Latest news with #Section125CrPC
News18
13-05-2025
- General
- News18
'One Or Two Lapses Not Same As Living In Adultery': Patna HC Upholds Maintenance To Wife, Daughter
Last Updated: The court rejected a plea by the husband that his wife was living in adultery with her brother-in-law, so she was not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC The Patna High Court has said that adulterous life is no doubt a disqualification for any wife to get maintenance from her husband under Section 125 CrPC; however, any physical relationship of a lady with any person prior to her marriage does not come within the definition of 'adultery" because adultery is an offence against one's spouse. A single-judge bench of Jitendra Kumar said the adulterous life of any wife subsequent to her marriage is undoubtedly a disqualification for any married wife to get maintenance from her husband. 'However, 'living in adultery' denotes a continuous course of conduct and not isolated acts of immorality. One or two lapses from virtues may be acts of adultery, but would not be sufficient to show that the woman was 'living in adultery'. A few moral lapses and a return to a normal life can not be said to be living in adultery. If the lapse is continued and followed up by a further adulterous life, the woman can be said to be 'living in adultery'," the bench said. The court rejected a plea by the husband that his wife was living in adultery with her brother-in-law, so she was not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC. Even the plea of the petitioner that the woman is now divorced and she is not entitled to get maintenance under Section 125 CrPC was rejected. 'As per Explanation (b) to Section 125(1) CrPC, wife includes even divorced wife and she is entitled to get maintenance under Section 125 CrPC if she has not remarried and it is not a case of the petitioner that his divorced wife has remarried," the bench said. The bench upheld the order by the Family Court, Bhagalpur, which directed the petitioner to pay Rs 3,000 per month to his wife and Rs 2,000 per month to his daughter towards their maintenance. It noted that, except for the allegation that his wife was having an illicit relationship with her brother-in-law prior to and subsequent to the marriage, there were no specific details regarding such a life of his wife. Even the conduct of the petitioner/husband during the subsistence of the marriage does not show that he was serious about his allegation, the court said. The bench pointed out, 'No such allegation has been made in his divorce petition, which was filed not on the ground of adultery but on the ground of cruelty and desertion. Moreover, as per his pleadings, he was always ready to keep his wife with him. Such willingness on the part of a husband is not possible if he believes that his wife has been indulging in an adulterous life. Hence, the petitioner has not proved that his wife was living in adultery." As per the claim of the wife, her husband-petitioner herein was having an illicit relationship with another lady, and hence, he was subjecting her to ill-treatment/cruelty, and she was constrained to leave her matrimonial home to live at her parental home along with the child. Even in the divorce proceeding, the petitioner-husband could not prove his allegation of desertion by his wife. Moreover, one criminal case filed by the wife for alleged cruelty is still pending for consideration in the Court of SDJM, Bhagalpur, the bench said. The petitioner-husband also claimed that he is not the biological father of the minor daughter, as she was born on August 08, 2010, whereas his marriage was solemnised on March 18, 2010, which shows that the girl child was born just after 4 months and 10 days of his marriage. He claimed the child is not his legitimate daughter and that she, being born out of an illicit relationship of the wife with someone else, is the illegitimate child of another man, and hence, he is not liable to pay any maintenance to her. On this, the bench, however, said it would be pertinent to point out that as per Section 112 of the Evidence Act, a child born during the continuation of a valid marriage between his/her mother and any man is held to be the legitimate son/daughter of that man, unless it is shown by that man that he had no access to his wife at any time when the child could have been conceived. Relying upon the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Aparna Ajinkya Firodia Vs Ajinkya Arun Firodia, the court pointed out it was held that birth during the continuance of marriage is 'conclusive proof" of legitimacy unless 'non-access" of the party who questions the paternity of the child at the time the child could have been begotten is proved by the said party. The court said the girl child was born here during the subsistence of marriage, though it is also not disputed that she was born just after 4 months and 10 days of the marriage. Hence, in view of the law, as provided in Section 112 of the Evidence Act, 1872, she was presumed to be the legitimate daughter of the petitioner because it had already been found that the marriage between her mother and the petitioner was valid and subsisting. The presumption regarding the paternity could have been rebutted only by the petitioner pleading and proving his non-access to the mother at the time when the child could have been conceived, the bench said. 'But I find that there is no such pleadings and evidence on behalf of the petitioner that before marriage, he had no access to or relationship with the wife, except the bald allegation on his part that his wife was having illicit relationship with her brother-in-law prior and subsequent to the marriage," the judge said. The court also pointed out that the petitioner has never filed any matrimonial petition before a family court or any civil court regarding a declaration in regard to the paternity of the child. The bench also rejected the petitioner's plea that the woman was not his legally wedded wife on the ground that his marriage with her was forcibly solemnised. 'However, I find that, as per the evidence, that the marriage was solemnised as per Hindu Rites and Customs at Temple without any application of force. Moreover, I find that the petitioner has never filed any matrimonial petition for annulment of his marriage, either under Section 11 or 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act. I further find that he has filed only a divorce petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act and it goes without saying that divorce petition is filed by the husband only against his legally wedded wife. Hence, the plea of the petitioner that the woman was not his legally wedded wife, has no substance," the judge said. The court also emphasised that a strict standard of proof is not required in a proceeding under Section 125 of CrPC, unlike in matrimonial proceedings, where strict proof of marriage or paternity is essential. top videos View all It said, prima facie, the court's satisfaction regarding the parties' marital status and the child's paternity is sufficient to pass an order under Section 125 of CrPC. It has also been discussed and found that any finding regarding the marital status of the party or paternity of the child in a proceeding under Section 125 CrPC is tentative and not final, and it is always subject to the order of any civil court or family court, which are the competent courts to conclusively decide the marital status of the party or legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, the bench said. Watch India Pakistan Breaking News on CNN-News18. Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from politics to crime and society. Stay informed with the latest India news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! tags : Adultery maintenance marriage Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: May 14, 2025, 02:46 IST News india 'One Or Two Lapses Not Same As Living In Adultery': Patna HC Upholds Maintenance To Wife, Daughter
News18
25-04-2025
- News18
Sharia Court Has No Recognition In Law: Supreme Court
Last Updated: The top court emphasised that any declaration or decision by such bodies, by whatever name labelled, is not binding on anyone and is unenforceable by resort to any coercive measure The Supreme Court has declared that Court of Kazi, Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat, Sharia Court, etc, by whatever name or style they may be, have no recognition in law, while allowing a maintenance plea by a Muslim woman under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah emphasised that any declaration or decision by such bodies, by whatever name labelled, is not binding on anyone and is unenforceable by resort to any coercive measure. 'The only way such declaration/decision can withstand scrutiny in the eye of law could be when the affected parties accept such declaration/decision by acting thereon or accepting it and when such action does not conflict with any other law. Even then, such declaration/decision, at best, would only be valid inter-se the parties that choose to act upon/accept the same, and not a third-party," the bench said. The court clarified the position of law while relying upon Vishwa Lochan Madan Vs Union of India (2014) as it found a Muslim man initially filed a plea in a Court of Kazi and Court of (Darul Kaja) Kajiyat seeking divorce from the wife. The bench here was dealing with a plea filed by Shahjahan questioning the Allahabad High Court's order of August 03, 2018, which dismissed her revision petition against the family court at Jhansi's order of April 23, 2010, denying her maintenance under Section 125 CrPC. The family court allowed only Rs 2,500 for her two children. The marriage was solemnised on September 24, 2002, according to Islamic customs. This was the second marriage for both. After hearing the counsel for the woman and the state government, the bench noted the appellant-woman contended that her husband had caused cruelty to her as she was not able to fulfil his demand for a motorcycle and Rs 50,000. On this aspect, the family court noted that since it was their second marriage, there is no possibility of demand of dowry by the man, as he would be trying to rehabilitate his house. 'Such reasoning/observation by the family court is unknown to the canons of law and is based on mere conjecture and surmise. The family court will do well, henceforth, to bear in mind the observation in Nagarathinam Vs State, through the Inspector of Police (2023) that the '…Court is not an institution to sermonise society on morality and ethics …'," the bench said. The SC also emphasised that the family court could not have presumed that a second marriage for both parties would necessarily entail no dowry demand. The bench also objected to the family court, taking note of the 2005 compromise between the couple, opined that it was the appellant's character and conduct which led to the rift in the conjugal life of the parties. 'This reasoning is based on the purported fact that the appellant in the compromise deed had admitted to her mistake. However, from a bare perusal of the compromise deed, it would become clear that it records no such admission. The first 'divorce suit' instituted by the husband in 2005 was dismissed on the basis of this compromise, wherein both parties decided to live together and agreed that they would not give the other party any occasion to complain. Hence, the very basis/reasoning for rejecting the appellant's claim for maintenance appears to be ex-facie unsustainable," the bench said. The court also dealt with the question of from which date the maintenance will be payable—the date of the application or the date of the order. In the case, the SC noted, the appellant contested the direction of the family court wherein it had made the maintenance payable from the date of the order instead of the date of application. 'Of course, Section 125(2) of the Code empowers the court to award maintenance from the date of the order but the same has to be justified in the background of the attendant facts and circumstances and should not cause unnecessary hardship to the applicant. In our view, Section 125 of the Code is a beneficial piece of legislation which has been enacted to protect the wife and children from destitution and vagrancy and, in the usual course, it would not be appropriate to disadvantage the applicant for the delay in the disposal of the application by the judicial system," the bench said, relying upon Rajnesh Vs Neha (2021). Having noted the husband worked as Aarakshak (Constable) in BSF and earned Rs 15,000 when the application was filed in family court, the bench said it is to be borne in mind that this was the situation in 2008-2009 (nearly 16 years ago) and much water would have flown under the bridge since then. 'We are of the view that maintenance could not have been denied to the appellant-wife under the prevailing circumstances," the bench said, directing for payment of Rs 4,000 per month as maintenance to the appellant, from the date of filing of the maintenance petition before the family court. The court also clarified that the maintenance awarded to the children will also be payable from the date of filing of the maintenance petition. Since the daughter has attained majority, the SC said, the maintenance awarded in her favour will only be payable up to the date of her attaining majority. The court directed the husband to deposit the amount in the family court within four months after adjustment of amounts, if any, already paid. Get breaking news, top headlines, and live updates on politics, weather, elections, law and crime. Stay informed with real-time coverage and in-depth analysis. Also Download the News18 App to stay updated! tags : divorce marriage sharia supreme court Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: April 26, 2025, 04:19 IST
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First Post
23-04-2025
- Entertainment
- First Post
After Ground Zero, Emraan Hashmi to star in another film inspired by true events- The Shah Bano Case, teams up with 'Article 370' actress Yami Gautam
The untitled project is expected to be Yami's next major theatrical release after Article 370 — and is poised to dive deep into the human cost of legal battles that become national flashpoints read more Emraan Hashmi will be seen in Ground Zero that releases this Friday. The film is inspired by true events. And now, he is already doing another film based on true events, this time on the 1985 Shah Bano case. He will be teaming up with Yami Gautam. The untitled project is expected to be Yami's next major theatrical release after Article 370 — and is poised to dive deep into the human cost of legal battles that become national flashpoints. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD A source told Hindustan Times, 'Yami and Emraan are leading this impactful courtroom drama and have finished the shooting schedule. A lot of research has gone into the script to ensure authenticity and the film boasts of several long and intense courtroom scenes. Yami plays Shah Bano, while Emraan's character draws from Ahmed Khan.' What was the Shah Bano case? In 1978, 62-year-old Shah Bano, a mother of five, approached the Supreme Court under Section 125 CrPC, seeking maintenance after being divorced via triple talaq by her lawyer husband, Mohd. Ahmad Khan, who cited Muslim Personal Law to deny support beyond the three-months for her and their children. After a 7-year legal battle, the Court ruled in her favour in 1985, stating that Section 125 applied to all citizens, ensuring a divorced woman's right to maintenance regardless of religion — a landmark verdict in the fight for gender justice and constitutional equality. The ruling sparked backlash from conservative groups, leading the Rajiv Gandhi government to pass the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, diluting the verdict. The episode reignited debates on vote-bank politics, UCC, and secularism — themes that remain relevant even today. Shah Bano's voice was once heard in the hallowed halls. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
