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Asia Times
15 hours ago
- Politics
- Asia Times
US-India partnership key to re-establish Indo-Pacific deterrence
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The advent of the second Trump administration has had a defining impact on Washington's engagement with the rest of the world. The US-India partnership – often called a 'defining relationship of the 21st century' – stands at a critical phase with opportunities to scale amid the rapid shifts in global geopolitics, geo-economics, and the exponential growth in dual-use technologies. In the last two decades, US-India relations, particularly defense ties, have seen greater military-to-military interoperability and bigger turnover in terms of defense trade. The last one-to-one meeting between President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in February produced a forward-looking joint statement that, among many other initiatives, aimed to forge a stronger defense partnership in tune with the demands of the dynamic balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. As President Donald Trump, in his second term, recalibrates the US national security and defense strategies amid new terms of engagement with allies and partners, we argue that the US-India defense partnership has a new opportunity to scale cooperation in interoperability and defense industrial synergy to forge stronger deterrent capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region. In his remarks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in May, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced that the United States' priority on foreign policy matters would be the reestablishment of deterrence, especially in (but not limited to) the Indo-Pacific region. It comes as no surprise that the purpose of this deterrence is countering the influence and the threat of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Hegseth stressed this administration's determination, like that of its predecessors, to remain engaged abroad, noting that the prosperity and security of Americans is linked to that of the rest of the Indo-Pacific. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community also contends that 'Russia, China, Iran and North Korea – individually and collectively – are challenging US interests in the world by attacking or threatening others in their regions, with both asymmetric and conventional hard power tactics.' In response to this threat, the US will not, in Hegseth's telling, 'preach' to other countries about how they govern themselves, nor does it seek to encircle China or execute regime change. It instead seeks to prevent war and prevent the PRC from carrying out its plans to annex Taiwan – and to do so via 'peace through strength': President Trump has also said that Communist China will not invade Taiwan on his watch. So, our goal is to prevent war, to make the costs too high, and peace the only option. And we will do this with a strong shield of deterrence, forged together with you—America's great allies and defense partners. Together, we will show what it means to execute peace through strength. While framed as a break from a previous administration that, in his telling, allowed deterrence to lapse, in at least one respect Hegseth built on the momentum of Trump 2.0's predecessor: developing bilateral ties with India. Hegseth had his first call with Indian Minister of Defense Rajnath Singh in February, in which they stressed accelerating 'our operational cooperation and defense industrial and technology collaboration to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific,' along with continuing the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue and concluding the next 10-year US-India Defense Framework later in 2025. The US-India relationship has seen a number of ups and downs, and the last two decades have been crucial in shaping the current contours. The relationship has the overall support of the major political parties on both sides, and the broader strategic convergence of counteracting China's assertive rise remains broadly intact, which is the mainstay of 're-establishing deterrence.' More than any domain in which the bilateral relationship has grown, the defense sector stands out, through habits of cooperation developed at the tri-service level and the growing defense trade. Moreover, the two defense industrial conclaves envision greater synergy, with a stronger role from the private sector, by following through on initiatives such as the US-India Roadmap for Defense Industrial Cooperation. Private sector partnerships include those between: Those are examples of how Indian and American firms are coming together to co-produce the necessary goods for meeting the security challenges ahead. Recognizing the disruptive impact of new technologies like artificial intelligence and quantum computing, both sides have also announced the Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA) aimed at scaling 'industry partnerships and production in the Indo-Pacific.' During the last one-to-one meeting between President Trump and Prime Minister Modi, both sides showed intent to push ahead comprehensive cooperation through the US-India COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) for the 21st century. From the Biden-era iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies) to the US-India TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology), a whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach is envisioned to leverage technologies for partnership in multiple sectors. The integration of US-origin defense items into India's inventory in the last two decades appears significant, despite bureaucratic processes of defense sales and purchases that need fixing from both ends. From heavy-duty transport aircraft and high-end attack helicopters to complex combat vehicles, missile systems and long-endurance unmanned systems, the partnership is growing in sea, land and air-based military assets. The partnership will remain especially important for developing India's anti-submarine warfare capabilities in the Indian Ocean, along with other surveillance and reconnaissance systems for a more robust maritime domain awareness. Follow-up will becrucially required to realize the benefits of the announcements made to 'to streamline defense trade, technology exchange and maintenance, spare supplies and in-country repair and overhaul of US-provided defense systems' and to open negotiations on a reciprocal defense procurement. The Trump administration sounds bullish on the prospects of improving 'accountability and transparency through the foreign defense sales systems to ensure predictable and reliable delivery of American products to foreign partners and allies in support of US foreign policy objectives.' Therefore, it is imperative for Washington and Delhi to work harder on a better alignment of their strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region that would, in turn, help streamline their vision of co-development and co-production in defense products and heightened cooperation in 'overseas deployments of the US and Indian militaries in the Indo-Pacific, including enhanced logistics and intelligence sharing.' The US Congress-mandated Commission on the National Defense Strategy last year proposed, among other things, a US 'multi-force theater construct' to enable warfighting in simultaneous conflicts with multiple adversaries, and a pitch for an augmented use of the private sector in the US defense industrial base. Therefore, for a critical stakeholder and major defense partner like India, how Washington's 're-establishing deterrence' pans out in the next few years will be crucial, for scaling the growing bilateral defense cooperation, and in minilateral groupings, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. India and the United States likely will never be fully aligned on matters of security cooperation, as their differing responses toward Ukraine and Islamic terrorism originating from Pakistan illustrate. However, these differences of opinion should not distract them, as both face a long-term challenge from a PRC that seeks to rewrite the rules of the Indo-Pacific region so crucial to both Delhi and Washington. Furthermore, as major Indo-Pacific powers with large populations and resources, both countries are well-situated to complement one another's efforts to deter Beijing's revisionism. The early signs from the Trump administration's interactions with the Modi government are promising, and it is imperative that the momentum between them continues. Monish Tourangbam ( is a senior research consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation (CRF), New Delhi. Rob York (rob@ is director for regional affairs at Pacific Forum.
South China Morning Post
13-06-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
South China Sea needs US-China ‘security talks mechanism' to prevent conflict: think tank
China and the US should consider setting up a 'security dialogue mechanism' on the South China Sea to help prevent conflict in the contested waterway, a noted independent Chinese think tank has suggested. According to analysts at the Beijing-based Grandview Institution, US-China aerial and maritime interactions in the South China Sea have been marked by confrontational, complex and unpredictable dynamics. However, competition in the strategic waterway was still 'manageable', though it was likely to be prolonged 'structurally', they said in a report published on Thursday. The report, titled 'Competition and Risk Reduction on the South China Sea – Views from China and the United States', was prepared in collaboration with the Pacific Forum, a Hawaii-based foreign policy research institute. Both China and the United States recognised the risk of inadvertent escalation and had developed several crisis management tools, according to the executive summary of the report. 'However, implementation remains inconsistent,' it said. Liu Xiaobo and Sophie Wushuang Yi, both researchers with Grandview, called on both sides to consider 'institutionalised' dialogue mechanisms focused on the regional security architecture, maritime legal order and law enforcement norms, and crisis response protocols. Liu and Yi co-wrote one of the three papers making up the report. Jeffrey Ordaniel, a non-resident adjunct senior fellow and director of maritime programmes at the Pacific Forum, authored another, while the third was by Thomas Shattuck, another Pacific Forum non-resident fellow.
Asia Times
13-06-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
UK's strategic defense posture still includes East of Suez roles
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The launch of the United Kingdom's Strategic Defence Review has finally set down a clear direction for the UK's strategic posture for at least a parliament, perhaps longer. The most instrumental element in the paper is the decision to focus on the Euro-Atlantic as the priority region. This was already understood, but there have been at least two decades of the UK flirting with an East of Suez strategy. This included development of a robust defense attaché network in Southeast Asia, the long courtship of China – and then India – for growth, and the resurgence of UK military assets to the region in the name of defending maritime sea lanes and a 'free and open' Indo-Pacific. While it's true that this SDR was written by externals, led by Lord George Robertson, Dr. Fiona Hill, CMG, and General Sir Richard Barrons, the Labour government has already stamped its seal of approval by accepting all 62 recommendations. So what exactly does it say about the UK's 'Indo-Pacific strategy?' Well, the document is a realization that the US 'Pivot' to the Indo-Pacific region is here to stay. This was made clear after the Biden administration re-released an Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2022 to put its stamp on the Trump strategy of 2019. Both strategies began with the starting point that the United States as an 'Indo-Pacific power' or 'Indo-Pacific nation.' While resources and political attention have – at times – remained stubbornly centered around the Middle East and CENTCOM and with Europe and EUCOM, the arrival of Elbridge Colby (a one-time Pacific Forum 'young leader') on the strategic scene in the United States has for now crowned the Indo-Pacific Pivot as the United States' priority region. The rise of China in this region, and the shift of political, military, and economic weight from Europe to Asia has cemented this shift. Colby's ratification as undersecretary of defense for policy has also added an explicit message to the Europeans: The dribbling of small amounts of assets to the Indo-Pacific is unnecessary; the United States would infinitely prefer that European powers – France, Germany and the UK – focus on the Euro-Atlantic and deal with Russia. The SDR wisely accommodates this resource imperative, while still providing a place for UK interests and support to the US and its allies in the region. If one looks at the number of times 'Indo-Pacific' is mentioned in the document (17), it is notable that this is down from a high of 32 mentions in the 2021 Integrated Review. Still, it is still better than the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 or the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, documents which mentioned 'Asia' five times and two times respectively. The 2025 SDR states that NATO-first does not mean NATO-only, putting the list of priorities as Euro-Atlantic, Middle East, and Indo-Pacific in that order. It states that 'the Indo-Pacific is strategically important to the UK as a global economic and political powerhouse and arena of increasing geopolitical tension.' It notes the strong partnerships the UK has in the region – ASEAN, Australia, Brunei, Japan, India, Indonesia, Nepal, New Zealand and Pakistan come in for special mention – and, of course, China. The SDR's position on China is probably closest to that of the UK Ministry of Defence and –sadly – does not reflect broader opinion across government in Whitehall. China is a 'sophisticated and persistent threat,' which behaves aggressively in the South China Sea and has escalated tensions in the Taiwan Strait. It notes the fact that China has supported Russia in its invasion of Ukraine and that the US-China relationship will be a 'key factor' in global security. It also notes the threats provided by Beijing's military build-up, nuclear modernization and technological and cyber capabilities and recommends the maintenance of UK-China military-to-military communications. Given that US-China mil-to-mil relations are extremely limited now and constantly under pressure from China over US arms sales to Taiwan, this might prove a helpful channel in time. Notably, it recognizes that most of the UK's adversaries will likely field Chinese technology – an important observation in its own right. The SDR's integrated approach toward the Indo-Pacific region is consistent with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy, and consistent with the overall security interests of its closest partners, Japan and Australia, which are rapidly becoming the more important partners of choice across a number of different metrics. First, both are key partners in intelligence-sharing, both work closely with the United States to demonstrate deterrent capability in military exercises in the region and both are defense industrial partners of choice. With Japan, the UK is developing the Meteor, a joint new air-to-air missile (JNAAM) and the Global Combat Air Programme (with Italy), though this latter effort is under pressure. With Australia, there is even more by way of 'production deterrence' in the form of the AUKUS submarine and technology programs. The rotation of UK Astute-class submarines to HMAS Stiling, in Australia, planned as early as 2027 will be an immense boon to deterrence and warfighting capability. So what's missing from the SDR? Well, with respect to the authors, there are a few things: The recent murmurings of disquiet about a lack of progress in AUKUS Pillar 2 is an issue. London and Canberra now need to press upon newly arrived Trump officials their thoughts on the blockage and what can be done to expedite things at the resourcing, regulatory, and organizational level. This needs to be done at a time when the White House is shifting the US trade environment, so this will be difficult. In addition, the UK Ministry of Defence needs to think about what posture it needs to 'surge' military forces into the region in a crisis. The MOD needs to provide options and these range from inter-changeability exercises for UK assets visiting the region to developing a more mature presence in INDOPACOM – through a mid-size consulate in Honolulu run at the ambassadorial level by someone with close links to MOD. The options include joining the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience – if this has not already occurred – and supporting 'production deterrence.' It might mean co-production on long-range munitions in the wide expanse of the Pacific. And, finally, it needs to develop – alone or in tandem with the US – hubs for maintenance, repair, and operations (MRO) so that it can operate at the long-distances required by the operational environment. Dr. John Hemmings (john. @ is deputy director at the Council on Geostrategy in London and senior advisor at Pacific Forum.
Asia Times
12-06-2025
- Politics
- Asia Times
US lethality not enough to counter China's malign influence
Originally published by Pacific Forum, this article is republished with permission. The Trump administration, particularly Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, correctly identifies the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the primary threat to regional security, especially its stated ambitions for Taiwan. Were the PRC to seize Taiwan militarily without US intervention, Beijing could dictate the terms of trade past the island, project power farther into the Pacific and cause Washington's allies in East Asia and emerging partners on the Indian subcontinent to question US willingness to stand up for them. Hegseth has called for a defense budget increase, and the Pentagon is currently drafting its new national security strategy, due in August. He has also made clear that the United States would be ready to respond if Taiwan were attacked. Yet he also notes, correctly, the need to deter such a conflict. The effects of a war over Taiwan would be so catastrophic that neither side could win – not the United States, whose aircraft carriers would be vulnerable to Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles; not China, whose troops would be vulnerable during the initial strait crossing and whose economy might contract as much as 25%; not Taiwan, which might see its miraculous economic growth erased even if it survived as an autonomous entity. And not the world, which is ever more dependent on the technology-fueled growth enabled by the semiconductors that Taiwan plays the leading role in fabricating. Hegseth is signaling that the United States will prioritize countering an invasion and mobilize the necessary resources to do so, including reviving the industrial base and investing in shipyards. He also noted that deterring conflict with the PRC is not America's role alone, and his remarks at the Shangri-la Dialogue last month demonstrated a keen interest in working with US partners in the region in that endeavor. He called upon them to make a similar investment in their defense and combat readiness. Hegseth has emphasized the need to prioritize the 'lethality' of America's armed forces, also using similar descriptors like 'warfighting' and 'readiness.' It would appear that this administration views hard power as the key to keeping the PRC from achieving its aims for the region. However, do the Pentagon and its sister agencies have a plan to prevent China from winning without war? It has been easy in recent years for the PRC's critics to mock its political shortcomings as Beijing's prickliness over issues it considers core strategic areas has overridden its diplomatic professionalism, leading to it alienating previously ambivalent partners. In 2011, China took the step of withholding rare-earth exports to Japan during a territorial dispute; within a decade, Japanese leaders would openly discuss defending Taiwan as a national security priority despite Tokyo's pacifist constitution. From 2016-2022, China enjoyed warm relations with the Philippines under the Duterte administration – which considered ending their hosting of US bases – only for public outrage over Chinese aggression in the South China Sea to prompt a course change by Duterte and the election of a pro-US administration in 2022. South Koreans, who had long seen China as essential not only for economic growth but for a resolution to inter-Korean division, now have among the world's most negative views of China following years of PRC enabling of North Korea plus the spread of Covid-19 and sanctions imposed on the country following THAAD deployment. Taiwan, which until 2016 had leadership that desired to deepen cooperation with the PRC and eventually achieve unification, now has elected three successive administrations supportive of independence, and the PRC's response has been a series of punitive measures that have only deepened the public's antipathy toward Beijing. It must be stressed, again, that those 'wins' for Washington were the product of PRC actions taken in defense of what Beijing considers core interests – whether concerning territorial rights, defense of the Chinese mainland or the credibility of Communist Party rule – and had little to do with US messaging or improvements to the American reputation in the region. And political successes in these countries may not be as durable as they appear. Taiwan's pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party recently launched a sweeping set of measures designed to counter PRC influence, but its pro-unification opposition still finds much success in local elections and now holds the majority in the Legislative Yuan, where it has used that majority to fight the defense budget increases the Trump administration wants to see, and even civil defense-bolstering programs. The current leadership of the Philippines has been strident in its support for the US alliance and has done the most among ASEAN nations to shine a light on the PRC's coercive tactics in the South China Sea. Yet the former president, who enjoyed a much friendlier relationship with China, remains a popular figure despite his recent arrest by the International Criminal Court. Duterte's party did very well in recent Senate elections, increasing the chances that his daughter, the current vice president, will survive upcoming impeachment proceedings and run for president herself in 2028. South Korea, after three years of close cooperation with the United States and Japan, just elected a candidate much more open to cooperation with China. Even Japan, where the success of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party is rarely in doubt, currently labors through a period of weak governance that makes the formulation of effective defense policy difficult, especially in terms of overcoming its post-war pacifism and insularity and preparing for an operation as risky as the defense of Taiwan. If the United States is to remain engaged in the Indo-Pacific and prevent PRC domination, it faces obstacles that cannot be solved by lethality alone. The PRC currently wages a campaign that lethality cannot counter. As Xi Jinping continues to purge high-ranking officers, the PRC would seem to lack the capability to direct an invasion even if it has the manpower and equipment to wage one. Therefore, its assaults on these locations will remain more subtle. These will include: seeking to co-opt the target countries' politicians, academics, media and social media personalities with paid trips to China, directing and controlling diaspora communities through the presence of overseas 'police stations' that some countries are not legally equipped to counteract, buying up crucial assets and establishing partnerships to ensure deference from business communities, and spreading narratives through official and unofficial channels that the United States is unreliable, untrustworthy and unable to counter the inevitability of China's rise. If the United States is not engaged in countering such influence, in the next five years Taiwan could again have a pro-unification leadership – or, at least, gridlock could prevent it from adequately prepping its defenses – while Manila could turn against hosting US military bases, Seoul could vow neutrality in a Taiwan contingency and Tokyo might not have made any meaningful preparations to counter PRC ambitions in the region. Under such circumstances, even if the defense secretary does get the most lethal US military in history, the US armed forces may be rendered helpless by politics in partner countries. The recent departure of Elon Musk, the Department of Government Efficiency's founder, from the US government is an opportunity to begin rebuilding soft power organs – USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy and the Bureau of Human Rights, Democracy and Labor at the State Department – that were targeted by spending cuts. The Defense Department should be part of broader, whole-of-government efforts – including State, Commerce, Energy, Treasury and others – not just to counter the PRC, but also to erode its influence. The lethality of US forces should not merely be enhanced; partners should know the United States will use it to good ends, including their defense against unprovoked aggression. The Trump administration need not worry about empowering political leaders who do not share its vision – political parties of the right are leading the charge against Chinese influence in Manila, Seoul, Tokyo and elsewhere and, despite its name, Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party is a big tent more committed to Taipei's autonomy than to political progressivism. Nor should such moves be seen as interference in the domestic affairs of partners; Washington has worked with unlikely partners in countries where politicians have campaigned on skepticism of the United States – until they, and the constituencies that elected them, saw what the alternative to the United States was. But before the United States can convince these countries that they should arm themselves, Washington must first convince regional countries that there is a threat to prepare for and that the United States is the reliable partner it claims to be. A trillion dollars in lethal weapons systems, by itself, will not buy that. Rob York ( rob@ ) is director for regional affairs at Pacific Forum International. He is the editor of Pacific Forum publications and spearheads Pacific Forum outreach to the Korean Peninsula and South Asia, as well as programming on countering malign influence in US partners. He earned his PhD in Korean history in December 2023.
Asia Times
10-06-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
Recommitting to Japan-South Korea cooperation amid uncertainty
This article, originally published by Pacific Forum, is republished with permission. As President Lee Jae-myung takes office in South Korea, his new government is poised to begin rebuilding domestic trust and setting forth a new foreign policy agenda. South Korea has been in political limbo for the past six months since former president Yoon Suk Yeol briefly declared martial law in December 2024 – and in the meantime the international arena has been thrown into chaos. As South Korea reemerges into this new global context, it faces some difficult decisions about how to manage its relationships with its key economic and security partners. Precisely because of this uncertain outlook, now is a critical time for the governments in South Korea and Japan to recommit to further strengthening their bilateral relations to deal with shared problems. Prior to the recent period of limbo, Japan-South Korea ties had improved markedly as part of a push by former President Yoon, former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and former US President Joe Biden to strengthen trilateral relations among their countries. Since the trilateral Camp David Summit in August 2023, over 80 US-Korea-Japan dialogues have been convened to promote collaboration in areas ranging from economics to security to people-to-people exchange. However, with recent changes in political leadership, there are questions as to how Japan-South Korea relations will evolve in the coming months under the Shigeru Ishida and Lee administrations as the two leaders begin to engage. Why should the governments of Japan and South Korea recommit to cooperation now? To begin with, the two governments face worsening security threats. Both Japan and South Korea harbor long-standing concerns about China, as well as about North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Concerns about North Korea have been compounded by deepening cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow in the war in Ukraine and the likelihood that Russia is rewarding North Korea's support with the transfer of military technologies. In addition, Japan and South Korea depend heavily on an international economic order that is currently in crisis. For years, the World Trade Organization has been stalled by disagreements among developed and developing countries and challenged by the practices of China's state-led economic system. Now, the trade system is under immense strain as the United States imposes unilateral tariffs that undermine the 'most favored nation' principle, and escalating trade war looms as a possibility. Japan and South Korea share an interest in stabilizing the existing economic order, maintaining relatively free flow of goods and services and strengthening their own economic security and national resilience. Moreover, Japan and South Korea must deal with a mutual US ally that is increasingly a source of disruption rather than stability. Both countries run significant trade surpluses with the US, which has made them top targets for tariffs. Japan and South Korea currently face reciprocal tariffs of 24% and 25% respectively, as well as Section 232 tariffs on autos, auto parts, steel, and aluminum. Japanese and Korean companies are being asked to invest more in the US. The two governments are also facing US pressure to boost their defense spending and host nation support and to increase other kinds of alliance burden-sharing at the same time as the US is considering reducing its military presence. In general, the return of an 'America First' approach to US foreign policy throws traditional alliances and institutions into question, leaving Japan and South Korea in a more vulnerable position. How can Japan and South Korea work together to address these challenges? The first step is to maintain the positive progress that has been achieved over the last two mechanisms have been established, and plans have been set in motion to start addressing many of the common concerns mentioned previously. Some initiatives will need to be reexamined under new national leadership, but they constitute an important baseline that should not be lost. Although the Trump administration has reaffirmed support for trilateral US-Japan-South Korea cooperation so far, Tokyo and Soul may need to push forward bilaterally without Washington in some cases. Second, Japan and South Korea may benefit from consulting with one another regarding their respective bilateral negotiations with the US on trade and security issues. In some cases, they may even find creative ways to coordinate their efforts. For example, SK Group Chairman Chey Tae-won recently proposed that South Korea and Japan could respond to US pressure by jointly purchasing liquefied natural gas from the US, 'to increase deal size and leverage greater buying power to secure lower prices.' This type of approach could be applied in other areas. Tokyo and Seoul could also quietly consult on their respective bottom lines, to avoid one government taking a 'bad' deal with the US that sets a negative precedent for the other. Third, Japan and South Korea can build upon the foundation of the last two years to cultivate more widespread support for improving bilateral ties among their domestic stakeholders including legislators, civil society organizations, scholars and the general public. There have already been modest improvements in the two countries' public sentiment toward each other, and now is the time to build on this momentum. The more stakeholders who see Japan-South Korea ties as valuable, the more resilient their relationship will be to negative episodes in the future. There are also likely to be opportunities to build ties in the trilateral context; for example, the US House of Representatives recently introduced bipartisan legislation to establish an inter-parliamentary dialogue among elected politicians in the US, Japan and South Korea. Fourth, Japan and South Korea will benefit from embedding their bilateral cooperation in broader regional and international coalitions. Most of the problems that these two countries face cannot be solved through bilateral cooperation alone; instead, Tokyo and Seoul must partner with other governments in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and elsewhere to address transnational security and economic challenges. For example, Lee, the new president, has already announced that he will be attending the June summit of the G7, which is an important venue for South Korea to consult with other like-minded countries as a guest. Japan and South Korea can continue to strengthen their cooperation with NATO as part of the 'Indo-Pacific 4.' The two countries should also explore ways to shore up the international economic system through broader trade initiatives. For example, they could work together to revitalize discussions on the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific at the APEC summit in Gyeongju in November, and South Korea could considering joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership as well as the WTO's Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement. Participation in such minilateral initiatives will help further reinforce and stabilize Japan-South Korea bilateral efforts. The path ahead will not be easy. Internal politics in both countries are complex, and leaders will have to balance competing domestic and foreign policy priorities moving forward. The grievances that haunt Japan-South Korea relations cannot simply be ignored, and it will require careful, sustained effort to find mutually acceptable resolutions. However, taking steps now to put Japan-South Korea relations on a more resilient footing will help to facilitate these difficult conversations – and the costs of not cooperating will increase if the international system becomes more unstable. Kristi Govella ( is an associate professor of Japanese politics and international relations at the University of Oxford and senior advisor and Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
