Latest news with #Sahelian
Business Insider
2 days ago
- Politics
- Business Insider
Despite Burkina Faso's headstrong stance, some African countries still want to remain friends
Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Traoré, the junta leader of Burkina Faso, received Tete António, the Special Envoy of the African Union (AU) Chairperson, Angolan President João Lourenço, in the country's capital of Ouagadougou on June 17, 2025. Lieutenant-Colonel Ibrahim Traoré met Tete António, AU's Envoy, in Ouagadougou to strengthen unity amid Sahel security threats. The AU's visit symbolizes its shift towards actionable engagement, aiming to support susceptible member states facing insurgencies. Discussions between the AU delegation and local officials focused on issues of security and humanitarian challenges. Tete issued a message from the current chair of the AU, Angolan President João Lourenço. The goal of António's visit is to strengthen continental unity with Burkina Faso in the face of growing Sahelian security threats. The delegation was described as a listening mission: "to see what collective paths we can take as Africans to find solutions." His visit symbolizes the AU's transition from declarations to engagement, indicating a readiness to assist vulnerable member states facing Islamist insurgencies. António said that the AU "will not remain indifferent" to the deepening crisis, emphasizing the notion of continental responsibility. The AU delegation met with Traoré and local officials to discuss security and humanitarian issues, as reported by Sputnik. The conclusion is likely to direct coordinated AU support, which may include logistics, peacekeeping, information sharing, and humanitarian supplies. This move mirrors a recent one made by the Nigerian government, which allowed the country to present an olive branch to the defected state. Burkina Faso, which is one-third of the three countries that recently exited its former regional bloc the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was offered a diplomatic overture alongside Mali and Niger for the re-estblishment of a working relationship with Nigeria. During a news conference in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, on Monday, Nigeria's Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Tuggar disclosed the intent, demonstrating the country's determination to continue promoting regional cooperation within the ECOWAS framework in spite of persistent political divisions. Nigeria sees the three nations as essential partners in West Africa's economic destiny, notwithstanding their official withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States, Tuggar underlined. He pointed out that political differences shouldn't stop regional growth, especially when common issues like infrastructure, trade, and security cut beyond institutional boundaries. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger's self-wiled stance In a remarkable turn that has reshaped West Africa's geopolitical landscape, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have formally withdrawn from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), signaling a profound break not just from the regional bloc, but also from long-standing Western alliances. The three Sahelian nations grappling with terrorism, underdevelopment, and political instability have increasingly expressed frustration with what they view as ECOWAS's ineffectiveness and bias, especially after the bloc imposed sanctions following recent coups. The military juntas leading these countries have made it clear: their priorities are internal stability, security control, and economic self-determination, not appeasing Western capitals or complying with ECOWAS timelines for a return to civilian rule. Mali and Burkina Faso, for instance, expelled French troops and suspended military cooperation with former Western allies, turning instead to new partners like Russia. Niger, following the 2023 coup, followed a similar trajectory by rejecting French military presence and forming a security alliance with its Sahel neighbors.
eNCA
3 days ago
- Politics
- eNCA
Togo suspends French broadcasters for three months
LOME - Togo suspended French broadcasters RFI and France 24 for three months, the country's media regulator said, accusing both of transmitting "inexact and tendentious" content. The temporary ban further reduces the two French public broadcasters' availability in West Africa after they were slapped with multi-year suspensions in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, a trio of Sahelian countries currently run by military juntas. "Several recent broadcasts relayed inaccurate, biased, and even factually incorrect statements, undermining the stability of republican institutions and the country's image," Togo's High Authority for Audiovisual and Communications (HAAC) said in a statement. In a joint statement, the two broadcasters declared they had "learned with surprise" of their ban which had been delivered "without warning" despite what they termed a "sustained and constructive dialogue" with the regulator. RFI and France 24 also reaffirmed their "indefatigable commitment to deontological journalistic principles, along with support for their teams who daily deliver rigorous, independent, verified, impartial and balanced news" broadcasts. In a statement which AFP has seen, HAAC cited three reports by the French broadcasters to justify its decision. The first was an interview on France 24 in which "inaccurate statements were made regarding the alleged conditions under which the artist Aamron was apprehended." The second featured "public statements by the regional correspondent of France 24 calling for mobilisation against republican institutions", while the third alluded to "biased" remarks in an RFI commentary. The suspension comes after anti-government protests shook the capital last week, Lome. Dozens of people were arrested after police dispersed protesters with tear gas on the night of June 5 to 6 in several districts, including near the presidential palace. Some journalists who covered the protests were also briefly detained and ordered by police to erase their footage. The government said it has since released more than 50 people but several remain in police custody. The protests, notably called for by popular rapper Aamron, were spurred by rising electricity prices and constitutional changes enacted by the government of President Faure Gnassingbe, who took power in 2005 upon the death of his father, who had ruled for nearly four decades. Those changes strengthened his grip over the country with the opposition saying they remove limits on his stay in office, extending his potential time as president until 2031 before likely being appointed to a new position of "president of the council of ministers" -- essentially prime minister. Gnassingbe says the reforms will strengthen national unity. Aamron -- real name Essowe Tchalla -- was arrested on May 26 but then appeared in a video 10 days later in which he apologised to the president and said he was in a psychiatric hospital suffering from "severe depression". Togolese opposition parties and civil society groups last Thursday demanded Gnassingbe step down. The National Alliance for Change (ANC), Democratic Forces for the Republic (FDR) and civil society groups urged citizens to engage in civil disobedience from June 23 to thwart the "illegitimate" regime. Protests have been banned in Togo since 2022, though public meetings are still allowed. There have been fresh calls this week for further protests on June 26, 27 and 28.
Daily Maverick
3 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Why a jihadist takeover of a Sahelian capital is unlikely
Despite a recent surge in terrorist attacks, the region is more at risk of fragmentation than centralised jihadist rule. Insecurity has risen sharply in the Sahel in recent months. Between late May and early June, major attacks claimed by Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) targeted various locations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This resurgence underscores the two groups' adaptive capabilities and questions the efficacy of counterterrorism strategies implemented by the Alliance of Sahel States' (AES) military-led governments. Consequently, some analysts are concerned about the potential for a Sahelian capital to fall under jihadist control – drawing parallels to the December 2024 capture of Damascus by terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, there are critical contextual distinctions between the two scenarios. Unlike HTS, which has consistently pursued regime change to position itself as a political-religious alternative, JNIM and ISGS show no intent to seize power in the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey or Ouagadougou. Rather, their strategies emphasise the gradual erosion of state authority in rural peripheries where they mediate local conflicts, enforce norms and collect taxes. This underscores their comparatively limited operational capacity. JNIM and ISGS primarily operate in remote rural areas, using light weapons such as rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars. They also use motorcycles, improvised explosive devices and weaponised civilian drones. Although they have taken and temporarily controlled towns in the interior, such as Djibo and Diapaga, they lack the firepower and logistical capabilities to sustain a prolonged siege and occupation of a major city. Their strength lies in mobility and local knowledge rather than the capacity to occupy and govern territory for long periods. HTS, by contrast, developed a structured military force with centralised command and tactical units capable of coordinated assaults supported by drones and heavy artillery. The group had sustained access to sophisticated weaponry through well-organised transnational supply lines. The fall of Damascus represented the culmination of a broader regime-change dynamic set in motion by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and bolstered, to varying degrees, by some Western and Gulf countries. For a while, HTS capitalised on key cross-border corridors – particularly with Turkey – that enabled the steady influx of foreign fighters, medical aid, munitions and advanced weapons systems. No comparable geopolitical architecture exists in the Sahel. While weapons trafficking from Libya has strengthened some armed groups, there is no declared international effort aimed at toppling the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Although AES leaders frequently accuse foreign actors – notably France – of supporting terrorism or destabilising the region, open-source data offers little evidence of this. Even Algeria, whose role in northern Mali has occasionally been ambivalent, has never sought to overthrow the government in Bamako. Another point of distinction is the internal dynamics of state militaries. The fall of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and ultimately Damascus, occurred within just two weeks. This was primarily due to the limited resistance by the Syrian Army – weakened by a decade of conflicts, widespread defections and deteriorating living standards. In contrast, the capabilities of armies in Sahelian countries are increasing. These militaries are ideologically and institutionally resistant to jihadists, perceiving them as existential threats to their respective governments. Furthermore, having assumed political power, AES military leaders have entrenched their authority within the state apparatus, bolstering their responsibility and accountability. Also, the rise of HTS was enabled by the exhaustion of a war-weary Syrian population and economic collapse, further aggravated by international sanctions. Disillusioned by Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian regime, many Syrians viewed HTS as either a lesser evil or, in some cases, a more favourable alternative. The Sahel situation is starkly different. Although hardline Islamist ideologies have found some traction in urban centres, public sentiment in the capital cities remains hostile towards jihadists who are perceived as instigators of violence, instability and national suffering. For now, these factors together render the capture and sustained control of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces improbable. JNIM and ISGS are likely to restrict themselves to guerrilla and destabilisation tactics. As history shows, however, this does not make these cities immune to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup was triggered by military setbacks in the north. Similarly, Burkina Faso's January 2022 coup occurred following a mutiny prompted by escalating casualties among security forces. Considering the AES countries' protracted military transitions and constrained political environments, further upheavals leading to institutional breakdowns and a disorganisation of security forces cannot be ruled out. This could have unpredictable consequences for the Sahel and west Africa at large. To avoid this, AES governments must acknowledge the strategic limitations of their militarised approach to terrorism. While increasing troop numbers and acquiring advanced weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures haven't incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the world's epicentre for terrorism for the second consecutive year, accounting for half of all global casualties. The youthful appearance of the assailants in the foiled 2 June Timbuktu attack should be a wake-up call to AES strategists. It reflects a generation of children deprived of schooling due to chronic insecurity, and whose families lack access to income, justice and essential social services. These factors are potent drivers of recruitment into armed groups – and cannot be solved through military means alone. AES governments need a coherent, region-wide counterterrorism strategy that goes beyond military interventions. Valuable insights can be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin's disengagement and reintegration programmes, Mauritania's religious dialogue initiatives, and Algeria's non-kinetic approach. Equally important is the need to engage with communities stigmatised by counterterrorism operations, fostering trust and reducing the risk of recruitment. Enhanced relations with Algeria and the Economic Community of West African States could bolster regional cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening the collective capacity to reduce the threat posed by armed groups. Without a meaningful recalibration of strategy, the Sahel could descend into prolonged fragmentation, with profound consequences for west Africa's stability. DM
Hindustan Times
11-06-2025
- Business
- Hindustan Times
Luxury property's final frontier
IN THE LAGOS edition of Monopoly, a board game, the priciest neighbourhood up for grabs in Nigeria's commercial capital is Banana Island. The sand-filled annex in Ikoyi, a rich part of town, was created just two decades ago. It has since become some of Nigeria's hottest property. To enter the enclave, non-residents need special security codes that change every hour. There are curfews for domestic staff and rules on loitering. Banana Island was supposed to have more reliable power than the rest of Lagos, too, though in practice it has not quite worked out that way . No matter. These days one square metre of land goes for almost $2,000, about the same price as in Camps Bay, a fancy suburb of Cape Town in South Africa. Despite a cost-of-living crisis, plots are selling fast. The skylines of west Africa's coastal cities are being reshaped by a surge in luxury property development. The changes offer an insight into how wealthy Africans are spending their money. They also show that the property sector is beginning to play a more important role in African economies, becoming a source of much-needed dollars. Lagos is a particularly obvious case, perhaps because it sits on a small, densely populated peninsula where there is little choice but to build upwards. One property developer reckons that at least 600 flats that are worth $1m or more each are currently being built there, even though GDP per person is still just $800. Property contributed more than 16trn naira ($10bn) to Nigeria's GDP in 2024, or 5.8%. That is almost as much as crude oil and natural-gas extraction, which accounted for 17trn naira ($10.7bn), or 6.2%, a remarkable feat in an economy that is still largely dependent on oil. But the trend is not limited to Nigeria. Arrivals at Ghana's main airport in Accra, the capital, are greeted by agents selling flats in at least half a dozen plush developments. Many units are sold before they are completed. Abidjan, the commercial centre of Ivory Coast, is being transformed by luxury developments, too. Land prices there have been rising by around 10% a year for more than a decade. One reason for the building boom is the changing nature of Africa's diaspora. Larger and wealthier than in the past, its members are spending more time and money on the continent. Marieme Ngom, a Senegalese property developer, says those of her clients who want luxury options already have second homes in other countries, both in Africa and in the West. They value staying in style when they come to see family or do business. Their ranks have been swelled by industrialists from neighbouring countries in the Sahel. Insecurity and the fondness of Sahelian juntas for expropriation have prompted the rich in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to send their families to safer places like Ivory Coast or Senegal. Members of the diaspora appreciate the opportunity to earn rent within the country from their flats when they are not using them, saving on the cost of transferring money in and out of the country. That is an especially lucrative option in cities like Dakar, Senegal's capital, where luxury hotels are thin on the ground. Others opt for build-to-rent blocks. Developers help them find tenants who can pay the high rents, which are often pegged to dollar values. It helps that property across the region is still relatively cheaper than in other places, promising higher returns as cities grow. That growth is itself spurring the trend along. Abidjan gains 200,000 new residents a year; in Lagos, it is 1m. The vast majority are unlikely to see much benefit from the trend, as few investors are interested in building non-luxury homes. Affordable housing 'is very risky. You don't make lots of money so you don't attract foreign investors,' says Nicolas Moreau, a developer in Ivory Coast. Yet while new middle-class residents may not be able to afford the priciest flats, they enjoy mixed-use developments that combine luxury residences with malls and restaurants and serve as urban islands in the cities' traffic-snarled chaos. For investors, combining residential and commercial property in this way mitigates risk. There are some concerns that the boom is a bubble. Many observers are puzzled by the sky-high valuations, particularly as the trend spreads to sleepier cities. Yet for now, a sufficient number of rich buyers and the continuing dearth of investment options will probably ensure it continues. Says Mr Moreau: 'Every year since 2010 I hear that this is a bubble, and this market will collapse. Every year I hear that, and it doesn't happen.' Get 360° coverage—from daily headlines to 100 year archives.
Economist
05-06-2025
- General
- Economist
African architects have cool designs for a warming planet
The first thing you notice, stepping from the scorching Sahelian sun into the laterite-stone dome, is how cold it is. There is no air-conditioning, just shade and natural ventilation; nor is there plaster. Diebedo Francis Kere, the architect behind the new mausoleum in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso's capital, strives to use only what can be sourced nearby. 'I'm a construction-material opportunist,' he says. 'I look around at what is most abundant, and how people use it, and try to do something new.' The result is a building so austere, low-tech and elegant that it is like entering a temple of the ancient world.
