04-06-2025
Should banks host the ballot? The democratic dilemma of ATM and app-based e-voting
ATMs and apps, unlike supervised polling booths, are uncontrolled environments. A voter could be coerced, or even incentivized to cast their ballot a certain way.
Image: Supplied
Prof Colin Thakur
On 22 May 2024, at a joint IEC-UNISA engagement hosted at the UNISA Durban campus, I had the privilege of presenting my research on electronic voting (e-voting) in South Africa. The audience - comprising about 200 participants from academia, civil society, and industry - grappled with the future of elections in a digital democracy. Core concerns included the digital divide, inadequate voter education, and the technical infrastructure required to support secure and inclusive e-voting.
Amid this robust debate, one audience member posed an intriguing question: Why not piggyback on banking apps or ATMs to collect votes securely? The suggestion - lateral and bold - demands thoughtful consideration, as it taps into the increasing appetite for leveraging familiar, trusted technologies to solve public challenges. We must have clear credible reasons for any decision choice.
Interestingly, this ATM idea is not new. I explored similar terrain in my 2010 research report commissioned by the IEC, titled The X-National Experience. At the time, the national ATM footprint stood at 19,996, growing steadily to peak at 33 025 in 2019, before declining to around 28 467 today. This figure compares favourably to the 23 293 voting stations currently deployed during national elections.
Yet this superficial alignment masks deeper issues. ATMs are not evenly distributed across human settlements. They are purposefully deployed in areas of high financial activity, often excluding rural and underserved communities. Unlike voting stations, they were never intended to ensure geographic electoral accessibility. This misalignment raises a critical democratic concern: how would such a model serve the unbanked, the rural, the digitally excluded?
Moreover, the proposition of using banking apps or ATMs for voting introduces complex risks of outsourcing democracy to private institutions. While banks are generally trusted to secure financial transactions, elections are not just about data integrity - they're about public trust, transparency, and universal enfranchisement. Delegating the core mechanics of voting to corporations - however competent - alters the fundamental relationship between the state and its citizens.
There are technical and ethical complications as well. ATMs and apps, unlike supervised polling booths, are uncontrolled environments. A voter could be coerced, or even incentivized to cast their ballot a certain way. The latter is called vote selling. This violates the secrecy of the vote, a cornerstone of legitimate democratic elections.
Let us also not forget that while banks can afford a statistical margin of error in the form of a few lost rands across millions of transactions. This, while unpleasant is acceptable as a business risk. This is not the case in an elections. A single compromised ballot is a red flag for legitimacy and can, in some cases, could invalidate entire portions of an elections.
Do also note the shrinking ATM footprint in South Africa. Banks are now closing ATMs due to three reasons: The first is Digital migration where more customers use online/mobile platforms. The second is operational costs and security risks with ATMs prone to vandalism, fraud, and cash transit costs particularly in remote areas. Finally new digital-first banks like TymeBank now use retail partnerships to offer cash access without traditional ATM infrastructure. This erosion of physical banking infrastructure further undermines the feasibility of ATM-based voting.
Finally ATM or app voting is a form of remote voting also called Internet Voting is arguably the most contentious form of ballot capture. David Dill, a computer science professor at Stanford University, argues that internet voting poses significant risks to election integrity, stating that "from the perspective of election trustworthiness, Internet voting is a complete disaster." This sentiment reflects broader concerns that the complexities and vulnerabilities inherent in digital platforms may not be adequately addressed when repurposing systems designed for banking to handle electoral functions.
