Latest news with #ExclusiveEconomicZones
Newsweek
2 days ago
- Politics
- Newsweek
US Ally Reveals Chinese Military Activity Near American Base
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. China has reportedly dispatched naval vessels to waters near a United States air base in South Korea, as the East Asian power continues to expand its military presence in the contested region. Newsweek has contacted the Chinese defense and foreign ministries for comment by email. Why It Matters South Korea—a U.S. ally that hosts American forces—created the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ) in the Yellow Sea, where Seoul and Beijing's 230-mile-wide Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) overlap, as the two countries have yet to establish permanent maritime boundaries. China has recently expanded its military presence in the disputed waters of the Yellow Sea, including repeated deployment of warships and the declaration of "no-sail zones" for war games, raising South Korea's concerns that its neighbor is attempting to alter the status quo. What To Know Citing South Korean military data provided to a lawmaker on Tuesday, newspaper Korea JoongAng Daily reported that the Chinese navy deployed ships to "South Korean-controlled waters" in the Yellow Sea approximately 170 times between January and May. Chinese vessels—equipped with surveillance systems—reportedly sailed within 37 miles of South Korea's territorial waters west of Eocheong Island several times. Waters extending up to 13.8 miles from the coast are considered under South Korean sovereignty. The Yellow Sea island lies approximately 37 miles from Kunsan Air Base—the home station of the U.S. Air Force's Eighth Fighter Wing—on South Korea's west coast. This places the distance between the base and the Chinese navy's operating location at 88 miles. "The presence of these sensor-equipped ships suggests that China is likely engaged in some level of intelligence-gathering," a South Korean defense official said, according to the report. This was the first time South Korea's military has confirmed that Chinese ships operating in the area were equipped with "sea surveillance radars and other reconnaissance technology." United States fighter jets taxi at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea on December 3, 2017. United States fighter jets taxi at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea on December 3, 2017. Senior Airman Colby L. Hardin/U.S. Air Force via Getty Images The Chinese vessels operating near South Korea are reportedly capable of spying from "hundreds of miles" away, enabling them to monitor flight operations, signal transmissions, and electronic communications at Kunsan Air Base. What People Are Saying A South Korean defense official said, according to Korea JoongAng Daily: "While it is difficult to officially assess the intent of another country's military activities, it is presumed that China is seeking to expand its regional influence." Shin Beom-chul, senior researcher at the Sejong Institute in South Korea, told Korea JoongAng Daily: "It's possible that China is using this as an opportunity to test its expanded naval power, strengthened through its Belt and Road Initiative, and may be targeting U.S. military bases near the Yellow Sea." What Happens Next It remains to be seen how South Korea and the U.S. will respond to China's growing naval presence in the Yellow Sea, as they remain preoccupied with countering North Korea's threats.
Focus Malaysia
09-06-2025
- Politics
- Focus Malaysia
Rethinking SEATO: A new maritime pact for ASEAN?
AS geopolitical tensions escalate in the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asian nations find themselves increasingly vulnerable to the turbulence sweeping the region. China's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, the rising strategic competition between the United States (US) and China, and the proliferation of non-traditional maritime threats such as piracy and illegal fishing have converged to create a volatile security environment. Against this backdrop, a provocative question has resurfaced: Should the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) revive the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) as a mechanism to bolster regional maritime security? SEATO, founded in 1954 and dissolved in 1977, was originally designed as a Cold War-era collective defence pact aimed at containing communism. Its legacy is, at best, mixed. With only two Southeast Asian members i.e., Thailand and the Philippines and heavily dominated by external powers like the US, United Kingdom, and France, SEATO was often criticised for its lack of cohesion and legitimacy within the region. Its failure to evolve into a true collective security mechanism contributed to its irrelevance and eventual dissolution. Yet in 2025, the strategic landscape has changed dramatically. Today, the Indo-Pacific is the epicentre of global power politics, and ASEAN's role has never been more crucial. The organisation stands at a crossroads: continue with its consensus-based, non-aligned approach, or adapt to a more assertive and structured security framework in response to rising threats. The idea of reviving SEATO or at least, reimagining it should be explored seriously, but with critical adjustments grounded in current realities. Maritime security: ASEAN's Achilles heel Southeast Asia's maritime domain is a focal point for multiple overlapping claims, economic interests, and military ambitions. The South China Sea alone sees one-third of global shipping pass through its waters. Yet, maritime security remains ASEAN's Achilles heel. Despite initiatives like the ASEAN Maritime Forum and joint patrols in the Sulu and Celebes Seas, the region lacks a comprehensive, cohesive maritime defence structure. In the face of China's continued island-building, coercion of fishermen, and incursions into Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), ASEAN's diplomatic toolbox seems increasingly inadequate. Reviving SEATO or creating a SEATO 2.0 could offer a more robust framework to pool resources, share intelligence, and establish clear deterrents. Unlike its Cold War predecessor, a modern version would need to be rooted in ASEAN leadership, rather than being externally driven. This could transform it from a symbol of neo-colonial entanglement into a proactive regional safeguard. A reimagined SEATO: ASEAN-led and inclusive Any modern iteration of SEATO must be fundamentally different in design and intent. First and foremost, it should be ASEAN-led, preserving the centrality of the organisation. External partners such as the US, Japan, Australia, and India could serve as dialogue or strategic partners, but not dominant actors. This would maintain ASEAN's long-held position of neutrality while enabling it to take a more assertive role in shaping regional security. The objectives of a new SEATO would also need to evolve. Rather than being a purely anti-China alliance, it should focus on enhancing maritime domain awareness, building naval interoperability, strengthening coast guard cooperation, and securing sea lines of communication. These goals are inherently defensive and could gain broader support among ASEAN's diverse members, many of whom are wary of becoming pawns in great power rivalries. This reimagined SEATO could also be integrated into the broader Indo-Pacific security architecture. Coordination with initiatives like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) would create a multi-layered and resilient defence posture. Challenges and caveats However, reviving or rebranding SEATO is far from a silver bullet. ASEAN's core principles are non-interference, consensus-based decision-making, and respect for sovereignty, often inhibit swift or unified responses to crises. Member states have varying security priorities and relationships with major powers. For instance, Cambodia and Laos maintain close ties with China, while the Philippines and Vietnam are more confrontational. This divergence makes the formation of a formal security pact challenging. Moreover, introducing a SEATO-like structure risks undermining ASEAN unity if not managed carefully. It could exacerbate intra-regional tensions and provoke backlash from China, which may interpret it as an encirclement strategy. Balancing deterrence and diplomacy will be crucial. The path forward: Pragmatic regionalism Rather than a wholesale revival of SEATO, ASEAN should consider a flexible, modular approach. A 'SEATO-lite' framework beginning with joint maritime exercises, intelligence sharing, and capacity-building—could evolve organically based on the needs and consensus of member states. This incremental strategy would avoid the political costs of formalising a defence pact while still enhancing maritime cooperation. Additionally, ASEAN should push for institutional reforms that allow for 'ASEAN Minus X' models where willing members move forward on specific security initiatives without requiring unanimity. This would preserve the group's cohesion while allowing progress on urgent maritime issues. Conclusion The notion of reviving SEATO as a means to strengthen maritime security in Southeast Asia is both provocative and timely. While the historical baggage of the original SEATO looms large, the current strategic environment demands fresh thinking. A reinvented, ASEAN-led security framework whether called SEATO or something new could be a pivotal step in safeguarding the region's maritime future. ASEAN must not allow itself to be paralysed by its past or by external pressures. The Indo-Pacific is evolving rapidly, and so too must Southeast Asia's security architecture. Whether through a revived SEATO or an entirely new model, one thing is clear: the time for passive neutrality is over. ‒ June 9, 2025 R Paneir Selvam is the principal consultant of Arunachala Research & Consultancy Sdn Bhd, a think tank specialising in strategic national and geopolitical matters. The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Focus Malaysia. Main image: AP Photo/Sakchai Lalit
Hindustan Times
31-05-2025
- Science
- Hindustan Times
Bleeding blue: All that we are looking to extract from the oceans
We know the ocean covers over 70% of the planet. What most of us don't really think about is that more than 60% of that vast expanse lies outside national boundaries, an unregulated immensity known as the high seas. For most of human history, oceans have been mythologised rather than mapped. The dividing lines that do exist have been drawn in intriguing and somewhat arbitrary ways. In the 18th century, for instance, a Dutch jurist proposed that a country's sovereign waters should extend as far as a cannon could fire from its coast, which turned out to be about three nautical miles (about 5.5 km). It was a brilliantly pragmatic solution: state control where defence was plausible, and freedom beyond. The so-called 'cannon-shot rule' became law, and lived on until the 20th century. Then came oil rigs, trawlers and submarines, which called for upgrades in maritime monitoring. In 1982, after years of Cold War-era wrangling, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was signed, dividing waters into zones of control. (UNCLOS was ratified in 1994.) Territorial waters were now considered to extend 12 nautical miles (about 22 km) from the coast. Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) extended to 200 nautical miles (about 370 km). Beyond that remain the high seas: vast, largely ungoverned, and increasingly contested. Fruit of the sea? Meanwhile, we famously have better maps of Mars than we do of Earth's oceans. Despite efforts made with satellites, submersibles and robots, an estimated 80% of the ocean remains unexplored. It doesn't help that light begins to dwindle rapidly beyond depths of 200 metres, and pressure builds. The Mariana Trench, for reference, sits at about 11,000 metres below sea level (deeper than Mount Everest is high). It isn't just mystery that lives in these deeps. It is priceless utility. The ocean is our thermostat, our oxygen engine, our pantry and, increasingly, our vault. We have been drilling for oil and gas reserves for decades. Now we are eyeing reserves of metals such as cobalt, nickel and manganese, vital to current green-energy technology. With nodules of these metals just sitting on the floor, there is talk of robots gliding about beneath the seas, gathering them up like underwater fruit. Except one must first determine whose nodules they are, and how to safely reach them. That safety, of course, relates primarily to the marine ecosystems themselves. Hidden treasure In 2023, after years of diplomatic inertia, the UN brokered the High Seas Treaty (officially, the Agreement on Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction; it's a good thing it has a nickname.) The treaty aims to create protected marine areas, mandate environmental assessments, and determine how to share the benefits of marine resources. This is a document born of rising anxiety: over vanishing species, collapsing ecosystems and the accelerating commodification of the deep. The treaty is not yet law. It has not been ratified and it is unclear how many countries will eventually sign on. Meanwhile, the high seas are already being commercially explored. What lies beneath is considered too tempting. Just one area, the 4.5-million-sq-km Clarion-Clipperton Zone between Hawaii and Mexico — an area larger than the European Union — is said to hold more battery-grade metals than all known land reserves. UNCLOS also created the International Seabed Authority (ISA), to regulate mining in international waters. ISA, headquartered in Jamaica, has already issued 31 exploration licences worldwide. Its dual role, to regulate and promote, is an open contradiction. A new gold rush is underway. Our final frontier The biggest risk? That it is already too late to ask the right questions. Unlike forests, the deep-sea floor has no history of human interference. Sediments settle over centuries. Scar them, and the wound may never heal. In a study published in 2020, German researchers returned to a small patch of seabed off the coast of Peru, which they had disturbed 26 years earlier. Their tracks remained. Microbial life hadn't returned. Time had not healed the area; it had simply fossilised the damage. We have no idea how the ocean responds to disturbance. Other recent findings suggest that the nodules that are the focus of our newest gold rush aren't simply inert 'fruit' waiting to be collected. They are biological scaffolds, hosting microbes that may play a crucial role in nutrient cycles and oxygen production. Still, the push continues. Many deep-sea mining companies promise cleaner extraction than on land. Better this, they argue, than poisoned villages and jungles razed to stubble as a result of mining activity. They are not entirely wrong. But the framing is false. The choice may not be a binary. There are other paths: battery innovation, material substitutes, recycling. What we lack isn't cobalt. It is patience, and perhaps humility. And for what? In research labs around the world, new battery chemistries are taking shape: sodium-ion systems that sidestep cobalt entirely, solid-state designs with safer materials. The very need driving seabed mining may disappear, not in decades but in years. There is precedent. In the 1800s, whale oil was essential… for lamps, lubrication, industry. Then came electricity, the lightbulb and fossil fuels. Demand collapsed. Whales didn't survive because we found compassion. They survived because we found something better. What if we're solving for the wrong scarcity? Yet, the machines are already descending. China, the US and the EU are testing new devices. India has secured two ISA exploration licences. Tiny Pacific Island countries are looking forward to profiting from holding the keys to the most accessible expanses, even as sea levels rise to what could be, for them, island-extinction levels. There is a photograph that captures something of the conundrum: a deep-sea octopus guarding its eggs, nestled on a bed of manganese nodules. It is a reminder that the sea isn't a vault. It is a nursery. Our world's wondrous balancing engine. And we don't really know how it works. Yet, our engines of extraction won't wait, neither for innovation nor hindsight. There is a pattern here, and it's not a new one. We rush before we reckon. This time, we are rushing into Earth's oldest, largest, possibly most defining biome. Is it more batteries we need, or more balance? *** In Hindu myth, the gods and demons churned the cosmic ocean to retrieve amrit, the nectar of immortality. But before the amrit, this yielded halahala, a poison so potent it threatened to destroy all life. Shiva, the god of destruction, had to swallow it to save the world. It is the oldest story we tell about extraction: treasure and terror, released together. It is wise to fear the ocean. It has never cared for surface designs. (Kashyap Kompella is an industry analyst and author of two books on AI)
Scoop
27-05-2025
- Scoop
Operation TUI MOANA 2025 Concludes With Strong Regional Coordination
Press Release – Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency The operation concluded on Friday 23 May 2025, with the successful participation of Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. HONIARA, 27 MAY 2025 – Ten Members of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) took part in Operation TUI MOANA 2025 (OPTM25), a two-week regional operation targeting illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing across FFA Members' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and adjacent high seas areas within the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) area. The operation concluded on Friday 23 May 2025, with the successful participation of Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. A key highlight of OPTM25 involved the listing of nine vessels of interest (VOI), including one confirmed apprehension for suspected IUU fishing activities. Furthermore, a total of 76 fishing vessels were boarded – 30 in port and 46 at sea – with an additional 31 vessel sightings and 4,937 satellite detections recorded. FFA Officer in Charge of the Fisheries Operations Division, Jason Raubani, praised the collaborative efforts during OPTM25's final briefing. 'The success of OPTM25 highlights the continued strong regional cooperation that is in place, and the commitment to protecting the rights of Members and their valuable tuna resources.' He noted that follow-up investigations are already underway and emphasized the importance of maintaining momentum through national enforcement efforts and regional coordination. Supporting the operation were the Pacific QUADs – Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United States – along with key monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) partners. A team of 29 national officers representing the participating Members, along with P-QUAD and partner personnel, were based at the FFA Regional Fisheries Surveillance Centre (RFSC) in Honiara throughout the operation. They coordinated real-time surveillance and intelligence efforts, directing surface and aerial patrols across the region. The RFSC team developed daily intelligence briefings using MCS tools and surveillance data, which were used to guide operations and inspections by national authorities and partner agencies. The operation also reinforced cooperation under the Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement, allowing joint action across maritime boundaries and information sharing.
Scoop
27-05-2025
- Scoop
Operation TUI MOANA 2025 Concludes With Strong Regional Coordination
Press Release – Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency The operation concluded on Friday 23 May 2025, with the successful participation of Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. HONIARA, 27 MAY 2025 – Ten Members of the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) took part in Operation TUI MOANA 2025 (OPTM25), a two-week regional operation targeting illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing across FFA Members' Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and adjacent high seas areas within the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) area. The operation concluded on Friday 23 May 2025, with the successful participation of Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Niue, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. A key highlight of OPTM25 involved the listing of nine vessels of interest (VOI), including one confirmed apprehension for suspected IUU fishing activities. Furthermore, a total of 76 fishing vessels were boarded – 30 in port and 46 at sea – with an additional 31 vessel sightings and 4,937 satellite detections recorded. FFA Officer in Charge of the Fisheries Operations Division, Jason Raubani, praised the collaborative efforts during OPTM25's final briefing. 'The success of OPTM25 highlights the continued strong regional cooperation that is in place, and the commitment to protecting the rights of Members and their valuable tuna resources.' He noted that follow-up investigations are already underway and emphasized the importance of maintaining momentum through national enforcement efforts and regional coordination. Supporting the operation were the Pacific QUADs – Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United States – along with key monitoring, control, and surveillance (MCS) partners. A team of 29 national officers representing the participating Members, along with P-QUAD and partner personnel, were based at the FFA Regional Fisheries Surveillance Centre (RFSC) in Honiara throughout the operation. They coordinated real-time surveillance and intelligence efforts, directing surface and aerial patrols across the region. The RFSC team developed daily intelligence briefings using MCS tools and surveillance data, which were used to guide operations and inspections by national authorities and partner agencies. The operation also reinforced cooperation under the Niue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement, allowing joint action across maritime boundaries and information sharing.
