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News18
16 hours ago
- Politics
- News18
In First Litmus Test After Op Sindoor, Congress Eyes Muslim Vote Ahead Of Bihar Polls
Last Updated: Having attempted to gain ground with the Hindu vote and not found sustained success, the Congress now seems to be doubling down on its appeal to minority communities. The first big election that the Congress will face as a litmus test after Operation Sindoor will be Bihar. With a 17 per cent Muslim population, Bihar presents a crucial electoral opportunity, with the Congress, JD(U), and RJD all eyeing the same vote pie. However, this battle for the Muslim vote is not limited to Bihar. Nationally, the almost 20 per cent Muslim votebank could be a game-changer for the Congress in its broader revival strategy. In recent years, the Congress has attempted to strike a balance between wooing the Hindutva constituencies and appealing to minority voters. However, it remains acutely aware that when it comes to the Hindu votebank, the BJP continues to be the natural first choice. In areas where Congress does secure Hindu votes, it is often not for religious reasons but due to local dynamics or disenchantment with the BJP. Given this reality, the party appears to be falling back on what was once its traditional stronghold — the Muslim vote. It was not without reason that former Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh once advocated for the speedy implementation of the Sachar Committee recommendations and emphasised increasing the rights of Muslims. This policy orientation underlined the Congress's commitment to minority welfare and social justice. Having attempted to gain ground with the Hindu vote and not found sustained success, the Congress now seems to be doubling down on its appeal to minority communities. But this is easier said than done. Not only does it face tough competition from regional parties such as the RJD and JD(U), it also has to deal with vote-sharing challenges with its own allies. The 17 per cent Muslim vote share in Bihar is being hotly contested, and Congress is in the race with both allies and opponents. The party's stand on the Iran-Israel conflict also reflects its evolving minority strategy. Priyanka Gandhi Vadra delivered one of the sharpest critiques of the government's silence on Gaza, accusing it of ignoring human rights violations. 'India is standing silent as Israel annihilates a nation," she said, making it clear where the Congress's sympathies lie. Her carrying a pro-Palestine tote bag in Parliament only further reinforced the message — a calculated effort to align with minority sentiment. At the state level too, groundwork has begun. The Karnataka Congress government recently announced 4 per cent reservation for Muslims in government contract jobs and proposed an increase in housing reservation for minorities from 10 per cent to 15 per cent. These decisions are not just governance moves but political signals, conveying that a Congress-led government at the Centre or in states like Bihar or Kerala would prioritise minority welfare. Looking ahead, seat-sharing talks and the Bihar elections will be a critical moment for the Congress's minority outreach strategy. Despite its alliance with the RJD, the Congress is clearly trying to carve out an independent appeal among Muslim voters. The induction of leaders like former JD(U) MP Anwar Ansari and other Pasmanda Muslim figures into its fold is part of this push. However, in its attempt to reclaim the Muslim vote while also appeasing some Hindu constituencies, the Congress often appears directionless — caught between conflicting impulses. Its struggle to choose between consolidating the Muslim vote and pursuing a soft Hindutva line leaves the party at political crossroads. First Published: June 20, 2025, 13:17 IST
The Print
2 days ago
- Business
- The Print
Modi craves Western approval while pretending to be above it
Just consider how US President Donald Trump and the international community have treated India over the past five weeks: The emptiness of Prime Minister Narendra Modi's PR-focused 'hugplomacy' is becoming only too apparent. At the 2010 G7 summit, US President Barack Obama said of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh: 'Whenever the Indian Prime Minister speaks, the whole room listens to him.' While both Manmohan Singh and Modi have attended these summits on several occasions, it doesn't look like Modi is getting much of a hearing. Modi's Western orbit isn't working These are not the actions of someone Modi described as a 'true friend'. The fact is that there are no real friends in world politics. Yes, there is a cosy Western club, but India is unlikely to find an entry anytime soon. Bluntly put, the craving for Western approval, while pretending to be above it, is rather cringeworthy—something Modi displays in spades. While he has clearly moved India into the Western orbit, it is unclear how this is helping us, if at all, in our slowly escalating confrontation with the China-Pakistan axis. By contrast, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi showed self-respect and dexterity while manoeuvring a much poorer and weaker India between two superpowers. In a recent Foreign Affairs article titled India's Great-Power Delusions, Ashley Tellis, one of the architects of the 2005 US-India civilian nuclear agreement, wrote that India, at its current 6 per cent economic growth rate, will at best be a distant fourth behind the US, China, and the EU by 2047. Modi's divisive Hindutva ideology, he added, further polarises and weakens India. On this diagnosis, there can be no doubt. India has to speed up economic growth and promote internal harmony if it hopes to balance China in the coming decades. This has to include a sharper focus on manufacturing. Modi has convinced a section of voters that India's manufacturing sector is thriving because Apple assembles phones in the country—despite the domestic content being only 20 per cent and most parts coming from China. The reality is that manufacturing value added rose 212 per cent to Rs 15.6 lakh crore during the UPA decade, but has increased only 176 per cent to Rs 27.5 lakh crore during Modi's first ten years. The futility of depending on the US is obvious from Trump's threat to impose a tariff of 'at least 25 per cent' on phones assembled by Apple and Samsung in India. Leaning towards the US with few strategic benefits in terms of capability development has got us nowhere. One could defend Modi's kowtowing to Trump as a short-term necessity—to secure, for example, a favourable trade deal. But drawing closer to the US should be conditional on its support for India becoming a manufacturing powerhouse. If the US wants to use India as a chess piece in its competition with China, it should make it worth our while. Also read: India keeps making the same foreign policy mistakes. World doesn't think we're being moral What India should demand from the US The crux is that successive Indian governments have valued strategic autonomy. The Indian National Congress and crores of Indians did not struggle to liberate themselves from the British empire only to slip into American or Chinese neo-colonialism. This means, above all, a focus on building domestic capabilities and reducing internal polarisation, so that the government and Opposition can cooperate on the basics, even if they disagree on other important issues. India's foreign policy should not be shaped by delusion and narcissism. Given the increasingly intense competition between the US and China, the Modi government must negotiate a new form of engagement, in consultation with the Opposition and those with experience. If Modi can nick the Congress' policies and rebrand them, surely he can also take its help in crafting a foreign policy fit for these challenging times. After all, the Prime Minister was obliged to deploy Opposition MPs in his recent global outreach. That means treating the Opposition with respect, and pulling back from the relentless campaign—using private capital and public agencies—to weaken both the Opposition and the country's institutions. It also means holding a special Parliament session to discuss both Operation Sindoor and its consequences. The world has clearly entered an era of war, which carries huge risks and costs for those who miscalculate, as we are seeing in Europe and West Asia. In his call with Trump, Modi said he reiterated his new policy of treating every terror attack as state-sponsored, a stance that could have serious consequences for India (as I discuss here). These issues demand serious, public discussion. Indians must now together decide whether to navigate this moment the old way, via non-alignment, or through a respectable alliance with the US. Until India becomes actually indispensable, Modi can forget about being truly respected. Amitabh Dubey is a Congress member. He tweets @dubeyamitabh. Views are personal. (Edited by Prashant)
Time of India
12-06-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Backwardness index will pave the way for targeted welfare schemes in Telangana, says Praveen Chakravarty
1 2 Hyderabad: In a move that could redefine the framework of welfare and social justice, Telangana is set to unveil India's first backwardness index—a comprehensive caste-wise ranking derived from its state-wide caste survey. The index aims to usher in a paradigm shift: The more backward a caste, the more targeted support it will receive. Praveen Chakravarty, convenor of the expert committee behind the index and a prominent economist who once worked with former PM Manmohan Singh, spoke to Sribala Vadlapatla about the methodology, intent, and implications. Is this the first time a backwardness index has been created in India? Yes, and it's a significant milestone. The Mandal Commission in 1979 surveyed about 50 lakh people but did not build a formal index. Telangana's survey is far more extensive—covering 3.5 crore individuals across 243 castes with 74 questions each. This is the first time such granular caste-level data is being used to develop a scientifically scored backwardness index. How did you ensure the data was accurate and reliable? We conducted rigorous data validation over a 20-day period to ensure the integrity and accuracy of the survey—a major achievement of this entire project. This included outlier analysis to detect anomalies or careless responses. For example, if a respondent in a white-collar job claimed to have no education, it would flag a likely inconsistency, suggesting inattention or error. Our team brought diverse and credible expertise to this process: I come from a data and statistics background; Professor Jean Dreze is both an economist and a sociologist; Professor Himanshu contributed to the Bihar caste census; Thomas Piketty, a renowned French economist, specialises in inequality; Nikhil Dey is a seasoned activist; and Professor Kancha Ilaiah, along with the commission chairperson, brings deep insight from Telangana. How is the ranking of castes determined? We identified 42 key parameters from the questionnaire—covering aspects such as literacy, education, and asset ownership—and placed them along a spectrum ranging from 'most backward' to 'least backward'. Based on these, we developed several sub-indices, including the social backwardness index, gender backwardness index, educational backwardness index, occupational backwardness index, and living conditions index. In our composite backwardness index, a higher score reflects greater backwardness, while a lower score indicates relative advancement. A caste ranking as the most backward across all 42 parameters would score a maximum of 126 points, while the least backward would score zero. However, in practice, no caste scored either the full 126 or zero across the board. How are castes grouped in the index? All 243 castes are divided into quartiles. Those in the most backward 20–30% range receive the highest points (3 per parameter), while the least backward (top 5%) receive zero. The rest fall within intermediary brackets (5–10%, 10–20%), ensuring a nuanced tiering instead of binary classification. What happens after the index is released? It is the govt's responsibility to design welfare schemes based on the varying degrees of backwardness across castes. While some communities lag in multiple areas, others may face disadvantages in only a few. This underscores that backwardness is relative, not absolute. Welfare policies must therefore be targeted and data-driven. We have recommended that the aggregate survey data be made publicly accessible for researchers and policymakers, with AI tools leveraged for deeper analysis. Follow more information on Air India plane crash in Ahmedabad here . Get real-time live updates on rescue operations and check full list of passengers onboard AI 171 .
Time of India
11-06-2025
- Business
- Time of India
Modi @ 11: Economy's good, but job creation, land & labour reforms need a push
There are two parameters that economists typically use to measure the economic performance of a country or any govt - growth rate and inflation. Going by GDP growth, the Indian economy expanded an average 6.8% during the UPA tenure, while averaging 6.2% between 2014-15 and 2024-25. But keeping 2020-21, when Covid resulted in economic contraction, and 2021-22, when the base effect resulted in a massive jump in growth, the average works out to 7.1%. On inflation too, the years of Modi govt have been better, averaging 8.1%, compared with 5% during the 10 years of Manmohan Singh (although based on different base years). While there is greater focus on managing food prices by ensuring improved supply and quicker responses, a big differentiator is crude oil, which has been kinder to Modi than Singh. On June 10, 2014, the Indian basket for refiners was $107 a barrel, translating into Rs 6,331 a barrel at the then exchange rate of Rs 59.26 to a dollar. Eleven years later, PPAC data for June pegs the Indian basket at $67.38 and at Tuesday's exchange rate of Rs 85.60 to a dollar, the cost works out to Rs 5,711 a barrel - almost 11% lower. "The economy delivered an average growth of 6.2% and an inflation rate of 5% over the last 11 years, despite the pandemic. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like 180k traders trust IC Markets for CFD trading | Sign up today IC Markets Learn More Undo The economy is currently in a healthy shape with inflation under control, corporates and banks having healthy balance sheets, a low current account deficit, and ample forex reserves. Rains and crude oil prices, which are luck factors, are expected to be favorable this year. We expect India's GDP to grow at 6.5% in fiscal 2026, with risks tilted to the downside due to weak global prospects amid heightened uncertainty," said Crisil chief economist DK Joshi. Economists concur that on most macro parameters, the Indian economy is healthy: India remains the fastest growing major economy, inflation is within RBI's comfort zone of under 4%, the fiscal numbers are transparent, bank and corporate balance sheets are not as fragile as 10 years ago, and the current account deficit remains within control. Apart from cleaning up its books, the Centre is seen to be prudent in fiscal management. "India demonstrated exemplary commitment to fiscal prudence and discipline over the last one decade despite the unprecedented Covid shock. Accordingly, India's public debt profile turns out to be a strong advantage today, much in contrast to the current global trend. Lower public debt, along with better anchored inflation and current account deficit, political stability and strong domestic demand amidst the current uncertain global economic environment, has enormously enhanced India's attractiveness as a preferred investor destination over the past decade," said Siddhartha Sanyal, chief economist and head of research at Bandhan Bank. What govt and economists are worried about is a pick-up in private investment as companies are not adding capacity that will create more jobs. Creating more jobs in the organised sector is seen to be the biggest challenge for govt. Technology and AI are making the task tougher. Experts have argued that govt now needs to move quickly on two critical reforms - land and labour. While it did try to fix land acquisition related issues soon after coming to office in 2014, protests prompted it to drop the plans, just as it retreated on farm law amendments. On labour, while govt managed to enact the four codes, it has been wary of notifying them, blaming the reluctance in some opposition-governed states. They are seen to be particularly crucial at a time when India is signing several free trade agreements, which will see it lower tariffs. With BJP dependent on coalition partners, strategic sale of public sector companies and asset monetisation, which would have helped generate resources for fresh capex are issues that are on the back burner. But the new found political confidence may help Modi move faster. Stay informed with the latest business news, updates on bank holidays and public holidays . AI Masterclass for Students. Upskill Young Ones Today!– Join Now
The Wire
10-06-2025
- Business
- The Wire
A Book Exploring Development Economics Through the Lives of South Asia's Most Consequential Economists
Former Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh (centre) and Amartya Sen (second from left), at an event in New Delhi in December 2008. Photo: Wikimedia Commons Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute Now Economic historians often tread paths heavily mined with complex, sometimes unsettled ideas and ideological conflicts. When they examine the subject's longue duré e since the Second World War – the slow evolution of development economics, its theories, structures, and processes – the journey can be quite treacherous. Tracing the development of economics and growth across post-colonial nation-states, the debates, the underlying ideas and ideologies, and the personalities of the individuals who shaped them is no easy task. It can leave the historian trapped in preference bias. David C. Engerman, the Leitner International Interdisciplinary Professor of History at Yale University, navigates many of these hazards deftly in his new book, Apostles of Development: Six Economists and the World They Made (India Viking, May 2025). The book offers a compelling description of the field of development economics and its progress over the last 75 years in South Asia. Engerman explores the ideas, debates, and conflicts that shaped development economics through the lives of six of South Asia's most consequential economists: Amartya Sen, Manmohan Singh, Mahbub ul Haq, Jagdish Bhagwati, Rehman Sobhan, and Lal Jayawardena. Apostles of Development: Six Economists and the World They Made, written by David C. Engerman, India Viking, May 2025. Photo: His selection is apt. All were born in pre-independence South Asia. Their early intellectual development was rooted in the transatlantic academic ethos of the 1950s and 1960s – Cambridge, Oxford, or MIT. Yet their willingness to shift from theoretical debates – classical, neo-classical, or Keynesian – to the grounded realities of post-colonial South Asia makes them vital figures in the history of economic thought. While exploring his choice of protagonists, Engerman writes in his introduction, 'Taken individually, each of these six made their mark on development thought over many decades – in their home countries, in South Asia writ large, across the Global South, and indeed around the world… All except Sen served in their governments at some point, each in his own way shaping the economic directions of their respective countries… Taken together, the six apostles show how much the Global South shaped the global enterprise of development.' This examination of the lives, thoughts, and impact of Sen, Singh, Haq, Bhagwati, Sobhan, and Jayawardena is not merely biographical; it offers sharp insights into their careers as highly consequential economists. The approach also serves as a useful narrative device, constructing a broad account of key events and debates in economics over the past 70 years, mainly centred on India and South Asia. A book focusing primarily on South Asia In the book's introduction, Engerman suggests that his work is about the development of economic thought in the Global South. But this claim is only partially borne out since the book focuses primarily on South Asia. It offers little discussion about the impact that experiences from other regions might have had on Engerman's six protagonists, and pays virtually no attention to the influence they may have had on development in Latin America or Africa. Engerman does clarify that the book is centred on post-colonialism, and is therefore more about South Asia than the Global South. Still, the evolution of development economics has been shaped as much by Latin America and Africa as by the post-colonial experiences of South Asia. More could have been done to explore the wider intellectual currents that shaped the six protagonists, particularly the influence of thinkers from other regions. During his tenure at UNCTAD from 1966 to 1969, Manmohan Singh worked closely with the Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch, whose contributions to structuralist economics – including the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis and dependency theory – were foundational. A much fuller exploration of Prebisch's influence on Singh's later thinking and career would have made for compelling reading. Likewise, a more detailed account of the protagonists' engagement with thinkers such as Gunnar Myrdal, W. Arthur Lewis, Walt Rostow, and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan – and the extent to which these figures shaped their ideas – would have added depth to the book. Myrdal's work with Nicholas Kaldor on circular cumulative causation resonated with Sen's thinking. Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, too, offered instructive counterpoints, rooted in their Austrian-British and American traditions, respectively. Nevertheless, the book draws on a rich vein of historical research, making it essential reading for those interested in South Asia's economic and development history. The six protagonists have helped shape not only the contours of development theory, but also the economic trajectories of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. Sen's work, which earned him the Nobel Prize, has in many ways defined a distinctive strand of development thought in economics. Bhagwati's contributions to trade theory – and his demonstration of how tariffs and government interventions can distort welfare outcomes – remain relevant in today's conflicted, Trumpian times. Singh and Jayawardena have brought about consequential change as practitioners of the art and craft of economics, while Haq and Sobhan have done much to try and influence the economic trajectories of Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively. The author demonstrates a solid understanding of the foundations of international economic inequality. However, Engerman excels more as a historian than as an analyst adept at exploring the philosophical influences on economists. In retracing the paths of these six figures through the hallowed halls of Cambridge in the 1950s, Engerman introduces brief but illuminating sketches of British economists such as Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor, Richard Kahn, and P. T. Bauer. His portrayal of Robinson – her rejection of orthodox assumptions and her disdain for the mathematical modelling favoured by Americans – is particularly absorbing. His concise description of Bauer's early work in British Malaya, which laid the foundations for his dissenting critiques and the first development economics monograph, is equally compelling. These thinkers contributed significantly to the foundation of the field, as well as to the intellectual formation of Engerman's six protagonists. Engaging depiction of Indian economic thought in the 1960s Engerman's depiction of Indian economic thought in the 1960s, viewed through the eyes of Bhagwati, Sen, and Singh, is especially engaging and significant. His account of the period offers valuable examples of the persistent tussle between politics and economics in the Global South. One episode in India stands out as particularly illustrative of the era's political economy. It captures both the pressures that shaped the decisions of leaders such as Indira Gandhi and the challenges economists faced in steering policy. In 1966, Indira Gandhi made the politically fraught decision to devalue the Indian rupee – a move in which Bhagwati's influence was evident. The prime minister invited him to a confidential discussion. Engerman neatly sums up Bhagwati's dilemmas and his responses to political pressures. 'Yet as he (Bhagwati) recalled, the Prime Minister's interests were purely political, 'for which my economics training had not prepared me,'' Engerman writes, adding that Bhagwati 'soon enough proposed a range of possible efforts to adjust the effective value of the rupee, without necessarily taking the fraught step of formal devaluation.' Engerman's portrayal of Bhagwati as a counterweight to the more structuralist thinking of Sen and K. N. Raj at the Delhi School of Economics underscores the intellectual and contextual complexities of the time. It also highlights the spirited debates that shaped the ideological divide between the two camps and, in turn, influenced the trajectory of the Indian economy. 'The Raj-Sen model's neglect of foreign trade symbolised a broader Indian tendency to omit foreign trade from policy discussions – a phenomenon that entered the Indian economic lexicon, thanks to Singh, as export pessimism,' Engerman notes. He goes on to outline the long-term effects of India's Third Five Year Plan (1961–66), and how the divergence between the Raj-Sen model and the Bhagwati-Singh approach to trade shaped the trajectory of policy. Engerman writes: '… this strategy also produced perennial foreign exchange shortages, and thus the pressing need for foreign aid… Much as Bhagwati had observed, the Third Plan era saw new forms of domestic market regulation, and the emergence of a dynamic in which failures of regulation led to only more layers of regulation.' He notes that the phrase 'license-permit-quota raj' first emerged during this period. The inequality debates influenced economic policy across South Asia. Engerman's discussion of Bhagwati's reasoning – that inequality was not a lasting economic problem, as it would eventually diminish in line with the Kuznets curve – offers an illuminating perspective on why the argument failed to resonate in India, and how the debates were historically framed and perceived in the region. Sen's work in the 1980s, in which he developed his capabilities approach and alternative formulations of development, is engagingly recounted. As Prime Minister of India, Singh pushed through the Food Security Bill in 2013, his flagship anti-poverty programme. Engerman's account of how the Bill became 'just one skirmish in a broader battle that Bhagwati waged against Sen' – a clash over economic ideology – is compelling. Author's skills as a descriptive historian The author's skills as a descriptive historian are evident throughout the book. His portrayal of Sobhan's role in Bangladesh during the critical decade of the 1980s, and his contribution to the development of concepts such as South-South cooperation, raises interesting questions about the gains that might have accrued from true economic cooperation. Engerman's description of what he terms Sen's 'often-abstruse articles' used to introduce questions of social choice and to offer a new approach to the problems of poverty and inequality – is thought-provoking, and provides one of the few genuine glimpses into the personalities of the book's main protagonists. In the end, one might ask whether Engerman's tendency, as a historian, to focus on the minutiae of South Asia's economic development – though illuminating – distracts at times from deeper insights into the theoretical rifts of the period and the evolution of ideas within development economics, many of which remain contested. Might it have been more fruitful to delve further into the protagonists' intellectual doubts, and the global political cross-currents that shaped them? Do the minutiae of events risk overshadowing the broader evolution of ideas? Events undoubtedly shape individuals, but for the 'apostles' of development, their uncertainties, intellectual shifts, contemporary global political contexts, and evolving frameworks of thought are just as critical. Even with such reservations, the book's meticulous research, vivid narration, careful chronology, and focus on six influential thinkers – Amartya Sen, Manmohan Singh, Mahbub ul Haq, Jagdish Bhagwati, Rehman Sobhan, and Lal Jayawardena – make Apostles of Development a valuable addition to the literature on economics, economic history, and the development of ideas. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
