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Indian Express
16 hours ago
- Business
- Indian Express
Why India doesn't need to worry about the Trump-Munir lunch
US President Donald Trump's recent lunch meeting with Pakistan's Army Chief, General Asim Munir, has raised more than a few eyebrows, particularly in India. Munir is not a well-known figure in Washington's strategic circles and yet, he found himself seated across from the most powerful man in the world. For many, it seemed like a bizarre political detour. But if one strips away sentiment and looks through the lens of history and statecraft, the picture becomes clearer. As the old adage goes, nations have no permanent friends or enemies — only permanent interests. What we are witnessing is not a departure from norms but a reaffirmation of how American foreign policy has long worked, particularly when it comes to Pakistan. Pakistan occupies one of the most strategically sensitive pieces of real estate in the world. It borders five civilisational and geopolitical spheres: Indian, Chinese, Central Asian, Persian and Arab. No other space in the world offers such a dense intersection of influence. That alone ensures that Pakistan, regardless of its economic health or internal chaos, will continue to feature in the calculus of global powers. This is not a new phenomenon. From the 1950s onwards, Pakistan was a member of both SEATO and CENTO — Cold War alliances aimed at containing communism. In 1960, CIA pilot Gary Powers flew a U-2 spy plane from Peshawar over Soviet territory, which was later shot down, sparking an international crisis. In the 1970s, Pakistan served as the covert conduit through which President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger opened diplomatic relations with China. Crucially, after 9/11, Pakistan's territory became indispensable for US operations in Afghanistan. Whether it was providing a logistics corridor for NATO supplies, intelligence coordination (however uneven), or access to airbases, Pakistan allowed America to wage a two-decade war in its backyard without the financial and operational burden of establishing new infrastructure in Central Asia. Without Pakistan, the Afghan war would have cost three times as much and been logistically far more challenging. Many Indians are rightly puzzled by Washington's recurring tilt toward Pakistan, especially when it is common knowledge that Pakistan has harboured and supported anti-India terror networks. However, the US Department of Defence has maintained a deep institutional relationship with the Pakistan army that survives changes in political mood. America may mistrust Pakistan's civilian governments or even its double-dealing on terrorism, but it views the Pakistan military as a rational, hierarchical force that can 'get things done'. I attended training courses and programmes in the US. I can state that in a lineup of Indian and Pakistani officers from the armed forces, an American general will always shake hands first with the Pakistanis. That calculus has not changed. Trump's meeting with Munir signals a tactical re-engagement rather than a fundamental strategic pivot. The US may be planning for renewed contingency operations in Afghanistan, hedging against China's Belt and Road Initiative via CPEC, or managing risks in Iran and Central Asia. Pakistan is relevant in all these theatres. At the same time, India must recognise that its own strategic partnership with the US remains strong and is grounded in very different fundamentals. Since 1991, when India opened up its economy and began integrating with the global order, relations with Washington have steadily deepened. The nuclear deal of 2008, defence cooperation under LEMOA and COMCASA, technology partnerships and the rise of the Quad reflect this. However, this relationship is not immune to friction. India's insistence on strategic autonomy occasionally confounds American expectations. Nowhere was this more visible than during the Ukraine war. While the West imposed sweeping sanctions on Russia, India chose a path of calibrated engagement — buying oil at discounted rates, abstaining at the UN, and maintaining robust dialogue with both sides. This decision wasn't about fence-sitting; it was about placing Indian national interest above alliance politics. Washington noticed — and, to its credit, ultimately respected — India's position. But the episode was a timely reminder; even close partners will diverge when their interests do. Seen in this light, Trump's outreach to Pakistan should not be read as a betrayal or a shift away from India. It is better understood as tactical engagement driven by geography, legacy relationships, and evolving regional threats. Pakistan will always offer America access, whether for leverage in Kabul, observation posts against Iran, or to counter Chinese expansion. But such engagement is opportunistic, not strategic. India's strength lies elsewhere. We are not a country that offers itself as an operational base or intermediary. We offer long-term strategic value; a stable democracy, a massive consumer market, a growing technological base, a competent military, and a rules-based approach to global governance. We are not transactional in our diplomacy; we are a civilisational state with depth. Pakistan's ruling elite — particularly its military — has always sought visibility abroad to compensate for instability at home. Foreign engagements like the one with Trump are often used to burnish credentials domestically. But Pakistan's fundamentals remain fragile: An economy in freefall, a splintered polity, and an increasingly alienated populace. America knows this. While it may engage Islamabad's generals from time to time, it does not mistake tactical necessity for strategic trust. India, on the other hand, has remained firm and predictable through global flux. India remained steady whether it was Covid, the Afghanistan pull-out, or the energy crisis after Ukraine. That is the hallmark of a reliable partner, not one that flits in and out of favour but one that shows up and stays the course. Let us not be distracted by luncheon invites. Let us remain focused on India's trajectory. We are not a fly-by-night friend of the US — we are a strategic power in our own right. We are neither insecure about Pakistan's moment in the sun nor anxious for validation. We should be confident that the more uncertain the world becomes, the more valuable India's stability will appear. The US knows this, even if it occasionally wanders in search of old allies for new problems. Real partnership is tested over time — and India has passed that test repeatedly. The US may dip back into its Pakistan playbook occasionally, but its real bet is on a rising India. That bet may not always be loud, but it will be lasting. The writer is a former corps commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps and a member of the National Disaster Management Authority. Views are personal
Focus Malaysia
09-06-2025
- Politics
- Focus Malaysia
Rethinking SEATO: A new maritime pact for ASEAN?
AS geopolitical tensions escalate in the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asian nations find themselves increasingly vulnerable to the turbulence sweeping the region. China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, the rising strategic competition between the United States (US) and China, and the proliferation of non-traditional maritime threats such as piracy and illegal fishing have converged to create a volatile security environment. Against this backdrop, a provocative question has resurfaced: Should the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) revive the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) as a mechanism to bolster regional maritime security? SEATO, founded in 1954 and dissolved in 1977, was originally designed as a Cold War-era collective defence pact aimed at containing communism. Its legacy is, at best, mixed. With only two Southeast Asian members i.e., Thailand and the Philippines and heavily dominated by external powers like the US, United Kingdom, and France, SEATO was often criticised for its lack of cohesion and legitimacy within the region. Its failure to evolve into a true collective security mechanism contributed to its irrelevance and eventual dissolution. Yet in 2025, the strategic landscape has changed dramatically. Today, the Indo-Pacific is the epicentre of global power politics, and ASEAN's role has never been more crucial. The organisation stands at a crossroads: continue with its consensus-based, non-aligned approach, or adapt to a more assertive and structured security framework in response to rising threats. The idea of reviving SEATO or at least, reimagining it should be explored seriously, but with critical adjustments grounded in current realities. Maritime security: ASEAN's Achilles heel Southeast Asia's maritime domain is a focal point for multiple overlapping claims, economic interests, and military ambitions. The South China Sea alone sees one-third of global shipping pass through its waters. Yet, maritime security remains ASEAN's Achilles heel. Despite initiatives like the ASEAN Maritime Forum and joint patrols in the Sulu and Celebes Seas, the region lacks a comprehensive, cohesive maritime defence structure. In the face of China's continued island-building, coercion of fishermen, and incursions into Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), ASEAN's diplomatic toolbox seems increasingly inadequate. Reviving SEATO or creating a SEATO 2.0 could offer a more robust framework to pool resources, share intelligence, and establish clear deterrents. Unlike its Cold War predecessor, a modern version would need to be rooted in ASEAN leadership, rather than being externally driven. This could transform it from a symbol of neo-colonial entanglement into a proactive regional safeguard. A reimagined SEATO: ASEAN-led and inclusive Any modern iteration of SEATO must be fundamentally different in design and intent. First and foremost, it should be ASEAN-led, preserving the centrality of the organisation. External partners such as the US, Japan, Australia, and India could serve as dialogue or strategic partners, but not dominant actors. This would maintain ASEAN's long-held position of neutrality while enabling it to take a more assertive role in shaping regional security. The objectives of a new SEATO would also need to evolve. Rather than being a purely anti-China alliance, it should focus on enhancing maritime domain awareness, building naval interoperability, strengthening coast guard cooperation, and securing sea lines of communication. These goals are inherently defensive and could gain broader support among ASEAN's diverse members, many of whom are wary of becoming pawns in great power rivalries. This reimagined SEATO could also be integrated into the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture. Coordination with initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) would create a multi-layered and resilient defence posture. Challenges and caveats However, reviving or rebranding SEATO is far from a silver bullet. ASEAN's core principles are non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, and respect for sovereignty, often inhibit swift or unified responses to crises. Member states have varying security priorities and relationships with major powers. For instance, Cambodia and Laos maintain close ties with China, while the Philippines and Vietnam are more confrontational. This divergence makes the formation of a formal security pact challenging. Moreover, introducing a SEATO-like structure risks undermining ASEAN unity if not managed carefully. It could exacerbate intra-regional tensions and provoke backlash from China, which may interpret it as an encirclement strategy. Balancing deterrence and diplomacy will be crucial. The path forward: Pragmatic regionalism Rather than a wholesale revival of SEATO, ASEAN should consider a flexible, modular approach. A 'SEATO-lite' framework beginning with joint maritime exercises, intelligence sharing, and capacity-building—could evolve organically based on the needs and consensus of member states. This incremental strategy would avoid the political costs of formalising a defence pact while still enhancing maritime cooperation. Additionally, ASEAN should push for institutional reforms that allow for 'ASEAN Minus X' models where willing members move forward on specific security initiatives without requiring unanimity. This would preserve the group's cohesion while allowing progress on urgent maritime issues. Conclusion The notion of reviving SEATO as a means to strengthen maritime security in Southeast Asia is both provocative and timely. While the historical baggage of the original SEATO looms large, the current strategic environment demands fresh thinking. A reinvented, ASEAN-led security framework whether called SEATO or something new could be a pivotal step in safeguarding the region's maritime future. ASEAN must not allow itself to be paralysed by its past or by external pressures. The Indo-Pacific is evolving rapidly, and so too must Southeast Asia's security architecture. Whether through a revived SEATO or an entirely new model, one thing is clear: the time for passive neutrality is over. ‒ June 9, 2025 R Paneir Selvam is the principal consultant of Arunachala Research & Consultancy Sdn Bhd, a think tank specialising in strategic national and geopolitical matters. The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Focus Malaysia. Main image: AP Photo/Sakchai Lalit
