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Indian Express
5 days ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
The real cause of delays in district courts
The popular narrative regarding delays in India's district courts has been one of resource crunch. As per this narrative, an inadequate number of judges and insufficient funding are responsible for the sorry state of affairs. Fix these, and the problem of judicial delays would be solved, we are told. But these claims need closer scrutiny. Proponents of this narrative often cite a shortage of anywhere between 5,000 judges to 70,000 judges at the level of district courts. The claim that India is short of 70,000 judges, when the sanctioned strength of the district judiciary is currently at 25,771 judges, is based on a thoroughly discredited methodology of calculating the required number of judges as per the population of the country. Despite three expert committee reports discrediting this methodology, it continues to be cited quite frequently. On the issue of judicial vacancies at the level of the district judiciary — the most recent data provided to Parliament keeps it at 5,292 judges — more context is required. To begin with, the sanctioned strength of the district judiciary has tripled since the late 1980s, from 7,675 to 25,771 judges. Thus, even though there are vacancies, the overall number of judges has expanded. More importantly, a significant volume of complex litigation has been transferred from the dockets of the district courts to institutions like the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and consumer forums. Similarly, on the issue of underfunding for the judiciary, critics often overlook the substantial allocations made by the Union Government in the last two decades — more than Rs. 12,000 crore — to improve the physical and digital infrastructure of the district courts. In addition, the 13th Finance Commission had recommended a grant of Rs. 5,000 crore for the judiciary, most of which remained unspent. These are substantial numbers given that India has around 20,000 judges staffing the district courts across India. Long story short, despite substantially increasing the number of judges and funding, while diverting cases to new judicial forums, the delay in the disposal of cases before district courts remains a consistent problem. Against this backdrop, we would like to offer a new theory to explain judicial delays before the district courts. Our theory has three components. The first component is the manner in which the High Courts discipline the judges staffing the district courts. Unlike the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, who can be impeached only by Parliament on grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity, judges of the district courts are subject to the same disciplinary rules as the civil bureaucracy in the state. The only difference is that these disciplinary rules are administered by the judges of the High Courts instead of the state government. The track record of High Courts in conducting disciplinary inquiries into the conduct of judges is woeful. There have been cases where district judges have been dismissed for being too generous in granting compensation in land acquisition cases or granting bail too frequently, despite no evidence of bribery or other misconduct. Simply put, judges of the district courts are being disciplined for perceived legal errors. This does not happen anywhere else in the world since legal errors are meant to be corrected via the appellate courts. Even when there are allegations of misconduct, such as corruption or bribery, the inquiries have a certain Kafkaesque flavour since the HCs regularly permit hearsay evidence by witnesses with no personal knowledge. As a result, there have been cases, like that of District Judge K Ganesan, who was dismissed from the judicial service based solely on rumours and gossip. Dismissing a review petition filed by the Judge, the Madras High Court ruled, quite astonishingly, that charges of bribery cannot be ignored even in the absence of 'direct evidence' since finding 'direct evidence is a Herculean task.' That these disciplinary inquiries are conducted behind closed doors, with HCs refusing to disclose inquiry reports under the RTI Act even after proceedings are concluded, does little to build confidence in the system. The result of such a Kafkaesque disciplinary framework is that it compromises the ability of district judges to decide cases freely without worrying about a backlash in the form of an opaque and unfair disciplinary inquiry. This worry then translates into a reluctance to hear cases perceived as 'risky', or alternatively, they may hesitate to grant certain risky remedies like bail in controversial cases. The second component is how HCs assess the performance of the district judiciary. Each HC has devised a 'unit system', which lays down certain disposal targets for judges of the district judiciary. Under this system, judges are expected to decide a certain number of cases in a quarter or a year, and in addition, they are also awarded a predetermined number of 'units' for each judicial task they complete towards disposing of a case. The number of units then contributes to their overall rating for the year, which in turn can determine their promotions, postings and whether they can be 'compulsorily retired', without cause, when they cross certain milestone ages. One of the many problems with this 'unit' based system is that it does not factor in time or complexity of different judicial tasks. For example, a judge gets the same number of units for presiding over a cross-examination of a witness, no matter the time spent on the cross-examination. Similarly, a judge gets the same number of units for the disposal of a certain category of cases regardless of the complexity of individual cases within that category. The inevitable result of such a performance system based on quantifying work is that it can be easily gamed by judges, who now have an incentive to pick and choose easy cases in order to meet their targets, at the expense of delaying complicated or risky cases. The third component is the phenomenon of the 'revolving docket'. Unlike in most other countries, where a case remains on the docket of a single judge, the district judiciary has a revolving docket due to a policy of transfer of judges within states and also within districts. This policy ensures that a case revolves between dockets of different judges since cases remain in the same court while judges get transferred. This 'revolving docket' increases inefficiencies as cases remain partially heard, while also letting the judges pick and choose the easiest cases in order to avoid disciplinary inquiries and earn 'units' necessary to secure a good rating. As long as the 'revolving docket' exists, it will be impossible to hold any single judge accountable for delays in disposing of a case. Reorienting the public debate on reforms to these issues of judicial governance and away from the resource crunch narrative will be crucial in tackling the root of the problem of delays in India's district courts. The writers are lawyers. Tareekh Pe Justice: Reforms for India's District Courts is their latest book
Scroll.in
09-06-2025
- Politics
- Scroll.in
Collegium system imperfect but preserves ‘judiciary's autonomy', says Supreme Court judge
The Supreme Court's Justice Surya Kant has said that the collegium system of appointing judges, despite its imperfections, serves as a 'crucial institutional safeguard' and preserves the judiciary's autonomy, The Indian Express reported on Sunday. Kant, who is slated to become the next chief justice of India, said that the collegium system 'significantly limits interference by the Executive and Legislature, thereby preserving the Judiciary's autonomy and insulating judges from extraneous pressures that could otherwise compromise their impartiality,' the newspaper reported. Under the collegium system, the five most senior judges of the Supreme Court, including the chief justice, decide on the appointments and transfers of judges to the top court and the High Courts. Speaking at Seattle University in the United States on June 4, Kant acknowledged that the system has faced criticism, especially on the lack of publicly articulated criteria for selecting judges. However, he said that 'recent efforts by the Supreme Court signal a growing commitment to enhancing transparency and public confidence in it'. In 2022, the Supreme Court Collegium had published detailed documentation of its deliberations on selecting five judges. Since October 2017, the Collegium has also been publishing its resolution on the court's official website. Kant also said that the 'the judiciary's evolving relationship with its own independence, lies at the very heart of how India's vast, pluralistic democracy continues to function with remarkable cohesion'. He also said that some phases of institutional strain 'particularly during the Emergency' eventually 'gave way to renewed judicial consciousness'. In recent years, the Bharatiya Janata Party government at the Centre has been selectively appointing judges recommended for elevation to the bench by the Supreme Court collegium, which has allowed the Union government to exercise a veto over judicial appointments. The executive and the judiciary have been in a tug-of-war regarding appointments to higher judiciary in recent years. Former Law Minister Kiren Rijiju and Vice President Jagdeep Dhankhar have repeatedly criticised the collegium system of appointing judges, contending that it is opaque. In 2014, the BJP-led government had introduced the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act with the objective of making appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts 'more broad-based, transparent, accountable and bringing objectivity in the system'. The National Judicial Appointments Commission Act had proposed to make judicial appointments through a body consisting of the chief justice, two senior Supreme Court judges, the Union law minister and two other eminent persons nominated by the chief justice, the prime minister and the Leader of the Opposition. In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the Act, ruling that it was unconstitutional.
Business Recorder
07-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Recorder
Amendments to orders for accuracy: Commissioner IR has powers under Sec 221(1) of IT law: SC
ISLAMABAD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Commissioner Inland Revenue has jurisdiction under Section 221(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 to amend the orders by rectifying any mistake apparent from the record. The 24-page judgment, authored by Justice Munib Akhtar, set aside the impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court (LHC) and the Islamabad High Court (IHC). It held; 'the tax references out of which these matters arise shall be deemed pending in the respective High Courts and the questions of law raised therein decided in accordance with law and consistently with this judgment.' Section 122 (5A) ITO: Power granted to IR commissioners is not without boundaries: ATIR 'CPLA 431-L/2023 involves questions of law other than the one decided by this judgment. This leave petition is returned to the office to be fixed in the ordinary course before an appropriate Bench,' it also said. A three-judge bench, headed by Justice Munib Akhtar, and comprising Justice Ayesha A Malik and Justice Shahid Waheed heard the department (FBR) petitions against the LHC and IHC decisions. Babar Bilal appeared in CPLA Nos.4583 to 4585/2023. The judgment noted that the matters relating to the deemed assessment order (and indeed, the deemed amended assessment order) fall only and always within the first part (of Mehreen Zaibun Nisa), with all ensuing 'inevitable corollaries' applying accordingly. One of these is that the deemed orders of both kinds must be regarded as orders 'passed' by the Commissioner within the meaning, and for the purposes of, Section 221(1). 'The Commissioner therefore has the jurisdiction to amend the orders by rectifying any mistake apparent from the record'. The judgment decided the question; 'Whether the Commissioner has jurisdiction under subsection (1) of Section 221 of the 2001 Ordinance to amend, in exercise of the power thereby conferred and, in the manner, and to the extent therein stated, what is known as a deemed assessment order under s. 120 to rectify a mistake apparent from the record?', in favour of the Commissioner and against the taxpayers. The High Courts had answered the question in the negative. The Department urged that both the courts erred materially in this regard. The taxpayers pray that the impugned judgments be upheld as having reached the correct conclusion in law. The judgment confirmed that the error made by the High Courts was to conflate the two deeming provisions into one. It was on account of this mistake that both judgments, whose reasoning run in parallel, concluded that there was no application of mind by the Commissioner and that the mistake always lay where, and by whom, in fact made, i.e., the taxpayer. However, once this unfortunate fusing is unpacked, and what the subsection actually does and require is realized, the mistake becomes apparent. Had the subsection only contained the deeming required by clause (b), then there could be merit to what the learned High Courts concluded. In such a situation, the only 'state of affairs' required to be imagined would be the deemed issuance of an assessment order. It could perhaps then be said that the deeming did not reach or touch any mistake to be found as a matter of fact in the return, and hence the deemed assessment order did not deal with any such thing. In this situation the attribution of the mistake, being outside the scope (or beyond the limit) of the legal fiction could be said to lie where, and by whom, actually made as a matter of fact. But that of course is not the case. There is also the (precedent) deeming required by clause (a). Once that is kept in mind then the inevitable conclusion is that there was, as a matter of law, a (deemed) application of mind by the Commissioner. Since it operated (as it could only) on the return, an inevitable corollary is that it is the whole of it, mistakes and all, that is the assessment (deemed) to have been made. And it is the (deemed) assessment so made that then results in the (deemed) issuance of the assessment order. In our view, it is only in terms of this bifurcation that subsection (1) can be properly understood and applied. A rolling up of the two clauses into one, with respect, led to the error into which both the learned High Courts fell. Thus, in the principal LHC judgment much emphasis was placed on s. 221(1) requiring that the order be 'passed' by the Commissioner. The matters before the Supreme Court arose under the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 in relation to the jurisdiction, under subsection (1) of Section 221, of the Commissioner to rectify any mistake apparent on the face of the record and thereby amend what is known as a deemed assessment order under s. Most of these matters come from the Lahore High Court, where the principal judgment is dated 27.04.2022. That decision disposed of eight tax references that had been filed by the Commissioner and was followed in all the other matters in the said High Court by various orders of different dates. Islamabad High Court, where the principal judgment is dated 20.09.2023 which disposed of tax references filed by the Department. Both High Courts reached the same conclusion on the question now before the Court and therefore, all these matters were heard together and are being decided by this judgment. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
NDTV
04-06-2025
- General
- NDTV
"Judges Must Be Free": Chief Justice's Big Remark On Collegium System"
New Delhi: The government superseded the seniormost judges twice while appointing the Chief Justice of India when it had the final say in judges' appointment, Chief Justice of India BR Gavai has said. The Chief Justice was speaking on 'Maintaining Judicial Legitimacy and Public Confidence' at a roundtable organised by the UK Supreme Court. The roundtable was also attended by Justice Vikram Nath, Baroness Carr, the Lady Chief Justice of England and Wales and George Leggatt, judge of the Supreme Court of the UK. "In India, a key point of contention has been the question of who holds primacy in judicial appointments. Until 1993, it was the executive that had the final say in the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and High Courts. During this period, the executive twice superseded the senior-most judges in appointing the Chief Justice of India, which went against established tradition," the Chief Justice said. The two judges superseded for the top post are Justice Syed Jafar Imam and Justice Hans Raj Khanna. Justice Imam could not be elevated to the top post in 1964 because he was suffering from health issues and the then Jawaharlal Nehru government elevated Justice PB Gajendragadkar. Justice Khanna faced the Indira Gandhi government's ire in 1977, when he lost the Chief Justice post months after his dissenting judgment in the ADM Jabalpur vs Shiv Kant Shukla case, in which he ruled that fundamental rights cannot be suspended even during a national emergency. "In response, the Supreme Court of India, in its judgments of 1993 and 1998, interpreted the constitutional provisions concerning the appointment of judges to establish that the Chief Justice of India, along with the four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court, would form a collegium responsible for recommending appointments to the Supreme Court," he added. The Chief Justice said the Supreme Court in 2015 struck down the National Judicial Appointment Commission Act. The Act, he said, diluted the independence of the judiciary by giving primacy to the executive in judicial appointments. "There may be criticisms of the collegium system, but any solution must not come at the cost of judicial independence. Judges must be free from external control," he said. The Narendra Modi government had pushed for the replacement of the Collegium system. Then Law Minister Kiren Rijiju had said the system was "alien" to the Constitution. The Chief Justice also said that courts must have the power of independent judicial review, allowing judges to assess the constitutionality of laws and government actions that conflict with the provisions of the Constitution or established constitutional principles. Chief Justice On Ex Judges Contesting Elections Chief Justice Gavai said a judge taking up a government post, or resigning and contesting elections raises ethical concerns. "In India, judges are subject to a fixed retirement age. If a judge takes up another appointment with the government immediately after retirement, or resigns from the bench to contest elections, it raises significant ethical concerns and invites public scrutiny. A judge contesting an election for a political office can lead to doubts regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, as it may be seen as a conflict of interest or as an attempt to gain favour with the government. The timing and nature of such post-retirement engagements could undermine the public's trust in the judiciary's integrity, as it could create a perception that judicial decisions were influenced by the prospect of future government appointments or political involvement," the Chief Justice said. "In light of this, many of my colleagues and I have publicly pledged not to accept any post-retirement roles or positions from the government. This commitment is an effort to preserve the credibility and independence of the judiciary," he said.
Arabian Post
29-05-2025
- Politics
- Arabian Post
Impeachment Rarely Works As An Effective Deterrent Against Judicial Misconduct
By K Raveendran The impeachment of Allahabad High Court judge Yashwant Varma in the wake of burnt notes being discovered from his residence appears to be a certainty. However, going by past experience, impeachment has rarely functioned as an effective deterrent against judicial misconduct in India. In the history of Indian judiciary, only five formal impeachment and removal proceedings have ever been initiated against judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. This, however, by no means suggests that the judiciary is largely free of corruption or misconduct; rather it reveals how impeachment has functioned more as a symbolic tool than as an effective deterrent against judicial impropriety. The process of impeachment is exceptionally rigorous. It requires not just a special majority in each House of Parliament but also an inquiry under the Judges Inquiry Act, 1968, if the motion is admitted. The special majority, as defined, demands a majority of the total membership of the House and two-thirds of those present and voting. Such a high threshold ensures that only the most egregious instances of judicial misconduct might proceed to actual removal, thereby protecting judges from political vendetta. However, this also severely limits the practical utility of impeachment as a deterrent mechanism. The case of Justice V. Ramaswami in 1993 was the first significant test of the impeachment provisions. Accused of financial and administrative irregularities during his tenure as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, an inquiry committee found him guilty. However, despite the damning report, the motion to impeach him failed in the Lok Sabha because the ruling Congress party abstained from voting, thereby denying the motion the required two-thirds majority. The episode starkly exposed the political vulnerabilities of the impeachment process. The failure to act decisively, even when guilt was established, sent a troubling signal: that the fate of judges accused of misconduct could be determined not by the strength of evidence but by partisan political considerations. Justice Soumitra Sen's case in 2011 provides a contrast. Accused of misappropriation of funds while acting as a court-appointed receiver before his elevation to the bench, he became the first judge to be impeached by the Rajya Sabha. However, before the House could take up the motion, Sen resigned. His resignation effectively halted the process, as impeachment can only be carried out against sitting judges. While some may view his resignation as an admission of guilt and an appropriate end, it also underscores a structural loophole — a judge can preempt removal by stepping down, avoiding formal accountability and preserving post-retirement privileges. This again undercuts impeachment's value as a true deterrent. Another illustrative case is that of Justice P.D. Dinakaran, who faced serious allegations of corruption, land-grab, and abuse of office. A judicial panel was constituted to investigate, but Dinakaran chose to resign in 2011 before the impeachment motion could be moved. Much like Sen's case, this resignation allowed Dinakaran to avoid the ignominy of removal while simultaneously frustrating any opportunity to establish institutional accountability through due process. In effect, resignation becomes an escape hatch for judges under scrutiny, preventing the larger objective of upholding judicial integrity from being fulfilled. The pattern of impeachment motions reveals a mix of serious misconduct, political motivations, and procedural stalemates. In 2015, Justice J.B. Pardiwala of the Gujarat High Court faced an impeachment notice due to controversial remarks on reservation policies. Though the motion gained the support of 58 Rajya Sabha members, it did not progress further, partly because the remarks were later expunged. This case raises questions about the threshold for initiating impeachment and whether judicial opinions — controversial as they may be — should form the basis for such an extreme remedy. The danger here is that impeachment could be weaponized to target ideological or jurisprudential differences rather than clear cases of misconduct, which could erode judicial independence. The same year, another motion was initiated against Justice S.K. Gangele, who faced allegations of sexual harassment by a former judge. A committee of inquiry under the Judges Inquiry Act found insufficient evidence to support the charges, and the motion was dropped. While the inquiry's outcome upheld procedural fairness, the case brought to light the difficulty in substantiating serious but often hard-to-prove allegations against sitting judges. Moreover, the high evidentiary bar combined with a stringent majority requirement in Parliament effectively discourages the initiation of impeachment even in cases that might warrant closer scrutiny. In 2017, an impeachment motion was moved against Justice C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy of the Andhra Pradesh and Telangana High Court. Accusations of abuse of power and casteist threats were levelled against him, and opposition MPs submitted a motion to the Rajya Sabha. Despite this, the matter did not progress to the final stages, again reflecting either a political reluctance or the cumbersome nature of the process. While the procedural safeguards are meant to protect judges from frivolous attacks, they simultaneously dilute the threat of consequences, particularly when the accused judge is strategically placed or politically shielded. Perhaps the most politically sensitive instance occurred in 2018, when opposition parties attempted to initiate impeachment proceedings against then Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra. Allegations ranged from impropriety in the allocation of cases to more general concerns over judicial functioning. While the motion was eventually rejected by the Vice President on grounds of insufficient merit, the episode reflected a broader sense of judicial crisis and institutional mistrust. Regardless of the specific merits, the mere fact that impeachment was contemplated against a sitting Chief Justice indicates how impeachment can also serve as a tool for political signalling rather than a strictly legal recourse. Overall, these examples reveal that impeachment has rarely functioned as an effective deterrent. The excessively high procedural thresholds, the option for resignation, and the overlap with partisan politics render the process merely symbolic. For impeachment to be a credible deterrent, it must be both operationally viable and procedurally sound — characteristics it currently lacks. Most motions either fail to gain momentum, are defeated due to political manoeuvring, or are short-circuited by resignations. Consequently, judges facing serious allegations often continue without facing institutional consequences, weakening public trust in the judiciary's accountability mechanisms. (IPA Service)
