Latest news with #CenturyofHumiliation
Asia Times
3 days ago
- Politics
- Asia Times
When police states collide, the people's truth will not be erased
'Make America Great Again' and 'Never let the Century of Humiliation return' are the slogans of two opposed superpower governments – producing one unsettling convergence. These are the ideological battle cries of the United States and the People's Republic of China – each invoking a grand civilizational mission to justify extraordinary state power. Beneath this geopolitical theater lies a shared strategy: Both MAGA-style authoritarianism and China's nationalist revivalism have co-opted the rhetoric of public interest to justify surveillance, censorship and the suppression of dissent, while suppressing the public's right to speak for itself. On June 14, demonstrators across the US rallied under the banner 'No Kings,' rejecting what they saw as authoritarian overreach under the Trump 2.0 administration. Protesters challenged the surveillance state, creeping censorship and politicized law enforcement. Civil liberties groups decried creeping executive power, while digital activists broadcast their dissent through livestreams and encrypted chats. 'No Kings' protesters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, USA, on June 14, 2025. Photo: Susan R. Martin The response was swift: unmarked federal agents, digital surveillance and coordinated efforts to discredit and delegitimize the movement. A familiar pattern has emerged where dissent is framed as extremism, and protest as threat. Thousands of miles away, another protest has unfolded – not in the streets, but across a vast digital terrain. Chinese netizens have erupted in outrage over the death of Dr. Luo Shuaiyu, a young intern surgeon at Xiangya Second Hospital who allegedly exposed illicit organ harvesting practices implicating senior hospital officials before dying under suspicious circumstances. After his May 8, 2024, death was labeled a suicide by the sanitized official provincial official narrative, despite troubling evidence to the contrary, citizens turned to digital forums to demand truth and justice. Luo's story, like the earlier case of missing teen Hu Xinyu, became a lightning rod for public grief, anger, and forensic online investigation. Hashtags, screenshots, voice notes and digital sleuthing kept his memory alive even as censors tried to erase it. On Chinese platforms including WeChat and Weibo, netizens mobilized to generate their own narratives in response to the lack of credibility they perceived in the official account of the doctor's sudden death. His story, like so many others – from Hu Xinyu's disappearance to past vaccine scandals – became a catalyst for a digitally-driven reckoning with the state's moral authority. In China, this takes the form of rights-based advocacy for 'Dao' (Changdao, 倡道). While the interest-based advocacy under Party's control (Changdao,倡导) – state-led ideological guidance – remains dominant, digital spaces have opened new channels for citizens to assert moral claims, circulate forensic counter-narratives, and amplify injustice. In Luo's case, fragments of voice recordings, hospital screenshots and encrypted group chats were enough to bypass censorship and spark mass questioning. Online outrage became a kind of public referendum – one that the government could not ignore, even as it moved to erase, suppress or redirect the conversation. In the United States, the MAGA narrative has done more than reshape electoral politics. It has become a blueprint for state overreach under the guise of immigration enforcement. Agencies such as ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) have increasingly acted as autonomous arms of ideological policy, empowered not just to detain and deport but to surveil, intimidate, and over-police immigrant communities. Under Trump's 2.0 administration, ICE has not only expanded its detention infrastructure but blurred the line between civil immigration proceedings and criminal enforcement. The agency now mirrors the very logic of authoritarian policing: using opaque watchlists, secret evidence and vague national security claims to justify raids, detentions, and prolonged surveillance. While presented as a 'public interest' defense of national sovereignty, this campaign routinely ignores rights-based advocacy, silencing immigrant voices and bypassing due process. Just as China's public interest rhetoric masks political control, MAGA's immigration agenda uses patriotism to conceal systemic injustice. Across the Pacific from each other, two governments – one claiming democratic legitimacy, the other insisting on single-party stability – are confronting a shared challenge: the rise of digitally empowered, rights-based public advocacy. From the United States' 'No Kings' protests to viral outrage over the suspicious death of Dr. Luo Shuaiyu in China, citizens are resisting state narratives using the very tools once designed to control them. These protests—one physical, one digital—are not isolated. These two seemingly disconnected events – one anchored in American civil liberties, the other in Chinese public health scandal – share a deeper infrastructure. They both illuminate the power and signal the emergence of what I call an inter-network society: a transnational digital public sphere where global digital platforms enable ordinary citizens, armed with smart phones and moral outrage, engaged in distributed forms of civic engagement that challenge state-imposed narratives. But this emerging civic infrastructure faces a dual pressure: one from traditional authoritarian censorship, and another from ideological capture – in which 'public interest' becomes whatever serves state goals. In both countries, governments present themselves as defenders of a public good. In China, it is 'national rejuvenation' – a tightly managed story of unity, sacrifice, and historical destiny. In the US, it is MAGA's restoration fantasy – evoking a purified past to rationalize hardline policies in the present. Both narratives appropriate the function of public advocacy, framing dissenters as traitors, radicals or foreign agents. What gets erased in this process is rights-based advocacy. This form of public engagement draws from moral, legal, and civic principles to hold power accountable. While the interest-based advocacy under the Communists Party's control – state-led ideological guidance – remains dominant, digital spaces have opened new channels for citizens to assert moral claims, circulate forensic counter-narratives, and amplify injustice. In Luo's case, fragments of voice recordings, hospital screenshots, and encrypted group chats were enough to bypass censorship and spark mass questioning. Online outrage became a kind of public referendum – one that the government could not ignore, even as it moved to erase, suppress or redirect the conversation. It is messy, often uncomfortable and politically inconvenient. And that is exactly why it matters. This is more than spontaneous protest. Rights-based digital activism has taken the form of forensic public engagement: citizens compiling timelines, documenting abuses, and demanding accountability for the truth underneath the death of figures like Dr. Luo. Though heavily censored, this grassroots movement constitutes an incipient counter-power. Although the state retains control over laws, infrastructure, and coercive force, these digital publics insert new variables into governance: a demand for legitimacy, a challenge to propaganda, and a capacity for decentralized accountability. For now, it does not seek to overthrow the system, but to negotiate with it, expanding the space for justice within an otherwise tightly controlled ecosystem. In the new era of ideological policing, between the emerging digital resistance and the fragility of rights-based advocacy lies the paradox: Both regimes treat public interest as something to be defined from the top down, not claimed from the bottom up. Under whatever banner – national security, civilizational revival or cultural greatness – both of the states now position themselves as the exclusive interpreter of 'the people's will'—while undermining the people's voice. In the US, the rise of surveillance, 'lawfare' and state-led counter-disinformation campaigns reveals how dissent is increasingly framed as destabilization. There's a tendency to believe that constitutional protections shield people from the worst abuses of power. But the 'No Kings' protests reveal a troubling convergence: militarized policing, retaliatory surveillance and the erosion of civil discourse. Even in such a formal democracy, dissenters face digital tracking, criminalization and marginalization – not dissimilar in structure to their counterparts, the authoritarian regimes they claim to oppose. Whether in Beijing or in Washington, the state is learning to police not just individuals but information ecosystems. And yet, the people persist. And the public is learning, too. Thus, this is a nuanced and urgent call to defend public truth from the ground up. It is assembling evidence, forming alliances and refusing to be gaslit into submission. What unites the stories of Luo Shuaiyu, Hu Xinyu, and the 'No Kings' protestors is not ideology but method. Digital advocacy – especially in its rights-based form – has become a crucial lever of engagement. It may not yet dismantle structural power, but it undeniably reshapes its contours. What's new are the transnational logic of repression and the global, networked resistance it has provoked. If there is hope, it lies in the connective tissue of our time: the inter-networked public sphere. It is imperfect, fragmented, and surveilled – but it remains a space where people, across borders and regimes, still ask the hardest questions: Who decides what truth is? Who benefits from silence? Who speaks for justice? And most importantly: Who dares to dissent? It's a digitally connected society that resists monologue with dialogue, propaganda with documentation, erasure with remembrance, The challenge ahead is not simply one of state versus society. It is about who gets to define truth, and how. In both China and the US, people are witnessing an epistemological battle – between authoritarian certainty and democratic doubt, between managed silence and messy transparency. The advocates persist by reclaiming the power through physical demonstration also the digital lifelines, the encrypted circles and the fragmented solidarity of the global internet. A digitally connected society now resists monologue with dialogue, propaganda with documentation and erasure with remembrance. This is the frontier of public life in the 21st century: where networked publics must confront not only authoritarian power but the seductive narratives that claim to speak in their name. To Dr. Luo – and to the countless unnamed advocates across borders who dare to ask inconvenient questions and keep disguised truths alive – we salute you. The people's truth cannot be twisted. It echoes through silence, reassembles through fragments, and survives every attempt to erase it. Yujing Shentu, PhD, is an independent scholar and writer on digital politics, international political economy and US-China strategic competition.
Economic Times
29-05-2025
- Business
- Economic Times
‘Nationalism in China has grown with Xi Jinping— many citizens think economic showdowns with the US are part of China's rejuvenation'
Rory Truex is Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das, he discusses what's driving China — in the era of Donald Trump: Q. What is the core of your research? A. I study Chinese politics — I've researched public opinion in China, how citizens think about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the regime. I've worked on US-China relations and how American foreign policy makers think about US-China ties. Finally, I've been working increasingly on authoritarianism in general and particularly authoritarian trends in the United States and elsewhere in the democratic world Q. Which main features define the US-China relationship today? A. The US-China relationship has undergone a significant transformation starting with Donald Trump's first administration. We saw the end of the broad idea of engagement with China then and a shift towards 'strategic competition', which sees these as rival countries, competing economically, in science, military power, international influence, etc. Some in the US policy arena even believe we are in a Cold War with China — we just haven't realised it yet. Q. How do most Chinese view America under Donald Trump? A. There is a general decline in attitudes towards the US — and a rise in nationalism, which corresponds with Xi Jinping's ascent. The party has used external competition to foster nationalism at home and frames geopolitical competition with the US as a foreign power trying to contain China's rise — this resonates with Chinese history and the idea of the 'Century of Humiliation'. There are some pockets of admiration for Trump — some Chinese view him as humourous and appreciate his off-the-cuff style. However, these aren't particularly large constituencies. More common is the idea that Trump is eroding American competitiveness and, in turn, helping China's rise. Q. Can China actually afford to decouple economically from America? A. My understanding is that full economic decoupling would be costly for both sides. I think this rhetoric from the CCP is a bargaining chip to show resolve before heading into talks. More broadly, the Chinese government has been preparing the population psychologically for war with the US and economic showdowns — Chinese citizens have been socialised into thinking any of those costs are part of the struggle for national rejuvenation. Q. Does an authoritarian state like China have politics? A. Yes — it's just difficult to observe. The machinations which occur at the elite level, between Xi Jinping and other leaders in the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, cannot be readily observed — so, the degree of disagreement at that level isn't really known beyond signals in state-owned newspapers, etc. There is also mass-level politics — occasionally, the population engages in collective action that shifts policy-making. The 'White Paper Revolution' occurred in 2022 on the back of the long 'Zero-Covid' period in China which became increasingly draconian. Citizens protested then and the government had to roll back some of those policies. The citizen voice is muted — but it has an impact. Q. Are most state decisions mainly diktat? A. Of late, the CCP has tried to emphasise 'consultative processes' — this is 'consultative authoritarianism', where a government isn't just ruling by diktat but tries to incorporate public preferences. We see this in China's People's Congress System — every year, deputies convey different suggestions to the government. Laws put forth through the National People's Congress are posted for comment. Citizens can contact municipal governments through Mayor's Mailboxes. There are ways for people to express grievances — the question is, whether the government responds. My assessment is under Xi Jinping, we have not seen a strengthening of such channels. They exist but overall, there's been a relative closing of politics under him. Civil society organisations have been gutted — increasingly, this process is just lip service. Q. China has some of the world's most capitalistic billionaires — how do they view life under a communist state? A. Importantly, the CCP shifted its strategy about business elites in the last few decades — under Mao and the early years of Deng Xiaoping, the party was for peasants and workers. Jiang Zemin introduced the concept of 'The Three Represents' which sought 'advanced productive forces' — that's code for 'capital' —– to be brought into the party. Since then, the CCP has been quite cosy with business interests. Since the 2000s, the CCP is quite an elite party — it is nominally communist but in key levels of leadership, you'd be hard-pressed to find working-class people. Q. Has the drive to become a global superpower reduced dissent in China? A. It's important to note there are many people in China who dissent. It's hard to see them and several face real consequences. However, people in Xinjiang or Tibet, for instance, would take issue with the CCP, which is basically a Han-dominated regime. Young feminists in China understand the CCP as a traditional patriarchal authoritarian regime, while parts of the periphery, like Hong Kong, are not fully on board. In democracies, disagreements are front and centre — they are organised into parties that raise funds and compete electorally. In China, the party claims to represent everyone but glosses over dissent. Also, the Chinese's government's repressive capacity has increased so much in the last decade that a large-scale mass protest — a Tiananmen 2.0 — is almost impossible today, given the Orwellian level of surveillance. This has implications for its governance and other authoritarian governments.
Time of India
29-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
‘Nationalism in China has grown with Xi Jinping— many citizens think economic showdowns with the US are part of China's rejuvenation'
Rory Truex is Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University . Speaking to Srijana Mitra Das , he discusses what's driving China — in the era of Donald Trump : Q. What is the core of your research? A . I study Chinese politics — I've researched public opinion in China, how citizens think about the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP ) and the regime. I've worked on US-China relations and how American foreign policy makers think about US-China ties. Finally, I've been working increasingly on authoritarianism in general and particularly authoritarian trends in the United States and elsewhere in the democratic world Play Video Pause Skip Backward Skip Forward Unmute Current Time 0:00 / Duration 0:00 Loaded : 0% 0:00 Stream Type LIVE Seek to live, currently behind live LIVE Remaining Time - 0:00 1x Playback Rate Chapters Chapters Descriptions descriptions off , selected Captions captions settings , opens captions settings dialog captions off , selected Audio Track default , selected Picture-in-Picture Fullscreen This is a modal window. Beginning of dialog window. Escape will cancel and close the window. Text Color White Black Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Opacity Opaque Semi-Transparent Text Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Opacity Opaque Semi-Transparent Transparent Caption Area Background Color Black White Red Green Blue Yellow Magenta Cyan Opacity Transparent Semi-Transparent Opaque Font Size 50% 75% 100% 125% 150% 175% 200% 300% 400% Text Edge Style None Raised Depressed Uniform Drop shadow Font Family Proportional Sans-Serif Monospace Sans-Serif Proportional Serif Monospace Serif Casual Script Small Caps Reset restore all settings to the default values Done Close Modal Dialog End of dialog window. Q. Which main features define the US-China relationship today? A . The US-China relationship has undergone a significant transformation starting with Donald Trump's first administration. We saw the end of the broad idea of engagement with China then and a shift towards 'strategic competition', which sees these as rival countries, competing economically, in science, military power, international influence, etc. Some in the US policy arena even believe we are in a Cold War with China — we just haven't realised it yet. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like Linda Kozlowski, 67, Shows Off Her Perfect Figure In A New Photo Today's NYC Undo Q. How do most Chinese view America under Donald Trump? A . There is a general decline in attitudes towards the US — and a rise in nationalism, which corresponds with Xi Jinping 's ascent. The party has used external competition to foster nationalism at home and frames geopolitical competition with the US as a foreign power trying to contain China's rise — this resonates with Chinese history and the idea of the 'Century of Humiliation'. There are some pockets of admiration for Trump — some Chinese view him as humourous and appreciate his off-the-cuff style. However, these aren't particularly large constituencies. More common is the idea that Trump is eroding American competitiveness and, in turn, helping China's rise. Q. Can China actually afford to decouple economically from America? A . My understanding is that full economic decoupling would be costly for both sides. I think this rhetoric from the CCP is a bargaining chip to show resolve before heading into talks. More broadly, the Chinese government has been preparing the population psychologically for war with the US and economic showdowns — Chinese citizens have been socialised into thinking any of those costs are part of the struggle for national rejuvenation. Live Events Q. Does an authoritarian state like China have politics? A . Yes — it's just difficult to observe. The machinations which occur at the elite level, between Xi Jinping and other leaders in the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, cannot be readily observed — so, the degree of disagreement at that level isn't really known beyond signals in state-owned newspapers, etc. There is also mass-level politics — occasionally, the population engages in collective action that shifts policy-making. The 'White Paper Revolution' occurred in 2022 on the back of the long 'Zero-Covid' period in China which became increasingly draconian. Citizens protested then and the government had to roll back some of those policies. The citizen voice is muted — but it has an impact. Q. Are most state decisions mainly diktat? A . Of late, the CCP has tried to emphasise 'consultative processes' — this is 'consultative authoritarianism', where a government isn't just ruling by diktat but tries to incorporate public preferences. We see this in China's People's Congress System — every year, deputies convey different suggestions to the government. Laws put forth through the National People's Congress are posted for comment. Citizens can contact municipal governments through Mayor's Mailboxes. There are ways for people to express grievances — the question is, whether the government responds. My assessment is under Xi Jinping, we have not seen a strengthening of such channels. They exist but overall, there's been a relative closing of politics under him. Civil society organisations have been gutted — increasingly, this process is just lip service. Q. China has some of the world's most capitalistic billionaires — how do they view life under a communist state? A . Importantly, the CCP shifted its strategy about business elites in the last few decades — under Mao and the early years of Deng Xiaoping, the party was for peasants and workers. Jiang Zemin introduced the concept of 'The Three Represents ' which sought 'advanced productive forces' — that's code for 'capital' —– to be brought into the party. Since then, the CCP has been quite cosy with business interests. Since the 2000s, the CCP is quite an elite party — it is nominally communist but in key levels of leadership, you'd be hard-pressed to find working-class people. Q. Has the drive to become a global superpower reduced dissent in China? A . It's important to note there are many people in China who dissent. It's hard to see them and several face real consequences. However, people in Xinjiang or Tibet, for instance, would take issue with the CCP, which is basically a Han-dominated regime. Young feminists in China understand the CCP as a traditional patriarchal authoritarian regime, while parts of the periphery, like Hong Kong, are not fully on board. In democracies, disagreements are front and centre — they are organised into parties that raise funds and compete electorally. In China, the party claims to represent everyone but glosses over dissent. Also, the Chinese's government's repressive capacity has increased so much in the last decade that a large-scale mass protest — a Tiananmen 2.0 — is almost impossible today, given the Orwellian level of surveillance. This has implications for its governance and other authoritarian governments.
Observer
20-05-2025
- Politics
- Observer
From humiliation to a Century of Justice
Between 1842 and 1945, eight foreign powers conspired to strip China of its sovereignty, wealth and dignity in what the Chinese people call as the 'Century of Humiliation". Great Britain's Opium Wars forced millions into addiction and ceded Hong Kong; France imposed unequal treaties and seized territories in Guangxi and Guangdong; Japan's incursions into Taiwan, Manchuria, and coastal provinces inflicted decades of occupation; Russia pressed deep into Manchuria and the Amur region; Germany established a naval base at Qingdao after leasing Jiaozhou Bay; Austria-Hungary coerced minor concessions following the Siege of Beijing in 1900; Italy extracted extraterritorial rights and treaty ports; and the United States enforced the Open Door policy to guarantee its merchants unfettered access and immunity from local law. These powers treated China as a quarry for opium, territory and raw materials, bringing an end to the Qing dynasty's power and prestige for good, plunging Chinese families into poverty, igniting uprisings and freezing China's development. Today, that same arrogance and appetite for control resurfaces across the globe, especially against the so called Global South. In just the past weeks, the 47th President of the United States visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to sign almost RO 1.5 trillion in technology, energy and defence agreements. Yet while headlines glorified the size of these deals, parents in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are picking body parts of the dead children from the rubble, the hospitals of Gaza lie in ruins, humanitarian supplies are blocked, and Palestinians endure what countless observers describe as a campaign of collective punishment, starvation, bombardment and forced displacement. The contrast is stark: transactional diplomacy on one hand, and systemic violence on the other. These are not isolated tragedies but echoes of histories we refuse to learn from. To break this cycle of impunity, we must adopt a 'Century of Justice' Roadmap: A concise, hard-edged framework to replace the old world's greed-driven systems with one that centres actual human dignity and sustainable cooperation. The first element is the Shared Ethical Code, a binding compact that defines non-negotiable standards for state and non-state actors alike. Under this code, no government may employ killer Artificial Intelligence - AI technology, collective punishment, use starvation as a weapon, or seize territory by force. An independent council of jurists and civil-society representatives would monitor compliance in real time. Violators would incur targeted sanctions, asset freezes and travel bans. This is not idealism; it is deterrence through accountability. Second, we prepare Leaders of Conviction. From my own experience, elections become popularity contests driven by fear and factionalism instead of just common, interests. Under this pledge, every candidate, local, regional, or national commits to transparency in decision-making, to resolving disputes through dialogue rather than proxy wars, and to refusing to outsource violence to militias or private armies. Should any signatory authorise bombing of civilian infrastructure or the demolition of homes, that leader's regime automatically triggers diplomatic isolation and suspension from multilateral forums. Citizens and parliaments, empowered by this pledge, can hold their leaders to account even in emergencies. Third, the roadmap establishes Justice Alliances - practical coalitions pairing governments with civil-society groups, faith communities and the private sector to confront war's aftermath. In Palestine, for instance, these alliances would comply with the UN resolutions and International Court of Justice - ICJ decisions to coordinate humanitarian corridors in Gaza and other Occupied Territories, document and prosecute war crimes and design long-term reconstruction plans. Funding would come from reparations levied on aggressor states and corporations that profit from conflict, creating a direct link between wrongdoing and responsibility for rebuilding. By working in coordinated task forces rather than scattered NGOs, resources are pooled, expertise shared and survivors supported with dignity. Fourth, we must ratify Sustainability Pacts that bind producers and consumers in equitable resource stewardship. These legally enforceable agreements cover water, minerals, forests and carbon emissions, tying access and extraction rights to third-party audits and community-driven management. When a nation or corporation overreaches - clear-cutting forests, diverting rivers, or looting minerals, their concessions are voided and they incur reparations owed to affected populations. Such pacts transform mercenary resource grabs into partnerships that safeguard ecosystems and livelihoods. This Century of Justice Roadmap is no utopian manifesto. As the Chinese people ended the Century of Humiliation to become a global superpower, so can the Global South, including the Arab and Muslim world. This is a call to action rooted in the hard lessons of history. Insist that your institution endorse the Shared Ethical Code. Demand that every public office candidate signs the Leaders of Conviction pledge. Join or support a Justice Alliance focused on the world's worst humanitarian crises. Pressure corporations and states to ratify Sustainability Pacts. We stand at crossroads: We can repeat the old script of power, profit and impunity, or we can forge a new century defined by justice, not greed. The choice is ours, and the time to act is now even if this takes a hundred years.
