Latest news with #Prigozhin
Euronews
3 days ago
- Politics
- Euronews
African Initiative: Russian-backed outlet peddles influence in Africa
The African Initiative presents itself as a Moscow-based news agency that covers events across the continent, aiming to "mutually expand the knowledge of Russians and Africans about each other." But in reality, it has been classified as the "main vehicle" for Russia's disinformation activities across Africa, according to a new report by Vignium, the French agency which monitors foreign digital interference. Many individuals who run the African Initiative have affiliations with Russian intelligence services, while others have been identified as former members of the Wagner paramilitary group. The African Initiative was launched in September 2023, just a month after Yevgeny Prigozhin — one of Wagner's founders and its leader — died in a plane crash. Prigozhin had played an instrumental role in promoting Russian interests on the African continent. Following his death, Moscow rushed to replace Wagner-run operations across the African continent. The outlet publishes its content on various websites in several languages, including on Telegram — where it boasts 70,000 subscribers across its channels — as well as on various Facebook and TikTok accounts. In addition to publishing articles and digital content, the outlet uses local fronts and soft power initiatives like journalism schools and press trips to embed itself within local communities. For instance, in June the outlet organised a conference which aimed to dismantle "myths, negative narratives" about Russia and instead to build opportunities to "create an objective image of Russia on the African continent." The African Initiative has also been pushing to develop its activities in the former French colonies of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, which make up the Alliance of the Sahel States — a union that Russia was the first country to recognise. West African countries under the control of juntas have distanced themselves from France and other former Western allies — criticising failed interventions against Islamist extremists and their colonial legacies — and instead turning to Russia. Following Prigozhin's death, Moscow launched a new paramilitary group, "Africa Corps", which is believed to be managed and closely monitored by Russia's Defence Ministry, as part of the Kremlin's plan to tighten its grip on ongoing operations across Africa. Israel has started flying home citizens stranded overseas during the conflict with Iran, with two flights from Cyprus landing in Tel Aviv on Wednesday morning. Israel's airspace has been closed since the country launched a surprise airstrike campaign against Iran on Friday. Iran has retaliated with hundreds of drones and missiles. A total of 13 repatriation flights were scheduled on Wednesday from Larnaca to Israel, with nine to Haifa and four to Tel Aviv, according to an airport operator in Cyprus. Israel's transport ministry says that up to 150,000 Israelis are currently outside the country, about a third of whom are trying to return home. Many Israelis stranded abroad have ended up in Cyprus, which is the closest EU country to Israel. The jets of Israel's three airlines have been moved to Larnaca since the conflict with Iran began last week. The conflict has forced most countries in the Middle East to close their airspace. Dozens of airports have halted all flights or significantly reduced operations, leaving tens of thousands of passengers stranded and others unable to flee the conflict or return home. At least 400 Israeli citizens are reported to be stranded along Bulgaria's Black Sea coast. One of those tourists, Galid, told Euronews that she did not know when she and her family would be able to return home to Israel. "We can't go back now. We can't. We'll have to stay here with the children and wait. Nothing can be done right now. That's it. It's war," Galid said. Two other tourists, Eden and Itai, stated that they had ruled out the possibility of flying to Jordan or Egypt and then entering Israel through the land border because they had a young child. The hotels where the stranded Israelis are staying in Bulgaria have been placed under increased police presence and security measures in recent days. Israel's national carrier El Al has said it intends to operate dozens of flights to repatriate Israelis from various European capitals such as Athens, Rome and Paris. Smaller carrier Arkia will fly back Israeli citizens from Greece, Cyprus and Montenegro, while Israir is operating flights for the country's stranded tourists from Cyprus, Greece and Bulgaria. However, passenger flights are still not departing from Israel, which means that tens of thousands of tourists are currently stranded in the country. Israeli airstrikes hit Iran's capital Tehran overnight and into Wednesday morning, as Iran launched a small barrage of missiles at Israel with no reports of casualties. The attacks between the bitter rivals have opened a new chapter in their turbulent recent history. Many in the region fear a wider conflict as they watch waves of missiles fly across their skies every night. A Washington-based Iranian human rights group, Human Rights Activists, says at least 585 people, including 239 civilians, have been killed and more than 1,300 wounded by Israel's strikes on Iran. Since Friday, Iran has fired about 400 missiles and hundreds of drones in retaliatory strikes that have killed at least 24 people in Israel, all civilians, and wounded hundreds, according to Israeli authorities.
Yahoo
3 days ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
Putin under pressure to declare war on Ukraine
When Ukraine smuggled dozens of drones into the back of freight trucks and launched a surprise attack on Vladimir Putin's prized nuclear bombers, Russia's most radical voices were furious. 'Shock and outrage' is how one high-ranking Russian official described the mood in the Kremlin the day after the strike. Another Russian official told The Telegraph: 'Like every thinking patriot, I took it as a personal tragedy.' The fury ran so deep in some quarters that there were renewed calls for Putin to 'declare war' on Ukraine – a demand that may seem baffling to Western observers, given that the conflict is already Europe's bloodiest since the Second World War. But amongst Russia's hardline nationalist elite, there is growing belief that Putin has not gone far enough, that he should formally declare war, recruit a million more men, and wipe out Volodymyr Zelensky's government with daily missile strikes on Kyiv. The Telegraph spoke to Kremlin insiders to assess whether Ukraine's drone attack – dubbed Operation Spider Web – might push Russia to escalate even further. All agreed to speak on condition of anonymity. 'Explosions, drones, sabotage, and possibly even terrorist attacks are what the future may hold for us if the Zelensky regime is not completely destroyed,' said a current high-ranking Russian government official. He described himself as hawkish and admitted sympathising with Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner warlord who led a failed mutiny against Putin in June 2023 and was later killed in a plane crash. 'If Ukraine ceases to exist in its current form, the criminal underground will be demoralised,' he claimed. Yet despite the scale of Ukraine's strike, which damaged at least 20 Russian nuclear bombers, according to US estimates, the Kremlin has so far stuck to a more cautious approach. 'This did not catalyse a political discussion or a change in the format of military operations,' said a former senior Kremlin official who once directed operations against Ukraine. 'In the Russian power system, where inertia and preserving the current balance are essential, that speaks volumes.' Another source, based in an analytical centre close to Russia's defence ministry was blunt: 'Could the president declare war on Kyiv? Right now, unlikely. As cynical as it may sound, the leadership is satisfied with the current situation.' Traditionally, opposition to Putin has come from liberal critics. But since the invasion, a new breed of nationalist opposition has emerged – figures who claim the Russian president is too cautious. The roots of this anger go back to 2014, when some hardliners accused Putin of failing to fully support Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. One of the most prominent is Igor Girkin – also known as Strelkov – a former FSB officer and leading figure in the 'Angry Patriots', a faction demanding Ukraine's total destruction. After criticising Russia's handling of the war, Girkin was jailed for extremism in 2024. 'I serve the Fatherland!' he shouted after the verdict. Such figures may be marginal, but they wield outsized influence inside Russia's security apparatus. 'The fact they're the guys with the guns means the Kremlin has to at least be aware of them,' Mark Galeotti, a British historian and expert on Russian security, told The Telegraph. To most in the West, the conflict is clearly a war. But Putin still refers to it as a 'special military operation' – a distinction that matters to Russia's hawks. They argue that only a formal war declaration would permit full-scale escalation – daily inter-continental missile strikes, mass mobilisation, and perhaps even the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Earlier this month, the nationalist podcast Russians with Attitude argued: 'Liberal Putinism has its perks – comfortable, modern, and nearly sanction-proof. A true 21st-century experience. But the cons are clear – soft-glove warfare, sparing enemy leadership, and burying failure.' Currently, most Russian soldiers are volunteers attracted by pay packets of about 200,000 roubles (£1,900) a month – a significant sum in rural areas. Declaring war could enable the mobilisation of two million reservists. 'The government and the authorities would essentially be given carte blanche to move the country on to an explicit war footing,' said Emily Ferris, Russia analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). But even as the bloodshed continues, the Kremlin has been careful to shield most Russians from its effects. At the outset of the invasion in 2022, Putin banned the words 'war' and 'invasion' from the media. Recruitment has been focused on the outer regions, not Moscow or St Petersburg. Russians may be dying in droves, but they do so mostly out of sight. In Moscow, Artyom, a cybersecurity researcher who did not want to give his real name, told The Telegraph that most young people trust in Putin's decisions as the country 'stands proud' with living standards still high despite the sanctions. The Kremlin is forecast to spend 6.3 per cent of GDP on defence this year, which is the highest since the Cold War but not what would be expected of a country on a full war-time footing. For comparison, Ukraine spent 34 per cent of its GDP on defence last year. British defence spending as a percentage of GDP rose to more than 50 per cent during the Second World War. 'Mobilisation undermines economic stability,' said one current government employee. According to him, those close to Putin are able to persuade the Russian president that mass mobilisation would be a step towards the war effort's collapse. 'And why is it needed now? We have Kalibr missiles, we have volunteers. Their resources are not yet exhausted,' he added. A new wave of mobilisation would mean not only economic strain but also a public acknowledgement that the Kremlin is not succeeding in its three-year war against its neighbour. 'That is too costly an admission in a situation where everything hinges on the illusion of control,' noted the former high-ranking Kremlin official. While that illusion may not last forever, experts believe Putin's military will be able to fight at the current rate into next year, and possibly for years. 'I think next year is when a certain number of economic chickens come home to roost,' Mr Galeotti said. 'But the Russians will be able to fight this war for years.' The Kremlin appears to agree. Vladimir Medinsky, Putin's chief negotiator, recently told The Wall Street Journal that Russia could continue fighting for 'another 21 years' – invoking Peter the Great's long war with Sweden. Putin's popularity has surged since the invasion of Ukraine, according to both state-owned polls and those of the Leveda Centre, an independent institution that has frequently drawn the Kremlin's ire. However, that could change if Putin were to start mass mobilisation. There's also the question of fear. 'As soon as you call it war, every parent who has got a kid doing national service or going to be soon is going to start getting scared that they are about to be sent to the front,' said Mr Galeotti. In other words, escalation is not without political risk. While nationalist bloggers and pro-war influencers dominate Telegram and the Z-pilled commentariat, the Kremlin is all too aware of how fragile domestic control might become if the war truly came home. That explains Putin's brutal repression. There is no longer an organised war party in Russia. The prominent figures of that camp – and liberal opponents – have been removed. Mr Prigozhin, who at one time had been close to Putin, was killed in a suspected bombing weeks after his failed mutiny. Girkin is in prison. Alexei Navalny, Russia's most popular politician, died in a penal colony. This served as a signal from Putin to anyone who might display political initiative. Simultaneously, the security services are tightening control over radical patriotic and nationalist circles that have become more active after the invasion. 'So far, no power centre inside the country is capable of imposing its will on Putin,' said a Telegraph source close to the State Duma leadership. In any case, for all the hawkish rhetoric, Putin's capacity to escalate is not limitless. That much was exposed by his response to Operation Spider Web. Given the significance of the attack, warmongers had demanded a massive response. They didn't get one. There's no denying the horror Ukrainian cities like Kyiv and Kharkiv have faced during massive drone barrages in recent days. But the retaliation was limited, by both Western standards and Russian expectations. 'The response to Operation Spider Web could have been a lot worse. That would've been the time to have a major response, they didn't do it,' Ms Ferris said. Experts believe Putin's military simply lacks the resources. Despite sabre-rattling over tactical nuclear weapons and strategic missile strikes, Russia doesn't have the capacity to launch the kind of daily missile barrages some of its loudest nationalists fantasise about. 'There's always more room for escalation,' Mr Galeotti said. 'Maybe Putin could fire a few hundred extra drones per day. But that's about it.' For now, though, the fantasy of full-scale war – of Oreshnik missiles fired daily at Kyiv, of Zelensky's government turned to rubble, remains just that – a fantasy. Broaden your horizons with award-winning British journalism. 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Telegraph
3 days ago
- Politics
- Telegraph
Putin under pressure to declare war on Ukraine
When Ukraine smuggled dozens of drones into the back of freight trucks and launched a surprise attack on Vladimir Putin's prized nuclear bombers, Russia's most radical voices were furious. 'Shock and outrage' is how one high-ranking Russian official described the mood in the Kremlin the day after the strike. Another Russian official told The Telegraph: 'Like every thinking patriot, I took it as a personal tragedy.' The fury ran so deep in some quarters that there were renewed calls for Putin to 'declare war' on Ukraine – a demand that may seem baffling to Western observers, given that the conflict is already Europe's bloodiest since the Second World War. But amongst Russia's hardline nationalist elite, there is growing belief that Putin has not gone far enough, that he should formally declare war, recruit a million more men, and wipe out Volodymyr Zelensky's government with daily missile strikes on Kyiv. The Telegraph spoke to Kremlin insiders to assess whether Ukraine's drone attack – dubbed Operation Spider Web – might push Russia to escalate even further. All agreed to speak on condition of anonymity. 'Explosions, drones, sabotage, and possibly even terrorist attacks are what the future may hold for us if the Zelensky regime is not completely destroyed,' said a current high-ranking Russian government official. He described himself as hawkish and admitted sympathising with Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner warlord who led a failed mutiny against Putin in June 2023 and was later killed in a plane crash. 'If Ukraine ceases to exist in its current form, the criminal underground will be demoralised,' he claimed. Yet despite the scale of Ukraine's strike, which damaged at least 20 Russian nuclear bombers, according to US estimates, the Kremlin has so far stuck to a more cautious approach. 'This did not catalyse a political discussion or a change in the format of military operations,' said a former senior Kremlin official who once directed operations against Ukraine. 'In the Russian power system, where inertia and preserving the current balance are essential, that speaks volumes.' Another source, based in an analytical centre close to Russia's defence ministry was blunt: 'Could the president declare war on Kyiv? Right now, unlikely. As cynical as it may sound, the leadership is satisfied with the current situation.' The hawkish opposition Traditionally, opposition to Putin has come from liberal critics. But since the invasion, a new breed of nationalist opposition has emerged – figures who claim the Russian president is too cautious. The roots of this anger go back to 2014, when some hardliners accused Putin of failing to fully support Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. One of the most prominent is Igor Girkin – also known as Strelkov – a former FSB officer and leading figure in the 'Angry Patriots', a faction demanding Ukraine's total destruction. After criticising Russia's handling of the war, Girkin was jailed for extremism in 2024. 'I serve the Fatherland!' he shouted after the verdict. Such figures may be marginal, but they wield outsized influence inside Russia's security apparatus. 'The fact they're the guys with the guns means the Kremlin has to at least be aware of them,' Mark Galeotti, a British historian and expert on Russian security, told The Telegraph. Why declare war? To most in the West, the conflict is clearly a war. But Putin still refers to it as a ' special military operation ' – a distinction that matters to Russia's hawks. They argue that only a formal war declaration would permit full-scale escalation – daily inter-continental missile strikes, mass mobilisation, and perhaps even the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Earlier this month, the nationalist podcast Russians with Attitude argued: 'Liberal Putinism has its perks – comfortable, modern, and nearly sanction-proof. A true 21st-century experience. But the cons are clear – soft-glove warfare, sparing enemy leadership, and burying failure.' Currently, most Russian soldiers are volunteers attracted by pay packets of about 200,000 roubles (£1,900) a month – a significant sum in rural areas. Declaring war could enable the mobilisation of two million reservists. 'The government and the authorities would essentially be given carte blanche to move the country on to an explicit war footing,' said Emily Ferris, Russia analyst at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). But even as the bloodshed continues, the Kremlin has been careful to shield most Russians from its effects. At the outset of the invasion in 2022, Putin banned the words 'war' and 'invasion' from the media. Recruitment has been focused on the outer regions, not Moscow or St Petersburg. Russians may be dying in droves, but they do so mostly out of sight. In Moscow, Artyom, a cybersecurity researcher who did not want to give his real name, told The Telegraph that most young people trust in Putin's decisions as the country 'stands proud' with living standards still high despite the sanctions. Cracks in the illusion The Kremlin is forecast to spend 6.3 per cent of GDP on defence this year, which is the highest since the Cold War but not what would be expected of a country on a full war-time footing. For comparison, Ukraine spent 34 per cent of its GDP on defence last year. British defence spending as a percentage of GDP rose to more than 50 per cent during the Second World War. 'Mobilisation undermines economic stability,' said one current government employee. According to him, those close to Putin are able to persuade the Russian president that mass mobilisation would be a step towards the war effort's collapse. 'And why is it needed now? We have Kalibr missiles, we have volunteers. Their resources are not yet exhausted,' he added. A new wave of mobilisation would mean not only economic strain but also a public acknowledgement that the Kremlin is not succeeding in its three-year war against its neighbour. 'That is too costly an admission in a situation where everything hinges on the illusion of control,' noted the former high-ranking Kremlin official. While that illusion may not last forever, experts believe Putin's military will be able to fight at the current rate into next year, and possibly for years. 'I think next year is when a certain number of economic chickens come home to roost,' Mr Galeotti said. 'But the Russians will be able to fight this war for years.' The Kremlin appears to agree. Vladimir Medinsky, Putin's chief negotiator, recently told The Wall Street Journal that Russia could continue fighting for 'another 21 years' – invoking Peter the Great's long war with Sweden. Putin's popularity has surged since the invasion of Ukraine, according to both state-owned polls and those of the Leveda Centre, an independent institution that has frequently drawn the Kremlin's ire. However, that could change if Putin were to start mass mobilisation. There's also the question of fear. 'As soon as you call it war, every parent who has got a kid doing national service or going to be soon is going to start getting scared that they are about to be sent to the front,' said Mr Galeotti. In other words, escalation is not without political risk. While nationalist bloggers and pro-war influencers dominate Telegram and the Z-pilled commentariat, the Kremlin is all too aware of how fragile domestic control might become if the war truly came home. That explains Putin's brutal repression. There is no longer an organised war party in Russia. The prominent figures of that camp – and liberal opponents – have been removed. Mr Prigozhin, who at one time had been close to Putin, was killed in a suspected bombing weeks after his failed mutiny. Girkin is in prison. Alexei Navalny, Russia's most popular politician, died in a penal colony. This served as a signal from Putin to anyone who might display political initiative. Simultaneously, the security services are tightening control over radical patriotic and nationalist circles that have become more active after the invasion. 'So far, no power centre inside the country is capable of imposing its will on Putin,' said a Telegraph source close to the State Duma leadership. Limits of escalation In any case, for all the hawkish rhetoric, Putin's capacity to escalate is not limitless. That much was exposed by his response to Operation Spider Web. Given the significance of the attack, warmongers had demanded a massive response. They didn't get one. There's no denying the horror Ukrainian cities like Kyiv and Kharkiv have faced during massive drone barrages in recent days. But the retaliation was limited, by both Western standards and Russian expectations. 'The response to Operation Spider Web could have been a lot worse. That would've been the time to have a major response, they didn't do it,' Ms Ferris said. Experts believe Putin's military simply lacks the resources. Despite sabre-rattling over tactical nuclear weapons and strategic missile strikes, Russia doesn't have the capacity to launch the kind of daily missile barrages some of its loudest nationalists fantasise about. 'There's always more room for escalation,' Mr Galeotti said. 'Maybe Putin could fire a few hundred extra drones per day. But that's about it.' For now, though, the fantasy of full-scale war – of Oreshnik missiles fired daily at Kyiv, of Zelensky's government turned to rubble, remains just that – a fantasy.
New Statesman
11-06-2025
- Politics
- New Statesman
How Russia became a franchise of the Wagner Group
For several years, during a season of boredom in the West, the Wagner Group, Russia's private military company, became a pet obsession for the media. This was a story of Vladimir Putin's shadowy 'army of cut-throats', plundering Africa of its gold and diamonds while upending Europe's influence in its former colonies. Western audiences were hooked. In 2022, Wagner became a key tool in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and its previously hidden founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former St Petersburg restaurateur, finally emerged from the shadows. The narrative became even riper: Prigozhin led a short-lived mutiny against the Russian regime in June 2023. But it ended abruptly when his private jet exploded not far from Putin's dacha on Lake Valdai two months later. The story is far from over. The group continues to wage vicious campaigns in the Sahel region, now rebranded as the 'Africa Corps'. In Mali, it helps the regime fight Tuareg and Islamist insurgencies, and was accused of executing civilians. Two recent books shed light on Wagner's role in ushering in a new era of modern warfare: Death Is Our Business by the American journalist John Lechner and Our Business Is Death by the Russian reporters Ilya Barabanov and Denis Korotkov. If Wagner's business was death, then it meant a good deal of its own mercenaries dying, too. This was true even back in the 2010s when Wagner was still viewed as an elite and secretive force, the most prominent case in point being the infamous Battle of Khasham in February 2018. In an episode that became the closest, if indirect, US-Russia clash of the 21st century, Wagnerites tried to capture an oil field in north-eastern Syria controlled by American-backed Kurdish fighters. The Kurds fought back, supported by the US from the air, and the mercenaries were mowed down. Some 80 Russians were killed in just a few hours. All the previous Wagner losses, however, were overshadowed by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and the transformation of the mercenary group into a vehicle to recruit convicts. Lifted out of prisons and put through short and superficial training, some 50,000 of them, by Prigozhin's own estimate, were sent to storm the Ukrainian stronghold of Bakhmut. Barabanov and Korotkov's book presents accounts of convicts forced to fight under the fear of execution. Those refusing to take part in the 'meat storms' were reportedly shot as deserters. Some 20,000 Wagner fighters died in Bakhmut alone, according to Prigozhin's count. Shocking as it was, this practice was not new. Penal battalions were introduced in the Soviet army during the Second World War, guarded by anti-retreat detachments with orders to shoot deserters. Allowing for huge losses to advance on a battlefield was another tradition from Soviet times that was resurrected in Putin's Ukrainian 'special military operation'. 'The special military operation was, in many respects, one giant World War II re-enactment, and everyone got to don a costume and play a character,' Lechner observes. All of this, however, came later. Before 2022, Wagner was less of a cosplay enterprise and more of a private military company with operations in Syria, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Africa's Sahel region. Nobody was forced or encouraged to fight for it – but thousands volunteered to. Subscribe to The New Statesman today from only £8.99 per month Subscribe What made so many Russian men risk their lives in faraway countries? Barabanov and Korotkov grapple with this question, drawing from personnel files included in a vast archive of Prigozhin's corporate empire that was leaked to them, as well as their interviews with mercenaries. The fact that Wagner offered the kind of salaries these men would never get anywhere else loomed large. In 2017, the Wagner salary of Rbs250,000 a month was worth around $4,300 – six times the national average wage in Russia at the time. Even by Moscow standards, such salaries were very high indeed; outside of Moscow, unheard of. The dramatic culmination of Prigozhin's story, too, is a testament to a broader trend. His rebellion against the system was triggered by bureaucratic pressure. The Russian state wanted to control all those fighting against Ukraine, forcing private military companies and volunteer units to sign contracts with Russia's Ministry of Defence (MoD). Moscow did not need the plausible deniability of Wagner, Cossacks and ragtag nationalist militias any more. It was now openly and brazenly invading Ukraine under the pretext of 'denazification' and wanted to have full military control. When Prigozhin pushed back against the MoD takeover, the palace intrigue ran out of control. He questioned the Kremlin's justification for the invasion, criticised the rampant corruption of Russian elites and even suggested that a certain 'grandpa' in charge of Russia could be 'a dickhead'. Grandpa was the opposition's nickname for Putin, popularised by Alexei Navalny. A showdown was imminent, and Prigozhin blinked first, launching his mutiny before abruptly aborting it. Shortly afterwards, he was dead. [See also: Death of a warlord] But having dispensed with Prigozhin, the Putin regime appears transformed by its former enforcer. Practices he pioneered have been adopted and taken to another level. Recruitment of convicts is now run at such a scale that entire prisons have been hollowed out. And bribes to entice Russian men to fight keep growing. Recently, regional governments started offering new recruits 'staggering sums' with sign-up bonuses of up to $40,000, a BBC investigation revealed. Moreover, the mercenary group changed the very way Russia executes its war. Wagner's tactics at Bakhmut 'led to the systematic adoption of assault groupings, and expendable convict-staffed formations across the Russian military', wrote Michael Kofman, a leading expert on the Russian military. He called the process the 'Wagnerisation of the Russian army'. With up to a million Russians having signed contracts to fight in Ukraine, it may be time to consider the Wagnerisation of Russia. Being paid to kill Ukrainians is today among the highest paying jobs in the country. But for its owner, Wagner was never a golden goose the way, for example, his food catering services in Russia were. Instead, Lechner places the private military company in the broader context of Prigozhin's attempts to ingratiate himself with Putin, the case of the troll factory meddling in the US elections being another prominent example. It was about status, the restaurateur-turned-warlord being 'hell-bent on joining the elite', the author suggests. In the process, he helped bring about the new age of private warfare. Private military companies 'helped usher us into the 17th century with 21st-century technology – onto a battlefield in which the distinction between soldier and mercenary is close to immaterial', Lechner writes, drawing parallels between the likes of Blackwater founder Erik Prince and Prigozhin and the condottieri of Italian city states. In the new era of conflicts between global and regional powers, the mercenaries have returned. There was initial hesitation: Western leaders' thinking was shaped by the post-Cold War 'peace dividend', with Russia humbled by its defeat in Afghanistan and the Cold War in general, while America was still haunted by the spectre of Vietnam. In the era of liberal interventionism and the war on terror that followed, policymakers offered elaborate justifications and set tight rules for use of force. Their justifications later proved bogus, and all rules were trespassed. But disillusionment with war has not sparked a pacifist revival. All around the world, not just in Moscow, there is less hesitation about using military force – and less need to hide behind private contractors. The US support for Israel's war in Gaza is an open-ended commitment, as is Nato's intelligence-sharing, weapons supplies and training of Ukraine's armed forces. Israel and Iran, for the first time in their history, have exchanged direct blows. Reasons for going to war are framed in terms of 'existential threats' and therefore require no further explanation. Mercenaries are still in high demand, but their role is changing. What started as a bespoke service provided by highly skilled, well-paid ex-soldiers has turned into mass recruitment of cannon fodder from poor and conflict-torn regions and countries. These include thousands of Colombians fighting in Ukraine, Yemen and Sudan; hundreds of Nepalese serving as the first line of attack for Russian troops; and Syrians being recruited to kill and die in Azerbaijan, Libya and Niger. For this new age of private warfare, the transformation of Wagner is a useful case study. Founded as an elite group providing security, military training and guarding installations – a business model based on the American example of Blackwater – it grew into dispensable shock troops managed directly by the Russian state. If the US's overseas campaigns made the modern mercenary industry a lucrative career path for army veterans and well-connected hustlers, Putin's wars helped transform it into a global form of human trafficking for men from poor regions of Russia. That in 2025 Russian men are as keen as Colombians and Syrians to fight for money in distant lands is perhaps the best indicator of the desperation, hopelessness and nihilism in Russian provinces after a quarter century of Putin's rule, despite all the talk of Moscow's economic resilience. Death Is Our Business: Russian Mercenaries and the New Era of Private Warfare John Lechner Bloomsbury USA, 288pp, £23 Our Business is Death: The Complete History of the Wagner Group Ilya Barabanov and Denis Korotkov StraightForwardFoundation, 291pp, $9.99 [See also: Trump's nuclear test] Related
Al Arabiya
08-06-2025
- Politics
- Al Arabiya
Wagner replaced by Russia's Africa Corp in Mali: Diplomatic sources
The Russian paramilitary group Wagner has left Mali and its units there have been taken over by the Moscow-run Africa Corps, diplomatic and security sources told AFP on Sunday. 'Officially, Wagner is no longer present in Mali. But the Africa Corps is stepping up,' one diplomatic source in the Sahel region said. A Telegram account affiliated with Wagner said: 'Mission accomplished. PMC Wagner is going home.' Mali's ruling junta, which seized power in coups in 2020 and 2021, broke off ties with former colonial power France and pivoted towards Russia for political and military support. Wagner, Russia's best-known mercenary group, was disbanded and restructured after its leader Yevgeny Prigozhin died in a mysterious plane crash in August 2023 following a short-lived rebellion against Moscow. Mali has never officially admitted Wagner's presence, insisting it only worked with Russian instructors. France withdrew its 2,400 troops from Mali in 2022 after ties with the junta soured and anti-French sentiment surged among the public. 'The Kremlin remains in control,' the same diplomatic source added. 'Most of the Wagner personnel in Mali, who are originally from Russia, will be reintegrated into Africa Corps and remain in northern regional capitals and Bamako.' The Africa Corps is another paramilitary group with links to the Kremlin and seen as the successor to the Wagner group. Like Wagner, its mercenaries are active supporting several African governments. For over three years, Mali had relied on Wagner in its fight against extremist militants who have killed thousands across the country. 'Wagner yesterday or Africa Corps today, our point of contact remains the same, it is the central power in Russia, that is to say the Kremlin,' a Malian security source said Sunday. The paramilitary group's brutal methods on the ground in Mali have been regularly denounced by human rights groups. A UN report accused Mali's army and foreign fighters of executing at least 500 people during a March 2022 anti-militant sweep in Moura – a claim denied by the junta. Western governments believe the foreign fighters were Wagner mercenaries. Last April, bodies were discovered near a Malian military camp, days after the army and Wagner paramilitaries arrested dozens of civilians, most from the Fulani community. Wagner's withdrawal comes amid what the Malian army calls a 'resurgence' of militant attacks, including two assaults that killed dozens of soldiers and forced troops to abandon a key central base. A European diplomatic source in the Sahel believes Africa Corps will probably do 'much more training of Malian soldiers than Wagner did.' 'Although Wagner claims that its operations and support strengthened the Malian army, Africa Corps will need to continue training and support, especially after the recent wave of attacks against the FAMA (Malian Armed Forces),' said Beverly Ochieng, an analyst at the Washington think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
