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The South African
6 days ago
- Business
- The South African
The yearly salaries of South Africa's State-owned enterprise CEOs
Several Parliamentary Q&A sessions have revealed just how much public officials and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of some of South Africa's top State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are earning annually. According to BusinessTech , the yearly salary of some are up to R15.5 million a year, which equates to a eyebrow-raising R42 400 every day. This yearly salary, earned by the CEO of the Development Bank of South Africa, also tops the list of highest salaries for public officials in SA. Next on the list of highly-paid Chief Executive Officers is Transnet's CEO, who earns R8.5 million a year. The Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) pays its CEO R7.8 million per year, with the CEO of the Road Accident Fund (RAF) coming in next, earning R7.1 million annually. Take a look at the top 10 SOEs as well as how much their CEOs are paid below: State-owned enterprise CEO pay per year CEO pay per month CEO pay per day Development Bank of South Africa R15.5 million R1.29 million R42 465 Transnet R8.5 million R708 333 R23 287 Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) R7.8 million R650 000 R21 370 Road Accident Fund (RAF) R7.1 million R591 666 R19 452 Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) R6.92 million R576 667 R18 959 Central Energy Fund R6.15 million R512 500 R16 849 Air Traffic Navigation Services R6.14 million R511 667 R16 822 South African Airways (SAA) R6.0 million R500 000 R16 438 PetroSA R5.8 million R483 333 R15 890 Rand Water R5.4 million R450 000 R14 795 Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 1 Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X and Bluesky for the latest news.


The Citizen
14-06-2025
- Business
- The Citizen
DA raises alarm over R8.5m deficit at Polokwane Housing Association
Quick read The DA in Polokwane has raised serious concerns over the financial mismanagement of the Polokwane Housing Association (PHA), which is projecting an R8.5 million deficit despite receiving a R10 million municipal subsidy. DA councillor Jacques Joubert said the housing body has failed to submit annual financial statements on time and has regressed to a qualified audit finding. Joubert pointed to the largely unoccupied phase two of the Ga-Rena housing project as a key example of mismanagement, citing delayed tenant placements and previous water supply issues. Phase one has also suffered vandalism and poor maintenance. Joubert warned that without decisive leadership and regular reporting, the entity risks collapse. The municipality has not yet commented on the matter. Full story POLOKWANE – The DA in Polokwane is deeply concerned about the manner in which the municipality's housing provision arm, the Polokwane Housing Association (PHA) is being managed, and intends to request a joint portfolio committee meeting to call the PHA Board of Trustees to account for a projected R8.5m deficit for the upcoming financial year. This deficit is despite the inclusion of a R10m subsidy in the city's budget. The PHA is tasked with providing affordable housing to qualifying residents but continues to be marred by maladministration and a failure to fulfil its core mandate, according to Jacques Joubert, DA councillor on the finance and land use, spatial planning and LED portfolio committees. To exacerbate the situation, the PHA has failed to submit its Annual Financial Statements for the 2023/24 financial year within the legally prescribed time frame and regressed to a qualified finding. 'For far too long, the PHA executive management and board have relied on bailouts from the Polokwane Municipality, placing the financial burden squarely on the shoulders of the city's residents. This cannot be allowed to continue,' Joubert noted and added that currently, phase two of the Ga-Rena housing project at Ladanna which PHA is in charge of, remains mostly unoccupied, having stood vacant for many months – incurring substantial financial losses. According to Joubert, initial delays were due to backup water supply issues, followed by the painfully slow pace of tenant placement. 'Occupation of these units with qualifying residents will significantly help to address Polokwane's housing backlog and alleviate the escalating problem of illegal land use and unregulated backyard dwellings. Phase one also faces major issues and numerous units have been vandalised and are now uninhabitable. Furthermore, the project has been plagued by poor debt collection since inception. 'Without firm and effective leadership, this entity is on a continued path to inevitable failure,' Joubert said and added that transparency and accountability are at an all-time low. Monthly financial reports are not submitted to the housing portfolio committee, and no joint oversight meetings with the finance portfolio committee have taken place in over 18 months. Comment could not immediately be sourced from the Polokwane Municipality. At Caxton, we employ humans to generate daily fresh news, not AI intervention. Happy reading!


The South African
25-05-2025
- Business
- The South African
DA slams R400 million salaries of CEOs of failing state-owned entities
The Democratic Alliance (DA) has condemned what it describes as 'exorbitant' executive salaries within South Africa's state-owned enterprises (SOEs), calling for immediate reform and accountability in the wake of shocking new data revealing over R400 million spent annually on executive pay – despite ongoing bailouts, service delivery failures, and poor audit outcomes. According to parliamentary responses and publicly available remuneration data, senior executives at public entities are earning salaries that far exceed national guidelines set by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA), with little regard for performance or fiscal sustainability. 'This reflects a broken system with weak oversight and eroded public accountability,' the DA said in a statement. The DA highlighted several examples: The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) CEO earns R15.5 million annually , making them one of the highest-paid public servants in the country. CEO earns , making them one of the highest-paid public servants in the country. Transnet's CEO pockets R8.5 million , even as the entity struggles with port inefficiencies and increasing reliance on the private sector after receiving a R47 billion bailout in 2023. pockets , even as the entity struggles with port inefficiencies and increasing reliance on the private sector after receiving a in 2023. At the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) , the CEO earns R7.8 million , despite the agency's ongoing infrastructure woes and audit disclaimers. , the CEO earns , despite the agency's ongoing infrastructure woes and audit disclaimers. The Road Accident Fund (RAF) CEO receives R7.1 million, while the fund remains technically insolvent. Other entities named in the report include the CSIR (R6.92 million), SAA (R6 million), Rand Water (R5.4 million), and PetroSA (R5.8 million) – many of which continue to underperform or rely heavily on government support. The DA warned that this level of spending undermines service delivery and public confidence in the government's ability to manage state resources effectively. With only 13 of 40 government departments reporting so far, the total national expenditure on executive pay could be significantly higher than R400 million. 'If such excesses are occurring at senior levels, it is reasonable to infer that similar practices may exist across all employment tiers within SOEs,' the DA said. The party is demanding that the Minister of Public Service and Administration, along with the Minister of Finance, implement the following: A standardised executive remuneration framework for all public entities for all public entities Mandatory justification and public disclosure of any salary exceeding DPSA guidelines of any salary exceeding DPSA guidelines Parliamentary oversight and collaboration to ensure alignment with public service principles They argue that executive pay should reflect performance, especially in entities that have repeatedly failed to deliver on their mandates or required state bailouts. The DA has described the excessive salaries as an 'affront' to millions of ordinary South Africans who continue to endure failing services, from collapsing rail infrastructure to persistent water outages and electricity disruptions. 'The South African public deserves competent and ethical service delivery. These excessive salaries remain not only unjustifiable but an affront to the millions who rely on basic services that are consistently failing.' The DA has vowed to pursue fiscal discipline and performance accountability through legislative channels and continue exposing what it sees as a culture of excess and impunity in state entities. Let us know by leaving a comment below, or send a WhatsApp to 060 011 021 1 Subscribe to The South African website's newsletters and follow us on WhatsApp, Facebook, X and Bluesky for the latest news.

IOL News
11-05-2025
- Business
- IOL News
Tongaat Hulett's rescue or ruin? the damning quiet of a company in freefall
Tongaat Hulett refinery in KwaZulu-Natal. Image: Supplied It has now been more than two years since Tongaat Hulett, South Africa's 130-year-old sugar giant, entered business rescue. What was supposed to be a bold restructuring has instead devolved into a slow, painful erosion of shareholder rights, creditor value, and public confidence. As of today, 10 May 2025, the Vision consortium—heralded as the saviour of Tongaat—has failed to deliver even a cent of the promised funding. The April 30 deadline, the fifth to be missed, has passed with silence. No explanation. No accountability. No money. And yet, somehow, the show goes on. The Illusion of Progress On 16 April, a SENS announcement confirmed that the Zimbabwean competition commission had approved the sale of assets to Vision. According to the Business Rescue Practitioners (BRPs), this was the 'last required competition authority sign-off,' supposedly marking progress. But let's call this what it really is: window dressing. The BRPs and Vision are pushing forward with asset sales not as part of a thriving business rescue, but as a fallback mechanism—the 'Debt Set Off' clause—that bypasses shareholder approval, strips the company of assets, and readies it for liquidation. Let that sink in: the rescue of Tongaat is being implemented through liquidation-by-stealth. Legal storms brewing This brazen shift has not gone unchallenged. Two legal processes are now before the courts: RGS Group's Part B in the Durban High Court seeks to set aside the adopted plan, citing Vision's failure to meet its contractual obligation to acquire the full R8.5 billion in lender claims before any debt-for-equity conversion or asset sale could proceed. That was a clear condition precedent—not a suggestion—and its violation renders the plan unimplementable under both the Companies Act and established precedent. A Shareholder Interdict submitted in the Johannesburg High Court seeks a declaratory order that the plan unlawfully alters shareholder rights and, by failing to hold a shareholder vote as required under Section 152(3)(c), was never lawfully adopted. In effect, the sale of assets currently underway may well be void ab initio—illegal from the outset. Tongaat Hulett itself confirmed in its 4 April BR update that while Part A of RGS's challenge was dismissed on urgency grounds, Part B remains active, and shareholders have delivered their own affidavit, which should have been publicly posted on THL's website. If either legal action succeeds, Vision's grip on Tongaat could collapse overnight. The myth of shareholder consent Let us be clear: shareholders never voted for this outcome. Despite the BRPs' insistence that the business rescue plan did not "alter shareholder rights," the facts say otherwise. The plan proposed issuing 4.86 billion shares to Vision, diluting existing shareholders to just 2.7%. In real terms, the dilution destroyed shareholder value by over 97%—a fact confirmed in the shareholder court application. Under Section 152(3)(c) of the Companies Act, any such alteration requires shareholder approval. Yet the BRPs, led by Trevor Murgatroyd, Pieter van den Steen and Gerhard Albertyn, chose not to convene a vote. Worse still, when shareholders rejected the Section 41(3) resolution to approve the share issue in August 2024, the BRPs simply pivoted to the asset sale model without missing a beat. This isn't corporate rescue. It's corporate coup. Asset Stripping in Real Time SENS notices confirm that the BRPs have signed four major Business Sale Agreements: Tongaat's entire South African operations have been sold to Vision Sugar SA. Its Zimbabwean business , Triangle Sugar, is being handed over. Its Botswana stake has been transferred to ensure a controlling 50.1% interest. And in perhaps the most controversial deal, Mozambique's sugar operations —including Acucareira de Moçambique and Tongaat Hulett Açucar Lda—are being disposed of. Yet to date, shareholders have not seen the sale agreements. The applicants in the shareholder interdict explicitly state they are unaware whether these deals are subject to any suspensive conditions, or whether they've already been partially executed. So we must ask: who authorised the sale of billions in strategic assets without a lawfully adopted plan? And more urgently—what happens if the courts rule that the plan was invalid from the outset? The sound of silence Standard Bank, Vision's transaction advisor, guarantor and lead lender, remains disturbingly quiet. It was their 'letter of funds' in December 2023 that supposedly confirmed Vision's liquidity. Yet four deadlines have now passed. Did the funds ever exist? Were they warehoused elsewhere? Has Standard Bank misled the market? The same bank now stands to benefit from Vision's completion of the deal it enabled and guaranteed. If this isn't a case study in conflicted interests, then nothing is. What the law demands Sections 134, 140 and 152 of the Companies Act exist precisely to prevent this kind of abuse. They require: That all property disposals occur only under a lawfully adopted business rescue plan. That BRPs must implement only such a plan—not their own version. That shareholder rights, if altered, must be approved in a vote. All of these protections have been cast aside. In their place is a rescue plan implemented in name only—a plan that no longer exists in its originally approved form, but continues to be actioned as if it does. This Is No Longer Business Rescue Let's not sugarcoat it: Tongaat Hulett is being dismantled. And this is happening under the noses of regulators, bankers, employees, and the public. If the courts do not intervene—and fast—South Africa may soon witness one of its oldest listed companies being dismembered in broad daylight, shielded by legal technicalities and institutional apathy. The Verdict: The shareholders have spoken. The courts are being called. The facts are plain. Vision has not paid. The plan was not lawfully adopted. And Tongaat Hulett—along with its thousands of employees and legacy—deserves better than this. This isn't rescue. This is the slow-motion execution of a national asset. Roy Nzero is a small scale farmer in Jozini, KZN with a masters in agricultural science. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL or Independent Media. BUSINESS REPORT