Latest news with #NationalNuclearSecurityAdministration
Yahoo
10-06-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Nuclear watchdogs, scientists question need for SC plutonium plant amid environmental study
The Savannah River Site has a total of 51 waste tanks. Eight of those tanks have been operationally closed. (From Savannah River Site fact sheet, May 2022, U.S. Department of Energy) South Carolina's federal nuclear site is part of a plan to replace the plutonium cores of bombs in the country's nuclear arsenal. But now the federal government is taking a closer look at the environmental impacts of such a venture — or whether it's even necessary. A $25 billion factory planned for the Savannah River Nuclear Site in western South Carolina would mean new investment and lots of new jobs for the area — an estimated 1,000 new positions over the next several years. But anti-nuclear and environmental groups sued in 2021 saying the U.S. Department of Energy, the federal agency that manages the country's nuclear stockpile, didn't follow national environmental law in developing its plans and failed to account for disposal of excess radioactive material. In a settlement in January, the government agreed to redo the necessary study. The public has until July 14 to weigh in on the scope and factors they think the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Energy Department's nuclear arm, should consider in its review. 'A rushed program will likely increase the risks to the workers and frontline communities who bear still unaddressed burdens from the production of nuclear weapons during the Cold War,' Dylan Spaulding, senior scientist for the Union of Concerned Scientists, wrote in a recent report. The Department of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration did not respond to emails sent by the SC Daily Gazette. 3 SC colleges could split $120M to educate students for jobs at nuclear laboratory Plutonium decays over centuries. The recycling of spheres of plutonium, called pits, used in nuclear weapons has become a priority over the past couple decades as the country's nuclear stockpile has aged. In response, scientists at Savannah River, as well as those at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, have been charged with salvaging usable plutonium from old pits and recycling it into new ones. Savannah River was expected to make 50 pits per year by 2030, though that timeline was considered ambitious to begin with. It likely will be further delayed by the legal settlement, which halted some of the proposed construction work and equipment installation. The 310-square-mile complex, known to locals as the 'bomb plant,' produced weapons-grade plutonium and tritium for the U.S. nuclear arsenal from the 1950s through the end of the Cold War and nuclear arms race between the United States and Russia. All radioactive production at the site that covers parts of Barnwell, Aiken, and Allendale counties ceased in 1992, when its mission shifted to cleanup and research. Federal scientists have said they have no way of knowing how long the nuclear weapons pits will remain usable. But the Union of Concerned Scientists argues new pits aren't necessary to maintain the existing U.S. nuclear fleet. 'The claim that we need new pits just to maintain a safe and reliable arsenal just doesn't hold water,' Spaulding wrote. 'The reality is NNSA has thousands of existing plutonium pits in reserve and should investigate options for re-use before one more pit is produced.' Tom Clements, director of Savannah River Site Watch, is a longtime nuclear watchdog whose organization helped bring the federal lawsuit against the pit program. He also pointed to statements in the NNSA's own study of pit aging, which says plutonium pits have reliable lifetimes of at least 100 years. The average age of the country's current pits is now around 42 years. 'While public rationales for the program often emphasize a need to replace aging pits, the national laboratories have offered no evidence that the nation's existing pits are anywhere near the end of their service lives,' Spaulding wrote. 'Moreover, the national laboratories can use existing capabilities to monitor any potential for aging effects without reviving pit production.' Both Clements and the Union of Concerned Scientists are calling for a new independent assessment of pit lifetimes, an inventory of existing pits, as well as an assessment of all potential pit recycling and waste disposal sites, beyond those just considering Savannah River and Los Alamos. Defense package includes $2.7B for SRS in 2024 South Carolina has long wrestled with tons of weapons-grade plutonium that have accumulated at Savannah River, suing in 2016 over the federal government's inability to meet deadlines for its promised removal. Much of the surplus plutonium from sites across the country was brought to South Carolina in 2002 and stored inside the reactor that once produced the radioactive metal. It was supposed to be turned into fuel for commercial nuclear reactors — mixed-oxide fuel, or MOX — as part of a nonproliferation agreement with Russia in 2000. But with the plant to convert the plutonium years behind schedule and billions over budget, the Obama administration tried repeatedly to scrap it. However, South Carolina's delegation balked, and Attorney General Alan Wilson sued, keeping the project going. The fatal blow came from the Trump administration, which continued with his predecessor's plans, and another effort by South Carolina officials to revive the project failed. The project was officially terminated in 2018. That left 11.5 metric tons of plutonium underground at SRS, enough to build the bomb dropped on Nagasaki nearly 2,000 times over, The Post and Courier reported. A $600 million settlement with the state in fall 2020 gave the U.S. Department of Energy an additional 15 years, until 2037, to get rid of all the plutonium it shipped to SRS. Even if doesn't, South Carolina can't sue again until 2042, as per the settlement's terms. The proposed pit production factory is meant to be developed at the site of that failed fuels plant. The state already has invested heavily to prepare for the future of both the Savannah River Site and its associated national laboratory. Last year, the Legislature allocated $60 million in the budget to fund faculty, student scholarships, lab upgrades and a control room simulator at the University of South Carolina, Clemson University and South Carolina State University, as well as a workforce center at USC's four-year campus in Aiken.
Miami Herald
20-05-2025
- Politics
- Miami Herald
US completes new nuclear bomb year ahead of schedule
By Dean Murray The United States has completed its new nuclear bomb, nearly a year ahead of schedule. The B61-13 weapon features a maximum yield of 360 kilotons - 24 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. The first unit was unveiled on Monday (May 19) in Amarillo, Texas, by U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright. He said: "Modernising America's nuclear stockpile is essential to delivering President Trump's peace through strength agenda. "The remarkable speed of the B61-13's production is a testament to the ingenuity of our scientists and engineers and the urgency we face to fortify deterrence in a volatile new age. "This achievement signals American strength to our adversaries and allies alike." The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) said: "The B61-13 will provide the President with additional nuclear options against certain harder and large-area military targets; separately, the Department of Defense will coordinate with NNSA to complete and implement a comprehensive strategy for the defeat of hard and deeply buried targets." The B61-13 is one of the most rapidly developed and fielded weapons since the Cold War. The NNSA allocated $92 million over four years for development, with original production expected to begin in fiscal year 2026. The bomb will be deployable by strategic aircraft such as the upcoming B-21 Raider stealth bomber and possibly the retiring B-2 Spirit. The post US completes new nuclear bomb year ahead of schedule appeared first on Talker. Copyright Talker News. All Rights Reserved.
Yahoo
18-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Musk aides got accounts on classified system with US nuclear secrets: sources
WASHINGTON − Luke Farritor and Adam Ramada, two Elon Musk aides who worked under his Department of Government Efficiency, have accounts on a sensitive National Nuclear Security Administration network holding tightly guarded information about the design and vulnerabilities of U.S. nuclear weapons, according to two people with knowledge of their access. Farritor's and Ramada's names are listed on a sensitive network at the agency, which oversees the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons, the sources told USA TODAY. They spoke on condition of anonymity out of fear of retaliation. Neither of the two Musk aides − a former SpaceX intern and a Miami investor − appears to have a background in nuclear weapons. More: Elon Musk talks Lincoln Bedroom stays, late-night ice cream as he steps back from DOGE More: Price of US nuclear weapons jumps 25% to nearly $1 trillion by 2034, budget office says Ben Dietderich, chief spokesperson for the Department of Energy, said DOGE aides had never had access to the system. Farritor and Ramada's accounts on the classified system were first reported by NPR. Users need to have a top-secret security clearance of the highest level possible at the Energy Department to access the network, according to agency rules for handling classified information. The network transmits highly classified nuclear information, including how nuclear weapons are designed and function, and vulnerabilities they may have. Some information on the server could be used to help build a "dirty bomb" – a conventional bomb loaded with radioactive material. More: Exclusive: DOGE staffer, 'Big Balls', provided tech support to cybercrime ring, records show The presence of the two aides' names in the network does not mean they have access to everything it contains – users still need to be granted access to specific folders within it, the sources said. "This is a highly sensitive agency, maybe one of the most sensitive in the entire government," said Elaine Kamarck, a senior fellow the Brookings Institution. "There are security concerns in every piece of the government due to how DOGE came in and took over." The Trump administration – with Musk and his aides as the tip of the spear – have roiled the federal government with mass layoffs and demands for access to sensitive information at agencies including the Social Security Administration, the Internal Revenue Service and the National Labor Relations Board. The DOGE push for access to sensitive information "is a bigger story than the firing of civil servants because it endangers all Americans," said Kamarck, who led an initiative that shrunk the federal government by 400,000 jobs during the Clinton administration. More: Trump nukes nominee questioned on DOGE cuts, nuclear weapons testing Amid the purge, the Trump administration laid off more than 300 probationary NNSA employees, only to backpedal and bring almost all of them back days later. Email addresses under the names of the two Musk aides appeared at other agencies months ago, as DOGE made a sweeping effort to dismantle much of the federal government. More: How Elon Musk, the world's richest man, has dominated Trump's agenda Farritor, a 23-year-old former SpaceX intern and member of a fellowship for college dropouts created by tech billionaire Peter Thiel, was also given access to high-level systems at the U.S. Agency for International Development in early February, according to the New York Times. He was listed as the "executive engineer" in the secretary of Health and Human Services' office, the Times also reported. The Trump administration later dismantled USAID and fired almost all of its employees. Ramada is a former Miami venture capitalist. He, Farritor and Ryan Riedel, recently listed as a SpaceX employee, were installed at the Department of Energy, which encompasses the NNSA, in February, Politico reported. This article originally appeared on USA TODAY: DOGE staff got accounts on system holding nuclear secrets
Yahoo
14-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Lapsed federal funds threaten monitoring at NM's national labs
Rick Shean, who leads the Environmental Protection Division for the New Mexico Environment Department, pictured above testifying before the Radiation and Hazardous Waste interim committee on Aug. 21, 2023. (Danielle Prokop / Source New Mexico) According to New Mexico officials, for the last three years, the National Nuclear Security Administration has failed to pay its share toward monitoring the environment around federal installations in the state. Unless the federal government makes up that funding, Source has learned, independent monitoring of air, water and ecology around Los Alamos and Sandia National Labs could stop at the end of the month. 'My concern is that the state of New Mexico and our citizens will not have an independent review of the impacts the labs are having,' New Mexico Environment Department Resource Protection Division Director Rick Shean told Source NM. 'Without this funding, going forward we're not going to be able to sample and monitor the environment for ourselves in order to ensure that the data that they're collecting is true.' NMED has operated water, air and environmental monitoring projects at LANL and Sandia since 1990, and later included the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad. 'We're verifying they're not impacting the environment and public health around their facilities,' Shean said. The bureau does not regulate the sites but does release data to the public on its findings. The work is funded by a U.S. Department of Energy grant, which was developed as part of an agreement between the state and federal government. Previously, one office in the Department of Energy paid for the grant funding the oversight bureau at NMED. In recent reshuffling at the federal level, the National Nuclear Security Administration was assigned to foot part of the bill. Currently, NMED's Department of Energy Oversight Bureau has 16 employees and a budget of $4.3 million. The NNSA has failed to pay its share for the past three years, Shean said. For this year, that amounts to a $750,000 gap, approximately 17% of the budget for the state oversight program. Without the funding, NMED would have to stop the current monitoring work at the national laboratories on May 30, Shean said. WIPP monitoring would still continue. Compounding the missing funding, Shean says new federal projects are putting more strain on existing employees. For instance, Shean noted LANL's new plan to start venting pent up barrels of tritium, a radioactive isotope of hydrogen, possibly in June, which would increase the monitoring workload for the oversight bureau. Shean said he received assurances on May 9 after a meeting with NNSA officials, that federal funds would be available by May 16. In an emailed statement, the NNSA said it issued a partial payment to NMED, but did not disclose the amount. 'NNSA will continue to incrementally fund its portion of the funds for the remainder of FY 2025,' the statement said. The statement concluded by saying the agency would pay NMED by the close of the fiscal year. It's unclear if that indicates the federal fiscal year (in September) or New Mexico's fiscal year, which ends in June. NMED spokesperson Drew Goretzka confirmed to Source NM that NNSA sent a partial payment to the agency but said the NNSA statement to Source does not reflect previous commitments the federal government made. Source has a pending request for more specifics on the amount of the payment that was made. 'That timeline does not line up with what they presented to us in meetings in which they are going to deliver the funds by this Friday, May 16,' Goretzka said in a phone call. 'We're still under the impression they'll deliver the funds by then.' SUBSCRIBE: GET THE MORNING HEADLINES DELIVERED TO YOUR INBOX
Yahoo
28-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
For nuclear deterrence, US policymakers must rely on facts, not hype
Washington finds itself in another season of hearings related to nuclear weapons, as Congressional leaders consider approving new defense appointees, negotiate the federal budget and hold annual hearings with military leaders. Such hearings are important, especially from a strategic perspective. Maintaining deterrence requires clear-eyed assessments of our own nuclear and conventional weapons, their doctrines for use, the health of the enterprise that operates them and the trade-offs inherent in all defense investments. This challenging work requires that policymakers plan against facts and best judgments, and avoid being distracted by misleading claims regarding the U.S. nuclear arsenal and those of other nations. Three chief narrative claims threaten to send Washington down costly, inefficient and indeed risky policy paths today. The first theme, which seemingly reemerges each year, is that U.S. nuclear weapons are ancient, and that this necessitates urgent action. This is true — Many U.S. nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are quite old. In these critical debates, this is sometimes portrayed as a new realization, and a problem for which the U.S. isn't yet pursuing solutions. In fact, this is a long-recognized challenge that the nation has been tackling with concerted action for years. At sites in Texas, Missouri, New Mexico, California and elsewhere, scientists, technicians and manufacturers are executing an expansive modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, to the tune of at least $1.7 trillion. The nation has been pursuing these plans for many years — long enough, in fact, that the real needs and costs of nuclear modernization become clearer each year. Second, policymakers will hear a rising chorus claiming that the U.S. does not have tactical nuclear weapons — or that we need even more. Both assertions are misleading, and several facts must remain central to any renewed policy debate on this subject. Just this January, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced that production is complete for upgraded B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs, which have the ability to be used with heightened precision and lower explosive yields, enabling tactical utility. The head of the agency publicly declared that they are 'fully forward deployed.' That's not all. During the first Trump administration, the U.S. quickly developed and fielded a low-yield variant of submarine-launched Trident II missiles. Additionally, development and testing continue for a new long-range standoff nuclear air-launched cruise missile, with the aim of it becoming operable by 2030. Washington pursued each of these nuclear capabilities with scenarios in mind that included adversaries using tactical nuclear weapons in conflict, and the need for the nation to have multiple types of response options available. The U.S. had — and chose to reduce — tactical nuclear weapons in the past, decisions that stemmed from deep military analysis, as well as knowledge of the operational, budgetary and weapons-capability trade-offs the military faced. These decisions also tied to the emergence and improvement of other technologies, including stealth, precision conventional weapons and the growth centrality of space in defense strategy and operations. These factors are only growing in importance in considering what nuclear capabilities are necessary for effective deterrence. Third, making hard decisions regarding U.S. investments toward deterrence requires the most precise accounting of the nuclear capabilities of countries like China and Russia that we can achieve — and measured consideration of how to handle any knowledge gaps we have. For example, some experts portray as a proven fact that China has nuclear weapons that are at serious risk of being fielded as tactical, battlefield weapons in conflict. This is not a settled fact, and it is a matter of hot debate. China has long avoided developing some types of nuclear weapons, such as those delivered by tactical cruise missiles. Its doctrine historically considered nuclear weapons to be solely strategic, and held firm to the concept that use of nuclear weapons was beyond the normal threshold for acceptable combat. And indeed, some of its recent actions raise concerns about whether the nation's leaders have altered course. Still, no one in the U.S. concretely knows the answer to this or other questions about China's nuclear capabilities and concepts of use. It will likely take the type of dialogues that President Trump has proposed, as well as sustained technical and political engagement at all levels, to gain clarity. Until that happens, in the name of maintaining deterrence, policymakers should be careful to discern what we know and what remains unclear in our knowledge of these nations' nuclear capabilities. Our nation's leaders face tough questions about how to keep deterrence stable and effective in an extraordinarily complex security environment. It will indeed require modernizing parts of the nuclear arsenal. However, the more-is-better style of arms racing that the U.S. and Soviet Union pursued in the Cold War is not a fit for modern strategy. Initiating plans for nuclear weapons that exceed our capacity to build or maintain them does nothing to enhance deterrence and may risk strategic miscommunication. With this in mind, the nation can also benefit from the fact that we stand at a moment of strong, bipartisan agreement on numerous policy paths that aim to keep deterrence as effective as possible. For example, there is broad agreement that the U.S. should pursue defense acquisition reform and seek to out-innovate adversarial nations, both subjects for which Trump recently signed executive orders. The nation's nuclear weapons plans and policies should not be exempt from these important pursuits or the trade-offs they will entail. Second, there is significant agreement that the U.S. needs to invest more in its science, technology and industrial base that keeps the nuclear deterrent strong and secure. This must be adequately reflected in forthcoming budgets that support the national laboratories, the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration and other relevant infrastructure. Third, most experts agree on the need to be creative in how we pursue deterrence, across nuclear and non-nuclear domains. Though some experts focus heavily on building more nuclear weapons as the primary answer, many of us agree that we should first maximize other approaches to complicating the decision-making of adversaries in ways that keep them back from the nuclear brink. This should include creative approaches to signaling U.S. capabilities and determination (including technical and strategic capabilities other than weapons systems), sharp messaging from senior leaders, and showcasing dedication to long-standing military alliances. While there is much work to do, we are already fifteen years into the implementation of a bipartisan program of record for a U.S. nuclear arsenal that is safe, secure and effective. By pursuing that program and the priorities noted above, our deterrent will remain second to none. Hon. Andy Weber is a senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks and previously served as assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs. Christine Parthemore is the CEO of the Council on Strategic Risks and previously served at the Pentagon.
