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Daily Maverick
3 days ago
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Why a jihadist takeover of a Sahelian capital is unlikely
Despite a recent surge in terrorist attacks, the region is more at risk of fragmentation than centralised jihadist rule. Insecurity has risen sharply in the Sahel in recent months. Between late May and early June, major attacks claimed by Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) targeted various locations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This resurgence underscores the two groups' adaptive capabilities and questions the efficacy of counterterrorism strategies implemented by the Alliance of Sahel States' (AES) military-led governments. Consequently, some analysts are concerned about the potential for a Sahelian capital to fall under jihadist control – drawing parallels to the December 2024 capture of Damascus by terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, there are critical contextual distinctions between the two scenarios. Unlike HTS, which has consistently pursued regime change to position itself as a political-religious alternative, JNIM and ISGS show no intent to seize power in the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey or Ouagadougou. Rather, their strategies emphasise the gradual erosion of state authority in rural peripheries where they mediate local conflicts, enforce norms and collect taxes. This underscores their comparatively limited operational capacity. JNIM and ISGS primarily operate in remote rural areas, using light weapons such as rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars. They also use motorcycles, improvised explosive devices and weaponised civilian drones. Although they have taken and temporarily controlled towns in the interior, such as Djibo and Diapaga, they lack the firepower and logistical capabilities to sustain a prolonged siege and occupation of a major city. Their strength lies in mobility and local knowledge rather than the capacity to occupy and govern territory for long periods. HTS, by contrast, developed a structured military force with centralised command and tactical units capable of coordinated assaults supported by drones and heavy artillery. The group had sustained access to sophisticated weaponry through well-organised transnational supply lines. The fall of Damascus represented the culmination of a broader regime-change dynamic set in motion by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and bolstered, to varying degrees, by some Western and Gulf countries. For a while, HTS capitalised on key cross-border corridors – particularly with Turkey – that enabled the steady influx of foreign fighters, medical aid, munitions and advanced weapons systems. No comparable geopolitical architecture exists in the Sahel. While weapons trafficking from Libya has strengthened some armed groups, there is no declared international effort aimed at toppling the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Although AES leaders frequently accuse foreign actors – notably France – of supporting terrorism or destabilising the region, open-source data offers little evidence of this. Even Algeria, whose role in northern Mali has occasionally been ambivalent, has never sought to overthrow the government in Bamako. Another point of distinction is the internal dynamics of state militaries. The fall of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and ultimately Damascus, occurred within just two weeks. This was primarily due to the limited resistance by the Syrian Army – weakened by a decade of conflicts, widespread defections and deteriorating living standards. In contrast, the capabilities of armies in Sahelian countries are increasing. These militaries are ideologically and institutionally resistant to jihadists, perceiving them as existential threats to their respective governments. Furthermore, having assumed political power, AES military leaders have entrenched their authority within the state apparatus, bolstering their responsibility and accountability. Also, the rise of HTS was enabled by the exhaustion of a war-weary Syrian population and economic collapse, further aggravated by international sanctions. Disillusioned by Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian regime, many Syrians viewed HTS as either a lesser evil or, in some cases, a more favourable alternative. The Sahel situation is starkly different. Although hardline Islamist ideologies have found some traction in urban centres, public sentiment in the capital cities remains hostile towards jihadists who are perceived as instigators of violence, instability and national suffering. For now, these factors together render the capture and sustained control of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces improbable. JNIM and ISGS are likely to restrict themselves to guerrilla and destabilisation tactics. As history shows, however, this does not make these cities immune to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup was triggered by military setbacks in the north. Similarly, Burkina Faso's January 2022 coup occurred following a mutiny prompted by escalating casualties among security forces. Considering the AES countries' protracted military transitions and constrained political environments, further upheavals leading to institutional breakdowns and a disorganisation of security forces cannot be ruled out. This could have unpredictable consequences for the Sahel and west Africa at large. To avoid this, AES governments must acknowledge the strategic limitations of their militarised approach to terrorism. While increasing troop numbers and acquiring advanced weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures haven't incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the world's epicentre for terrorism for the second consecutive year, accounting for half of all global casualties. The youthful appearance of the assailants in the foiled 2 June Timbuktu attack should be a wake-up call to AES strategists. It reflects a generation of children deprived of schooling due to chronic insecurity, and whose families lack access to income, justice and essential social services. These factors are potent drivers of recruitment into armed groups – and cannot be solved through military means alone. AES governments need a coherent, region-wide counterterrorism strategy that goes beyond military interventions. Valuable insights can be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin's disengagement and reintegration programmes, Mauritania's religious dialogue initiatives, and Algeria's non-kinetic approach. Equally important is the need to engage with communities stigmatised by counterterrorism operations, fostering trust and reducing the risk of recruitment. Enhanced relations with Algeria and the Economic Community of West African States could bolster regional cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening the collective capacity to reduce the threat posed by armed groups. Without a meaningful recalibration of strategy, the Sahel could descend into prolonged fragmentation, with profound consequences for west Africa's stability. DM
Business Recorder
22-05-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
Gratuity, in addition to CPF: AGP questions power of ISGS board for irregular payment to employees
ISLAMABAD: Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP) has questioned the power of the board of Inter State Gas Systems (Pvt) Limited (ISGS) for irregular payment gratuity in addition to contributory provident fund (CPF) to its employees annually. According to the website of the company, ISGS is a private limited Company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (Now Companies Act, 2017) and a wholly owned subsidiary of Government Holding (Pvt) Ltd. The company has a Board of Directors comprising nine members. The authorised share capital of the company is Rs20 billion. In a Public Accounts Committee (PAC)'s sub-committee held on Tuesday discussed the authority of the board in light of observations of audit report 2012-13. Audit report of ISGS observed that facility of gratuity in addition to CPF was allowed to employees appointed after October 16, 1984. Thus payment of gratuity in addition to CPF of Rs5.25 million made was held irregular. Federal government service rules provide for the various other benefits such as the pension, medical, accommodation, tuition, vacation, social security etc which are currently not applicable on the employees of the ISGS. These are competitive with the current prevailing market practices. The CPF scheme was being run by the government for its employees and not the private funds created. In case of ISGS the separate funds were being maintained for the gratuity and provident fund and no payment for gratuity was made out of the CPF scheme and therefore, there was no violation of the part of the ISGS of the instructions of the Finance Division. This would have been applicable if the ISGS provident fund had been part of the government provident fund scheme. Furthermore, finance consultation with Finance Division was not warranted when payment of remuneration/ bonus did not involve budgetary impact for government. In another audit report year 2022-23 pointed out that Petroleum Division collected GIDC amounting to Rs354 billion up to June 30, 2023. These funds meant to be utilised on TAPI, IP and Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline Project but progress on these mega gas infrastructure development projects were slow and no significant headway could be made resulting in non-utilisation of GIDC funds. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Daily News Egypt
23-03-2025
- Politics
- Daily News Egypt
Egypt condemns Niger mosque massacre; ISGS suspected
Egypt has condemned a terrorist attack on a mosque in southwestern Niger in which suspected militants from the 'Islamic State' militia in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) killed worshippers, according to Niger's Interior Ministry and a statement released by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 'Egypt condemns the brutal terrorist attack that targeted a mosque in southwestern Niger, resulting in the death and injury of dozens of victims,' the Egyptian statement said. The attack occurred around 2 p.m. local time on Saturday while Muslim worshippers were performing Friday prayers, according to the Nigerien Interior Ministry. 'Around 2 p.m., while Muslim worshippers were performing Friday prayers, these heavily armed terrorists surrounded the mosque to carry out their massacre of rare cruelty,' the ministry said in a statement. The gunmen also reportedly set fire to a market and houses before retreating. The death toll from the attack stood at 44 on Saturday, with 13 people injured, four of them seriously, Nigerien authorities said. Egypt conveyed its condolences to the government and people of Niger, and to the families of the victims, wishing a swift recovery to those injured. 'Egypt, government and people, expresses its sincere condolences and heartfelt sympathy to the government and people of the Republic of Niger, and to the families of the victims of this heinous terrorist act, wishing a speedy recovery to all the injured,' the Egyptian statement read. The Egyptian Ministry reaffirmed Egypt's support for Niger's efforts to combat terrorism. 'Egypt affirms its full solidarity with the sisterly Republic of Niger and its support for all its efforts in combating terrorism and achieving security and stability, denouncing all acts that target places of worship and holy sites.' Niger's military-led transitional government has declared three days of national mourning for the victims of the attack. More than 99% of Niger's approximately 28 million inhabitants are Muslim. The attack took place two days after Niger's army killed 45 ISGS members.
Al Bawaba
23-03-2025
- Politics
- Al Bawaba
Attack on mosque kills 44 civilians in Niger
BAMAKO, Mali At least 44 people were killed and 13 injured in a 'deliberate strike against civilians' on Friday in southwestern Niger, Interior Minister Mohamed Toumba said on state television. The assault in the village of Fonbita in the rural commune of Kokorou happened when militants identified as members of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) stormed a mosque, targeting worshippers. Toumba said the attack left four of the 13 who were wounded in critical condition. The ministry condemned the assault as a "cowardly and inhumane act" and vowed to intensify efforts to combat terrorism in the region. The Nigerien government declared 72 hours of national mourning beginning Saturday to honor the victims. Flags will fly at half-mast across the country, and public events are expected to be subdued as the nation grieves. The southwestern region of Niger, particularly areas near the borders with Mali and Burkina Faso, has seen a surge in violence in recent years, with groups like the ISGS exploiting instability to carry out deadly raids on villages and security forces. The attack underscores the security challenges facing the Sahel nation, despite efforts by the government and international partners to curb the insurgency. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack, though the Interior Ministry's attribution to ISGS aligns because of the group's known presence in the region. Authorities have promised a thorough investigation and a robust response to bring the perpetrators to justice. The latest killings add to a growing toll of civilian casualties in Niger, where communities remain vulnerable to the persistent threat of extremist violence.
Zawya
21-02-2025
- Politics
- Zawya
Mali: Armed Islamist Attack on Convoy Kills 34 Civilians
An apparent Islamist armed group attacked a civilian convoy escorted by Malian armed forces and allied militias in northeastern Mali on February 7, 2025, killing at least 34 civilians and injuring 34 others, Human Rights Watch said today. The loss of civilian life underscores the need for all parties to the conflict to better protect civilians from military operations. Witnesses said that in the early afternoon of February 7, Islamist fighters attacked a convoy of at least 19 civilian vehicles carrying over 100 civilians, mostly miners from Niger and traders from Mali, as they travelled from the towns of Gao to Ansongo, about 90 kilometers south, along a road where civilians had previously been attacked. At least five military pickup trucks and several motorbikes carrying Malian soldiers and militiamen escorted the convoy. Witnesses said that when the convoy reached the village of Kobe, the fighters opened fire on the convoy, and the soldiers and militiamen returned fire. 'The attack at Kobe demonstrates the deadly risks civilians in Mali face just going about their daily lives,' said Ilaria Allegrozzi, senior Sahel researcher at Human Rights Watch. 'Malian authorities should impartially investigate the incident to determine whether the attackers violated the laws of war and how their own security forces can better protect civilians at risk.' Human Rights Watch interviewed six witnesses to the attack, three people who assisted the injured, and several residents of Gao. Witnesses said the convoy stretched along about one kilometer of the road with two military vehicles in the front and three in the back. 'All of a sudden we heard gunshots, there was intense shooting,' said a 51-year-old man who was injured as he jumped off a bus near the front of the convoy. 'I felt something on my right thigh, then I saw blood, I lay down and played dead until soldiers rescued me.' A 50-year-old man, whose son, 20, and daughter, 10, were both wounded in the attack, said: 'Bullets were flying over my head, terrorists were shooting and screaming 'Allah Akbar,' [and] people panicked and ran away. My son was shot in the buttocks and right thigh, my daughter in the legs and arms.' The attacking forces have not been conclusively identified. The Malian army chief of staff released an initial statement on February 7 saying that the attack on the convoy caused 25 civilian deaths, with 13 injured. The statement said that soldiers engaged in 'violent combat' with the fighters and later recovered the bodies of '19 terrorists,' as well as weapons and other equipment. The number of Malian soldiers and militiamen killed and wounded was not reported. The attack occurred in an area where the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) armed group has been fighting Malian security forces for over a decade. The Islamist group has often clashed with Malian forces and fighters of the Russia-backed Wagner Group, which has supported the Malian government since December 2021. Witnesses and residents said that a week before the attack at Kobe, Malian soldiers and Wagner fighters attacked ISGS fighters along the same road, killing several and recovering weapons and money. They said the ISGS has been present along the road linking Gao to Ansongo for at least three years and often imposed illegal tolls on travelers. The civilians killed in the attack included 13 Malian nationals and 21 foreigners, most from Niger, according to people assisting victims as well as victims' family members. The injured included 20 Malian nationals and 14 foreigners, also mostly Nigeriens. Human Rights Watch reviewed a list compiled by Gao residents with the names of the 13 Malian victims, including 5 women, ages 20 to 60. Witnesses and other local sources said that attacks against civilians along this road had become so common that the military authorities in Gao imposed armed escorts with travelers since late 2024. Some residents, including traders who frequently journey along the road, expressed concern that the escorts blurred the lines between military and civilians, exposing the latter to increased risks of attacks. 'Soldiers just attract the attention of the armed groups,' said a 45-year-old trader from Ansongo. 'Military escorts are a danger for us because if the military is attacked then civilians can be caught in the crossfire.' Since 2012, successive Malian governments have fought at least two Islamist armed groups, the Al-Qaeda-linked Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimeen, JNIM) and the ISGS. The hostilities have resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians and the forcible displacement of more than 378,000 people. The departure of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in December 2023, at the request of Malian authorities, raises grave concerns about the protection of civilians and the monitoring of abuses by all sides. Human Rights Watch has extensively documented widespread abuses by Islamist armed groups in Mali since 2012. It has also reported on violations of international law by Malian armed forces, allied ethnic militias, and Wagner fighters during counterinsurgency operations. All parties to Mali's armed conflict are bound by international humanitarian law, notably Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and customary laws of war. Under the laws of war, attacking forces must take all feasible precautions to minimize loss of civilian life and property. Attacking forces are prohibited from carrying out deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, as well as indiscriminate attacks that use methods of combat that cannot be directed at a specific military target. An attack in which the expected loss of civilian life is excessive compared to the anticipated military gain is unlawfully disproportionate. While the government forces and militia joining the convoy were legitimate military targets, the civilians and civilian vehicles were not subject to deliberate attack. The Malian government should investigate the attack on the convoy to determine whether the ISGS forces carried out a deliberate, indiscriminate, or disproportionate attack on civilians in violation of the laws of war. The military and militia forces taking part in the convoy may have failed to take all feasible precautions to protect civilians and civilian vehicles under their control against the effects of attacks. Civilian police and security personnel that guard convoys would not normally be subject to attack. 'Given the countless atrocities committed by Islamist armed groups against civilians in Mali, it is understandable that the authorities want military escorts to guard civilian convoys,' Allegrozzi said. 'Malian authorities should consider alternative means to protecting civilians on the roads, such as using police escorts that are not lawful military targets.' Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Human Rights Watch (HRW).
