a day ago
The Emergency and its external dimension
The pain inflicted by the 21-month Emergency rule in India on its body politic and its people continues to hurt even after 50 years. The domestic dimensions of the Emergency have been discussed at length. A recent study by Srinath Raghavan ably explores its structural dimensions – of the gradual evolution of a powerful executive, creeping encroachments on freedoms and rights and authoritarian tendencies of governance — that have been building for long. However, Indira Gandhi's oft repeated allegations about the role of 'foreign hand' (of the United States of America) in destabilising her government have often skipped rigorous scrutiny. Her political opponents, many media commentators, and even serious historians like Ramchandra Guha and Bipin Chandra have dismissed these allegations in want of hard, concrete evidence, as a pretext to justify her authoritarian streak. This was also the position of the various US official organs, as expected.
The prevailing intellectual narrative clearly underlines that transformational changes in developing countries result from a conscious or coincidental coalition of domestic and external forces. Over the years, many new archives have opened and the present ruling dispensation in New Delhi has brought the issue back to the forefront of India's political dynamics. The narrative of the US pushing Indira Gandhi towards the Emergency decision and supporting the peoples' uprising against its repressive regime deserve a second dispassionate look. This may be done at three levels.
First, regime change, through covert as well as overt means, against Communist/ socialist or Left-oriented governments in Latin America (Chile) and Asia (Iran) has been an integral part of the toolkit of US policy since the Cold War years. According to American scholar Lindsey O'Rourke, the US carried out 64 covert regime-change operations between 1947 and 1989. Another scholar, David S Levins (2020), claims that the US carried out the largest number of foreign electoral interventions during 1946-2000. The use of covert operations for regime change in developing countries brought about extensive criticism of the US's democratic credentials, forcing the US Congress to appoint The Church Committee to investigate the matter. In its report in 1976, this Committee came down heavily on CIA operations and blamed it for having a worldwide network of several hundred individuals to have access 'to a large number of news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial publishers and media outlets' for covert operations.
Secondly, at the regional level in South Asia, the US National Security Council's policy document, NSC 98/1, was adopted by President Truman in January 1951. It asked US policy in the region to take 'more frequently accept calculated risks' in ensuring that the Communist (as also, socialist and Communist supported) governments did not remain in power. Only such governments were acceptable that 'would assist the United States and its allies to obtain the facilities desired in the time of peace or required in the event of war'.
The Nixon (1969-1974)-Kissinger (1969-1977) team of the US had a strong focus on South Asian regimes in its endeavour to cultivate China and isolate the Soviet Union. Between 1975 and 1977, major developments took place in South Asia. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1975) in Bangladesh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1977) in Pakistan were deposed brutally by military regimes. Sheikh Mujib's Bangladesh in 1971 had emerged in strategic defiance of the US, and Bhutto had defied the US on the nuclear issue. Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, was reported to have disclosed Kissinger's threat in November 1976 to Bhutto to make a horrible example of him if he pursued the nuclear path. Nepal (Zone of Peace, 1975) and Sikkim (the American queen of the Chogyal sponsored independent status, 1974-75) had explicit support from the US so as to distance them from India.
Lastly, at the bilateral level, Indira Gandhi's 'foreign hand' paranoia was a reflection of these regional developments. She had the worst of relations with the Nixon-Kissinger team both on the Bangladesh (1971) and the nuclear (implosion, 1974) issues. It was problematic for the US establishment that Indira Gandhi, whom the CIA supported in dethroning the Communist regime in Kerala in late 1950s, was during 1967-69, leaning on the Indian Communists in her struggle for power within her own party. The CIA activities during Indira Gandhi's regime had become so unacceptable even to the US embassy in New Delhi that ambassador Patrick Moynihan had to ask the state department to withdraw CIA operations.
The imposition of Emergency was publicly disapproved by the US state department and American media. The US secretary of state Kissinger in his memo to President Ford in September 1975 said that the Emergency had discredited Indian democracy, adding, 'We should avoid any overt involvement that could confirm her allegations of foreign subversion'. Did this imply that covert operations to subvert the Emergency could go on? The post-Emergency regime was headed by Morarji Desai, who American journalist Seymour Hersh alleged was a CIA mole in Indira Gandhi's cabinet. Desai fought a libel case in the US against Hersh unsuccessfully. President Carter visited India in January 1978 to acclaim the post-Emergency regime, and asked Prime Minister Desai to desist from the nuclear path.
Thus, there are ample leads at all the three levels to revisit the question of the 'foreign hand' and see if it had any links with the popular protests. British scholar Paul Garr in his study, Spying in South Asia (2024), says that Indira Gandhi's 'foreign hand' was an exaggeration sometimes, but her fears about the CIA were 'genuine' and valid. Our reliance only on the structural theories and Indira Gandhi's authoritarianism do not explain her decision to end the Emergency, as also how she managed to stage an impressive electoral comeback in less than three years.
SD Muni is professor emeritus, JNU, former ambassador and special envoy, Government of India. The views expressed are personal.
