instead of spiralling into prolonged conflict, both sides chose de-escalation, suspending cross-border trade temporarily but recommitting to border security cooperation. As senior Balochistan official Qadir Bakhsh Pirkaani confirmed to AFP, border crossings in five districts, including Chaghi, Panjgur, and Gwadar, were response reflects a shared understanding: instability in one country risks fuelling extremism in the other. As Pakistan's military conveyed in its meeting with US President Donald Trump, a collapse of authority in Iran could lead to an influx of militants and refugees. Trump, referring to his conversation with Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir, bluntly summarised: 'They're not happy about anything,' referring to Pakistan's views on the Israel-Iran conflict. Beyond security concerns, Pakistan's energy crisis makes cooperation with Iran essential. According to Iran's Customs Administration (IRICA), Iran exported $2.4 billion worth of non-oil goods to Pakistan in the last Iranian calendar year, ending March 20, 2025, making Pakistan its fifth-largest export destination. In the first two months of the new year alone, Iranian exports totalled $322 million, according to the Tehran Pakistan's exports to Iran stood at a meagre $43 million in the same period, down dramatically from $303 million in 2018. This trade imbalance has not dampened ambitions. In May 2025, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated a goal of increasing bilateral trade from the current $3 billion to $10 billion in the coming years, a sentiment echoed by Iranian leaders, who acknowledge that current trade levels are "not acceptable" given the potential. At the centre of Pakistan and Iran's energy cooperation lies the long-stalled Iran–Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline, often called the 'Peace Pipeline'. First proposed in 1995, the project gained traction with a formal agreement signed in Ankara in according to the New Delhi-based Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), the pipeline has been mired in delays for nearly three decades, largely due to US sanctions on Iran and mounting pressure on Iran has already completed its 1,100-kilometre section, Pakistan's 780-kilometre stretch remains mostly unbuilt. The pipeline is intended to transport natural gas from Iran's South Pars field to Pakistan's southern regions, including Gwadar and citing a lack of funds, failed to begin construction on its side. Tehran even offered a $500 million loan to help Islamabad finance the pipeline, estimated at $1.5 billion for Pakistan at the time, but the project still failed to move forward. In a symbolic gesture aimed at pushing the project ahead, then-President Asif Ali Zardari and his Iranian counterpart jointly inaugurated construction in March 2013. That same year, then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif assured that Pakistan would honour its commitment. But those assurances did not hold for long. By 2014, not only had the project failed to make meaningful progress, but it appeared to be regressing. Pakistan considered abandoning it altogether, prompting Iran to withdraw its loan escalated in 2019 when Iran threatened legal action against Pakistan for non-compliance. After years of inaction, Islamabad finally issued a force majeure notice in June 2023 under the terms of the Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement (GSPA), claiming circumstances beyond its control. Tehran rejected this notice, but the agreement was subsequently amended, giving Pakistan an additional five years to complete the consequences of inaction have been severe. According to ICWA, Pakistan has faced legal action from Tehran for non-compliance and owes up to $18 billion in penalties for breaching the contract as of a cautious step forward, the Pakistani government in February 2024 approved the construction of an 80-kilometre segment of the pipeline near the Iranian border. The project will be financed through the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess (GIDC) and implemented by Interstate Gas Systems (Private) Limited (ISGS).Still, US opposition continues to cast a long shadow over the project. Back in 2013, Washington had warned Islamabad that going ahead with the pipeline could invite economic sanctions, and instead encouraged it to explore liquefied natural gas (LNG) the challenges, the pipeline remains critical for Pakistan's energy needs, and for Iran's ambition to bypass Western-imposed isolation. As reported by Global Energy Monitor and The Diplomat, Islamabad has asked the US for sanctions exemptions for this project, a request that remains the pipeline was once envisioned as a regional connector. In 1999, India was invited to join the project, transforming it into the Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) pipeline that was to extend all the way to New Delhi. But progress stalled, and India officially withdrew in 2009. Iran had also hoped to include countries such as China and Bangladesh, but those ambitions have yet to was the first country to recognise Pakistan following its independence in 1947. During the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, Iran stood firmly by Islamabad's side, offering diplomatic and military support. In 1965, Tehran supplied Pakistan with arms and ammunition. During the 1971 war, Iran again backed Pakistan, reportedly even considering the deployment of F-4 Phantom fighter two nations were also strategic allies during the Cold War. Both were founding members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), formed on February 24, 1955, by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Backed by the West, CENTO aimed to curb Soviet expansion in the Middle East and South Asia. Although the alliance dissolved in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution, the shared threat of communist influence, and later, concerns over drug trafficking, cross-border insurgencies, and smuggling, kept channels of cooperation ties have further deepened the relationship. Persian language, literature, and political philosophy have left a lasting imprint on Pakistani intellectual and cultural life, influencing everything from poetry to statecraft. Even after Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, Pakistan was among the first nations to recognise the new regime. Despite international pressure, Islamabad extended support to Tehran during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), highlighting the resilience of their strategic calculus. Pakistan's deepening alignment with Iran also reflects a shifting geopolitical calculation. Islamabad has long tried to balance its ties with Saudi Arabia and the United States, both adversaries of Tehran, but changing global dynamics are pulling Pakistan the start of Israel's bombing campaign, Pakistan has positioned itself as one of the few Muslim-majority countries refusing to normalise relations with Israel. Countries such as the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have formalised ties with Tel Aviv under the Abraham meanwhile, has maintained that normalisation will not occur unless Palestinian statehood is October 2023, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry has repeatedly condemned Israeli airstrikes on Iran, calling them violations of June 20, 2025, Reuters reported that Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan, speaking at a press briefing, said: 'This is for us a very serious issue... It imperils the entire regional security structures, it impacts us deeply.' He further stated, 'Iran has the right to defend itself under the UN Charter.' According to the same Reuters report, Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar has spoken with foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, and the UK, warning that 'Israeli actions against Iran can have dangerous effects in the region and beyond.' Iranian officials have welcomed Pakistan's position. Several Iranian parliamentarians publicly thanked Islamabad, and there have been unconfirmed reports of Pakistani military delegations visiting Tehran. While Pakistan denies supplying military aid, its consistent diplomatic support has signalled a clear strategic emerging alignment brings Pakistan closer to Iran's key allies: China and Russia. All three countries have condemned Israeli actions and share an interest in limiting US influence in West and South Asia. As noted by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), Turkey has also escalated its rhetoric, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accusing Israel of 'setting the entire region on fire'.The idea of a growing Iran–China–Pakistan–Russia axis is no longer implausible. For Pakistan, closer ties with this bloc offer diplomatic protection, economic opportunity, and greater strategic leverage, especially as it seeks to expand Chinese investment through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a project that overlaps with Iranian ambitions at the Chabahar has repeatedly expressed interest in joining CPEC as part of China's broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vision that depends on regional stability, particularly in Iran and Pakistan. With Gwadar (in Pakistan) and Chabahar (in Iran) positioned as key regional trade hubs, collaboration between the two neighbours becomes even more in 2015, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), then-President Hassan Rouhani publicly expressed Iran's interest in becoming part of CPEC, emphasising the importance of regional connectivity for peace and support for Iran amid Israeli aggression is no knee-jerk reaction. It is a calibrated stance rooted in geography, history, security, economics, and shifting alliances. While some see it as an ideological solidarity with a fellow Muslim nation, the reality is more cannot afford a destabilised Iran. It fears spillover violence, refugee influxes, energy shortages, and economic penalties from unmet obligations. It also sees opportunity: in trade, in diplomacy, and in regional rebalancing.
Time of India
9 hours ago
- Politics
- Time of India
Missiles, Militants, and Markets: Pakistan's quiet alliance with Iran runs deeper than you think
Few know this, but 'Pakistan' comes from Persian: Pak, meaning 'pure', and -stan, 'land'. In Iran, the name quite literally means 'Land of the Pure'. As tensions flare between Israel and Iran, an unexpected regional realignment is unfolding quietly but unmistakably. While Gulf Arab states walk the tightrope between maintaining ties with the West and managing regional outrage, Pakistan has been bold in its stance: openly condemning Israeli aggression, expressing solidarity with Iran, and strengthening bilateral trade and strategic cooperation with its Shia-majority neighbour. But this is not just about ideology. Behind Pakistan's rhetorical support for Iran lies a complex web of shared threats, historical affinities, economic dependencies, and strategic repositioning that defy easy categorisation. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Play War Thunder now for free War Thunder Play Now Undo Militants, maps and mutual fears One of the most significant factors linking Pakistan to Iran is geography. The two countries share a 900-kilometre (560-mile) border, primarily between Pakistan's Balochistan province and Iran's Sistan-Baluchestan province. This region is populated by ethnic Baluch, a Sunni Muslim minority group that has long complained of marginalisation in both countries. These grievances have birthed separatist movements and armed insurgencies on both sides of the border. Live Events The militant group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice), formed by Iranian Baluch and operating from within Pakistan, is just one of several transnational threats both countries confront. According to Reuters, following Israeli strikes on Iran in mid-June, the group issued a call for widespread resistance, stating, 'Jaish al-Adl extends the hand of brotherhood… and calls on the people of Baluchistan to join the ranks of the Resistance.' As Israel targets Iran's nuclear infrastructure with a series of airstrikes, its officials have made no secret of a broader goal: to undermine, if not outright topple, the Iranian regime. In addition to fears of regional instability spilling over from Iran, Pakistan is also alarmed by the precedent Israel is setting by launching strikes on another nation's nuclear facilities. The concern is particularly acute given Pakistan's own rivalry with nuclear-armed neighbour India . The two countries were engaged in an intense four-day conflict as recently as May. This alarmed Pakistani officials, who fear the radicalisation of their own Baluch population and the possibility of a broader, united 'Greater Baluchistan' movement. This scenario was described by Islamabad-based analyst Simbal Khan to Reuters as a real risk. 'They're all going to fight together if this blows up,' Khan warned. 'There's a fear of ungoverned spaces, which would be fertile ground for terrorist groups,' said Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistani ambassador to Washington. The fear is not just theoretical. In January 2024, Iran launched unprecedented drone and missile strikes into Pakistan's Balochistan, targeting alleged militant sanctuaries. Pakistan responded with retaliatory airstrikes in Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan province, claiming to have hit "terrorist hideouts" belonging to Baloch separatist insurgents engaged in conflict against Pakistan, specifically the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF). Pakistan stated that these strikes were a manifestation of its "unflinching resolve to protect and defend its national security against all threats." The Iranian government stated nine foreign citizens, including three women and four children, were killed in the airstrikes. But instead of spiralling into prolonged conflict, both sides chose de-escalation, suspending cross-border trade temporarily but recommitting to border security cooperation. As senior Balochistan official Qadir Bakhsh Pirkaani confirmed to AFP, border crossings in five districts, including Chaghi, Panjgur, and Gwadar, were suspended. This response reflects a shared understanding: instability in one country risks fuelling extremism in the other. As Pakistan's military conveyed in its meeting with US President Donald Trump , a collapse of authority in Iran could lead to an influx of militants and refugees. Trump, referring to his conversation with Pakistan Army Chief Field Marshal Asim Munir , bluntly summarised: 'They're not happy about anything,' referring to Pakistan's views on the Israel-Iran conflict. Iran's energy lifeline to Pakistan Beyond security concerns, Pakistan's energy crisis makes cooperation with Iran essential. According to Iran's Customs Administration (IRICA), Iran exported $2.4 billion worth of non-oil goods to Pakistan in the last Iranian calendar year, ending March 20, 2025, making Pakistan its fifth-largest export destination. In the first two months of the new year alone, Iranian exports totalled $322 million, according to the Tehran Times. Meanwhile, Pakistan's exports to Iran stood at a meagre $43 million in the same period, down dramatically from $303 million in 2018. This trade imbalance has not dampened ambitions. In May 2025, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif stated a goal of increasing bilateral trade from the current $3 billion to $10 billion in the coming years, a sentiment echoed by Iranian leaders, who acknowledge that current trade levels are "not acceptable" given the potential. The pipe dream that won't die At the centre of Pakistan and Iran's energy cooperation lies the long-stalled Iran–Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline , often called the 'Peace Pipeline'. First proposed in 1995, the project gained traction with a formal agreement signed in Ankara in 2010. However, according to the New Delhi-based Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), the pipeline has been mired in delays for nearly three decades, largely due to US sanctions on Iran and mounting pressure on Pakistan. While Iran has already completed its 1,100-kilometre section, Pakistan's 780-kilometre stretch remains mostly unbuilt. The pipeline is intended to transport natural gas from Iran's South Pars field to Pakistan's southern regions, including Gwadar and Nawabshah. Pakistan, citing a lack of funds, failed to begin construction on its side. Tehran even offered a $500 million loan to help Islamabad finance the pipeline, estimated at $1.5 billion for Pakistan at the time, but the project still failed to move forward. In a symbolic gesture aimed at pushing the project ahead, then-President Asif Ali Zardari and his Iranian counterpart jointly inaugurated construction in March 2013. That same year, then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif assured that Pakistan would honour its commitment. But those assurances did not hold for long. By 2014, not only had the project failed to make meaningful progress, but it appeared to be regressing. Pakistan considered abandoning it altogether, prompting Iran to withdraw its loan offer. Tensions escalated in 2019 when Iran threatened legal action against Pakistan for non-compliance. After years of inaction, Islamabad finally issued a force majeure notice in June 2023 under the terms of the Gas Sales and Purchase Agreement (GSPA), claiming circumstances beyond its control. Tehran rejected this notice, but the agreement was subsequently amended, giving Pakistan an additional five years to complete construction. Yet the consequences of inaction have been severe. According to ICWA, Pakistan has faced legal action from Tehran for non-compliance and owes up to $18 billion in penalties for breaching the contract as of 2023. In a cautious step forward, the Pakistani government in February 2024 approved the construction of an 80-kilometre segment of the pipeline near the Iranian border. The project will be financed through the Gas Infrastructure Development Cess (GIDC) and implemented by Interstate Gas Systems (Private) Limited (ISGS). Still, US opposition continues to cast a long shadow over the project. Back in 2013, Washington had warned Islamabad that going ahead with the pipeline could invite economic sanctions, and instead encouraged it to explore liquefied natural gas (LNG) alternatives. Despite the challenges, the pipeline remains critical for Pakistan's energy needs, and for Iran's ambition to bypass Western-imposed isolation. As reported by Global Energy Monitor and The Diplomat, Islamabad has asked the US for sanctions exemptions for this project, a request that remains unanswered. Interestingly, the pipeline was once envisioned as a regional connector. In 1999, India was invited to join the project, transforming it into the Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) pipeline that was to extend all the way to New Delhi. But progress stalled, and India officially withdrew in 2009. Iran had also hoped to include countries such as China and Bangladesh, but those ambitions have yet to materialise. Allies then, allies now Iran was the first country to recognise Pakistan following its independence in 1947. During the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, Iran stood firmly by Islamabad's side, offering diplomatic and military support. In 1965, Tehran supplied Pakistan with arms and ammunition. During the 1971 war, Iran again backed Pakistan, reportedly even considering the deployment of F-4 Phantom fighter jets. The two nations were also strategic allies during the Cold War. Both were founding members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), formed on February 24, 1955, by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. Backed by the West, CENTO aimed to curb Soviet expansion in the Middle East and South Asia. Although the alliance dissolved in 1979 following the Iranian Revolution, the shared threat of communist influence, and later, concerns over drug trafficking, cross-border insurgencies, and smuggling, kept channels of cooperation open. Cultural ties have further deepened the relationship. Persian language, literature, and political philosophy have left a lasting imprint on Pakistani intellectual and cultural life, influencing everything from poetry to statecraft. Even after Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, Pakistan was among the first nations to recognise the new regime. Despite international pressure, Islamabad extended support to Tehran during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) , highlighting the resilience of their strategic calculus. Pakistan bets east, not west Pakistan's deepening alignment with Iran also reflects a shifting geopolitical calculation. Islamabad has long tried to balance its ties with Saudi Arabia and the United States, both adversaries of Tehran, but changing global dynamics are pulling Pakistan eastward. Since the start of Israel's bombing campaign, Pakistan has positioned itself as one of the few Muslim-majority countries refusing to normalise relations with Israel. Countries such as the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have formalised ties with Tel Aviv under the Abraham Accords. Pakistan, meanwhile, has maintained that normalisation will not occur unless Palestinian statehood is assured. Since October 2023, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry has repeatedly condemned Israeli airstrikes on Iran, calling them violations of sovereignty. On June 20, 2025, Reuters reported that Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson Shafqat Ali Khan, speaking at a press briefing, said: 'This is for us a very serious issue... It imperils the entire regional security structures, it impacts us deeply.' He further stated, 'Iran has the right to defend itself under the UN Charter.' According to the same Reuters report, Pakistan's Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar has spoken with foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, and the UK, warning that 'Israeli actions against Iran can have dangerous effects in the region and beyond.' Iranian officials have welcomed Pakistan's position. Several Iranian parliamentarians publicly thanked Islamabad, and there have been unconfirmed reports of Pakistani military delegations visiting Tehran. While Pakistan denies supplying military aid, its consistent diplomatic support has signalled a clear strategic pivot. This emerging alignment brings Pakistan closer to Iran's key allies: China and Russia. All three countries have condemned Israeli actions and share an interest in limiting US influence in West and South Asia. As noted by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), Turkey has also escalated its rhetoric, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accusing Israel of 'setting the entire region on fire'. The idea of a growing Iran–China–Pakistan–Russia axis is no longer implausible. For Pakistan, closer ties with this bloc offer diplomatic protection, economic opportunity, and greater strategic leverage, especially as it seeks to expand Chinese investment through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a project that overlaps with Iranian ambitions at the Chabahar port. Iran has repeatedly expressed interest in joining CPEC as part of China's broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vision that depends on regional stability, particularly in Iran and Pakistan. With Gwadar (in Pakistan) and Chabahar (in Iran) positioned as key regional trade hubs, collaboration between the two neighbours becomes even more crucial. Back in 2015, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), then-President Hassan Rouhani publicly expressed Iran's interest in becoming part of CPEC, emphasising the importance of regional connectivity for peace and development. Partners in survival? Pakistan's support for Iran amid Israeli aggression is no knee-jerk reaction. It is a calibrated stance rooted in geography, history, security, economics, and shifting alliances. While some see it as an ideological solidarity with a fellow Muslim nation, the reality is more pragmatic. Pakistan cannot afford a destabilised Iran. It fears spillover violence, refugee influxes, energy shortages, and economic penalties from unmet obligations. It also sees opportunity: in trade, in diplomacy, and in regional rebalancing.
