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Newsroom
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Newsroom
The Israel-Iran conflict may not end without a regime change
Analysis: The spiral of conflict in the Middle East took another dangerous turn when Israel, seemingly unprovoked, attacked Iran last Friday on an unprecedented scale, taking the region to the brink of full-scale war as Iran retaliates. The day before Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched the still ongoing war, he went to the Western Wall (or Wailing Wall) sacred to Jews and posted a note into a crack in the colossal stone blocks as per the ritual. The note quoted the biblical Book of Numbers: 'Behold, the people shall rise up as a great lion.' Hence the name Operation Rising Lion. When I visited Jerusalem in 2023, I made it into the tunnels behind and beneath the Western Wall and saw long forgotten and faded notes scattered on the ground. My guess is that the current trajectory in the Middle East will see Netanyahu's vision for Israeli power and security cast in the dirt also. For most, the main question now is whether there is any justification or tangible reason for Israel's pre-emptive attack against Iran's suspected nuclear weapons programme. My response would be that mutual perceptions of existential crisis in Israel and Iran is driving the region deeper into crisis. To understand this, one could adopt a lens of ontological security. This means the very identity and essence of the political systems in Israel and Iran are intrinsically tied to ideologically conditioned language and behaviours without which the regimes would deflate and crash to earth like punctured hot air balloons. According to this understanding, Israel and Iran have been on a collision course since the formerly close allies parted ways 45 years ago after the Iranian revolution. Let me explain. The raison d'être of the Israeli state is to protect its citizens above all – this is perhaps the one universal principle of an otherwise diverse and increasingly politically divided nation. The more that Israelis feel threatened, the more the state's identity becomes anchored to an inflexible security paradigm willing to compromise the lives and human security of others who are perceived as a 'threat', including Palestinians and those who support them. On the Iranian side, the Islamic Republic emerged out of a popular revolution against the repressive western-aligned Pahlavi monarchy. Again, like the State of Israel the Islamic Republic immediately faced attack and isolation, which led to regression into a narrow, paranoid oligarchy with a theocratic veneer. To offset flagging internal legitimacy, the regime exaggerated the Islamic character of the state by taking up the cause of Muslim justice abroad. The Palestinian issue and anti-Israel sentiment – manifested in the Axis of Resistance alliance – came to rest at the core of the Iranian regime's identity. A senior cleric of the ruling oligarchy expressed this reality perfectly in 2013 when he stated: 'The destruction of Israel is the idea of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and is one of the pillars of the Iranian Islamic regime. We cannot claim that we have no intention of going to war with Israel.' The two core paradigms of both states are mutually reinforcing – Iran props up its internal legitimacy by proclaiming a desire to destroy the Zionist state on behalf of Muslims, and Israel commits atrocities against Muslims in its search for security for Jews. Since the 2000s, the spectre of a nuclear-armed Iranian state amplified this cycle immensely. Israel has been planning to strike Iran's nuclear programme since at least 2007. At that time Israel embarrassed the Syrian regime and its Iranian ally by effortlessly evading air defences to destroy a nuclear research facility in Northeast Syria. The Israeli Defence Force then made clear its intention and capacity to do the same in Iran. What prevented Israel were Iran's regional assets, located on Israel's borders. If Israel were to attack Iran directly, they would have faced a barrage of missiles and rockets from resistance axis allies, Hamas and other militia in Gaza, and from Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Syria also posed a possible threat from the Golan. This was the Iranian regime's outer defence rim and insurance policy. This changed after the October 7, 2023 attacks. By the end of 2024, Hamas and Hezbollah were no longer able to threaten Israel as before, the Al-Assad regime was gone and the path to Tehran and the Furdow, Netanz and other nuclear facilities were wide open. If US president Donald Trump had not restrained Netanyahu in the first months of 2025, the latter may have pulled the trigger on the attack even earlier. Trump, in consultation with Gulf allies during his May visit to the Middle East, which tellingly did not include Israel, was persuaded to leverage the vulnerable Iranian state into a more favourable nuclear deal. Talks were being facilitated by the neutral Omanis in Muscat. Trump had scotched the 2013-15 deal negotiated by Barak Obama, also hosted by Oman, in 2018. The latest round of talks were due to be held in Muscat on Sunday, June 15. The Iranians relaxed their security personal protocols put in place after the assassinations of top leaders via pinpoint strikes through 2024, believing that they were safe until at least after the talks. Netanyahu sensed the opportunity and his war cabinet ordered Operation Rising Lion. (Apart from a spike in pizza deliveries to the Pentagon on the day before the attacks it remains unclear how much knowedge the US had of the operation.) Where the current conflict will lead is not clear. At this point, it seems neither the Israelis nor the Iranians can change the script. The Israeli regime will act according to an ingrained impulse to destroy anything and anyone they think poses an existential risk to the State of Israel. The Islamic Republic will continue to fire back as much as they can with missiles and inflammatory rhetoric about the final destruction of Israel. It may be that only regime change in Tehran and Jerusalem via the Iranian and Israeli peoples can arrest the cycle.
Time Magazine
a day ago
- Politics
- Time Magazine
A New Middle East Is Unfolding Before Our Eyes
It might be difficult to discern through the black clouds billowing from bomb craters in Tehran, but Iran has spent most of the 21st century as the region's rising power. Until recently, things had really been going its way. In Iraq, the U.S. toppled Saddam Hussein, then departed, having turned Iran's largest and most dangerous neighbor from an enemy to a vassal even before Tehran's militias rescued Baghdad from ISIS, and then stayed. The forces Iran sent to Syria did double duty, rescuing the Assad regime while opening an arms pipeline to Hezbollah, the Iran-backed militia fighting beside them. Based in Lebanon, Hezbollah was the crown jewel in the 'Axis of Resistance' that Iran had arrayed against Israel. And for more than 80 years, opposition to Israel had defined the Middle East. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, it still does. Removal of the Jewish state from 'Islamic lands' is core to the ideology of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, which casts Iran in the unlikely role of leader of the Muslim world. America is the Great Satan, but for Iran's proxies in Baghdad, Lebanon, and Yemen, Israel is the target. So on the eve of Oct. 7, 2023, the leaders of Hamas, the only prominent Palestinian node in the axis, had reason to assume that after breaching Israeli defenses on the Gaza Strip and pouring into Israel by the thousands, they would not be fighting alone for long. But the axis of resistance barely resisted at all. Hezbollah launched a few missiles a day toward Israel when the 'Zionist entity' was most vulnerable. Iran's leaders had scanned the battlefield, and, seeing an opponent backed not only by U.S. arms and intelligence, but also a nuclear arsenal, remembered why they were investing in one of their own: survival. In the words of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, creator of the theocratic system that governs Iran, 'The preservation of the system is the highest priority.' Solidarity with the Palestinians was laudable, but there's also such a thing as self-interest. The problem, for both Iran and the Palestinian cause, is that the rest of the Middle East had already come to the same conclusion. During the two decades Iran was extending its military reach in the name of the Palestinians, the wealthy kingdoms of the Persian Gulf had been making common cause with the Jewish state. The fact is, most of the Arab world had made some accommodation or other with Israel. Egypt and Jordan, which share borders with Israel, signed peace treaties with it after suffering repeated military defeats at its hands. The Gulf states aligned with Israel in large part out of a shared enmity for Iran. As home to Islam's dominant Sunni branch, the kingdoms know Iran not only as radical, but as the nominal leaders of the minority Shi'ite branch, and thus a rival. Saudi Arabia, custodian of Islam's holy sites, has its own claim to leadership of the world's Muslims. As autocratic states, the Gulf kingdoms were also eager clients for an Israeli tech sector that had grown out of its military. Surveillance, not least of millions of Palestinians under occupation (and obliged to use Israeli phone systems), generated startups like the spyware firm NSO Group, which soon found clients in the Arab regimes. One, the United Arab Emirates, was the first nation to cement diplomatic ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords, the signal diplomatic achievement of the first Trump Administration. Three other Arab states followed, and the Saudis keep signaling their intention to do the same once the situation in Gaza permits. But Gaza churns on, a war Israel had not expected, and has no plan to win, because at bottom it's not a military affair. The Palestinian question—What to do about the people who claim the same land Jewish Israelis do?—will still be waiting when the shooting stops. The war on Iran, by contrast, is one Israel spent years planning for, and opened with the playbook of deception, decapitation, and precision strikes on missile sites that decimated Hezbollah in the space of a month last September, freeing Israelis from the dread of the militia's 100,000 missiles, and exposing Iran to the Israeli offensive that began June 13. That day, a shepherd posted cell phone footage of an Israeli C-130 low in the sky over Syria, sheep bells clanking over the roar of the engines. The Assad family had fled the country months earlier, helpless to keep rebels out of Damascus without Hezbollah. Iran sent a plane to evacuate its generals to Tehran. There, the question is how Israel will choose to define victory. Regime change did not go so well in Iraq. And the stated goal of demolishing Iran's nuclear facilities appears impossible without U.S. airstrikes. That decision rests with Donald Trump. His choice may alter the region in unforeseen ways. But by reaching past the Palestinians to embrace Israel, as well as the sheiks of the Gulf, the U.S. President already has described the contours of its new, more transactional reality. In 1945, the mere prospect of an Israeli state inspired a boycott by every Arab one, in the name of the Palestinians. Eighty years later, an Arab nation can declare outrage that 55,000 have been killed in Gaza, then dispatch jets to intercept Iranian missiles aimed at Tel Aviv, joining Israeli warplanes in the skies over a new Middle East.
Yemen Online
a day ago
- Politics
- Yemen Online
Yemen : Houthis Say They Won't End Support for Gaza
A top leader of the Iran-backed-Houthi militias in Yemen said they will keep up their support for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip until Israeli 'aggression stops, and the siege is lifted.' 'Our operations in support of Gaza will not cease, no matter the sacrifices,' said Mahdi al-Mashat in a statement Wednesday. The Houthis are the last militant group in Iran's self-described 'Axis of Resistance' that is capable of regularly attacking Israel. They have been firing long-range missiles at Israel in the months since it resumed the war in Gaza, setting off air raid sirens but generally causing few casualties. They have also been attacking shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
Yahoo
2 days ago
- Politics
- Yahoo
Why Isn't Russia Defending Iran?
The Atlantic Daily, a newsletter that guides you through the biggest stories of the day, helps you discover new ideas, and recommends the best in culture. Sign up for it here. Iran is suffering blow after blow, and Russia, its most powerful supporter, is apparently not prepared to do much of anything about it. Not long ago, backing the West's least-favorite power in the Middle East had its uses. In prosecuting his war of attrition in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made confrontation with the West the organizing principle of his foreign policy. In that context, edging closer to Iran and its partners in the 'Axis of Resistance' made sense. Tehran was also an important supplier: It delivered Shahed drones for Russian use in Ukraine at a moment when these were particularly crucial to Moscow's war-fighting capacity. Then came the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, followed by Israel's brutal war in Gaza. Leaning into pro-Palestinian and anti-Western sentiment allowed Russia to score points with global public opinion. But dynamics that initially seemed to benefit Russia quickly became a strategic headache. First, Israel devastated Iran's partners Hamas and Hezbollah; then, in April and October 2024, Iran attacked Israel directly with strikes that yielded only minimal damage, suggesting that Iran's missile capabilities were not all that formidable. Israel retaliated, impairing Iran's missile production and air defenses, including its Russian-made S-300 missile systems. Suddenly, Iran looked weak, and Russia had a choice: It could shore up its Middle Eastern ally, or it could cut its losses in a troubled region. That Moscow could not or would not intervene decisively on behalf of its anti-Western partners in the Middle East became obvious in December 2024, when Syrian rebels ousted Bashar al-Assad, Russia's longtime ally. Iran and Russia continued to cooperate in areas such as electronic warfare and satellite development, and they even signed a strategic-partnership treaty in January. But Russia declined to give Iran the support it would have needed—say, advanced fighter jets or sophisticated air defenses—to deter or better defend itself against further Israeli attacks. [Read: 'This war is not helping us'] The truth is that Russia has always had limits as to how far it would go in supporting Iran. The Kremlin's obsessive anti-Western agenda elevated the Islamic Republic's importance as a partner, but Putin still has other interests in the region—a long-standing, if complicated, relationship with Israel and a need to coordinate with OPEC on oil prices, for instance—and so remained mindful of Israeli and Gulf State red lines when it came to defense cooperation with Iran. What's more, Russia was never going to risk military entanglement on behalf of its partner, especially not while it has had its hands full closer to home. Finally, Russia may no longer have much appetite for cooperating with Western states in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, but it has never wanted Iran to cross the nuclear threshold. The Kremlin takes American warnings on this score seriously and has sought to avoid U.S. military action against Iran. And it has never wished for Iran to acquire the global status that nuclear weapons would confer—among other reasons, because Moscow knows that it would lose leverage over a nuclear Iran. Russia stands to gain some advantages from a protracted war between Iran and Israel. The fighting would torpedo President Donald Trump's attempts to broker a nuclear deal with Iran—making the United States look weak and highlighting its inability to keep Israel on a leash. Oil prices would stay elevated, especially if Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz. This would relieve some pressure on Russia's state finances. U.S. missile interceptors—and world attention—would be diverted from Ukraine to the Middle East. Sure, Iran would have to stop sending Russia weapons for an indefinite period. But Russia has already succeeded in localizing the production of Iranian-designed drones and sources the components from elsewhere. Still, Iran's humiliation at the hands of a U.S. ally can hardly please Russia's leaders. Israel has already claimed freedom of movement in the skies over Iran. Russia may also worry that a long war in Iran could destabilize the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), where Russia has interests but for which it has had precious little bandwidth during the war in Ukraine. Nor would Moscow welcome unrest that hastens the end of the Iranian regime. A cornered Iran could also lash out, leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or dash for the bomb, laying bare the limits of Moscow's leverage over Tehran. Russia would probably like to avoid having Iran go nuclear—but it would also prefer not to see the U.S. sweep in with military action that further weakens Iran. [Read: What Trump knew about the attack against Iran] On Saturday, Putin congratulated Trump on his birthday and offered to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with Iran (he had made a similar offer in early March). Ever since the inauguration, Moscow has been signaling its appetite to work with Washington on geopolitical dossiers—in part to stall on a Ukraine cease-fire. Iran presents a rare opportunity for Putin to return to the stage of great-power diplomacy by negotiating an issue of global consequence. The question is: What can Russia bring to the table? A defenseless Iran will not respond well to Russian sticks, and in any case, Moscow is unlikely to take a punitive approach to Tehran. Russia may not have shown up as Iran's knight in shining armor, but the two countries are still partners, and they are fundamentally united in an anti-Western agenda. Russia also has few meaningful carrots to offer Iran at this point and will be cautious about providing military equipment in a moment when Israel is systematically destroying it. And Putin is not someone who likes to openly side with what appears to be the losing party. Russia can potentially play a practical role in a future agreement, having offered to remove Iran's highly enriched uranium and convert it into civilian-reactor fuel for Tehran. But Russia's technical schemes cannot bridge what is a fundamental political divide between a U.S. administration that insists on zero enrichment and an Iran that views such a demand as a call to surrender. Strategically isolated and acutely vulnerable, Iran will be even more distrustful of the United States than it was before Israel's attack, and it will want Russia involved for at least the appearance of balance. But Russia has little influence over the outcome of the war, Iran's next steps, or Washington's decision as to whether it will engage militarily. When it comes to shaping events far from Russia's borders, Moscow is only so interested and only so able, particularly given its deep investment in the war in Ukraine. Having anti-Western partners in the Middle East serves its purpose. But no one should hold their breath waiting for Russia to come to the rescue of Iran. Article originally published at The Atlantic
Atlantic
2 days ago
- Politics
- Atlantic
Why Isn't Russia Defending Iran?
Iran is suffering blow after blow, and Russia, its most powerful supporter, is apparently not prepared to do much of anything about it. Not long ago, backing the West's least-favorite power in the Middle East had its uses. In prosecuting his war of attrition in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made confrontation with the West the organizing principle of his foreign policy. In that context, edging closer to Iran and its partners in the 'Axis of Resistance' made sense. Tehran was also an important supplier: It delivered Shahed drones for Russian use in Ukraine at a moment when these were particularly crucial to Moscow's war-fighting capacity. Then came the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, followed by Israel's brutal war in Gaza. Leaning into pro-Palestinian and anti-Western sentiment allowed Russia to score points with global public opinion. But dynamics that initially seemed to benefit Russia quickly became a strategic headache. First, Israel devastated Iran's partners Hamas and Hezbollah; then, in April and October 2024, Iran attacked Israel directly with strikes that yielded only minimal damage, suggesting that Iran's missile capabilities were not all that formidable. Israel retaliated, impairing Iran's missile production and air defenses, including its Russian-made S-300 missile systems. Suddenly, Iran looked weak, and Russia had a choice: It could shore up its Middle Eastern ally, or it could cut its losses in a troubled region. That Moscow could not or would not intervene decisively on behalf of its anti-Western partners in the Middle East became obvious in December 2024, when Syrian rebels ousted Bashar al-Assad, Russia's longtime ally. Iran and Russia continued to cooperate in areas such as electronic warfare and satellite development, and they even signed a strategic-partnership treaty in January. But Russia declined to give Iran the support it would have needed—say, advanced fighter jets or sophisticated air defenses—to deter or better defend itself against further Israeli attacks. The truth is that Russia has always had limits as to how far it would go in supporting Iran. The Kremlin's obsessive anti-Western agenda elevated the Islamic Republic's importance as a partner, but Putin still has other interests in the region—a long-standing, if complicated, relationship with Israel and a need to coordinate with OPEC on oil prices, for instance—and so remained mindful of Israeli and Gulf State red lines when it came to defense cooperation with Iran. What's more, Russia was never going to risk military entanglement on behalf of its partner, especially not while it has had its hands full closer to home. Finally, Russia may no longer have much appetite for cooperating with Western states in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, but it has never wanted Iran to cross the nuclear threshold. The Kremlin takes American warnings on this score seriously and has sought to avoid U.S. military action against Iran. And it has never wished for Iran to acquire the global status that nuclear weapons would confer—among other reasons, because Moscow knows that it would lose leverage over a nuclear Iran. Russia stands to gain some advantages from a protracted war between Iran and Israel. The fighting would torpedo President Donald Trump's attempts to broker a nuclear deal with Iran—making the United States look weak and highlighting its inability to keep Israel on a leash. Oil prices would stay elevated, especially if Iran were to close the Strait of Hormuz. This would relieve some pressure on Russia's state finances. U.S. missile interceptors—and world attention—would be diverted from Ukraine to the Middle East. Sure, Iran would have to stop sending Russia weapons for an indefinite period. But Russia has already succeeded in localizing the production of Iranian-designed drones and sources the components from elsewhere. Still, Iran's humiliation at the hands of a U.S. ally can hardly please Russia's leaders. Israel has already claimed freedom of movement in the skies over Iran. Russia may also worry that a long war in Iran could destabilize the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), where Russia has interests but for which it has had precious little bandwidth during the war in Ukraine. Nor would Moscow welcome unrest that hastens the end of the Iranian regime. A cornered Iran could also lash out, leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or dash for the bomb, laying bare the limits of Moscow's leverage over Tehran. Russia would probably like to avoid having Iran go nuclear—but it would also prefer not to see the U.S. sweep in with military action that further weakens Iran. On Saturday, Putin congratulated Trump on his birthday and offered to support U.S. efforts to negotiate with Iran (he had made a similar offer in early March). Ever since the inauguration, Moscow has been signaling its appetite to work with Washington on geopolitical dossiers—in part to stall on a Ukraine cease-fire. Iran presents a rare opportunity for Putin to return to the stage of great-power diplomacy by negotiating an issue of global consequence. The question is: What can Russia bring to the table? A defenseless Iran will not respond well to Russian sticks, and in any case, Moscow is unlikely to take a punitive approach to Tehran. Russia may not have shown up as Iran's knight in shining armor, but the two countries are still partners, and they are fundamentally united in an anti-Western agenda. Russia also has few meaningful carrots to offer Iran at this point and will be cautious about providing military equipment in a moment when Israel is systematically destroying it. And Putin is not someone who likes to openly side with what appears to be the losing party. Russia can potentially play a practical role in a future agreement, having offered to remove Iran's highly enriched uranium and convert it into civilian-reactor fuel for Tehran. But Russia's technical schemes cannot bridge what is a fundamental political divide between a U.S. administration that insists on zero enrichment and an Iran that views such a demand as a call to surrender. Strategically isolated and acutely vulnerable, Iran will be even more distrustful of the United States than it was before Israel's attack, and it will want Russia involved for at least the appearance of balance. But Russia has little influence over the outcome of the war, Iran's next steps, or Washington's decision as to whether it will engage militarily. When it comes to shaping events far from Russia's borders, Moscow is only so interested and only so able, particularly given its deep investment in the war in Ukraine. Having anti-Western partners in the Middle East serves its purpose. But no one should hold their breath waiting for Russia to come to the rescue of Iran.
