Latest news with #P5+1
Time of India
19 hours ago
- Politics
- Time of India
Iran claims foiled Israeli assassination attempt on its foreign minister Abbas Araghchi amid war
Iranian security forces have reportedly stopped an attempt to assassinate Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran, a plot that officials are calling a 'major Israeli conspiracy .' The dramatic revelation comes amid the Iran and Israel war, and as Araghchi prepares for high-stakes nuclear talks with European leaders in Geneva. The news broke after Mohammad Hossein Ranjbaran , adviser to Minister Araghchi, posted on X (formerly Twitter) that Iranian intelligence had uncovered and stopped a sophisticated assassination plot targeting the foreign minister. Ranjbaran credited the 'unknown soldiers of the homeland', a phrase commonly used to refer to Iran's intelligence and security operatives, for averting what he described as a potentially devastating attack. 'If it were not for the security measures of the unknown soldiers of the homeland, perhaps a few days ago the great Israeli conspiracy against him would have been carried out in Tehran, which, thank God, failed,' Ranjbaran wrote, as reported by Tasnim News Agency. He further stated that since it was announced Araghchi would travel to Geneva for negotiations with the European 'troika' (France, Germany, and the UK), concerns about Israeli targeting had intensified. 'Yes, there certainly was and still is such a threat. Nevertheless, Seyed Abbas Araqchi considers himself a soldier of the motherland more than the head of the diplomatic service,' Ranjbaran added. Live Events Seyyed Abbas Araghchi, is one of Iran's most experienced diplomats and currently serves as the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs. With over three decades of service, Araghchi has shaped Iranian foreign policy on some of its most pivotal issues, including nuclear negotiations and regional diplomacy. He was Iran's chief nuclear negotiator in the P5+1 talks. Despite the foiled plot, Araghchi remains undeterred, according to his adviser. 'He seeks martyrdom,' Ranjbaran said, emphasizing the minister's commitment to his mission regardless of personal risk. Araghchi is currently en route to Geneva for talks with his European counterparts, who are seeking to de-escalate the Iran-Israel conflict and revive diplomatic channels. As international attention turns to the outcome of the Geneva talks, Iranian officials have made clear that security threats—whether real or perceived—will not deter them from pursuing their strategic and diplomatic objectives.
Express Tribune
a day ago
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Slugfest in the Middle East
Listen to article Slugfest, yes; but of no ordinary consequences. It will take the world to keep it contained. Iran in the western construct is Middle East, not West Asia, and it is important to note. It comes under the geographical responsibility of US Central Command that oversees the Middle East. Israel too is a part as is Pakistan on its eastern most boundary. Nothing moves in the US CENTCOM AOR without its consent or at least without its notice. To imagine anything else is naïve. That is why the CENTCOM was created with its forward Headquarters conveniently placed in Al Udeid in Doha, Qatar. General Kurilla, the CENTCOM Chief, knows it all. Dial back a few weeks. President Trump wanted a 'deal' with Iran on the Nuclear Enrichment issue. Iran too wanted to settle now that a more aggressive administration was in power in Washington with its own peculiar worldview and willingness to support Israel to establish its dominance over the Middle East. For the more pliable wary of Israeli prowess there exist the Abraham Accords to help secure their future for Israel's acceptability only if Iran, the remaining stumbling block, could be subdued. The Houthis in Yemen would then easily acquiesce too. Iran's aspiration to be a nuclear power was already established. Agreement with the P5+1 had laid limits on Iran's ambition (Iran is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty). But then Trump chose to dump the Agreement in 2018, three years after the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) was first signed. It opened the space for Iran to pursue its nuclear enrichment programme at its own pace. The IAEA could visit to inspect if Iran was complying to the limits of enrichment levels and the stockpiled enriched uranium. Iran though built in greater ambiguity. It is said that Iran moved significantly ahead of its below-5 per cent limit on enrichment under the Agreement and held a significantly higher value of stockpiled enriched uranium than stipulated. In 2023 it was reported that Iran had enriched up to and over 83 per cent level. It was barely short of the magical 90 per cent mark to turn into a weapon. Trump in his second term, aware of the leeway the US exit had afforded Iran, sought an immediate renegotiation of the deal to rein Iran in. Implicitly he may have had in mind to reinforce his credentials of a deal and a peacemaker before the Alfred Nobel Committee. Israel did not seem to agree nor did some from within Trump's team. Donald Trump's was the stated position. More likely it left space for its partner, Israel, to eliminate or at the least significantly degrade Iran's nuclear programme as a living and present danger to Israel's long-term health and security. Iran had/has two major nuclear enrichment facilities, one at Natanz, that Israel struck with some effect in the ongoing war with Iran, and at Fordow near Qom, which is far more sophisticated and secure where enrichment levels are suspected to have been breached. When Iran was reluctant to enter negotiations, Trump declared a sixty-day window for Iran to agree to a deal proposed by the US, else the cost to Iran would be heavy and unbearable in military terms. Five rounds down and sixth on the anvil when it was more than likely that Iran was coming around to agree on most terms, Israel attacked Iran. It was the sixty-first day from the day Trump had announced the window of opportunity. Coincidence? Or a well deliberated execution? I don't think it needs much thought. What has followed since June 13 has been a conflagration ready to envelop the whole region unless handled with care. Both sides rain missiles on each other and wreak untold pain and misery. Soon, civilian populations will be the victims to test and breach their threshold of tolerance and of the two societies and their political masters. In a slugfest, one who can absorb more is usually the one to prevail. Mohammad Ali, the late Boxing Champion, perfected this art and established a psychological edge over his opponent by inviting him to give him body blows. The national character of Iran and its thousands of years of civilisational history and the size of its population hold it in better stead than Israel which is still young as a nation even if it boasts of a history of suffering over centuries. In the Iranian character, death is celebrated albeit with remorse; in the Israeli experience suffering and victimhood is emphasised to gain empathy. These two characteristics will hugely define the ultimate victor in the civilisational sense. Either Iran will now run out of its missiles or Israel will breach its threshold of pain. Each may be the first sign for that side to find accommodation or exhaust itself to desperate resort. How might Iran's nuclear programmes be affected will depend on the damage the programme suffers, possibly delaying the timeline for weaponising its ability – an important Israel-US aim for this war. Negotiations will surely follow when the war finally ends but how much Iran may give to the US will depend on how Iran has fared in the war in perceptions and in real terms. If Iran seems to have held her line resolutely the regime and the ongoing system in power will sustain and survive – it can surely outrun Israel in this madmen race. Or if the US offers it a chance for peace on terms that may save the regime and buy time and keep foundations of Iran's nuclear programme, Iran may take that route. It would be prudent in a long game. It will also save the region from chaos, uncertainty and falling dominoes which are sure to follow. Regime change, the deeper or implicit political objective, is a more complicated and extended effect of the war and where might it first happen, Iran or Israel, is moot. What is of essence here is that Israel and its supporters are now loudly calling for the US to intervene on Israel's behalf; that Israel with its existing capacity cannot complete the mission of eliminating Iran's nuclear programme. Iran's resilience and unexpectedly ferocious response on an overly sensitive Israeli psyche to the losses amidst their population centers is the key to shout for the patron to come to the rescue. Israel stands exposed with its civilisational inadequacies. This is Iran's great achievement. Similarly, were Trump to jump in and directly attack Iranian assets it shall not only be an act of desperation but will also puncture Trump's long held position of withdrawing from forever wars. Iraq is what he always refers to as an example. Iran will still survive despite Fordow but what carnage may ensue at the US installations in the Middle East will only expand, engorge and envelop all the Middle East which will be rendered chaotic, explosive and uncontrollable for years to come. Iraq, Libya and Syria stand as sorry examples of such ill-thought adventurism. More likely better sense will prevail despite Netanyahu's Israel.
CNA
3 days ago
- Politics
- CNA
Commentary: Israel and Iran are both letting illusory ambitions cloud their judgment
TEL AVIV: The rapidly escalating military conflict between Israel and Iran represents a clash of ambitions. Iran seeks to become a nuclear power, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu longs to be remembered as the Israeli leader who categorically thwarted Iran's nuclear programme, which he views as an existential threat to Israel's survival. Both dreams are as misguided as they are dangerous. Iran's nuclear ambitions have always been driven primarily by the goal of securing the regime's survival, not annihilating Israel, which is far more likely to be destroyed at the end of a long war of attrition than under a mushroom cloud. But Israel cannot afford to treat Iran's threats of nuclear Armageddon as mere bloviating, particularly after Hamas' Oct 7, 2023 terrorist attack, which triggered Israel's long, brutal and ongoing offensive against the Iranian proxy in Gaza. It is not wrong to fear a nuclear Iran. THE WHITE HOUSE WANTS A NUCLEAR DEAL But Netanyahu is a key reason why Iran's nuclear programme is as far along as it is. It was over his objections that the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), together with the European Union, negotiated the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, freezing the Islamic Republic's nuclear programme. And it was under pressure from Netanyahu that Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA three years later, spurring Iran to renew its race for the bomb. Israel's audacious attacks on Iran surely will cause further tension between Trump and Netanyahu. Since his return to the White House, Trump has sought a new nuclear agreement with Iran. But this was never going to be an easy process – and not only because Iran has little reason to trust the US. While Trump has no qualms about touting unimpressive (or worse) deals as historic breakthroughs, he surely feels pressure to strike an agreement that is somehow better than the JCPOA that then-US President Barack Obama negotiated a decade ago. Given this, Trump probably views Israel's strikes as useful in limited doses – just enough to increase his leverage in the nuclear negotiations that were already underway. But Netanyahu is fighting for his political survival – and in that battle, no bridge is too far. While Israel initially focused its attacks on nuclear facilities and ballistic missile bases, the conflict has escalated to include targets that could draw the US into the war (such as energy facilities and residential buildings), and it is just getting started. In line with his grand Churchillian ambition – and mirroring the perspective he has brought to his war against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon – Netanyahu is seeking 'total victory' over Iran. This would render a nuclear deal unnecessary. SO DO THE GULF STATES There is just one problem: Israel is incapable of eradicating Iran's nuclear programme. Israel has struck nuclear sites in Natanz and Isfahan, but the damage to the facilities was limited, partly because Israel recognised the need to avoid unleashing radiation across the region. And Israel does not have bombs that can penetrate Iran's Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, which is built inside a mountain. Of course, physical infrastructure is only part of the equation. That is why Israel also targeted scientists, as well as top Revolutionary Guard leaders. But Iran's nuclear programme is an expansive and deeply embedded state project. Killing a few – or even a few dozen – individuals will not paralyse it, let alone eliminate it. In any case, Israel still needs the US. And Trump has no interest in letting Israel drive up oil prices or create a rift between him and America's Gulf allies, which just agreed to funnel trillions of dollars in investment toward the US. Nor can Israel hope for the tacit complicity that the Arab states demonstrated in its war against Hamas and Hezbollah. While these countries have no love for Iran, they have a vested interest in regional stability, especially as they work to diversify their economies. A cornered Iran might even attack the Gulf states directly, hitting their oil installations or disrupting transport lanes in the Persian Gulf. These countries want a nuclear deal, not a regional conflagration. DIPLOMACY WILL REMAIN THE ONLY ANSWER Iran probably wants roughly the same. Though it withdrew from scheduled nuclear talks in Oman, its military response has been confined to Israeli targets. Notably, despite having poured billions of dollars into its regional proxies in recent years, it has refrained from activating them – however diminished they may have been rendered by Israel – against American or Arab targets. But if Iran finds itself with its back against the wall, it can force a reluctant Hezbollah and its Iraqi militias into the fight. If not now, when? It is for occasions like this that the alliances were created in the first place. Iran can also incite attacks against Israel elsewhere, such as the West Bank. Moreover, it will probably withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, opening the way for it to achieve nuclear breakout – a process that would take mere months. Iran now risks falling into the same strategic trap that drained the energies of the Sunni pan-Arabism it revolted against in 1979. By pouring its energy and resources into a war of annihilation against Israel, it would jeopardise its primary objective: regime survival. But Iran is not alone in letting illusory ambitions cloud its judgment. If Israel cannot destroy Iran's nuclear programme, it certainly cannot achieve total victory over Iran's regime. And it is not just Iran: none of Israel's security challenges can be overcome through total victory. No matter how many bombs Netanyahu drops, diplomacy will remain the only answer. Meanwhile, Israel's military hubris is becoming inadmissible to its moderate Arab allies. They wanted Israel as an equal partner in a regional peace, not as a new hegemon.
Hindustan Times
16-05-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Slow and steady progress in US-Iran nuclear talks
On May 11, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi and US special envoy for the Middle East Steve Witkoff met in Muscat for the fourth round of Omani-mediated nuclear talks since April 12. After the negotiations, the Omani foreign minister stated that the 'discussions included useful and original ideas reflecting a shared wish to reach an honourable agreement' and that the fifth round will be held after both parties have consulted their leadership. Initially scheduled for May 3, the fourth round was postponed for 'logistical reasons.' In the interim, the policy divide on Iran within the Trump administration played out in the media. However, the continued talks suggest both sides are serious about avoiding war. In fact, US President has said that the US and Iran are close to a nuclear deal. Witkoff echoed the zero Iranian enrichment position held by foreign policy hawks in the administration, while criticising the 'neocon element' in Washington for their bias in favour of a military solution. Araghchi hit back that Tehran will not give in to 'unrealistic and irrational' US demands. Also, Washington imposed new sanctions on Iran, and the US defence secretary Pete Hegseth threatened Iran with consequences for supporting the Houthis before a bilateral ceasefire deal was reached between the Yemeni armed group and the US. The continued talks suggest both sides are serious about their dialogue and avoiding a scenario of war. The task of diplomacy is to reach a compromise given the widely divergent red lines regarding the objectives of the negotiations. Trump wants a new deal that will permanently keep Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In 2018, when Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed in 2015 by the P5+1, he called it the worst deal ever. His primary criticism was its so-called 'sunset provisions' stipulating when the various restrictions imposed on Iran's nuclear programme expire. Some members of the Trump team, led by secretary of State Marco Rubio, have revived the earlier demands of eliminating Iran's uranium enrichment programme as a requirement to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. Others, including Witkoff, had initially suggested a scaled-back and heavily monitored enrichment programme. Iranian officials insist the new agreement should guarantee Iran's economic benefits and mutual fulfilment of the commitments. Further, Iran is sticking to its long-held position that under Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signatories have an inalienable right to independent civilian nuclear capability and that Iran cannot be treated as an exception within the global non-proliferation framework. Over the last two decades, Iran has made significant advances in developing a national nuclear fuel cycle. Much progress was made between 2006, when Iran ended its voluntary suspension of enrichment, resulting in the IAEA referral of Iran's nuclear file to the UNSC for punitive sanctions and 2012, when it agreed with the P5+1 on the negotiation framework. Iran created both technological capabilities and infrastructure for uranium enrichment up to 20%, the fabrication of fuel for its power and research reactors, and nuclear waste disposal. Despite escalating sanctions and military threats, Iran's rulers formed an intra-elite consensus and rallied wider society by framing the nuclear issue in terms of technological achievement and autonomy. In response to Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA and Israel's campaign of sabotage against nuclear facilities and assassination of Iran's top nuclear scientist, the Iranian parliament passed a law to scale up nuclear activity as a leverage-building exercise. Iran demonstrated its capacity to quickly scale up by installing new generations of centrifuges and enriching uranium to 60%. During talks with the Biden administration on reviving the JCPOA, Iran argued that, since Washington could not provide legal guarantees against another withdrawal, there should be 'inherent guarantees' under which Iran would have the provision to scale up its nuclear activities as a retaliation measure. In this context, it is highly unlikely that Iran will agree to dismantle its enrichment programme. Tehran has, however, made novel gestures of potential scientific and commercial collaboration with the US in Iran's civilian nuclear programme. Previously, analysts, including high officials in Iran, have broached the idea of joint-venture enrichment plants, with European or even Russian and Chinese participation, to resolve the impasse over the enrichment issue. Over the years, Tehran has relied on Russia and China to stave off US military threats over its nuclear programme. In recent months, Iran has strengthened coordination with Russia and China on the nuclear issue. In mid-March, the US and five other countries convened a closed-door session of the UN Security Council, where Britain indicated support for the 'snapback' of UN sanctions on Iran if necessary. Subsequently, after a meeting in Beijing, the deputy foreign ministers of Iran, Russia and China issued a joint statement emphasising the importance of diplomatic engagement and dialogue. While noting that Iran was committed to full compliance with its obligations under the NPT and Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, they stressed the need to fully respect Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Opposing a potential snapback, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi stated that a 'forced intervention' by the UNSC will destroy years of diplomatic efforts.' Before each round of talks with the US, Araghchi travelled to Moscow or Beijing, briefing them about negotiations as they progressed. Tehran has also made fresh overtures to Europeans to ensure they do not side with the US's maximalist demands. The success of the US-Iran talks is far from certain; the role of the other members of the P5+1 will be crucial in fashioning a compromise necessary for an agreement. Deepika Saraswat is an associate fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views expressed are personal
Arab News
13-04-2025
- Business
- Arab News
Saudi Arabia welcomes Oman's hosting of Iran-US talks, says dialogue is the way to go
RIYADH: Saudi Arabia welcomed Oman's hosting of the Iran-US talks on Tehran's nuclear program, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said, adding that the Kingdom prefers dialogue as a way to end all regional and international disputes. In a statement carried by the Saudi Press Agency, the ministry said Saudi Arabia hopes that the talks "will lead to supporting joint action to enhance security, stability and peace in the region and the world." On April 12, American and Iranian negotiators met for the first time in Muscat, the Omani capital, as the long-term adversaries try to come up with a new nuclear deal in place of the failed 2015 accord. The 2015 accord, or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was a long-term deal that Iran agreed with world powers known as the P5+1 - composed of the US, UK, France, China, Russia and Germany. Under that agreement, Iran was to limit its nuclear activities and allow international inspectors to visit its nuclear sites. In return, economic sanctions on Iran would be lifted by the world powers, notably the US. Donald Trump, however, pulled the US out of the agreement in his first term of office in 2018 amid objections by other regional powers that the accord lacked the teeth to curtail Iran's nuclear activities and only empowered Tehran to continue interfering in the affairs of its neighbors. In his second terms as president, Trump invited Iran's leadership to the negotiating table to avoid military action. In Saturday's initial meeting in Muscat, Oman's Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi acted as intermediary, shuttling from one room to the other where the American and Iranian delegations were assigned, as the long-time adversaries tried to lay the groundwork for their high-stakes nuclear talks. Albusaidi later told reporters that the talks took place in a 'friendly atmosphere,' adding: 'We will continue to work together.' According to the Iranian foreign ministry, the negotiators also spoke directly for 'a few minutes,' and that the talks were held 'in a constructive and mutually respectful atmosphere.' Steve Witkoff, a real estate magnate, headed the US team, while Iran's team was led by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, a seasoned diplomat and key architect of the 2015 accord. Just before the first meeting started, Trump told reporters: 'I want Iran to be a wonderful, great, happy country. But they can't have a nuclear weapon.' Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's adviser Ali Shamkhani said Iran was 'seeking a real and fair agreement.' The two sides have agreed to meet again.
