10 hours ago
When US wanted Iran and China to help Pakistan in war against India
The United States has bombed Iran using its strategic bomber aircraft fleet. This is an opportune time to recall the past friendship of the US with Iran and how at one point in the India-Pakistan war in December 1971, it wanted Iran to help Pakistan with urgent fuel supplies and also fighter aircraft to save the country from decimation at India's hands.
Declassified US State Department documents include minutes of a meeting held in Washington on December 9, 1971, which was chaired by Henry Kissinger, then national security advisor to US President Richard Nixon. In this meeting, the US officials worried about the lack of fuel reserves in West Pakistan and the fact that the Pakistani military would soon come to a standstill because its major fuel reserves had been destroyed by Indian attacks on the Karachi port.
Kissinger asked the officials if fuel supplies could be rushed from Tehran to Pakistan so that West Pakistan could be saved from being captured by India after the successful conquest of East Pakistan. In the same meeting, discussions were also held on supplying Pakistan with fighter aircraft from Iran and asking China to make threatening mocks on the border with India.
CIA Director Richard Helms informed the participants that in the last few hours, he had received a report from Karachi that the oil tanks there had been hit again, in the 12th or 13th air raid, and that six or eight of them had been burning.
'An ESSO representative has indicated that this means the loss of 50% of Karachi's oil reserves, which amounts to over 80% of the POL [petrol, oil, lubricants] for all of Pakistan. He estimates that they are left with a two-week supply, possibly less at the rate at which POL is now being consumed,' he said.
Kissinger asked the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas H Moorer for his estimate of the military situation. Moorer stated that in East Pakistan, in the absence of a ceasefire, it was just a matter of time until the Pakistan Army would be essentially ineffective.
'Their supplies are cut off and they have no air left. Any serious fighting could be over in ten days or two weeks, depending on whether the Paks continue to fight to the last man or whether they begin to surrender in large numbers, which does not seem to be in the cards now,' he said.
The admiral added that in West Pakistan, the Pakistanis are trying to occupy enough of Kashmir to give them a bargaining chip if and when there is a ceasefire. 'They are trying to block the main lines of communication. South of the Kashmir area, the Indians outnumber the Paks two-to-one, and they may plan to move south to Lahore, although there is no indication of that now. The best Pakistan can do is to gain as much control of Kashmir as possible,' he said.
Moorer added that the Pakistanis can operate for about three weeks or so. 'However, if there is a period of attrition, with no ceasefire, the Indians can hold out longer and the Paks have had it. Mrs. Gandhi has stated that her objective is to destroy the Pak military forces,' he said.
Kissenger asked whether in that case in a prolonged war, even if Pakistan got Kashmir, it would be unable to hold it and it would lead to the destruction of the Pakistan Army.
'Exactly. When East Pakistan is gone, the Indians will transfer their divisions to West-possibly four of the six divisions now in the East. This will take one to three weeks, depending on how much air they use. If the war continues to the end, the outcome for Pakistan is inevitable,' said Admiral Moorer.
At this point, John N Irwin, the undersecretary of state, mentioned a CIA paper, Implications of an Indian Victory Over Pakistan, that predicts the possible acceleration of the breakup tendencies in West Pakistan— possibly into as many as four separate states.
The admiral pointed out that the Indian objective was to take out the Pakistani tanks and planes. 'If they run out of POL and can't move, they'll be sitting ducks,' he said.
The meeting then discussed the possibility of trucking POL from Tehran. 'There is one road. We have one report that indicates that Chinese trucks are coming in but we don't know what they are carrying. Iran is the logical source of POL. I talked to the Turkish Chief of Staff at NATO and asked him how much assistance he thought Iran was prepared to give to Pakistan. He said he thought the Shah wanted to be helpful, but had one eye cocked on Iraq. In the end, he didn't believe the Shah would give significant assistance,' said the Admiral.
The documents also reveal that on instructions from Washington, a senior embassy official met the Shah of Iran in Tehran on December 8, 1971, to discuss the possibility of Iranian military support for Pakistan. The Shah stated that he had informed the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran that, in light of the treaty of friendship signed by India and the Soviet Union, he could not send Iranian aircraft and pilots to Pakistan. He was not prepared to risk a confrontation with the Soviet Union.
The Shah proposed an alternative way to support the hard-pressed Pakistani Air Force. He suggested that the United States urge King Hussein to send Jordanian F-104 fighters to Pakistan. The Shah in turn would send two squadrons of Iranian aircraft to Jordan to defend Jordan while Jordanian planes and pilots were in Pakistan engaged in support of fellow Muslims.
'The Embassy official indicated that, because of legal constraints regarding the use of military equipment provided by the United States, it would be difficult for officials in Washington to give permission for the transfer of the F-104s from Jordan to Pakistan, or to overlook their absence in Jordan. The Shah said that the United States could not hope to achieve the objective of bolstering Pakistan while maintaining that it was not involved in the effort,' the document says.
President Nixon, Attorney General John N Mitchell, and Henry Kissinger had earlier met on the afternoon of December 8, 1971, for an extended discussion of the crisis in South Asia.
Turning to the situation in East Pakistan, Kissinger warned that 'the Indian plan is now clear. They are going to move their forces from East Pakistan to the west. They will then smash the Pakistan land forces and air forces.' He added that India planned to 'annex the part of Kashmir that is in Pakistan.'
Kissinger went on to attribute to the Gandhi government the goal of balkanising West Pakistan into units such as Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. West Pakistan would become a state akin to Afghanistan and East Pakistan would equate with Bhutan.
Nixon said that he had given Prime Minister Indira Gandhi a warning during his dinner in Washington with her. 'I told her that any war would be very, very unacceptable.' Kissinger observed that any such warning obviously fell on deaf ears. 'She was determined to go.'
'As I look at this thing, the Chinese have got to move to that damn border. The Indians have got to get a little scared,' said Nixon. He instructed Kissinger to get a message to that effect to the Chinese.
Kissinger suggested that another pressure move would be to move a US aircraft carrier force into the Bay of Bengal. Summarising the decisions they were considering, Kissinger said, 'We should get a note to the Chinese, we should move the carrier to the Bay of Bengal.' Nixon interjected, 'I agree.'
Kissinger also pointed to the threat to West Pakistan, 'At this stage, we have to prevent an Indian attack on West Pakistan.' Nixon agreed. Kissinger continued, 'We have to maintain the position of withdrawal from all of Pakistan.' He stated that by introducing its military power into the equation, in the form of a carrier and other units from the Seventh Fleet, the US was seeking to prevent 'a Soviet stooge, supported by Soviet arms' from overrunning an ally.
Nixon returned to his conviction that China could exercise a decisive restraining influence on India. 'The Chinese thing I still think is a card in the hole there. I tell you a movement of even some Chinese toward that border could scare those goddamn Indians to death.' Kissinger agreed, 'As soon as we have made the decision here, we can then talk to the Chinese.'
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger engaged in conversation outside the Oval Office. Source: US National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials Project Photo Collection)
