Latest news with #Shahed
Straits Times
11 hours ago
- Politics
- Straits Times
Ukraine's Zelensky: Russia's defence of Iran shows need to tighten sanctions
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy looks on during the G7 Leaders' Summit in Kananaskis, in Alberta, Canada, June 17, 2025. REUTERS/Amber Bracken/File Photo KYIV - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on Thursday that Russia's defence of Iran's authorities underscored the need for intensified sanctions against Moscow. Zelensky said Russia's deployment of Iranian-designed Shahed drones and North Korean munitions was proof that Kyiv's allies were applying insufficient pressure against Moscow. 'Now Russia is trying to save the Iranian nuclear programme. There cannot be any other possible explanation for their public signals and their non-public activity on this,' Zelensky said in his nightly video address. 'When one of their accomplices loses their capability to export war, Russia is weakened and tries to interfere. This is so cynical and proves time and again that aggressive regimes cannot be allowed to unite and become partners.' When Russia deploys weaponry from Tehran and Pyongyang, he said, "it is a clear sign that global solidarity and global pressure are not strong enough." Russia signed a strategic partnership with Iran this year. Moscow has denounced Israeli strikes against Iran and offered to mediate. A Russian deputy foreign minister said Moscow was urging Washington to refrain from direct involvement. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said the conflict between Israel and Iran had exposed Russian hypocrisy, with Moscow defending Iran's nuclear programme and condemning strikes against Tehran while 'ruthlessly' attacking Ukraine. 'The only rational conclusion is that Russia cannot be trusted in any situation, and it is always part of the problem rather than the solution,' Sybiha wrote in English on X. Zelensky has accused Russia of refusing diplomatic approaches and rejecting an unconditional ceasefire in the war, which has lasted more than three years. In his address, he said he was 'very much counting on' US President Donald Trump to consider tougher sanctions and boost diplomatic efforts to end the war. Trump has so far ruled out calls to intensify sanctions against Moscow. Zelensky also expressed willingness to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin, though he said the Kremlin leader had stayed on beyond the constitutional limit of his office. That comment was a reference to Russian accusations that Zelensky had remained in office without agreeing, under provisions of martial law in Ukraine, to hold an election. REUTERS Join ST's Telegram channel and get the latest breaking news delivered to you.
Mint
18 hours ago
- Politics
- Mint
Russia-Ukraine war: Putin says he'll meet Zelensky — but only at ‘final phase' of talks
Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday (June 19) that he is willing to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — but only at the 'final phase' of any negotiations. 'So as not to sit there and divide things up endlessly, but to put an end to it,' Putin told international journalists during a media briefing in St. Petersburg. The comment came amid intensified Russian strikes on Ukrainian cities and growing global concerns that diplomatic efforts are losing momentum. However, Putin's broader tone remained defiant, casting doubt on the sincerity of any peace overtures. Putin reiterated that Russian forces were focusing attacks on Ukrainian defense infrastructure. 'The strikes were carried out against military industries, not residential quarters,' he claimed. The statement comes just days after a missile strike collapsed a residential building in Kyiv's Solomianskyi district, killing 23 people. Putin also warned Germany against delivering long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine, saying it would risk dragging Berlin into direct confrontation with Moscow. 'Our troops are advancing along the entire line of contact,' he said. 'If [Ukraine] fail[s] to agree [to Russia's terms], the situation could change for the worse.' Echoing previous statements, Putin questioned President Zelensky's legitimacy. He also endorsed Donald Trump's approach to the conflict, saying: 'If Trump had been the president, the conflict indeed might not have erupted.' A devastating Russian missile strike on a Kyiv apartment building that killed 28 people and injured 142 has prompted renewed calls from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the international community to increase pressure on Moscow. The strike, which occurred early Tuesday, hit multiple locations across Ukraine's capital, with the deadliest damage concentrated in the Solomianskyi district, where a missile collapsed a nine-story residential building, killing 23 people at that site alone. 'This attack is a reminder to the world that Russia rejects a ceasefire and chooses killing,' Zelenskyy said during a visit to the wreckage on Thursday, where he was joined by top officials, including presidential chief of staff Andrii Yermak and Interior Minister Ihor Klymenko. The strike was part of a broader wave of aerial assaults. Overnight on Wednesday, Russia launched 104 Shahed and decoy drones across Ukraine. According to Ukraine's air force, 88 were intercepted, jammed, or disappeared from radar, while others reached their targets. According to Ukrainian authorities, Russia launched over 440 drones and 32 missiles in what President Zelensky called 'one of the biggest bombardments of the war.' The attack overwhelmed Ukraine's air defenses, causing widespread destruction and casualties. Kyiv Military Administration head Tymur Tkachenko confirmed the toll on Thursday, calling it the capital's deadliest attack in 2025. Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha responded sharply to Russia's claims of openness to peace, calling them 'manipulations.' In a post on X, Sybiha wrote: 'It has been exactly 100 days since Ukraine unconditionally accepted the US peace proposal to completely cease fire... 100 days of Russia escalating terror against Ukraine rather than ending it.' He added: 'Ukraine remains committed to peace. Unfortunately, Russia continues to choose war, disregarding US efforts to end the killing.'
Boston Globe
a day ago
- Politics
- Boston Globe
Zelensky calls for more pressure on Russia after deadly Kyiv missile strike
Advertisement 'This attack is a reminder to the world that Russia rejects a ceasefire and chooses killing,' Zelenskyy wrote on Telegram, and thanked Ukraine's partners who he said are ready to pressure Russia to 'feel the real cost of the war.' Tuesday's attack on Kyiv was part of a sweeping barrage as Russia once again sought to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Russia fired more than 440 drones and 32 missiles in what Zelenskyy called one of the biggest bombardments of the war, now in its fourth year. As Russia proceeds with a summer offensive on parts of the roughly 1,000-kilometer (620-mile) front line, U.S.-led peace efforts have failed to gain traction. Russian President Vladimir Putin has effectively rejected an offer from U.S. President Donald Trump for an immediate 30-day ceasefire, making it conditional on a halt on Ukraine's mobilization effort and a freeze on Western arms supplies. Advertisement Meanwhile, Middle East tensions and U.S. trade tariffs have drawn world attention away from Ukraine's pleas for more diplomatic and economic pressure to be placed on Moscow. Russia in recent weeks has intensified long-range attacks that have struck urban residential areas. Yet on Wednesday, Putin denied that his military had struck such targets, saying that attacks were 'against military industries, not residential quarters.' Speaking to senior news leaders of international news agencies in St. Petersburg, Putin said he was open to talks with Zelenskyy, but repeated his claim that the Ukrainian leader had lost his legitimacy after his term expired last year — allegations rejected by Kyiv and its allies. 'We are ready for substantive talks on the principles of a settlement,' Putin said, noting that a previous round of talks in Istanbul had led to an exchange of prisoners and the bodies of fallen soldiers. Putin on Wednesday praised Trump's push for peace in Ukraine. But Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha wrote on X on Thursday that it was his country that had 'unconditionally accepted' the U.S. proposal for a ceasefire, and said that Russian claims of willingness to end the war were 'manipulations.' 'It has been exactly 100 days since Ukraine unconditionally accepted the U.S. peace proposal to completely cease fire, put an end to the killing, and move forward with a genuine peace process ... 100 days of Russia escalating terror against Ukraine rather than ending it,' Sybiha wrote. 'Ukraine remains committed to peace. Unfortunately, Russia continues to choose war, disregarding U.S. efforts to end the killing,' he added. Advertisement Overnight on Wednesday, Russia fired a barrage of 104 Shahed and decoy drones across Ukraine, according to the country's air force. Of those, 88 were intercepted, jammed, or lost from radars mid-flight. There were no immediate reports of casualties or damage caused by the attack.
Yahoo
2 days ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
Why Isn't Russia Defending Iran?
The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here. Iran is suffering blow after blow, and Russia, its most powerful supporter, is apparently not prepared to do much of anything about it. Not long ago, backing the West's least-favorite power in the Middle East had its uses. In prosecuting his war of attrition in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made confrontation with the West the organizing principle of his foreign policy. In that context, edging closer to Iran and its partners in the 'Axis of Resistance' made sense. Tehran was also an important supplier: It delivered Shahed drones for Russian use in Ukraine at a moment when these were particularly crucial to Moscow's war-fighting capacity. Then came the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, followed by Israel's brutal war in Gaza. Leaning into pro-Palestinian and anti-Western sentiment allowed Russia to score points with global public opinion. But dynamics that initially seemed to benefit Russia quickly became a strategic headache. First, Israel devastated Iran's partners Hamas and Hezbollah; then, in April and October 2024, Iran attacked Israel directly with strikes that yielded only minimal damage, suggesting that Iran's missile capabilities were not all that formidable. Israel retaliated, impairing Iran's missile production and air defenses, including its Russian-made S-300 missile systems. Suddenly, Iran looked weak, and Russia had a choice: It could shore up its Middle Eastern ally, or it could cut its losses in a troubled region. That Moscow could not or would not intervene decisively on behalf of its anti-Western partners in the Middle East became obvious in December 2024, when Syrian rebels ousted Bashar al-Assad, Russia's longtime ally. Iran and Russia continued to cooperate in areas such as electronic warfare and satellite development, and they even signed a strategic-partnership treaty in January. But Russia declined to give Iran the support it would have needed—say, advanced fighter jets or sophisticated air defenses—to deter or better defend itself against further Israeli attacks. [Read: 'This war is not helping us'] The truth is that Russia has always had limits as to how far it would go in supporting Iran. The Kremlin's obsessive anti-Western agenda elevated the Islamic Republic's importance as a partner, but Putin still has other interests in the region—a long-standing, if complicated, relationship with Israel and a need to coordinate with OPEC on oil prices, for instance—and so remained mindful of Israeli and Gulf State red lines when it came to defense cooperation with Iran. What's more, Russia was never going to risk military entanglement on behalf of its partner, especially not while it has had its hands full closer to home. Finally, Russia may no longer have much appetite for cooperating with Western states in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, but it has never wanted Iran to cross the nuclear threshold. The Kremlin takes American warnings on this score seriously and has sought to avoid U.S. military action against Iran. And it has never wished for Iran to acquire the global status that nuclear weapons would confer—among other reasons, because Moscow knows that it would lose leverage over a nuclear Iran. Russia stands to gain some advantages from a protracted war between Iran and Israel. The fighting would torpedo President Donald Trump's attempts to broker a nuclear deal with Iran—making the United States look weak and highlighting its inability to keep Israel on a leash. Oil prices would stay elevated, especially if Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz. This would relieve some pressure on Russia's state finances. U.S. missile interceptors—and world attention—would be diverted from Ukraine to the Middle East. Sure, Iran would have to stop sending Russia weapons for an indefinite period. But Russia has already succeeded in localizing the production of Iranian-designed drones and sources the components from elsewhere. Still, Iran's humiliation at the hands of a U.S. ally can hardly please Russia's leaders. Israel has already claimed freedom of movement in the skies over Iran. Russia may also worry that a long war in Iran could destabilize the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), where Russia has interests but for which it has had precious little bandwidth during the war in Ukraine. Nor would Moscow welcome unrest that hastens the end of the Iranian regime. A cornered Iran could also lash out, leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or dash for the bomb, laying bare the limits of Moscow's leverage over Tehran. Russia would probably like to avoid having Iran go nuclear—but it would also prefer not to see the U.S. sweep in with military action that further weakens Iran. [Read: What Trump knew about the attack against Iran] On Saturday, Putin congratulated Trump on his birthday and offered to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with Iran (he had made a similar offer in early March). Ever since the inauguration, Moscow has been signaling its appetite to work with Washington on geopolitical dossiers—in part to stall on a Ukraine cease-fire. Iran presents a rare opportunity for Putin to return to the stage of great-power diplomacy by negotiating an issue of global consequence. The question is: What can Russia bring to the table? A defenseless Iran will not respond well to Russian sticks, and in any case, Moscow is unlikely to take a punitive approach to Tehran. Russia may not have shown up as Iran's knight in shining armor, but the two countries are still partners, and they are fundamentally united in an anti-Western agenda. Russia also has few meaningful carrots to offer Iran at this point and will be cautious about providing military equipment in a moment when Israel is systematically destroying it. And Putin is not someone who likes to openly side with what appears to be the losing party. Russia can potentially play a practical role in a future agreement, having offered to remove Iran's highly enriched uranium and convert it into civilian-reactor fuel for Tehran. But Russia's technical schemes cannot bridge what is a fundamental political divide between a U.S. administration that insists on zero enrichment and an Iran that views such a demand as a call to surrender. Strategically isolated and acutely vulnerable, Iran will be even more distrustful of the United States than it was before Israel's attack, and it will want Russia involved for at least the appearance of balance. But Russia has little influence over the outcome of the war, Iran's next steps, or Washington's decision as to whether it will engage militarily. When it comes to shaping events far from Russia's borders, Moscow is only so interested and only so able, particularly given its deep investment in the war in Ukraine. Having anti-Western partners in the Middle East serves its purpose. But no one should hold their breath waiting for Russia to come to the rescue of Iran. Article originally published at The Atlantic
Atlantic
2 days ago
- Politics
- Atlantic
Why Isn't Russia Defending Iran?
Iran is suffering blow after blow, and Russia, its most powerful supporter, is apparently not prepared to do much of anything about it. Not long ago, backing the West's least-favorite power in the Middle East had its uses. In prosecuting his war of attrition in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made confrontation with the West the organizing principle of his foreign policy. In that context, edging closer to Iran and its partners in the 'Axis of Resistance' made sense. Tehran was also an important supplier: It delivered Shahed drones for Russian use in Ukraine at a moment when these were particularly crucial to Moscow's war-fighting capacity. Then came the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, followed by Israel's brutal war in Gaza. Leaning into pro-Palestinian and anti-Western sentiment allowed Russia to score points with global public opinion. But dynamics that initially seemed to benefit Russia quickly became a strategic headache. First, Israel devastated Iran's partners Hamas and Hezbollah; then, in April and October 2024, Iran attacked Israel directly with strikes that yielded only minimal damage, suggesting that Iran's missile capabilities were not all that formidable. Israel retaliated, impairing Iran's missile production and air defenses, including its Russian-made S-300 missile systems. Suddenly, Iran looked weak, and Russia had a choice: It could shore up its Middle Eastern ally, or it could cut its losses in a troubled region. That Moscow could not or would not intervene decisively on behalf of its anti-Western partners in the Middle East became obvious in December 2024, when Syrian rebels ousted Bashar al-Assad, Russia's longtime ally. Iran and Russia continued to cooperate in areas such as electronic warfare and satellite development, and they even signed a strategic-partnership treaty in January. But Russia declined to give Iran the support it would have needed—say, advanced fighter jets or sophisticated air defenses—to deter or better defend itself against further Israeli attacks. The truth is that Russia has always had limits as to how far it would go in supporting Iran. The Kremlin's obsessive anti-Western agenda elevated the Islamic Republic's importance as a partner, but Putin still has other interests in the region—a long-standing, if complicated, relationship with Israel and a need to coordinate with OPEC on oil prices, for instance—and so remained mindful of Israeli and Gulf State red lines when it came to defense cooperation with Iran. What's more, Russia was never going to risk military entanglement on behalf of its partner, especially not while it has had its hands full closer to home. Finally, Russia may no longer have much appetite for cooperating with Western states in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, but it has never wanted Iran to cross the nuclear threshold. The Kremlin takes American warnings on this score seriously and has sought to avoid U.S. military action against Iran. And it has never wished for Iran to acquire the global status that nuclear weapons would confer—among other reasons, because Moscow knows that it would lose leverage over a nuclear Iran. Russia stands to gain some advantages from a protracted war between Iran and Israel. The fighting would torpedo President Donald Trump's attempts to broker a nuclear deal with Iran—making the United States look weak and highlighting its inability to keep Israel on a leash. Oil prices would stay elevated, especially if Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz. This would relieve some pressure on Russia's state finances. U.S. missile interceptors—and world attention—would be diverted from Ukraine to the Middle East. Sure, Iran would have to stop sending Russia weapons for an indefinite period. But Russia has already succeeded in localizing the production of Iranian-designed drones and sources the components from elsewhere. Still, Iran's humiliation at the hands of a U.S. ally can hardly please Russia's leaders. Israel has already claimed freedom of movement in the skies over Iran. Russia may also worry that a long war in Iran could destabilize the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), where Russia has interests but for which it has had precious little bandwidth during the war in Ukraine. Nor would Moscow welcome unrest that hastens the end of the Iranian regime. A cornered Iran could also lash out, leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or dash for the bomb, laying bare the limits of Moscow's leverage over Tehran. Russia would probably like to avoid having Iran go nuclear—but it would also prefer not to see the U.S. sweep in with military action that further weakens Iran. On Saturday, Putin congratulated Trump on his birthday and offered to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with Iran (he had made a similar offer in early March). Ever since the inauguration, Moscow has been signaling its appetite to work with Washington on geopolitical dossiers—in part to stall on a Ukraine cease-fire. Iran presents a rare opportunity for Putin to return to the stage of great-power diplomacy by negotiating an issue of global consequence. The question is: What can Russia bring to the table? A defenseless Iran will not respond well to Russian sticks, and in any case, Moscow is unlikely to take a punitive approach to Tehran. Russia may not have shown up as Iran's knight in shining armor, but the two countries are still partners, and they are fundamentally united in an anti-Western agenda. Russia also has few meaningful carrots to offer Iran at this point and will be cautious about providing military equipment in a moment when Israel is systematically destroying it. And Putin is not someone who likes to openly side with what appears to be the losing party. Russia can potentially play a practical role in a future agreement, having offered to remove Iran's highly enriched uranium and convert it into civilian-reactor fuel for Tehran. But Russia's technical schemes cannot bridge what is a fundamental political divide between a U.S. administration that insists on zero enrichment and an Iran that views such a demand as a call to surrender. Strategically isolated and acutely vulnerable, Iran will be even more distrustful of the United States than it was before Israel's attack, and it will want Russia involved for at least the appearance of balance. But Russia has little influence over the outcome of the war, Iran's next steps, or Washington's decision as to whether it will engage militarily. When it comes to shaping events far from Russia's borders, Moscow is only so interested and only so able, particularly given its deep investment in the war in Ukraine. Having anti-Western partners in the Middle East serves its purpose. But no one should hold their breath waiting for Russia to come to the rescue of Iran.
